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NOTE ON ABBREVIATIONS 
The following abbreviations are used throughout 
this dissertation: 
Hobbes 
E.W. The English Works of Thomas Hobbes (13 Vols.), 
William Molesworth, editor. 
Other abbreviations of Hobbes' work appear as 
a result of my intention to preserve the integrity of 
citations by other authors: I have not altered references 
that appear following paraphrasing of Hobbes' words by other 
authors where the precise quotation was unclear. 
Wittgenstein 
B.B. The Blue and Brown Books, Harper & Row, 1958. 
o.c. 
P.G. 
P.I. 
P.R. 
z 
On Certainty. 
Philosophical Grammar. 
Philosophical Investigations. 
Philosophical Remarks. 
Zettel. 
All references are to numbered paragraphs, unless 
otherwise noted; the references to B.B. are to page nuabers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Different pictures of Hobbes can emerge from 
different judgments as to what is central and what is 
peripheral in his work, and in cases of apparent 
contradiction or superfluous multiple explanations, from 
different judgments as to what reflects his real intent. 
No single, final, and unequivocal account of the meaning 
and significance of Hobbes's political theory is 
therefore likely to arise. (Spragens, p.21) 
At present the truth of this claim seems undeniable. 
Even more now than in the past, it seems that no settled 
interpretation of Hobbes' political theory is possible. 
Three competing views concerning Hobbes' theory of 
obligation are receiving the bulk of attention today. These 
views are what I will call: 
traditional interpretation, 
(1) the mechanistic/egoistic or 
(2) the natural law or moral 
interpretation, and ( 3 ) the individual rights 
interpretation. Each view seeks to explain Hobbes' true 
intentions regarding the derivation of obligation, and do so 
independently of each other. 
Briefly stated, these views hold: ( 1 ) The 
traditional view: Hobbes is a materialist sparked by the 
ideas of the new, emerging science of motion begun by 
Galileo. Hobbes methodically applies its themes and 
procedures to the establishing of civil and ethical theories 
whose issues are understood from within the same 
1 
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perspective. His account of obligation is derived from an 
egoistic psychology which ultimately rests upon the 
materialistic presuppositions. Duty is a matter of 
prudence, i.e. of the rational pursuit of self-interest, 
which is in turn determined by the motions of appetite and 
aversion. This position will be examined in detail in 
Chapter I. 
(2) The natural law view: This position rests upon 
two propositions: (a) the apparently scientific cast and 
mechanical basis of the first view is misleading if taken to 
represent the true character of Hobbes' mature thought, and 
(b) the true nature of his ethical and political thinking is 
derived primarily from the Christian natural law tradition. 
Slightly different versions of this position are offered by 
A.E. Taylor, F.C. Hood, and Howard Warrender. This 
position, the various versions of it, and their differences 
will be examined in Chapter II. 
(3) The individual rights interpretation: Hobbes is 
seen as an analyst of individual man, singling out two 
passions as crucial to morality: vanity and fear of a 
violent death. Hobbes' starting point is taken to be 
natural right, not natural law nor materialism. His theory 
of obligation is seen to rest upon a notion of individual 
right, which in turn rests upon an understanding of human 
passions gained from self-examination. Again there are 
slightly different versions of this approach given by Leo 
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Strauss and Michael Oakeshott, both of which will be 
examined in Chapter III. 
Each view claims to be the true interpretation of 
Hobbes' theory of obligation. Each, in turn, is supported 
by numerous particular passages from Hobbes' writings and by 
various thematic threads traced through the whole of Hobbes' 
work. Consequently each makes a case for the exclusion of 
the other interpretations based on their errors of 
interpretation, misunderstanding of texts, and faulty 
reasoning. Each view assumes or explicitly argues that the 
other views are based on passages taken out of context, 
misstated by the interpreters, or actually mistated by Hobbes 
himself. "Once we clear away the biasses and interjected 
assumptions of those other views," each says, "we will then 
see that Hobbes is really saying ... ", just what that view 
interprets Hobbes to be saying. 
The obvious problem is, however, that three mutually 
exclusive interpretations of a single theory of obligation, 
drawn from a single set of written works by a single author, 
cannot all be correct at once. How is it possible that such 
conflicting positions can be attributed to one author? The 
unspoken assumption adopted by all three sets of 
interpreters is that Hobbes was in fact confused about his 
own beliefs or else not capable of stating them clearly. 
Once this assumption is made, whether it is stated or not, 
it is hard to see how we could ever determine which, if any, 
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or of all three or some other is the "true" account of 
Hobbes' derivation of obligation. 
There is, of course, another possible resolution of 
this puzzle, one based upon a different underlying 
assumption. Suppose we assume, quite simply, that Hobbes 
plainly stated his position, that the position embodies a 
coherent theory of obligation encorporating all three of the 
divergent elements noted above into a single unified whole, 
and that he had valid reasons for the seeming contradictions 
in his works. This hypothesis seems particularly warranted 
in Hobbes' case (though it seems rational, until proven 
otherwise, to assume that all philosophers are trying to 
clearly communicate a coherent position to their readers). 
For, as W.T. Jones notes, "Although in outlook Hobbes was 
almost wholly a man of the new mold, he inherited from the 
Middle Ages a disposition to think systematically and to 
view the function of philosophy as the construction of a 
unified world view, in which all the special sciences are 
derived from one supreme science, and in which the answers 
to all questions that can be asked are ultimately statable 
in terms of a single formula" (Jones, p.120). It seems 
quite reasonable to assume, then, that such a systematic 
thinker, seeking such a unified theory, would be able to 
recognize self-contradiction and be able to exclude 
competing or contradictory rationales within his theory of 
obligation. Should all three alternative justifications for 
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one element in his theory be justifiable textually, it is my 
belief that all three are there because Hobbes offered all 
three without finding them inconsistent or contradictory, 
rather than offering them as an inadvertent error on his 
part or out of some inadequacy. Were Hobbes some obviously 
muddled thinker I might take the opposite view. But he was 
recognized in his own time as a most intelligent and able 
thinker, even if a highly controversial one, 
philosophers since his time have been impressed 
power and order of his thought. 
and many 
with the 
The three interpretations I have described can, I 
believe, be shown to be consistent parts of a larger whole 
within Hobbes' work. To show this, however, we must be 
aware of Hobbes' place in the history of western thought. 
In Hobbes' time, new and revolutionary ideas were competing 
with older, established views. Hobbes did not, however, 
simply reject the older views (in particular, the doctrine 
of natural law based on Christian principles) in favor of 
revolutionary discoveries in natural science 
(materialism/mechanism). Nor did he cling dogmatically to 
the older beliefs and thus exclude from consideration the 
new evidence supporting a materialist explanation of the 
universe and the human enterprise. It seems, rather, that 
Hobbes was trying to delicately balance these various 
alternative points of view in his theory of obligation. He 
was enchanted by the new mechanistic science, was yet a 
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believer in a God who rules through natural law, and was 
also aware of the individualistic aspects of human nature 
and the developing notion of individual rights. For Hobbes, 
I shall argue, all three approaches had a place in 
justifying people's obligation to the sovereign. The 
argument for this interpretation of Hobbes' position is the 
substantive contribution of his dissertation to Hobbes 
scholarship and will be developed in chapters IV and V5, 
following detailed summaries of the three competing theories 
already mentioned. 
The central insight of this interpretation is that 
Hobbes came to see man as a unity of three differently 
focused elements: human beings are obviously physical beings 
governed by mechanistic laws as are all other physical 
objects; human beings are children of God, who communicates 
His will to them by natural law; finally, human beings are 
individuals with individual rights who are rules as much by 
vanity and fear as by reason. Hobbes, I hope to show, wove 
these three disparate elements into a single, tri-partite 
argument for his theory of obligation wherein persons are 
obliged to obey their sovereign. 
This interpretation also fits Hobbes' own 
anthropomorphic characterization of the Leviathan (the 
state). In the past, this analogy was taken as a purely 
explanatory analogy (or as a hypothetical device). But 
under my view it may be taken as involving a more literal 
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parallel between the state and a person. That is, human 
beings outside .the state, in the State of Nature, are 
physical beings bound to do things by mechanistic causal 
chains, rational beings able to discover {even in the State 
of Nature) certain natural laws which prescribe certain 
actions, and individuals who act out of basic passions such 
as vanity or fear. By moving into civil society human 
beings do not change their basic motivations, but rather 
perform different actions for the common good. These 
actions flow from the same three sources within society as 
outside it. Hobbes' analogy seeks to show that whether 
within or outside of a state, obligation derives, for human 
beings, from the same three sources. 
The main job ahead is to show that all three sources 
of obligation are, indeed, consistent and complimentary 
within Hobbes' particular project of proving one's 
obligation to the sovereign. Since they apply to different 
aspects of human beings and society, the possibility remains 
open that, when spliced together they create a conclusive 
argument for obligation to the sovereign. Moreover, it is 
clear that Hobbes was aware of the multiple influences 
operating on his readers and that to convince all segments 
of his audience of his conclusions he would do well to 
tailor his arguments to that segmented audience. That is, 
the mechanistic arguments appeal to those versed in the new 
science, whereas the moral arguments would appeal to the 
more 
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traditionally minded, and the individual rights 
argument would be aimed at those who saw the individual as 
the most important factor in any political theory. Hobbes' 
arguments offer three frameworks of justification that all 
support his major conclusion that citizens have almost 
absolute obligations to their sovereign and the laws he 
designs. The three approaches to obligation are Hobbes' 
attempt to convince different segments of his audience of 
his conclusions using arguments framed in the language and 
conceptual background best able to generate their assent. 
It is my aim in the pages to follow to show that Hobbes, 
indeed, intended all three to be a part of his argument for 
the obligation to the sovereign. First, however, I must 
explain the contents of the three individual elements of my 
synthesis. 
CHAPTER I 
THE MATERIALIST THESIS 
A. BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW 
Two considerations led Hobbes to formulate his 
unique theory of political obligation. The first was 
the political turbulence of his times, which saw 
Cromwell preparing to lead his men in a savage civil 
war. This experience of violence growing out of deep 
disagreements between men on political matters 
contrasted sharply in Hobbes's mind with the relatively 
quick agreements men acheived in mathematical and 
scientific matters. Secondly, Hobbes looked at 
political philosophy as a variation of the science of 
physics. He assumed that from a thoroughly 
materialistic view of human nature, in which human 
behavior could be explained simply in terms of bodies in 
motion, he could formulate an accurate political 
philosophy. (Stumpf, p.239) 
While the historical factors mentioned by Stumpf 
supply the overall impetus behind Hobbes• search for a firm 
foundation for obligation, it is the second consideration 
that forms the basis for the traditional 
materialistic/psychological egoistic interpretation of 
Hobbes' theory of obligation.* That is, the MP is based upon 
the belief that the primary (if not the total) basis of 
*I will abbreviate "the materialistic/psychological 
egoistic case" as MP. 
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Hobbes' theory is the new mechanism and the methods derived 
from and pioneered by Galileo. 
In his Dialogues Galileo, while working on the 
problem of accelerated motions, developed the view that 
there is a specific explanation for the behavior of bodies 
and that the method of explanation could be modeled after 
geometry. Geometry, being a deductive discipline when 
applied to the analysis of the motion of physical bodies, 
could turn physics into an exact science. Galileo held that 
there was a correspondence between the axioms of geometry 
and the observable properties of empirical, moving bodies. 
Further, Galileo held that the theorems deduced from these 
axioms would apply to the empirical facts of motion. 
Starting from this point and adding Galileo's subsequent 
refinement of the "resoluto-compositive" method (to be 
explained in the following section), the new science of 
motion was to become an important factor in Hobbes' theories 
of politics and obligation. Hobbes came to see in Galileo's 
model of motion as the conformity of a falling body to 
mechanical laws a model for all behavior. 
Galileo had opened the gates of "natural philosophy 
universal", while the Englishman, Harvey, had pioneered a 
causal science of motion in the human body, describing the 
motion of the blood and other fluids in his books, Motions 
of the Blood and Generation of Living Creatures. Hobbes was 
to attempt a similar description of human psychology and 
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politics, partly to augment these advances but also to 
explicate human motivation and its social consequences 
(Laird, p.90). Hobbes believed that Galileo's principles 
were the governing concepts in the human as well as the 
inanimate realm. His philosophy can therefore be seen as an 
attempt to push Galileo's dynamics and methods to their 
explanatory limits. (Copleston, p.33). Ultimately, as we 
shall see, Hobbes concluded that obligation is a matter of 
the rational pursuit of self-interest guided by the motions 
of appetite and aversion. 
"The drama of political 
Spragens explains Hobbes' view: 
life ... is the product of the 
interplay between contending fundamental motivations which 
govern the actions of all men. These motivations are 
universal, natural drives ... as much as the natural facts of 
his corporality and mortality." (Spragens, p.163). 
It is only when human motivation and its causes are 
seen as actions or motion in the purely physical world that 
politics becomes a matter for the new science. In fact, of 
course, according to the MP, this was Hobbes' belief. For 
him there was one fundamental characteristic that all bodies 
share and that alone makes it possible to analyze and 
understand their actions, namely motion. Hobbes' universe, 
for MP, is a closed material system. It is a set of bodies 
whose whole activity is motion. In this unverse are only 
two elements: matter and motion. All real entities are 
material, all real actions or events are explicable as the 
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motions of matter. Since human beings are a part of the 
closed system, they are governed by the same laws as any 
other parts of the system. Spragens says, "There is no 
escape hatch from the world of nature, no protected area or 
special status which man could have to exempt him from the 
forces and realities which govern the rest of the cosmos." 
(Spragens, p. 130). In all their complexity and no matter 
how men would like to think they are different from the 
other elements of the universe, for Hobbes they are not. 
At the core of Hobbes' view of human nature, 
according to the MP, is that human psychology is egoistic. 
Convinced that human beings could be analyzed using the same 
methods and principles used by the new science, Hobbes 
extrapolated the concepts of body, motion, and cause to the 
realm of human affairs, including politics. Beginning with 
an analysis of human motivation, Hobbes would unrelentingly 
extend Galileo's assumptions into the innermost regions of 
human thought and deliberation. This he saw as his original 
contribution to civil philosophy (Peters and Tajfel, p.164). 
Human nature is the same as any other part of the universe: 
sensation is motion, reason is the motion of bodies within 
the closed system of Nature, and human beings' motive 
faculties, which move them toward the end of their own well 
being, are the motions of the mind causing physical effects. 
The result of this perspective was an egoistic psychology. 
The path which took Hobbes to the egoistic account 
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of obligation can be briefly outlined. Hobbes saw that 
every living thing seeks to maintain its life, i.e. sustain 
its own motion; so, too, must human beings. Diverse 
external motions (actions of bodies from outside) produce 
diverse motions in us. Internal motions caused by the 
actions of these objects on one's senses ultimately cause a 
reaction to the external world. The two key sensations 
produced by external motions are pleasure and pain. 
Pleasure is "nothing really but motion about the heart, as 
conception is nothing but motion in the head" and pain is 
such a motion that "weakeneth or hindereth the vital motion" 
(E.W. IV, 31). Since a person's reactions are tendencies 
toward that which preserves the individual or tendencies 
away from the opposite, pain and pleasure are vital factors 
in understanding human motivation. It is pleasure that 
pushes human beings toward what sustains them, while pain 
pushes them away from what is harmful. The results are the 
motion of desire for pleasant things and the motion of 
aversion from unpleasant things. These involuntary motions 
then cause "animal motions", i.e. voluntary motions such as 
speaking, walking, and moving the limbs that are always 
"first fancied in our minds" (E.W. III, 38); the 
"imagination always being the first beginning of voluntary 
motion" (Peters, p.130), causes us to seek that which 
sustains life. 
Now we can complete the overview of the MP version 
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of Hobbes' theory. Having analyzed human motivation in this 
way, Hobbe$ turned from natural philosophy to political 
philosophy. Here the concept of the State of Nature is an 
important link in Hobbes' chain of reasoning toward 
obligation. Hobbes utilizes the State of Nature as an 
explanatory device to show how human nature ultimately 
brings people to form alliances for the sake of personal 
survival (the egoistic motivation). 
The 'State of Nature' refers to a condition of 
persons in which there are no rules governing desires and in 
which, as is the case in nature, all human beings are 
relatively equal in strength, cunning, and force. For gain, 
for safety, etc., people desire what will preserve or enrich 
their lives as the natures dictate. In addition, since 
there are no rules or outside authority liminting their 
actions, people have a right to all things which aid their 
nature this is the 'right of nature' to all that promotes 
self-preservation, which we shall examine more fully 
shortly. Eventually human beings are led into conflict with 
each other, with no rules available to check their 
inevitable decline into violent conflict, what they have 
come to, by a direct causal chain, is the state of war. 
Hobbes argues that as long as this state of war endures 
everyone is miserable. 
Being averse to misery, human beings, as egoists, 
seek to remove themselves from the State of Nature. Here, 
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finally, Hobbes reaches the concept of the social contract: 
human beings lay down their right to all things in order to 
gain security, obligating themselves to a sovereign and 
obeying and the laws the sovereign designs. This is all the 
result of the chain of motions leading to a desire to avoid 
the misery which the motions of their natures would 
otherwise inevitably lead them. Thus, the obligation they 
place themselves under is the end point of a natural chain 
of causal motions. That is, moved by the motives (motions) 
of prudence, fear, and reason people contract with others 
for the sake of their own security. The formation of civil 
society is, therefore, the outcome of each person's desire 
for their own survival, and obligation is the direct effect 
of their psychological egoism. Their duty is dictated by 
prudence and is the rational pursuit of self-interest or the 
motions of appetite and aversion. 
Hobbes' aim, then, according to MP, was the 
systematize the various elements just outlined into a total 
philosophical 
introduction 
system. Sterling 
to Hobbes' De Cive, 
Lamprecht, in his 
explains the basic 
structure of Hobbes' system for the MP approach in these 
words: 
It is indeed true, and it has often been pointed 
out ... that Hobbes conceived these principles as part of 
a grandiose schematism for a total theory of the 
universe. According to his schematism, the only 
ultimate facts are matter and motion, all else is but 
some special case of the basic realities of matter and 
motion. The schematism would, Hobbes thought, have 
three main parts: a theory of body in general, a theory 
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of living body (particulary of man), and a theory of 
special body (that is, of the state). (Lamprecht, pp. 
xvi-xvii) 
In the following sections of this chapter I will explicate 
in detail MP's detailed description of Hobbes' theory, and 
how this theory can be seen as the direct result of Hobbes' 
use of Galileo's principles and method. 
B. METHOD AND SYSTEM 
At the age of forty, in 1629, Hobbes had by chance 
come across Euclid's Elements laying open in the library of 
a gentleman he was visiting. Upon reading one of the 
demonstrations he reacted with alarm, saying such an 
analysis was impossible. But after rereading the proof and 
following its logical step-by-step progress to the 
inevitable conclusion, he immediately 'became in love with 
geometry'. He passionately explored it as a method for 
arriving at indubitable conclusions, finally conceiving the 
hope that he could use it to demonstrate his own political 
convictions and bring order to the political chaos in 
England by showing the evils of democracy and the 
superiority of an absolute monarchy. He hoped that these 
conclusions would be accepted by his countrymen if 
convincingly proven in geometrical fashion, if derived step 
by step from first principles. The problem was that he had 
no conceptual framework available to allow him to convert 
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his observations of contemporary society, his introspective 
insights into his own nature, and his knowledge of history 
into terms amenable to geometrical analysis. In what terms 
could he present this knowledge as a set of axioms from 
which theorems about the correct conditions for a civil 
society could be deduced? The problem was how to translate 
empirical and introspective observations into more 
mathematical terms. 
Hobbes' interests were not purely political, 
however, and led him to consider the problem of sensation at 
this time. In developing an answer to the question, "What 
causes sensation?", Hobbes employed the geometrical method 
of reasoning together with the concepts of the new science 
of motion, with which he was familiar. The result was his 
first philosophical work, the Little Treatise of 1637, in 
which he developed the idea that all manner of perceptions 
(apparition, imagination, as well as sensation) could be 
explained as the meeting of bodies in motion. The Little 
Treatise can be seen as the outcome of Hobbes' interest in 
geometry, his admiration of Galileo (dating back to 1610), 
and his theory of motion. He had met Galileo in 1636 and 
became obsessed with his suggestion that motion was the 
natural state of bodies. He, further, was impressed by 
Galileo's law of inertia which said such motion would 
continue to infinity unless impeded by some other body, a 
claim that forcefully contradicted the Aristotelian notion 
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that rest was a body's natural state. Hobbes combined the 
interest in motion, Galileo's suggestion, and his own 
passion for geometry to explain sensation. (The explanation 
of sensation will be explored a bit later in this chapter.) 
Hobbes came to conceive of science as deductive and 
non-empirical, and he scorned the use of experience or 
history in science as unreliable. Hobbes thought that 
wisdom demanded the use of reason, as distinct from 
experience which often leads one into illusion and does not 
yield the sorts of universalizable laws that reason does. 
Hobbes defines •reasoning' in this way 
When a man reasoneth he does nothing else but 
conceive a sum total, from additional of parcels: or 
conceive a remainder, from subtraction of one sum from 
another; which if done by words, is conceiving of the 
consequences of the names of all parts, to the name of 
another part ... For 'reason•, in this sense, is nothing 
but reckoning, that is adding and subtracting, of the 
consequences of general names agreed upon for the 
marking and signifying of our thoughts. (E.W. III, 29-
30) 
Science, as reasoning, is to proceed by deducing 
consequences from initial definitions, as geometry so 
successfully does. Science is "knowledge of all the 
consequences of names appertaining to the subject in hand" 
(E.W. III, 35). For we know only be definition (E.W. II, 
35). As such, science reaches conclusions not about things, 
but about what we think about things. Science yields 
hypothetical, though certain knowledge, expressed in words. 
In addition to characterizing science as the product 
of reasoning, Hobbes saw it as hypothetical knowledge, that 
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is, universal knowledge. It is hypothetical in the sense 
that any talk about a circle in geometry is not talk about a 
particular circle but is the expression of universal truths 
about any circle, about any figure that conforms to the 
initial definitions (Peters, p.61). Such statements are 
hypothetical propositions of the sort, "if a figure is a 
circle, then its area can be computed using the formula~ x 
r 2". What we are saying is that certain propositions will 
be true about any figure having certain properties. The 
truths of science, then, are universal, and so hypothetical, 
and eternal (in that they have the timelessness of logical 
implication). Thus, as Peters says, "The main business of 
scientists is to establish laws which are universal and 
hypothetical statements like 'Everywhere and always if iron 
is heated, then it expands'" (Peters, p.61). 
The major method available to scientists trying to 
understand the underlying structure of nature, according to 
Hobbes, is Galileo's resoluto-compositive method. It is 
this method, developed in Galileo's mechanics, that will 
allow scientists to understand motion, the universal cause, 
knowledge of which is fundamental to any basic theory of 
nature. The resoluto-compositive method exactly fits 
Hobbes' needs in that it quantifies phenomena wherever 
possible and in mathematical fashion analyzes the relations 
of the variables (quantified elements of phenomena) into a 
rational structure. More particularly, the method uses the 
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postulation of unobservables to advance the geometrical 
method into the science of motion. Peters explains: 
Galileo worked out his theory by imagining 
perfect spheres moving on frictionless planes in 
perfectly straight lines. He was able to conduct such 
imaginary experiments because his mind had been set free 
from the earth-bound Aristotelian system by the method 
of geometry which accustoms its students to conduct such 
experiments with parallel lines that are perfectly 
straight and stretch out to infinity, with angles that 
are really equal, and with perfect circles ... It was only 
because Galileo and his contemporaries ... were versed in 
geometrical modes of thought that they were able to make 
the momentous advance of imagining motion as the norm; 
for it is not through observation that we become 
convinced that bodies continue their motion unless 
something impedes them. It was through imagining the 
perfect case of a body moving without impediment as the 
norm that Galileo was set free to work out a new system 
of mechanics. (Peters, p.63) 
The method itself was employed in explaining a 
particular phenomenon, say the fall of an object to the 
ground, by taking a typical case like a ball rolling down an 
inclined plane and abstracting it. That is, the first step 
would be to think away any non-quantifiable characteristics 
of the ball (such as color, smell, or any "secondary 
qualities" in the classical sense). What would be left 
would be quantifiable simple elements such as the ball's 
weight and size, the angle of the plane, or the time it 
takes the ball to traverse the length of the plane. Now we 
would manipulate the mathematical relations and think about 
them until we isolate some formula which expressed one 
variable as the function of others: in our example, we might 
reduce the velocity of the ball to a function of the time it 
has rolled starting from rest. (Hobbes called this aspect of 
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the method 'analysis' rather than resolution.) Following 
this, we would then 'compose' or 'synthesize' the situation 
by reconstructing it in mathematical terms and then deducing 
the consequences from the laws discovered; in other words, 
starting from the known causes, we deduce the effects from 
them using previously discovered laws (Peters, p.64). 
In this manner, then, we would have a rational 
mathematical resolution of causal relations. Essentially 
the method combines mathematics, hypothesis, and "thought-
experiments" into an explanation of the causes and effects 
of bodies in motion. It was, in other words, exactly what 
Hobbes was looking for at this time. 
Hobbes' paradigm of the search for causes, which he 
called 'philosophy', is Galileo's resoluto-compositive 
method. His definition and explication of philosophy shows 
it to be an analysis of causal relations just as mechanics 
was for Galileo: 
Philosophy is such knowledge of effects or 
appearances, as we acquire by true ratiocination from 
the knowledge we have first of their causes or 
generation: An again, of such causes or generations as 
may be from knowing first their effects ... (E.W. I, 3) 
The subject of Philosophy, or the matter it 
treats of, is every body of which we can conceive any 
generation, and which we may, by any consideration 
thereof, compare with other bodies, or which is capable 
of composition and resultuion; that is to say, every 
body of whose generation or properties we can have any 
knowledge ... (E.W. I, 10) 
The principle parts of philosophy are two. For 
two chief kinds of bodies, and very different from one 
another, offer themselves, to such a search after their 
generation and proeprties; one ... being the work of 
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nature ... a natural body, the other is called a 
commonwealth, and is made by the wills and agreement of 
men.(E.W. I, 11) 
Philosophy, like mechanics, deals with the causes 
and effects of matter (bodies) in motion. For Hobbes, the 
universe is a closed physical system consisting of matter in 
motion, that is, bodies whose motions produce effects, and 
bodies whose motions manifest these effects. By 'body' 
Hobbes simply means that "which having no dependence upon 
our thought, is coincident or co-extended with some part of 
space" (E.W. I, 94). Every actual body has a determinate 
magnitude (quantity) and is either at rest or moving at some 
determinate velocity (Jones, p.122). In Hobbes' universe 
bodies alone have real existence: " ... because it depends not 
upon our thought, we say body is a thing subsisting in 
itself; as also existing, because without us ... " (E.W. I, 
102). Bodies change only with respect to their motions, 
i.e. their "accidents'', defined as: "the manner of a body, 
according to which it is conceived; this is the same as 
saying: an accident is the power of a body by which it 
impresses a conception of itself upon us" (De Corpore, Ch.8, 
translated from Latin by David Ozar in an unpublished paper 
entitled ''A Study of the Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes"). 
Thus we come to know bodies through their accidents, as our 
motions (sensations) are influenced by the motions of the 
bodies which influence us. The study of the ultimate 
reality, "determinate body", is natural (or first) 
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philosophy, which is limited to a study of the quantifiable 
aspects of bodies and their motion: 
Every object is either a part of the whole world, 
or an aggregate of parts. The greatest of all bodies, 
or sensible objects, is the world itself ... Of the whole 
world we may inquire what is its magnitude, what is its 
duration, and how many there be, but nothing 
else ... (E.W. I, 410-411) 
Sensation is itself a meeting place of motions. Our 
sense organs are "pressed upon'' by external movements of 
bodies either directly (as in touch or taste) or through 
some medium (as in sight, smell, or hearing). These motions 
then are transmitted by the nerves and membranes of the body 
to the brain and heart, which react to the pressure with an 
outward counter-pressure or resistance, causing the 
sensations to have the appearance of externality since the 
internal motion in us is directed outward (E.W. III, 2). 
That is, although they are nothing more than internal 
motions in some internal substance of the head, they have 
the character of being external to use (Peters, p.97). 
Hobbes defines a sensation itself as "a phantasm, made by 
the reaction and endeavour outwards in the organ of sense, 
caused by an endeavour inwards from the object, remaining 
for some time more or less" (E.W. I, 391). Not only is 
sensation the end product of external motions, it is the 
efficient cause of the actions of the sentient beings 
themselves. Actions are, for Hobbes, the reactions to 
external stimuli received through the sense organs; 
sensation is a bridge between movement in the external world 
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and the behavior of human beings. 
Philosophy, as the study of sensible bodies in 
motion, seeks an understanding of the causes of all motion 
and thereby the nature of events and behavior in the world. 
All causation is antecedent motion. 
A body is said to work upon or act, that is to 
say, do something to another body, when it either 
generates or destroys some accident in it: and the body 
in which an accident is generated or destroyed is said 
to suffer, that is, to have something done to it by 
another body; as when one body by putting forwards 
another body generates motion in it, it is called the 
AGENT; and the body in which motion is so generated is 
called the PATIENT ... 
••. A CAUSE simply, or an entire cause, is the 
aggregate of all the accidents both of the agents how 
many soever they be, and of the patient, put together; 
which when they are all supposed to be present, it 
cannot be understood but that the effect is produced at 
the same instant; and if any of them be wanting, it 
cannot be understood but that the effect is not 
produced ... 
An entire cause is always sufficient for the 
production of its effect, if the effect be at all 
possible ... 
And seeing a necessary cause is defined to be 
that, which being supposes, the effect cannot but 
follow, this also may be collected, that whatsoever 
effect is produced at any time, the same is produced by 
a necessary cause ... (E.W. I, 120-123) 
Thus, Hobbes argues that all causes are necessary 
and all actions necessitated. Therefore, there are no 
random events, no contingencies. Those events we believe to 
be contingent are simply those events whose necessary causes 
we do not yet perceive (E.W. I, 130). The task of 
philosophy is the uncovering of the necessary causes of all 
motion in bodies, and the formulation of general, universal 
laws that govern that motion (which will be mechanical laws) 
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by the use of which we can understand and predict that 
motion, and thereby understand the world. 
Philosophy is composed of the two parts previously 
mentioned, namely the study of natural bodies (natural 
philosophy) and artificial or man-made bodies (civil 
philosophy). But philosophy, too, is part of an overall 
system or hierarchy of the sciences envisioned by Hobbes. 
If the unverse is entirely matter in motion, then all the 
sciences treat the same things and utilize the same method 
of investigation, i.e. that of geometry and Galileo's 
resoluto-compositive method. The hierarchy of sciences 
treats three particular topics: body, man, and citizen, and 
results from Hobbes' extension of the Galilean system in two 
directions, into geometry at one end, and into psychology 
and politics at the other. The hierarchy itself is: 1) 
Geometry, 2) Philosophy of motion (Galileo's system), 3) 
Physics (also a part of Galileo's system), 4) Morals, and 5) 
Politics. The common feature for all is that they are 
studies of motion, though this is a very loose binding 
principle and one Hobbes never really develops so as to join 
the five sciences into a strong, unitary system. In fact, 
the advocates of the MP approach (especially Peters and 
Laird) willingly admit that the transitions from one 
discipline to the next are not rigorously made (especially 
from physics to psychology or moral philosophy). 
Nonetheless, it is clear that Hobbes considered this 
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hierarchy to be a single system for the study of the nature 
of the universe; and the science of motion forms the heart 
of that larger system. 
Briefly, the five disciplines, as 
motion, can be characterized as follows. 
treatments of 
To Hobbes, 
geometry was the science of simple motions that demonstrate 
how figures are generated by varieties of motions (such as 
the line, described as the motion of a point in a perfectly 
straight path), as Galileo had imagined it. The philosophy 
of motion, presumably Galileo's as well, considers the 
effects of the motions of bodies upon each other. Physics, 
the third of the sciences, is an investigation of the 
internal and invisible motions which would account for "such 
effects as are made by the motion of the parts of any body, 
as, how it comes to pass, that things when they are the 
same, yet seem not to be the same, but changed" (E.W. I, 
72). Here Hobbes notes that we search for the sensible 
qualities such as light, color, heat, and cold, and the 
causes of sense itself (the secondary qualities not being 
real, but appearances, give false impressions of change). 
After physics we proceed to psychology or moral philosophy, 
i.e. the study of the motions of the mind such as appetite 
and aversion, or love (E.W. I, 72-73). Finally, we reach 
civil philosophy, the study of the motions generating 
artifical man-made bodies called States or Commonwealths. 
Here we study how the State is generated from the qualities 
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of human nature and the cause of "what is natural right, and 
what are civil duties; and in every kind of government, what 
are the rights of the commonwealth ... the principle of the 
politics consist in the knowledge of these motions from the 
knowledge of sense and imagination ... "(E.W. I, 74). The 
total system is a complete approach to the study of motion 
in all its manifestations, and Hobbes thought it important 
to stress the unity of the various elements of the system: 
"And, therefore, they that study natural philosophy, study 
in vain, exept they begin at geometry; and such writers or 
disputes thereof, as are ignorant of geometry, do but make 
their readers and hearers lose their time" (E.W. I, 73). 
In fixing the nature of political obligation the 
advocates of MP claim that it will be the direct outcome of 
Hobbes' system and method. Obligation must be explained as 
the motions of bodies, in this case of the human beings that 
generate the Commonwealth. Such an explanation requires an 
understanding of Hobbes' psychology and ethics, i.e. of his 
psychological egoism. The next section deals with these 
subjects. 
C. PSYCHOLOGY AND ETHICS 
Hobbes' psychology is the outcome of extending the 
Galilean methodology into the realm of human behavior. It 
is mechanical in the sense of being a causal, materialistic 
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explanation of human motivation, action, and deliberation. 
But it also includes introspection as source of information 
about human nature. This is not surprising given Hobbes' 
concern with his own character and his introspective 
analysis of himself; what psychology would do would be to 
generalize his insights about himself and express them as 
descriptions of human nature itself. 
What he had observed in himself, of course, were 
motions conforming to Galilean principles, namely sensations 
and thoughts explicable as internal motions of the brain or 
heart. This conformed, moreover, to the fact that all 
phenomena are explicable as bodies in motion. What we might 
call 'mental events,' Hobbes called functions of the living 
body. Human beings are composite systems of physical 
particles subject to numerous influences from the external 
world mediated by the sense organs, which then set up 
internal reactions of the mind or passions according to the 
appropriate laws, the most important being the drive for 
self-preservation. Human beings, then, like the rest of 
universe function according to the laws of mechanics, the 
laws of motion. Psychology is the study of the laws of 
motion particular to human beings; it is the description of 
our reactions to external stimuli either positive 
(appetite/desire) or negative (aversion). 
The transition from physics to psychology is 
accomplished through the bridging concept or term 
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•endeavor'. Hobbes defines 'endeavor' as, " ... motion made 
in less space and time than can be given; that is, less than 
can be determined or assigned by exposition or number; that 
is, motion made through the length of a point, and in an 
instant or point of time ... " (E.W. I, 206). This concept 
harkens back to the Galilean methodology in that it is an 
"unobservable'' (since it occupies less space and time than 
can be given) used to help explain that which is observable 
(human behavior); but nonetheless it is posited in purely 
physical terms as a particle of matter in motion, albeit 
unobservable. As Reik explains the concept: "Endeavor is 
conceived as an infinitely small, instantaneous motion or 
tendency toward motion ... (it) is 'appetite' or 'aversion' 
inmen, depending on whether the motion is toward or away 
from an object" (Reik, p.74). We need to note that 
'endeavor' is a motion, not merely a tendency to motion, and 
that motion is always the motion of matter of some sort. 
Hobbes uses endeavor in two ways: 1) as the 
connecting term in the chain of reasoning that joins his 
mechanics or physics to his psychology, and 2) to help 
formulate his description of the role of pleasure and pain 
in guiding human behavior. The causal chain producing human 
actions is not observable throughout, so that Hobbes needed 
to posit some physical entity or motion to complete the 
chain. Peters and Tajfel explain Hobbes' solution: 
... whenever 
motion--e.g. between 
there was a gap in observable 
the object and the sense organ or 
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between the stimulation of the sense organ and the 
movements of the muscles in appetite or aversion, Hobbes 
postulated 'endeavors' which transmitted the motion. 
For, according to his theory, motions from the external 
world not only move to the brain and produce images; 
they also affect the vital motions of the body which are 
manifest in the circulation of the blood, breathing, 
excretion, nutrition, and other such processes. (Peters 
and Tajfel, p.169} 
To explain the various elements and relations 
between the elements of Hobbes' theory introduced above, let 
me begin by distinguishing the two sorts of motion in the 
body that Hobbes posits. The first is 'vital motion'; as 
Peters and Tajfel note, it is observable as the circulation 
of the blood, excretion, and other involuntary actions. 
Vital motions begin with life itself and continue without 
ceasing throughout the life of the person (or animal), doing 
so without the conscious direction of the person (E.W. III, 
38). The second type of motion is 'animal motion', or 
voluntary motion, and is exemplified by walking, talking, or 
the moving of one's limbs. This motion is mediated by the 
imagination; it is conscious behavior, "first fancied in our 
minds" (E.W. III, 38}. For Hobbes all voluntary motion has 
its first beginnings in the imagination. 'Imagination' is 
"decaying sense" (E.W. III, 4}, the 'decay' being the 
function of remoteness in time or the overriding of other 
sense impressions; it is not unlike memory, although there 
may be more involved in acts of "creative" imagination (when 
we compound images such as that of a horse with that of a 
man to form the image of a centaur; for purely creative 
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imagination--images created out of nothing, having no 
connection to previous experience--are impossible given 
Hobbes' theory). Imagination is motion in the brain 
stimulated by sensation and mediated by phantasms, i.e. 
motions produced by other motions and producing motions in 
other bodies (Peters, p.85). Images are not clearly 
explained by Hobbes and seem to be motions of physical 
particles in the brain, but also to have a mentalistic 
interpretation. Hobbes apparently had no interest in 
working out the epistemological status of images and it 
(image) is an ambiguous concept at best (Peters, p.78). 
Motion from the external world not only reaches the 
brain to produce phantasms and images; it also affects the 
vital motions of the heart, giving rise to the sensations of 
pleasure and pain. External motion reaching the heart (via 
the sensory organs, nerves, and 'other cords and strings' in 
the body) may help or hinder the vital motions. That which 
helps the vital motion is experienced as pleasure; that 
which hinders it is felt as pain. What helps the vital 
motion we call 'good', what we shun as an impediment to 
vital motion we call 'evil', thus we call pleasure good and 
pain evil (E.W. III, 41). The body, further, will be guided 
so as to preserve the motion which aids its own vital 
motion, and be guided to avoid that which hinders its own 
Vital motion. For Hobbes these motions to preserve or avoid 
are the first endeavors of animal motion: the first endeavor 
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tending toward what we experience as pleasure is called 
•appetite' (or 'desire'), and the first endeavor that 'shuns 
what is troublesome' or what is experienced as painful is 
called 'aversion' (E.W. III, 39; E.W. I, 407). That is, 
"appetite or aversion are simply small bodily motions within 
us, and pleasure is merely an 'appearance' produced by the 
endeavor" (McNeilly, "article", p .194) . It is Hobbes' 
postulation of these unobservable endeavors that completes 
the material causal chain in human behavior and allows 
Hobbes to make the claim that human actions can be explained 
in mechanical terms just as the motions of falling bodies 
are explained. 
Hobbes considered thought of any kind to be motion 
as well; in particular, thought is motion in the brain. 
There are two kinds of thought mentioned by Hobbes: 
regulated and unregulated, what we might call roughly 
'rational' and 'irrational' thinking.* There were two types 
of regulated thought, Hobbes believed. The first was 
deliberation in the classic Aristotelean sense: a desire 
posits an end, and means to attaining the end are traced 
backward from the end until something within the agent's 
power to perform is reached. At this point the agent acts 
*Unregulated thinking follows no rational order 
or plan and was of little interest to Hobbes. As a 
result he formualted no princicples for explaining or 
describing this type of thought. 
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to set the causal sequence toward the end in motion. Hobbes 
believed that animals and humans both possessed this 
'inventive' faculty. 
The second, and more important, sort of regulated 
thinking Hobbes called 'prudence'. Only humans could 
exercise prudential thought. In this type of deliberation 
the starting point is the action that is within the person's , 
power to perform 
That 
combined with their store of 
I ·~ 
past/ 4; ~~ 
of 0 
~ 
experiences. is, memory and past experience 
pleasure and pain are used to analyze the probable effects~ 
' -h -of the contemplated action and to speculate as to whether ~ 
the effects might be pleasurable or painful. If the agent 
foresees pleasurable effects, desire results; if painful 
effects 'fear'. Prudential reasoning would be useful or 
fruitful, Hobbes believed, in direct proportion to the 
amount of past experience the agent had to draw upon: "As he 
that foresees what will become of a criminal, reasons what 
he hath seen follows on the like crime before; having this 
order of thoughts, the crime, the officer, the prison, the 
judge, and the gallows" (E.W. III, 14-15). 
The deliberative process itself Hobbes described as 
follows 
When in the mind of men, appetites, and 
aversions, hopes, and fears, concerning one and the same 
thing, arise alternately; and divers good and evil 
consequences of the doing, or omitting the thing 
propounded, come successively into our thoughts; so that 
sometimes we have ~n appetite to it; sometimes an 
aversion from it; ... the whole sume of desires, 
aversions, hopes and fears, continued till the thing be 
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either done, or thought impossible, is what we call 
DELIBERATION ... (E.W. III, 47-48) 
In del~beration, the last appetite or aversion, 
immediately adhering to the action, or to the omission 
thereof, is that we call the WILL; the act, not the 
faculty of willing ... Will therefore is the last appetite 
in deliberating. (E.W. III, 48-49) 
Will may be further clarified as Peters explains: 
Will is not simply the last appetite in deliberating; 
for often we would be inclined to say of a man who 
eventually decided to stay in bed that he did not exert 
his will. Rather it is deliberation carried on under 
the aegis of self-regard, in which self-regard 
reinforces what Hobbes called an appetite and enables it 
to be the last one in the field. (Peters, p.134) 
The remaining factor in Hobbes' psychology of 
motivation is his analysis of the role of the passions. 
Roughly, the major passions are love and hate, being the 
same as appetite and aversion except that the object of the 
passion is present (the object of appetite or aversion being 
absent), and joy and grief, which involve anticipation of 
future ends rather than just an immediately perceived object 
(Peters, p.134). The remaining passions, such as hope or 
despair, are compounded from the first four (e.g. hope is 
appetite along with an opinion that we will attain the end). 
The most important of these other passions as far as Hobbes' 
ethics and politics are concerned is fear, which he defines 
as aversion joined to the opinion that the object will harm 
the person. Fear of death is the strongest fear of all, 
says Hobbes, and of coursefigures prominently in his 
political philosophy, as we shall see. 
As far as the social aspects of human psychology, 
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Hobbes saw social life as a race for precedence which ended 
only with death. Foresight and the abillity to anticipate 
and plan for the future are necessary for success in this 
race. Here joy and grief are specific forms of pleasures 
and pain that encourage or hinder people in the race for 
precedence; they are mental pleasures and pains which "arise 
from the expection that proceeds from foresight of the end 
or consequence of things; for whether those things in the 
sense please or displease" (E.W. III, 43). The key notion 
now becomes power, i.e. the anticipation a person has that 
they can produce or attain the end which they anticipate. 
"Wherefore all conception of future, is conception of power 
able to produce something. Whosoever therefore expecteth 
pleasure to come, must conceive withal some power in himself 
by which the same may be attained" (E.W. IV, 37). In short, 
if we expect joy, 
our goal; but 
from our course. 
our conception 
involved. 
our anticipation drives us forward toward 
if we expect grief, our aversion shunts us 
What we expect, of course, depends upon 
of the power we have over the events 
The concept of power included 
notion of powers as faculties (e.g. 
nutritive power as functions of our 
faculties). It included the power 
acquisition of things such as riches, 
authority. Such things are attained 
not just the usual 
the mental power or 
mental or physical 
gained through the 
favor, or a place of 
in the first place 
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through the exercise of our mental, physical, and other 
powers (as faculties). Moreover, as "the power of one man 
restricteth and hindereth the effects of the power of 
another, power simply is no more but the excess of the power 
of one above another; for equal powers opposed destroy one 
another; and such their opposition is called contention" 
(E.W. IV, 38). Here the desire for the power to control our 
own lives and ensure our own goals drives us to compete with 
others for goods and favor, as well as for the simple means 
to survival. 
Here the notion of power is functioning in a manner 
like that of the notion of endeavor, that is, as a bridging 
concept; where 'endeavor' bridges the gap between physics 
and psychology, 'power' bridges the gap between psychology 
and politics. Consider Hobbes' famous phrase, 11 ••• I put for 
a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and 
restless striving of power after power, that ceaseth only in 
death" (E.W. III, 85-76). Here the desire for power refers 
to our need to acquire the power to control and dominate 
others who might interfere with our pursuit of our own best 
interest. We (and others) must compete with each other for 
the acquisition of such additional power if we are to be 
successful in the race for precedence; for, as Peters 
reminds us, to fail to compete is to die (Peters, p.139). 
It is this 
that Hobbes' 
psychological predeliction for a massing power 
political theory seeks to overcome. The 
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political structures Hobbes postulates are designed to 
overcome and end the competitive drive for power, to end the 
struggle for power over one another that terminates in death 
(with the loser dying in the struggle and the winner 
continuing the struggle with others until his own death). 
Hobbes' concept of human psychology is perfectly 
consistent with his own view of the universe as composed of 
matter and motion. All human thought and action is 
reducible to the motion of certain internal organs and 
particles 
motions) 
of matter 
according to 
in response to external stimuli (i.e. 
causal laws. As Samuel Mintz 
observes, "Hobbes never considered the possibility that the 
product of mental activity--thought--is different in kind 
from the physical processes which given rise to it" (Mintz, 
pp.65-66). To say human beings are free within this strict 
causal schema is only to say that they are not hindered in 
acting upon their choices by external impediments; all 
animal motion, choices or actions, is voluntary but causally 
determined. Deliberation leading to a choice or action is a 
succession of phantasms passing across the mind (all 
explained as matter and motion), terminating in an act of 
will which causes the body to act or not act. Further, 
there is no truly creative imagination, except the 
"creative" compounding of previous images, since imagination 
itself is described as internal motion in the brain and is 
determined in the same ways as any other motion. The desire 
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to acquire what is pleasurable and to avoid what is painful 
are the governing motivations for all human behavior 
(manifested as fear of death, or desire to acquire power, 
etc.); and both are explicable in material, mechanical 
terms. 
Social interaction, as well, is explicable in 
mechanical terms, the most important being power. Thus, the 
total picture Hobbes gives of human nature is mechyanistic 
and egoistic: human beings are psychological egoists 
(hedonists) seeking their own good. As J.W.N. Watkins 
characterizes Hobbes' description of human nature 
This man, according to Hobbes's picture of him, 
is a sort of engine governed by its mainspring or heart. 
This picture yields various psychological principles, 
some testable, some untestable. Among the latter is the 
principle that men are essentially egocentric. What a 
man desires is determined by what encourages his vital 
motion; and he can pursue only what he desires ... 
(Watkins, pp. 110-111) 
From this mechanistic picture of human nature Hobbes 
drew out the two principles he would use to demonstrate the 
necessity of contracts or covenants and the basis of moral 
and civil prudence: 
... the one arising from the concupiscible part, 
which desires to appropriate to itself the use of those 
things in which all others have a joint interest; the 
other proceeding from the rational which teaches every 
man to fly a contra-natural dissolution, as the greatest 
mischief that can arrive from nature. (E.W. II, vii) 
Thus, everything human beings do, they do out of the 
desire for power or from the fear of an untimely death, as 
Peters explains: 
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The fear of death, especially violent death, 
which encompasses all the aversions, alone can damp down 
the jet of appetite. The appearances, our pretentions 
to generosity or to disinterestedness, are but cloaks to 
hide the struggle between egoistic motives; the reality 
beneath is the thrust and recoil of a pleasure-pain 
calculating machine. (Peters, p.143) 
Earlier we noted that what is 'good' or 'evil' is 
relative to the individual agent for Hobbes, good being the 
object of the agent's desire, evil being the object of the 
agent's aversion (E.W. III, 41). There is no metaphysical 
or objective content to either term, such that we could 
derive any common rule of good and evil from the nature of 
the objects themselves (E.W. III, 41). What the term 
'good' is applied to is a defined relatively "to the 
emotions, desires, or interests of the person using it" 
(Peters, p.151). Thus, goodness, for Hobbes, was the 
capacity of an object to attract us (E.W. V, 192). There 
is, however, a certain generality to the terms, as Laird 
says 
Evil was actually molestum (E.W. III, 42), an 
objective damage or hurt, and pleasure ... was a physical 
occurrence that corroborated vital motion. Again, 
Hobbes habitually regarded death as the greatest of all 
evils, not only because dying was painful, but also and 
chiefly because death implied 'the loss of all power' 
(E.W. IV, 83), (Laird, p.170) 
Thus, Hobbes' conception of good and evil are not totally 
subjective, it is not the case that any statement about 
goodness or evil will be a purely psychological statement 
about the agent. Rather, Hobbes simply anticipates many 
modern philosophers by noting that it is not any definite 
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quality in the object itself that we refer to when we speak 
of goodness or evil, although we call the object good or 
evil in virtue of some property it possesses. The qualities 
we identify vary from person to person and from circumstance 
to circumstance. The only "common rule", then, is the 
understanding of the speaker and the audience as to what the 
term means. Each person's desires ultimately determine what 
qualities they seek or avoid. 
Hobbes further refined his analysis by connecting 
goodness to reason, which allowed him to distinguish short-
and long-term goods. "Reason declaring peace to be good, it 
follows by the same reason, that all the necessary means to 
peace be good also" (E.W. II, 48). This contrasts to our 
irrational appetite for the most immediate present good, 
even at the cost of forgoing what is good in the long run 
(peace, in this case). Hobbes, however, believing that he 
understood human nature, and human beings are by nature 
rational, declared that peace was what any rational person 
would desire if they correctly understood their permanent, 
long-term interests. Peters elaborates 
A man may not in fact desire peace at a 
particular moment; but he would desire it if he 
reflected calmly on what would give him pleasure on the 
whole and in the long run. Sobered by fear of death he 
would see the desirability of peace and of the means 
necessary to attain it ... And all men were in part 
rational because of their fear of death. This analysis 
preserves the reference to desire as part of the meaning 
of 'good', but 'object of desire' is expanded to include 
what a man would desire if he were rational. (Peters, 
p.154) 
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This fuller analysis paves the way directly for Hobbes' use 
of his psychological principles to demonstrate the necessity 
of contracts and the fundamentals of moral and civil 
prudence. 
The demonstration of moral principles, for Hobbes, 
was a matter of deriving them from his postulates describing 
human nature. The set of principles or laws to be derived 
would apply not simply to the individual agent, but to the 
governing of social relations between individuals, 
generally. Morality is the extension of the principles of 
inidividual good to what is good in relation to others. 
That these moral principles were to be derived from an 
analysis of human nature, from psychological postulates, was 
dictated by the nature of Hobbes' methodology. According to 
Watkins 
His resoluto-compositive method precluded any 
appeal to external norms, any importing of extraneous 
considerations into his civil philosophy. It confined 
him to the analysis of existing society into its 
individual parts; to the establishing of the principles 
which govern their behaviour; and to derivations from 
these. If this yields prescriptions or imperatives, 
these can only have been derived from these 
psychological principles. (Watkins, p.77} 
In addition to the influence of the constraints of 
his methodology, Hobbes' derivation of social rules was also 
influenced by certain aspects of classical natural law 
theory. The idea that mor~lity concerned the derivation of 
the rules that must be accepted to limit the pursuit of good 
When others are affected and that there was a small number 
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of such rules called laws of nature goes back to the Stoics 
(Peters, p.155). The Stoics regarded this body of rules as 
universally binding and in no way conventional in the way 
the laws of particular governments were conventional. With 
the coming of Christianity, "The system of natural law came 
gradually to be regarded as a selection from God's rules for 
man which could be rationally discerned as distinct from 
being supernaturally revealed" (Peters, p.156). During the 
Renaissance, interest was focused on man as an individual, 
and so the law of nature came to be regarded as rooted in 
man-the-individual, who nevertheless resembled all other 
individuals in various respects. But natural law was not 
derivative from man's civic or 
(Peters, p.156). 
ecclesiastical status 
During the era of religious contoversy immediately 
prior to and during Hobbes' lifetime, natural law theory was 
popular in its latest form which put binding restraints on 
kings as well as subjects, thereby limiting absolutism. 
Finally, the Dutchman Grotius tried to translate natural law 
into a scientifically established set of rules on which a 
system of international law could be erected. Grotius 
attempted to demonstrate that law had an "axiomatic 
foundation in self-evident principles which were clear and 
distinct to any rational being" (Peters, p.157). Thus 
Grotius had attempted a Galilean resolution of the nature of 
law, one that certainly would have appealed to Hobbes. 
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Natural law theory, then, was something readily available to 
Hobbes, as he sought a way to articulate his account of 
political life and obligation. 
What resulted from Hobbes' assimilation of these two 
threads of thought was a natural law theory that was 
grounded in the psychological principles of human nature. 
More specifically, Hobbes believed that he could derive 
roughly the same set of laws as Grotius from his own view of 
humans as beings who are both rational and afraid of death. 
That is, and here is Hobbes' o~iginal interpretation of 
natural law theory, he reduced natural laws to maxims of 
prudence. This is a major aspect of MP interpretation. 
Since there can be no transcendent principles of morality on 
Hobbes' materialistic view of the universe, and since human 
psychology is the only source available for deriving moral 
rules, and since human nature is egoistic, the laws of 
nature must be those that serve individual self-interest 
within a social setting. Or, as Watkins states it, "the so 
called 'moral' law, or law of nature, consists of precepts 
or general rules found out by rational derivation from 
principles which all individuals, given their passionate 
make-up, will assent ... the law that tells us how to live 
with other men--is securely anchored in our deepest wants" 
(Watkins, p.84). The laws of nature are maxims of prudence 
insofar as 'prudence' is limited to considerations affecting 
only the individual agent. 
44 
A LAW OF NATURE, lex naturalis, is a precept or 
general rule, found out by reason, by which a man is 
forbidden to do that, which is destructive of his life, 
or taketh away that means of preserving the same; and to 
omit that, by which he thinketh it may be .best 
preserved ... (E.W. III, 116-117) 
Finally, it is clear, according to MP, that Hobbes' 
laws of nature are not moral laws in the traditional sense 
which separates morality from prudence. Hobbes, as Watkins 
asserts, should be seen as a reductionist who reduced all 
moral laws to prudential, non-moral, hypothetical 
imperatives. For it would be a mistake to interpret Hobbes' 
talk of natural laws as 'moral' laws distinct from a 
prudential character in the same way it would be a mistake 
to cite Copernicus' use of the term 'sunrise' as evidence 
that he had abandoned his heliocentric thesis (Watkins, 
p.83). In other words, Hobbes had collapsed "the ought/want 
dualism into a single system of basic wants and proven 
hypothetical imperatives" (Watkins, p.85). 
Hobbes maintained more or less the same set of rules 
that Grotius had derived, but Hobbes held that they were 
axioms that any person who was rational and afraid of death 
had to accept. Basic egoistic human nature is such that 
humans shun death "by a certain impulsion of nature" and 
"there is nothing he can make use of, that may not be a help 
unto him, in preserving his life against his enemies" (E.W. 
III, 117). It is this aspect of our nature that saves us, 
for as Hobbes says, if it were only our irrational or 
'concupiscible' side that governed our actions there would 
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be no society and life would be "solitary, poor, nasty, 
brutish, and short" (E.W. III, 113). Without restraint on 
such irrational, self-serving actions humans would .find 
themselves in constant war with each other for those things 
that best satisfy their own desires; they would, that is, 
find themselves in that state of constant warfare of all 
against all that Hobbes calls the State of Nature. If only 
our irrational side ruled us we would die in the struggle in 
the State of Nature, especially given the relative equality 
between people in body and mind, such that even the weakest 
is capable of destroying the strongest. Hobbes describes 
the evils of such a state as follows: 
In such condition, there is no place for 
industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and 
consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor 
use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no 
commodious building; no instruments of moving, and 
removing, such things as require much force; no 
knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; 
no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of 
all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and 
the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and 
short. (E.W. III, 113) 
However, the fear of death does cause people to stop 
their pursuit of personal interest to reflect upon the 
conditions around them and the predicament they are in as a 
result of following their drives for power and precedence. 
Fear causes people to search for a way out of their 
predicament. It is reason that provides the way itself. 
That is, it is the passions of human beings that have 
created the aversive conditions they find themselves in; and 
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it must be reason that alters the passions' control of human 
action to allow them to escape the State of Nature. Reason, 
for Hobbes, is in itself without force or power to influence 
the actions of people. Rather it is simply a tool, either 
used or rejected, of the passions, i.e., the pleasures and 
displeasures, of people (Gotesky, p.419). Historically, 
Hobbes writes, "as oft as reason is against, so oft will a 
man be against reason" (E.W. IV, xiii). Reason can guide 
people toward peace (the opposite condition of war) and 
justice "only when it is employed in the discovery of those 
principles by means of which the passions can be controlled 
and utilized; and only as man grows in understanding of his 
passions can he effectively use them to live the life of 
reason, of precept" (Gotesky, p.419). 
What reason shows is that peace is the truly natural 
condition for human beings, because peace and security are 
the condition of those who live in terms of their whole 
natures (passions and reason), of their whole rational being 
within the order of nature. The Laws of Nature are derived 
by reason from reflection upon the passions; prudence alone 
cannot accomplish this. The actions guided solely by 
prudence or passion are often violent or contradictory, as 
in the State of Nature, and set people against each other. 
The Laws of Nature, 
such opposition if 
on the other hand, never put people in 
they are followed. Therefore, the 
Passions (or prudence) alone cannot point to the ways of 
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peace (E.W. IV, 87). Reason is required to clarify the 
nature of the passions and to show how they can best be 
satisfied without catastrophic results. Reason probes for 
the essential objects of the passions and, having discovered 
them, frames the Laws of Nature such that following them 
will allow a person to attain these objects without being 
destroyed. 
Every man by natural passion, calleth that good 
which pleaseth him for the present, or so far forth as 
he can foresee; and in like manner, that which 
displeaseth him, evil. And therefore he that foreseeth 
the whole way to his preservation, which is the end that 
every one by nature aimeth at, must also call it good, 
and the contrary evil. And this is that good and evil, 
which not every man in passion calleth so, but all men 
by reason. And therefore the fulfilling of all these 
laws is good in reason, and the breaking of them evil. 
(E.W. IV, 109) 
For Hobbes, then, prudence alone cannot, or does not 
cause vital motions sufficient to guide appetite and animal 
motion toward peace. Hobbes' explanation of the psychology 
of human action had more than a passing agreement with his 
materialism, as Laird says, "since he was at pains to show 
that men's appetites were literally physical motions, and 
habitually assumed that appetite had to be tutored by sense, 
imagination, and reason" (Laird, p.162). Since reason is 
nothing other than a particular set of motions in the brain 
and since these motions, like others called prudence, cause 
motions in the regions around the heart, and thus affect the 
Vital motions, it follows that reason differs from prudence 
only in its capacity to handle many more aspects of 
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experience than prudence through the use of manipulation of 
language. 
Prudence cannot form a conception of long-range 
goods such as peace and security that will affect the vital 
motions such that peace will be chosen over the immedite 
satisfaction of lesser desires (the ataining of immediate 
but lesser goods). But reason can conceive peace and 
security, can grasp the causes of people's misery in the 
state of war caused by the guidance of prudence alone, and 
thereby can form a conception of how to avoid this 
condition. It is the limitation of prudence's ability that 
leads human beings to a state of unhappiness, not a flaw in 
prudence itself. Reason, by virtue of its ability to 
conceptualize, constructs a scenario wherein people assign 
their equal powers to one person who acts as the coercive 
agent necessary to ensure total peace. That is, reason 
formulates the conception of peace and security by 
recognizing that the conditions of a life guided solely by 
passion or prudence are self-destructive in the long run, 
and also imagines or visualizes the way around such a life. 
Reason, then, shows us that peace is necessary for 
our survival and that there are certain articles of peace, 
or what Hobbes calls laws of nature, upon which we can base 
our agreement to abide by their provisions. Even in the 
State of Nature human beings can know the laws which are 
consistent with the egoistic drive for survival; for Hobbes, 
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we can explicate the rationale for any civil society by 
deriving these rules using Galilean resolution from the 
underlying motivations of the members of a society. The 
point here is "to show what sort of rules and conventions 
for civil society man as a natural machine must necessarily 
assent to and need to have supported by the sword of the 
sovereign" (Peters, p.16O). Thus, the derivation of the 
laws of nature demonstrates that peace is necessary and that 
a covenant must be formed to ensure that the articles of 
peace are followed. In other words, the covenant is 
necessary to ensure moral and civil prudence. Accordingly, 
Hobbes' derivation and articulation of the key laws of 
nature focuses on these points: 
And because the condition of man ... is a 
condition of war of every one against every one ... in 
such a condition, every man has a right to every 
thing ... therefore as long as this natural 
right ... endureth, there can be no security to any man, 
how strong or wise soever he be, of living out the time, 
which nature ordinarily alloweth men to live. And 
consequently, it is a precept, or general rule of 
reason, that every man, ought to endeavor peace, as far 
as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot 
obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and 
advantages of war. The first branch of which rule, 
containeth the first, and fundamental law of nature; 
which is, to seek peace, and follow it. The second, the 
sum of the right of nature; which is, by all means we 
can, to defend ourselves. 
From this ... is derived this second law; that a 
man be willing, when others are so too, as far-forth as 
for peace, and defense of himself he shall think it 
necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and he 
contented with so much liberty against other men, as he 
would allow other men against himself ... 
it; or 
hath in 
right; 
Right is laid aside, either by simply renouncing 
by transferring it to another .... And when a man 
either manner abandoned, or granted away his 
then it is he said to be OBLIGED, or BOUND, not 
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to hinder those, to whom such right is granted, or 
abandoned, from the benefit of it: and that he ought, 
and it is his DUTY, not to make void that voluntary act 
of his own ... 
The mutual transferring of right is that which 
men call CONTRACT ... 
From that law of nature, by which, we are 
obliged to transfer to another, such rights, as being 
retained hinder the peace of mankind, there followeth a 
third; which is this, that men perform their covenants 
made: without which, covenants are in vain, and but 
empty words; and the right of all men to all things 
remaining, we are still in the condition of war. (E.W. 
III, 117-130) 
Thus, Hobbes demonstrates the necessity of the covenant and 
the obligation to keep it from the laws of nature which are, 
in turn, derived from the analysis of human nature and 
psychology. Here Hobbes' natural law of contracts simply 
reflects his perception of what is necessary for a person to 
do to preserve their life, assuming the desire to preserve 
it exists. The "ought" is derived from a simple causal 
analysis: "Given the nature of human drives, a particular 
effect (preservation of life) will result from a particular 
cause (keeping contracts)" (Jones, p.147), and, Hobbes 
holds, from it alone. 
Hobbes' demonstration seems most valid if we view it 
as an example of a Galilean "thought-experiment" rather than 
as an empirical or factual description. What Hobbes has 
done is to isolate the irrational and rational aspects of 
human nature as he saw it, and then in Galilean to fashion 
explore each independently to uncover the consequences of 
following one or the other's dictates exclusively. The war 
of the State of Nature is necessary given only human self-
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assertiveness and egoistic motivation. But given the 
overwhelming fear of death humans will accept the conditions 
necessary to avoid death. As Peters describes Hobbes' moves 
here: 
He was conducting a Galilean experiment of the 
imaginary sort--a resolution of society into its clear 
and distinct parts so as to reconstruct the whole in 
order of logical dependence rather than of historical 
genesis. He could thus treat men 'as if but now sprung 
out of the earth and suddenly, like mushrooms, come to 
full maturity' (E.W. II, 109). Having isolated the 
underlying movements of men towards each other--their 
desire for power--he deduced the consequences that 
followed from this postulate alone. This was the state 
of war ... 
Having shown the logical consequences of man's 
desire for power, Hobbes passed to the other clear and 
distinct component, the fear of death .... In the calmness 
occasioned by this overwhelming fear man's reason 
informs him that peace is a necessity for survival and 
it also 'suggesteth convenient articles of peace, upon 
which men may be drawn to agreement' ... (Peters, pp.158-
159) 
From here the compositive step begins: 
If these two components were now put 
together ... men would be demonstrated as poised 
precariously between civil society, which was the 
ultimate consequence of accepting the laws of nature and 
enforcing them by the sword of the sovereign, and the 
state of nature. (Peters, p.161) 
And, of course, the necessity of avoiding the State of 
Nature causes men to accept natural law and the rules of the 
sovereign. 
The rationale behind Hobbes' derivation of the 
necessity of the covenant and the acceptance of the 
sovereign is the chaotic state of English politics in 
Hobbes' time. Hobbes' an~lysis is a Galilean resolution of 
this situation into the simple components of human nature 
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that are ultimately the basis of it. So far as humans are 
egoistic and rational, they must recognize human nature for 
what it is and see that there are certain necessary means to 
be accepted to obtain the pease and security they desire. 
Acceptance of these social rules is based on the fear of 
death and the desire for self-preservation; and it is only 
the fear of death that can ensure that the rules are obeyed, 
as Peters points out: "Fear of punishment is the cause of 
political obedience; were it no for the fact that the sword 
dangles over the head of every member of a state, not motive 
would be strong enough to counteract the disruptive passions 
of men'' (Peters, p.194). Or, as Sabine puts it, "Strictly 
speaking he is saying merely that in order to cooperate men 
must do what they dislike to do, on pain of consequences 
which they dislike still more. In no other sense is there 
logically any obligation in Hobbes's system" (Sabine, 
p.469). The last element of Hobbes' system, his political 
theory, according to MP, simply applies these conclusions to 
the structuring of the State. 
D. POLITICAL THEORY 
The transition from political history to 
political science came when Hobbes asserted that the 
state could be regarded as a wholly artificial body, 
analogous to a geometrical figure. We, the citizens, 
are surely the consitituent matter of the state, and 
surely our adherence to the laws is the cause of the 
state's generation and existence, as our adherence to 
geometrical rules generates figures. Was not the state 
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in this sense an artificial body created by our art? 
And since we ourselves construct the state, could we not 
understand the properties and implications of civic 
institutions simply by deducing the consequences of our 
own voluntary motions? (Reik, p.64) 
The analysis of the nature of the State followed the same 
methodology as the analysis of human psychology; for the 
state is nothing more than an artificial body constructed by 
humans. The same causal laws that govern all bodies will 
therefore govern the actions of the constituent parts and 
causes of the State and will be explicable using the same 
mechanistic method of analysis that had been used throughout 
Hobbes' work. 
Hobbes' aim was to demonstrate the necessity of 
accepting an absolute sovereign (a monarch, preferably, but 
he left the choices open) in order to prevent, through the 
coersion of laws, the return of the anarchy of the State of 
Nature, which would otherwise eventually overcome the 
rational agreement to the terms of the covenant, given the 
nature of human passion and egoistic desire. There must be 
a State empowered to enforce the terms of the covenant, 
Hobbes believed; otherwise the covenant could not endure and 
chaos and anarchy would continue. 
As we saw earlier, however, there was a model at 
hand by means of which Hobbes could present his Galilean 
analysis of the rationale for civil society, namely social 
contract theory, which Hobbes already knew of through the 
works of Grotius and others. The social contract model fit 
54 
Hobbes' needs almost perfectly, in that he needed a 
rationale for free and equal individuals, which people were 
in the State of Nature, to admit themselves to be bound or 
obliged at the same time that they could remain free to 
pursue their paramount interests as individuals (Peters, 
p.187). The contract provided a way to handle just this 
sort of a problem. Peters explains: 
For in a contract free and equal individuals voluntarily 
enter into a relationship which imposes obligations on 
them. And the conditions on which they are obliged can 
be written into the contract. So the contract provides 
a model for justifying the acceptance of social control 
in a way which is compatible with human dignity and 
individual liberty .... It was a logical device for 
stating certain typical demands for liberty, limited 
government by consent, and the end of traditional forms 
of authority ... The device was widespread and popular 
because of its usefulness to the rising forces of 
individualism, commercialism, and Protestantism. 
Hobbes' great ingenuity consisted in taking over this 
logical weapon and slewing it round so that its 
broadsides were directed against those who had fashioned 
it. He used it to show that absolutism was the logical 
outcome of consistent individualism. (Peters, p.188) 
Thus, Hobbes' prior analyses of human nature as egoistic and 
of the overriding concern for security allowed him to ground 
absolutism in axioms of mechanistic human nature and to 
present it as the only rationally defensible form of 
government, much to the chagrin of those who believed in 
government by consent rather than absolutism. "The 
dispositions of mean are such that except they be restrained 
through fear of some coercive power, every man will distrust 
and dread each other" (E.W. II, xiv, xv). An absolute 
sovereign would best exercise the necessary coercive force. 
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Thus, the cause of political obedience is the fear 
of punishment since without such force no motive would be 
sufficient to outweigh the drives of human appetite. Since 
humans are driven irresistably by fear, like stones rolling 
downhill, Hobbes deduced the necessity of the rule of the 
sword. Peters explains, "like men under the influence of an 
irresistable impulse, the only reasons that they would 
accept would be those indicating means to objectives 
dictated by their fear. Thus, given the de facto existence 
of civil society, Hobbes' analysis revealed fear as its only 
possible constitutive cause and self-preservation as the 
only possible reason for its institution" (Peters, p.194). 
Hobbes, anticipating the objection that fear alone would not 
be sufficient to generate civil society, writes: 
It is objected: it is so improbable that men 
should grow into civil societies out of fear, that if 
they had been afraid, they would not have endured each 
other's looks. They presume, I believe, that to fear is 
nothing else than to be affrighted. I comprehend in 
this word fear, a certain foresight of future evil; 
neither do I conceive flight the sole property of fear, 
but to distrust, suspect, take heed, provide so that 
they may not fear, is also incident to the fearful. 
They would go to sleep, shut their doors; they who 
travel, carry their swords with them, because they fear 
theives. Kingdoms guard their coasts, and frontiers 
with forts and castles; cities are compact with walls; 
and all for fear of neighboring kingdoms and towns. 
Even the strongest armies, and the most accomplished for 
fight, yet sometimes parley for peace, as fearing each 
other's power, and lest they be overcome. It is through 
fear that men secure themselves by flight, indeed, and 
in corners, if they think they cannot escape otherwise; 
but for the most part by arms and defensive weapons; 
whence it happens that daring to come forth they know 
each other's spirits. But then if they fight, civil 
society ariseth from the victory; if they agree, from 
the agreement. (E.W. II, 6n) 
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Hobbes did not take this to be an empirical or 
historical analys~s of fact, however, as did some contract 
theorists. It is rather an element in a Galilean resolutio 
of civil society into its simple elements, namely 
individuals and the traits of human nature they display. 
The State of Nature functions as a hypothetical explanation, 
a "thought-experiment", for the existing state of affairs. 
Hobbes imagines that in the State of Nature each person is 
right to protect their life and to use all means necessary 
to do so (E.W. II, 8). They also are right to obtain what 
they want and to use whatever force is necessary to get it 
(E.W. II, 10). The right to self-preservation is a right 
that one cannot be obliged to give up in the State of Nature 
simply because it is psychologically impossible for one to 
do so (Reik, p.91). For MP that is not a legal entitlement, 
nor a matter of tradition or morality: it is simply a 
psychological necessity. 
However, as we have seen, fear drives us to accept 
certain laws of nature, including the second which 
prescribes that every person should lay down their right to 
all things and be content with liberty equal to that which 
everyone has against him. This is accomplished by the 
agreement of everyone to the terms of the covenant already 
outlined, and is a matter of transferring one's rights to 
another so that the transferrer is obliged not to hinder the 
recipient. This, Hobbes says 
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... is the generation of the great LEVIATHAN, or rather, 
to speak more reverently, of that mortal god to which we 
owe under the immortal God, our peace and defense. For 
by this authority, given him by every particular man in 
the commonwealth, he hath the use of so much power and 
strength conferred upon him, that by terror thereof, he 
is enabled to perform the wills of them all, to peace at 
home, and mutual aid against their enemies abroad ... 
And he that carrieth this person, is called 
SOVEREIGN, and said to have sovereign power; and every 
one besides, his subject. (E.W. III, 158). 
so, is fear by which the sovereign ensures that it is never 
to anyone's advantage to violate the terms of the covenant 
even when it seems to be to their advantage to do so 
(usually from theperspective of short-term interest as 
perceived by the person's passions rather than by reason). 
The contract functions as if each person has 
authority the State to have and use their two rights of 
nature, thereby making "artificial chains, called civil 
laws, which they themselves by mutual covenants, have 
fastened at one end to the lips of that man, or assembly, to 
whom they have given the sovereign power; and at the other 
end to their own ears" (E.W. III, 198). In obeying the 
sovereign and the civil laws each person is submitting to 
laws they had taken part in instituting and was therefore 
exercising their liberty in obeying laws that were conducive 
to obtaining the ends of internal peace and security 
(Peters, p.207). The State or Commonwealth thus is created 
by the voluntary agreement that unites a group of 
individuals into a whole, into one artificial "person". The 
ruler that results is called the sovereign and is created by 
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the contract, through not a party to it. 
Hobbes, using the Galilean resoluto-compositive 
method, has shown that the creation of the State results 
from the motive of fear of death as the only motive 
sufficient to counteract individuals' self-assertion, and 
finally deduces that the State must be strong enough to 
enforce its will through fear as well. To maintain security 
and preserve life the State must be able to force obedience 
to unsavory commands. Punishment or threat of punishment is 
the force behind the state's ability to do so. The 
necessity of having the power to punish and of having the 
ability to best secure peace dictates a certain structure 
for the sovereignty, according to Hobbes. That is, Hobbes 
believes that the sovereign must be such as to be able to 
accomplish these ends. Moreover, the sovereign best able to 
do so, Hobbes says, is one that is perpetual, absolute, and 
unitary. 
For to divide or limit sovereignty would be 
illogical. There would be a constant danger of the 
sovereign speaking with a divided voice and being unable 
to enforce his commands; and since safety is the sole 
reason for the institution of a sovereign, and since 
these limitations on sovereignty would endanger the 
safety of the subject, individuals could not logically 
institute a sovereign who whould perhaps be unable to 
perform effectively the functions for which he had been 
instituted . ... And complete safety entails complete 
submission to a sovereign. Absolutism is the logical 
consequence of government by popular comsent once the 
real interests of any man in consenting to government 
are properly realized. (Peters, p.194) 
Thus, complete safety entails complete submission and an 
absolute sovereign is the logical end of Hobbes' analysis. 
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This conclusion ends Hobbes' scientific resolution of the 
nature of the political obligations of the citizens of any 
state, and the best political structure for that State. 
To summarize MP, we can trace the steps Hobbes has 
taken as the advocates of this view posit them: 
1) Hobbes begins with a method and view of the 
universe as matter and motion, taken from the new science of 
Galileo. 
2) The model of all behavior is the falling body's 
conformity to mechanical law. 
3) Acceptance of the method rules out any non-
physical explanations of anything--especially obligation. 
4) All things have one universal cause--motion. 
5) External motions produce thought, reactions to 
external motions are drives toward self-preservation 
(aversion/attraction to pain or pleasure). 
6) The State of Nature is war, causally derived from 
a material causal chain. 
7) Prudence, desire for survival, and reason spur 
human beings to seek an end to this state of war; the cause 
of the solution is the contractual formation of civil 
society. 
8) The need to ensure that no one will break the 
contract to the detriment of the others shows that some way 
of keeping contracts is necessary. This is fear of 
punishment which, as the ground of political obligation now 
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becomes a central element in civil society. 
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The crucial 
interpretations of 
CHAPTER II 
THE NATURAL LAW THESIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
point of departure for the various 
Hobbes' theory of obligation is the 
question of the meaning, status, and content of natural 
laws. The question of the status of natural law is 
important due to its intimate connection with the whole 
problem of the grounds of political obligation. Where the 
traditionalist thesis requires viewing natural laws as 
maxims of prudence, the moral interpretation views them as 
deontological or as moral imperatives. Despite various 
differences, A.E. Taylor, Howard Warrender, and F.C. Hood, 
the major exponents of the natural law view, share the 
belief that the basic source of Hobbes' political thought is 
not to be found in his natural philosophy. Rather, they 
believe, it is to be found in some interpretation of his use 
of a natural law morality. 
Beginning with the traditional interpretation, it 
was usually held that Hobbes does not have a genuine theory 
of moral obligation since he admits only prudential motives 
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of self-interest for human actions. However, the proponents 
of the moral interpretation claim that 
... not only does this charge beg the question of whether 
the moral quality of an obligation is a function of the 
motives men have for complying with it; it is also very 
difficult to reconcile with the universal validity which 
Hobbes attributes to the laws of nature and the 
requirement contained in his doctrine of obligations of 
conscience that all men make a sincere estimate of the 
dangers involved in covenanting with others (Olafson, 
p.24). 
The issue becomes one of establishing the claim that the 
laws of nature are divine moral commands within Hobbes' 
theory of obligation. 
In general, the natural law interpretation construes 
self-interest in terms of compliance with the natural law 
and makes the individual's well-being causally dependent 
upon a sincere effort to obey these laws. The only way this 
can be done successfully is if the laws themselves are 
commands addressed to all human beings by an obliger who is 
capable of punishing those who do not obey. Within Hobbes' 
system God functions as that authority. Given the role of 
God in Hobbes' system, the connection between self-interest 
and compliance with the laws of nature becomes direct and 
necessary, in contrast with the more traditional view of 
obligation as the predictable natural consequences of acting 
in one way or another. 
The moral interpretation is predicated upon the 
belief that Hobbes was more or less following in the path of 
classic natural law theory. The central contentions of 
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classic natural law theory were adopted and used by Hobbes 
as the basis of his theory of obligation. What are these 
contentions? 
(1) The ruler or legislator is under a moral 
obligation to create positive laws that conform to a 
higher or natural law which is the law insofar as the 
latter becomes accessible to human comprehension. 
(2) The subject is under a moral obligation to 
obey the laws set for him by the ruler so long as these 
are consistent with the natural law which is superior to 
both the sovereign and the people. When they are 
compatible, the subject has a moral duty to obey the 
positive law; when not, he is dispensed of the duty of 
obligation. 
(3) Underlying this whole conception of 
political obligation there is the belief that the 
positive law, in order to qualify as law, must be 
derivable from the natural law by processes of deduction 
and specification and that such derivability can be 
established by purely rational means. (Olafson, p.16) 
These basic features of natural law theory seem to 
substantiate the belief that obligation, for Hobbes, is a 
moral duty. "Appeal-to-God" and "appeal-to-duty" arguments 
are given by both Taylor and Warrender, while Hood bases his 
case almost exclusively on a Scripturally-based appeal-to-
God. There is little or no use of Hobbes' natural 
philosophy to ground obligation, though it is true that 
Hobbes couched his natural law theory in the language of the 
new science. The following chapter will outline the 
arguments used by Taylor, Warrender, and Hood to 
substantiate this interpretation. Since both Warrender's 
and Hood's books contain vast numbers of details, fine 
linguistic distinctions, and material not limited to Hobbes' 
66 
theory of obligation, I will not attempt full detailed 
summaries of their entire books. I will present the central 
elements of their respective interpretations of obligation, 
as well as some points of comparison. 
B. THE TAYLOR THESIS 
1. Taylor's Divergence from the Traditional View 
Taylor, Warrender, and Hood all reject 
in Chapter I. traditional interpretation presented 
seem to be three reasons underlying the distinction 
the 
There 
they 
maintain between Hobbes' ethical theory and his egoistic 
psychology (Brown, pp.33-34): 
1) As Taylor points out, there are passages in which 
Hobbes discusses obligation using language that cannot be 
explained on the egoistic/mechanistic model: the most 
familiar example being Hobbes' assertion that human beings 
are obliged in foro interno to keep covenants even in the 
State of Nature. Others include his treatment of obligation 
in terms of covenants and submission, and his lists of 
duties of sovereigns to their subjects. Given these 
passages, one must either assume that Hobbes is 
systematically inconsistent or that the traditional view is 
in error and need of revision. 
2) If the traditional view is correct, Hobbes' 
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ethical theory will be false or untenable if psychological 
egoism is false. But Hobbes' psychological egoism, as a 
descriptive theory of motivation, now seems quite crude and 
plainly false. Therefore, if we are to take Hobbes 
seriously and read him sympathetically with a view to 
determining the plausibility of his ethical theory, we must 
look with suspicion at the traditional view. We must assume 
that his ethical theory could turn out to be logically 
independent of his psychology. 
3) Even if Hobbes himself failed to distinguish 
clearly between questions in moral philosophy and empirical 
psychology, we do make such distinctions and must determine 
whether Hobbes could, in principle, have done so without 
damage to his theory. 
Taylor, in his article, "The Ethical Doctrine of 
Thomas Hobbes", separates himself from the traditional 
interpretation first by noting that the false perspective on 
Hobbes maintained in this view is due largely to a 
concentration upon the Leviathan. He bases his view more 
upon De Cive. From the Leviathan comes the mistaken 
impression that the 'ought' of political obligation comes 
from personal interest, i.e., from psychological egoism. By 
concentrating upon the Leviathan the average reader gets the 
impression that a good man ought to (has a duty to) obey the 
Political sovereign without question and that the reason why 
he ought to do this is equally simple: he stands pe~sonally 
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to lose by doing anything else, and the object of every 
man's desire is 'always some good to himself'. To say "this 
is to my interest" is equivalent to saying that it is my 
duty; my duty, in fact, means my personal interest calmly 
understood (Taylor, "Doctrine", p.36). 
Taylor believes that this is not all there is to 
Hobbes. There are really two distinct questions before 
Hobbes: "why ought I behave as a good citizen" and "what 
inducement can be given to me to do so if my knowledge of 
the obligation to do so is not in itself sufficiently 
effective?" According to Taylor, Hobbes thought that, 
psychologically, a person would violate the law if it was in 
his own interest. Thus, he had to argue that doing so would 
not be in their best interest. The analysis of the State of 
Nature does this, but this is really secondary. The answer 
to the first question is quite different, and precedes that 
analysis of the State of Nature: to break a covenant is an 
iniquity. For Taylor, "Hobbes's ethical doctrine proper, 
disengaged from an egoistic psychology with which it has no 
logically necessary connection, is a very strict deontology, 
curiously suggestive, though with interesting differences, 
of some of the characteristic theses of Kant (Taylor, 
"Doctrine", p.37). 
To substantiate this, Taylor points to a passage in 
De Cive wherein Hobbes explains: 
When the words are applied to persons, to be 
just signifies to be delighted in just dealing, to study 
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how to do righteousness, or to endeavor in all things to 
do that which is just; and to be unjust is to neglect 
righteous dealing, or to think it is to be measured not 
according to my contract, but some present benefit .... 
That man is to be accounted just, who doth just things 
because the law commands it, unjust things only by 
reason of his infirmity; and he is properly said to be 
injust, who doth righteousness for fear of the 
punishment annexed unto the law, and unrighteousness by 
reason of the iniquity of his mind. (E.W. II, 32-33) 
Taylor concludes: 
This is precisely Kant's distinction between 
action done merely in accord with law and action done 
from law, with the characteristic difference that Hobbes 
is trying to reduce the law from which the virtuous man 
acts to the single law that a promise once duly 
fulfilled must be kept ... The thought here is at bottom 
the same as Kant's, but for the differences that (1) 
Hobbes ... reduces all injury to the violation of an 
express or implied promise; (2) and he has not, like 
Kant, thought of the 'universalizing of a maxim' as a 
criterion of its freedom from contradiction. But the 
really important point is that Hobbes agrees with Kant 
on the 'imperative' character of the moral law, exactly 
as he agrees with him in the assertion that it is the 
law of 'right reason'. (Taylor, "Doctrine", p.39) 
This, Taylor argues,is obscured from the casual 
reader by the fact that Hobbes also repeatedly describes the 
contents of that law as 'theorems' discovered by our reason 
(like those of mathematics), and even goes so far as to say 
that these theorems only become laws proper in civil 
society. Once we note the character of Hobbes' argument 
above, we see, says Taylor, that his theory of obligation is 
a moral deontology. 
2. The Laws of Nature 
a. Laws As Dictates 
70 
The fundamental disagreement between the moral view 
and the traditional view is the treatment of the 
characterization of the Laws of Nature. Taylor notes that 
in the Leviathan they are called precepts of prudence, but 
in De Cive and The Elements of Law they are described as 
"divine laws in respect of the author thereof, God Almighty" 
(E.W. II, 50; Laws I, 18, sec.l). He says that the 
traditional view interprets the contradictory passages such 
that outside society (in the State of Nature) the basis of 
law is taken to be prudence (it pays a person better to keep 
his word than to break it), while in society they are 
converted into imperatives by the sovereign who imports the 
'thou shalt' into them by making covenant-breaking 
actionable in his courts. 
Taylor 
difficulties. 
feels this view is fraught with insufferable 
The first problem is that Hobbes always 
refers to natural laws as dictates, not as pieces of advice, 
even when referring to the State of Nature; the very use of 
this language implies their imperative character. Even 
given the use of the term 'theorem' in Hobbes, one can see 
that the imperative character of the law is inseparable from 
it. That is, "Hobbes regularly says of his natural law that 
it is a 'theorem' which forbids certain actions, and uses 
imperative or quasi-imperative language in his formulation 
of them (De Cive II, l; Leviathan, XIV) (Taylor, "Doctrine'', 
P-41). 
71 
The recognition of this point is the key to 
Taylor's thesis. While Hobbes does argue that laws of 
nature are articles of peace and does state that violating 
the Laws of Nature produces negative personal consequences, 
Taylor holds strongly that this is not all that Hobbes 
argues. The concept that Laws of Nature forbid certain 
actions is central to Taylor's position which he explicates 
as follows: 
... if this is all there is to be said against breach of 
covenant, right and wrong, as distinguished from mere 
prudence and imprudence, will have no more existence in 
the civil society than they had in the supposed 'state 
of nature'. If all that Hobbes really means by calling 
rebellion wrong is that the chances are usually against 
the rebel, he would have done better to base his case 
against disobedience simply on the de facto strength of 
the 'sovereign', without the very artifical attempt to 
justify his authority by a supposed consent of his 
subjects. Clearly Hobbes means something more, and that 
he does so is shown by the very suggestive language of 
his definition of a law of nature; such a law is said to 
be a 'precept or general Rule, found out by Reason, by 
which a man is forbidden to do that which is destructive 
to his life ... ' The important word here is 'forbidden'. 
Reason, it seems, not merely discovers that a certain 
course of conduct will destroy my life; it prohibits 
that conduct. The law is, after all, not simply a 
theorem to be expressed in the indictive mood; it is a 
command, an imperative. (Taylor, "Apology", p.137) 
In strict accordance with this recognition of the 
imperativeness of the law, Hobbes always states that 
obligation is not created by the sovereign when he gives 
orders fortified by threats of penalties. Taylor interprets 
Hobbes as saying that the moral obligation to obey natural 
laws is prior to civil society and sovereignty. The Laws of 
Nature, even in the State of Nature, oblige in foro interno. 
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sere, Taylor thinks, Hobbes has let ambiguity creep in, and 
says, "Hobbes could have conveyed his meaning more 
unambiguously perhaps,if he had laid more stress on the 
point that the fundamental law of nature and morals, as he 
conceives it, is a law of reciprocal obligation: what it 
commands is peace with him who is willing also to be at 
peace with me, 
may be found 1 , 
'that peace is to be sought after, where it 
'that everyman ought to endeavor Peace, as 
farre as he has hope of obtaining it'" (Taylor, "Doctrine", 
p.41), Elsewhere Taylor makes the same point by saying that 
in the State of Nature people have to judge for themselves 
what precautions for self-protection need to be taken and 
have to rely upon their own abilities to make such 
precautions effective, but that this is not a desirable 
state of things, so one must pay the price of subjection for 
the benefits of settled peace, known law, and even justice 
(Taylor, "Apology", p.135). The key factor is that Hobbes 
does not rest on the idea that a domination originally 
founded on mere violence is sufficiently justified ex post 
facto if it provides these benefits. Hobbes "cannot be 
content until he has legitimated the position of 'sovereign' 
by arguing that I am in a tacit agreement with my fellow 
subjects to take his commands as the rule of life so that to 
disobey is to be guilty of violating a solemn engagement, an 
act which is clearly immoral" (Taylor, "Apology", p.135). 
There is, also, a fuller implication of Hobbes' 
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position that his "unfriends" often overlook: "whereas the 
civil law can only be in fringed by overt acts or or words, 
the moral law is violated by an improper thought or purpose" 
(Taylor, "Doctrine", p.41). Taylor refers to two passages 
in Hobbes to support this position: 
But the laws which oblige conscience, may be 
broken by an act not only contrary to them, but also 
agreeable with them; if so be that he who does it, be of 
another opinion. For though the act itself be 
answerable to the laws, yet his conscience is against 
them. (E.W. I I, 46) 
Whatsoever Laws bind in foro interno may be 
broken, not only by a fact contrary to the Law, but also 
by a fact according to it, in case men think it 
contrary. For though the Action in this case, be 
according to the Law; yet his Purpose was against the 
Law, which where the Obligation is in foro interno is a 
breach. (E.W. III, 145) 
This leads him to assert that Hobbes can 
consistently maintain that natural law--unlike civil law--is 
immutable and eternal; what natural law forbids can never be 
lawful, what it commands can never be unlawful (E.W. II, 
46) . 
Here, however, Hobbes has a problem since he cannot 
(by reason of his nominalism) appeal to a knowledge of God's 
nature or desires as the basis of obligation; he cannot base 
the duty of obeying a moral law on the knowledge that to do 
otherwise would be to disobey a divine command. But as 
Taylor notes, for Hobbes, who had an unusually keen sense of 
duty, "it was impossible not to regard right and wrong-doing 
as, essentially, obedience and disobedience to command. 
Therefore ... he takes the only course left open to him. The 
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moral law is before everything a thing commanded" (Taylor, 
l II "APO ogy, p.133). But given the inability to appeal 
directly to God, we must say that it is the command of a 
visible and present authority, our political superior, the 
sovereign. Hence, Hobbes identified moral law with the law 
of the land. 
Taylor goes on to say that the sovereign does 
nothing to create the obligation to keep a covenant; his 
will does not create the iniquity of refusing him the 
obedience we have promised. The sovereign merely decrees 
that performing certain covenants is illegal, and prescribes 
the exact form our covenants must take to count as 
constituting a contract. The submission to the sovereign is 
a moral duty, not merely a formula for securing personal 
safety. The moral obligation is imparted from the eternal 
natural law, which is prior to the formation of civil 
society. If Hobbes is granted this view on covenants and 
their nature, then the duty of obeying the civil law is, for 
Taylor, part of a consistent deontology--we do not require 
the psychological egoism of the traditional view to be 
obligated (we may require it to be motivated though--here 
the stress on this contract may be usefully restated) since 
we are strictly bound by prior obligation to comply with the 
commands of the sovereign (Taylor, "Doctrine", pp.44-45). 
b. The Sovereign and Moral Obligation 
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Beyond the fact that psychological egoism seems 
inadequate and logically unnecessary to Hobbes' account of 
obligation, a second problem arises for the traditional view 
on Taylor's theory. It is the fact that, for Hobbes, the 
sovereign is just as much under the rigid law of moral 
obligation as any of his subjects. The laws of nature 
oblige all men, the ruler as well as the ruled, 
independently of any commands by any human being. As Ramon 
Lemos explains, 
" ... for the fulfillment of this obligation the 
sovereign is accountable only to God, the authority of 
the law of nature ... Although the sovereign cannot act 
unjustly toward his subjects, he can sin against the 
laws of nature and therefore against God; and this he 
does by iniquitously failing to fulfill his fundamental 
natural obligation to promote the safety of his 
subjects." (Lemos, p.67) 
This is precisely Taylor's view as well. Although 
not subject to mortal courts the sovereign "always has to 
reckon with the account he will yet have to render to God, 
who is no except or of persons" (Taylor, "Doctrine", p. 45) . 
For this reason, Taylor notes, the misconduct of the 
sovereign is constantly described as iniquity or sin. 
Now, in the original contract between subject and 
sovereign no conditions are imposed upon the sovereign's 
actions. How can he be guilty of iniquity if he chooses to 
rule savagely or badly, or not at all, when he breaks no 
covenants, and if iniquity and breach of covenant are the 
same thing (as Hobbes claims they are, as noted earlier)? 
Taylor's answer is simply that Hobbes is careful to insist 
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that in ruling with the single aim of the public good, the 
sovereign is doing what he is obliged to do by the natural 
1aw (Taylor, "Doctrine", p.46). 
As Taylor argues in "Apology": 
... there is clearly some law of right and wrong 
antecedent to the civil law of the 'sovereign', which 
has been declared to be the standard of justice; and if, 
as Hobbes asserts, this antecedent moral law is 'the 
natural law', how is this to be reconciled with the 
earlier explicit declaration that 'the notions of Right 
and Wrong' have no place in the state of nature? If all 
law is a command laid down by one will for the obedience 
of another, and the 'natural law' is binding on the 
'sovereign' who creates the civil law, whose will does 
the natural law express? (Taylor, "Apology", pp.140-141) 
Taylor's answer is, "it follows immediately from his 
conception of wrongdoing as transgression of a command that 
the natural law by which iniquity is forbidden must be a 
code due to the Creator" (Taylor, "Apology", p.141). 
All this finally leads Taylor to say that, although 
Hobbes makes little mention of it, there is a bargain to 
which the sovereign is a party in the formation of civil 
society. Although he is not a party to the subjects' 
agreement to give up their natural rights to all things, he 
is a beneficiary of it as the person to whom these rights 
are transferred; he accepts the transfer such that the 
powers transferred are to be exercised for the preservation 
and benefit of everyone (Taylor, "Doctrine", p.48). Given 
this analysis we have enough to explain why, even if all 
iniquity can be reduced to a breach of contract, the 
sovereign is capable of iniquity and bound by the natural 
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Jaw (which includes having a number of exacting duties 
toward the subjects). 
c. The Sovereign's Duty 
It is the fact that sovereigns have duties that is 
the final reason Taylor favors the moral view over the 
traditional view. The duty of the sovereign is 'following 
what is prescribed by law', and a law is 'the command of the 
person ... whose precept contains it in the reason of 
obedience.' If the duty of the sovereign is to follow the 
law of nature and law is a command, it follows that there 
must be a 'person' with the right to command. On the 
traditional view there should be no such person, therefore 
Taylor says, "I can only make Hobbes's statements consistent 
with one another by supposing that he meant quite seriously 
what he so often says, that the 'natural law' is the command 
of God, and to be obeyed because it is God's command 
(Taylor, "Doctrine", p.49). Moreover, Hobbes was willing to 
admit that God's commandments can be collected out of the 
Scriptures, though they could not have been discovered 
without them (Taylor, "Apology", p.143). For Hobbes, on 
Taylor's view, humans including the sovereign do not fulfill 
the demands of equity unless they obey the divine command 
simply because it is a divine command. 
To make this theory work, of course, a certain kind 
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of theism is presumed. Taylor argues that Hobbes has, in De 
gJ.ve (see E.W. II, 206-207), provided just such a theism. 
Here Hobbes explains that one of the kingdoms of God is the 
natural kingdom which He rules by the dictates of right 
reason. Within this kingdom God's right to rule is founded 
entirely on His irresistable power. From this it follows 
that the natural law is a law (and not merely a collection 
of theorems) for all men (Taylor, "Doctrine", p.50). We 
must obey God simply because we are in God's power: "God's 
right to rule is founded solely on his irresistable power 
(Taylor, "Doctrine", p.50). 
Taylor's conclusion, then, is that Hobbes simply 
meant what he said about the natural law as a command of God 
and that he was led to this conviction primarily by the 
unusual depth of his own sense of moral obligation (and not 
so much by the numerous Scriptural passages he offers) 
(Taylor, "Doctrine", p.50). 
3. Conclusion of Taylor's Thesis 
Prior to Taylor's work, the moral aspects of Hobbes' 
writings, especially the use of traditional natural law, had 
received little serious attention. The state of Hobbes 
scholarship at the time had left a seemingly unsoluable 
dilemma, described by Laird: 
be 
The general sense of this statement appears to 
that there was an eternal moral obligation to keep 
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promises, but that, when men had promised obedience to a 
government, they made themselves liable, in addition, to 
the punitive machinery of political power. And so we 
come to a perplexing (but very fundamental) part of 
Hobbian theory. 
As we have seen, Hobbes frequently held that 
moral laws might be anterior to civil laws. In deed 
some of them obliged 'in a state of nature'. In other 
passages, however (and for the most part), he spoke, 
particularly regarding 'justice', as if human morality 
were essentially political, not pre-political. (Laird, 
p.184) 
Taylor's conclusion is that if we accept his thesis 
and lay less (or no) emphasis on the traditional view, which 
rests on a misreading of Hobbe.s, the dilemma vanishes. 
Rather than a theory built on psychological egoism, Hobbes 
constructed 
obligation. 
obligation 
a strict deontological theory of moral 
Hobbes made a clear distinction between 
(moral law) and compulsion (fear of civil 
punishment) in which the laws of nature oblige morally prior 
to civil society, in foro interno. In civil society the 
laws of nature oblige whenever civil law issues no 
injunctions or is silent, and they oblige the sovereign 
himself, who is above obligation to civil law (Taylor, 
"Doctrine", p.55). 
Furthermore, as Taylor says, the force of civil law 
is derived wholly from that of the natural law. If we are 
always to abide by civil law, even when we believe it to be 
inequitable, that is because we are already obliged by 
virtue of the natural law to honor our 'previous engagement' 
to obey the sovereign's commands (Taylor, "Doctrine", p.55). 
Thus, Hobbes should be taken to be, not a psychological 
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egoist (to believe him to be leads to the problems discussed 
above), but a philosopher of natural law who used the 
phraseology of commanding and forbidding and meant what he 
said. Given all this, then, the only conclusion seems to be 
that obligation in Hobbes' theory is a moral duty and his 
theory is strictly deontological. 
C. WARRENDER'S THESIS 
1. Introduction 
Warrender defines 'natural law' as "a body of 
prescriptive (as opposed to descriptive) rules, concerning 
human conduct, capable of being discovered by all men of 
right reason, and superior to the positive law of individual 
states" (Warrender, "Phil. Art.", p.2). He shows that, in 
Hobbes, our fundamental obligation is to obey the laws of 
nature, theat all other obligations may be deduced from this 
one, and that no new sorts of obligations arise in civil 
society which do not exist in nature. Finally, this 
obligation is moral obligation (as opposed to physical 
obligation--mechanistically based) traceable 
obligation to obey God in his natural kingdom, 
to the 
based upon a 
fear of divine power. (This is the normal meaning in Hobbes, 
he says, although the previously mentioned two alternate in 
interpretations are possible.) 
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In general Warrender agrees with Taylor that Hobbes' 
egoistic psychology and mechanism are not the keys to his 
theory of obligation, and that Hobbes can be seen as a 
natural law philosopher. However, there are essential 
differences between Warrender's position and Taylor's. He 
does not think Taylor's leap to a duty-for-duty's sake 
interpretation is justified. Rather, he is more impressed 
by the role of laws of nature in Hobbes' political theory 
and by Hobbes' view that laws of nature are grounded in the 
word of God, who has a right to command. He treats Hobbes 
as a natural law theorist, though he does not see Hobbes' 
theory as deontological. Nor does he see Hobbes' theory as 
a theory of rational egoism. 
Warrender was led, instead, to posit two systems in 
Hobbes: a system of motives, and a system of obligations. 
The motivational side explains how a man can do his duty 
(preservation), while the system of obligations explains why 
he ought to do his duty (it is the will of God). God's will 
'grounds' obligation, self-preservation is a 'validating 
condition' of it. But then Warrender ultimately concludes 
that the reason why a man ought to obey the will of God is a 
prudential one, as I will explain later. A final point is 
that 
duty, 
where Taylor starts from the covenant and a concept of 
Warrender sees the concept of natural rights as the 
Underpinning of Hobbes' interpretation of natural laws as 
morally binding. 
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In this summary I will concentrate primarily on 
tracing the argument in Parts I and II of Warrender's book, 
first to the effect that Hobbes' theory is a natural law 
theory traceable back to natural rights, and secondly that 
there are good reasons for rejecting self-interest as the 
ground of obligation. I will then briefly outline 
warrender's consequentialistic thesis that it is divine 
reward and punishment that is the force behind political 
obligation. Much of the vast detail of Warrender's book and 
argument will be omitted due to limits of space. 
2. Three Aspects of Obligation 
Warrender argues that the Laws of Nature must create 
valid obligations prior to civil society, if Hobbes' theory 
of obligation is to work: 
But, in general, we can say that if a reasonable 
cause of fear invalidates covenants retrospectively, and 
each man may judge the reasonableness of his own fears, 
there is no particular covenant that necessarily stands. 
Commentators have tended, however, to slide from the 
proposition, (1) that there are no valid covenants in 
the State of Nature ... to the proposition (2) that there 
is no obligation to keep valid covenants in the State of 
Nature, and hence to regard the State of Nature as a 
moral vacuum and the sovereign as the creator of 
obligation to keep valid covenants, which is a complete 
mistake. If there is no obligation to keep valid 
covenants prior to the institution of the State, 
Hobbes's whole theory of political obligation is 
nonsensical. Even if we assume that there were no valid 
covenants whatsoever in the State of Nature, it would 
still be true that in the state the individual would be 
obliged to perform his part if there were any valid 
covenants. In other words, the sovereign does not 
Provide an obligation to keep valid covenants; he makes 
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possible circumstances in which there can exist valid 
covenants to keep. (Warrender, p.41) 
To show how Hobbes can consistently maintain that 
there is obligation in the State of Nature and that 
covenants create the only valid obligations in civil 
society, Warrender distinguishes three aspects of 
obligation. There are: (i) the grounds of obligation, (ii) 
the validating conditions of obligation and (iii) the 
instruments of obligation. His position is that the 
sovereign and his civil authority are the validating 
conditions, laws (civil) and covenants are the instruments, 
but natural law is the ground of all obligation. The three 
aspects noted constitute the framework of moral obligation 
which, for Warrender, are simply the conditions that must be 
satisfied, or the factors that must be present, before a 
person can be obliged. But what, exactly, does Warrender 
mean by each factor? 
a. Grounds of Obligation 
Warrender writes, "some conditions constitute 
obligations in that an action is obligatory because it 
fulfills this or these conditions, and its obligatoriness 
derives from this source" (Warrender, p.14). Such 
conditions Warrender labels the grounds of obligation. He 
explains that if something is the ground of obligation, and 
if some particular action is obligatory, then it is so 
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because of that which is the ground of obligation. 
In Hobbes' theory, this ground is Natural Law. This 
is revealed when one tries to answer the question of why the 
civil law obliges, or, going a step further, to answer the 
question of why natural law obliges. In short, an 
individual is obliged to obey the Laws of Nature. 
b. Validating Conditions 
Not all the conditions of obligation are grounds. 
some function in ways other than as constituting obligation. 
There are conditions which must be satisfied if a ground of 
obligation is to even be operative. Warrender says of 
these, "Apart from their conjunction with such a ground, 
however, they are not related to obligation at all" 
(Warrender, p.14). He calls these conditions validating 
conditions, or if expressed negatively, invalidating 
principles, which state the absence of some validating 
condition whose absence renders the ground inoperative. In 
other ethical theories, such validating conditions would, 
for example, include the assertion that obligations do not 
apply to lunatics or children. The key distinction here is 
that such a condition does not mean that sane adults are 
obligated because they are sane and adults. Rather, the 
around of obligation is whatever the particular ethical 
system may propose (God's will, yielding the greatest 
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happiness, etc .... ). What the validating conditions do is 
to specify under what conditions the grounds are inoperative 
or the extent to which they operate. For example, any 
ethical theory that utilizes sanity and maturity, and 
specifies the ground of obligation 'X', will taken the form 
of 'X type acts are obligatory for sane and mature persons.' 
Warrender holds that all obligations involve a pattern of 
this form such that 
Grounds of obligation specify 'a', the type of 
action. Validating conditions specify 'p', the class of 
persons. (Warrender, p.16) 
Yet, unless there is some ground of obligation it ls clear 
that such validating conditions will have no necessary 
connection with obligation and that nothing concerning 
duties can be deduced simply from saying one has satisfied 
them. Thus, according to Warrender, "validating conditions, 
taken strictly by themselves, supply no key,not even a 
formal key, to the content of duties, and leave the possible 
content of duty as wide and unspecified as it was before" 
(Warrender, p.15). 
Hobbes' theory, says Warrender, is such that the 
general ground of obligation is the Law of Nature as a 
command of someone that one is already obliged to obey. 
Warrender bases this on Hobbes' concept of a law as a 
command that provides a sufficient reason for moving a 
person to obey (E.W. IV, p.75). As Hobbes says: 
And not every command is a law, but only ... when 
the command is the reason we have of doing the action 
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commanded. And then only is the reason of our actions 
in the command, when the omitting is therefore hurtful, 
because the action was commanded, not because it was 
hurtful of itself; and doing contrary to a command, were 
not at all hurtful, if there were not a right in him 
that commandeth to punish him that so doth. He or they 
that have all punishments in their own disposing, cannot 
be so commanded, as to receive hurt for disobeying, and 
consequently no command can be a law unto them. (E.W. 
IV, 205) 
The Laws of Nature, as will be shown later, are laws per se 
only when regarded as God's commands; it is this alone that 
accounts for their obligatory character. The validating 
conditions are the necessary restraints on the concept of 
obligation, 
psychological 
just so many tests for the logical 
possibility of obligation. Among 
and 
the 
validating conditions in Hobbes' theory Warrender lists the 
following: 
1. An individual must be able to know the law and 
its author. 
2. In regard to covenants, what they specify must be 
possible; we cannot be obliged to do the impossible. 
3. There must be sufficient motive to obey the law 
or perform the covenant. Here fear and self-interest 
function. It is logically impossible that a Hobbesian agent 
be obliged to perform something 
unsufficient motive. (Warrender, p.94) 
for which he has 
Although we may accidentally perform an act we were 
unmotivated to perform, or----conform to an unknown ·-law 
authored by an unknown party, Warrender holds that it is 
logically impossible to conjoin the term 'obligation' to 
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commanded. And then only is the reason of our actions 
in the command, when the omitting is therefore hurtful, 
because the action was commanded, not because it was 
hurtful of itself; and doing contrary to a command, were 
not at all hurtful, if there were not a right in him 
that commandeth to punish him that so doth. He or they 
that have all punishments in their own disposing, cannot 
be so commanded, as to receive hurt for disobeying, and 
consequently no command can be a law unto them. (E.W. 
IV, 205) 
The Laws of Nature, as will be shown later, are laws per se 
only when regarded as God's commands; it is this alone that 
accounts for their obligatory character. The validating 
conditions are the necessary restraints on the concept of 
obligation, 
psychological 
just so many tests for the logical 
possibility of obligation. Among 
and 
the 
validating conditions in Hobbes' theory Warrender lists the 
following: 
1. An individual must be able to know the law and 
its author. 
2. In regard to covenants, what they specify must be 
possible; we cannot be obliged to do the impossible. 
3. There must be sufficient motive to obey the law 
or perform the covenant. Here fear and self-interest 
function. It is logically impossible that a Hobbesian agent 
be obliged to perform something 
unsufficient motive. (Warrender, p.94) 
for which he has 
Although we may accidentally perform an act we were 
unmotivated to perform, or conform to an unknown law 
authored by an unknown party, Warrender holds that it is 
logically impossible to conjoin the term 'obligation' to 
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such actions. Thus, validating conditions function as 
logical tests for the possibility of obligation as such and 
specify the class of persons who incur obligations, namely 
those who know the law and its author, and are able to have 
sufficient motive to obey. 
c. Instruments of Obligation 
Warrender's "instruments of obligation" are the 
standard means by which an obligation is incurred. The 
instruments are the answer to the question: how we are 
obliged, rather than why we are obliged. In Hobbes' system, 
Warrender says, the sole instruments of obligation are laws 
and covenants. Law imposes obligation upon a person; 
covenants are the instruments by which a person takes 
obligations upon himself/herself. 
Since these are the only two instruments of 
obligation in Hobbes' theory, Warrender argues, it follows 
that the necessary traits of valid law and the conditions of 
valid convenants are the conditions of obligation in 
general, and these thereby provide a valuable key to both 
the grounds and validating conditions of obligation. The 
sections to follow outline how Warrender applies this model 
to analyze the specifics in Hobbes' theory of obligation. 
Warrender believes that Hobbes could now assert that 
the Laws of Nature oblige in the State of Nature since, even 
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there, they fulfill the requirements necessary to be 
regarded as laws and to be obligatory. That is, God, as the 
commander, grounds natural law; people in the State of 
Nature, using reason, can perceive them as God's commands, 
while fear of their own deaths in the everlasting warfare of 
the state of Nature provides additional reason to abide by 
their provisions; and finally, the Laws of Nature are 
instruments of obligations since they meet Hobbes' 
requirements for valid law. Thus, Laws of Nature are 
obligatory prior to the covenant and formation of civil 
society. The covenant is obligatory as a result of the 
moral force of Natural Law, which prescribes the keeping of 
covenants; and civil law obliges as a result of the 
obligatory force of the covenant itself. The overall 
conclusion, then, is that it is in no way inconsistent for 
Hobbes to maintain that there are valid obligations in the 
State of Nature and that covenants create the only valid 
obligations in civil society since civil obligation is 
derived from natural law (natural obligation). 
3. Rejection of Egoism 
Since Warrender believes that only natural law and 
covenants ground obligation in Hobbes' system, it follows 
that the egoistic doctrine of obligation must be mistaken. 
That i s, obligation is grounded in self-interest motivated 
r 
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bY fear; while self-interest/fear do provide motives for 
obedience, the obligation to obey is itself a moral duty 
stemming from God. The fact that this has not been the 
standard interpretation of Hobbes is due, according to 
warrender, to the insistence by Hobbes that covenants 
without the sword are empty words and that law without 
sanction is futile. From this follows the conclusion that 
all obligation is grounded on the egoistic desire to avoid 
penalties attached to law-breaking by the sovereign in a 
civil society. Warrender denies that this is the correct 
account. 
Warrender's argument is based on Hobbes' distinction 
between law/command and counsel; the first of these is that 
part of the law which commands or prohibits an action and is 
addressed to all citizens, the latter lays down penalties 
for breach of the law and is addressed to magistrates alone. 
Hobbes defines 'law' and 'counsel' as follows: 
To follow what is prescribed by law, is duty; 
what be counsel, is free will. Counsel is directed to 
his end,that receives it; law to his that gives it; 
Counsel is given to none but the willing; law even to 
the unwilling .... (E.W. II, 183) 
Such a distinction shows that the obligatory force of law is 
not the same as the recognition of penalties. If the force 
of law and the recognition of its penalties were identical, 
the distinction would be pointless. Warrender explains, 
Considered in this light, laws would be 
essentially rules for gaining rewards or avoid 
penalties, and hence sufficiently similar to principles 
of counsel as hardly to justify a theory which stresses 
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the obligatory character of the one and the option 
character of the other. (Warrender, p.204) 
distinction, according to Warrender, points up 
Hobbes'intention to see contractual obligation as the ground 
of duty. Civil laws and its punishments simply provide a 
motive for doing one's duties; they are the conditions of 
the possibility of actually doing one's duty. 
This, however, leaves unexplained what importance 
Hobbes actually placed on civil sanctions. Warrender 
believes that Hobbes needed the civil authority/sanctions to 
satisfy a setting up of the circumstances under which one of 
the validating conditions of obligation may obtain. Self-
interest becomes important as a result of civil sanctions 
since Hobbes believes that 'ought' implies 'can'. This in 
turn, for Warrender, contains a necessary inference that the 
agent have sufficient motive to do what he is obliged to do 
and that this is a validating condition of obligation. 
Self-interest, represented by the command 'preserve thyself' 
plays the part of the supreme motive for the citizen while 
'seek peace' is the citizen's supreme duty. 
Fear and benefit function as motives in Hobbes' 
theory, not as grounds for obligation as they do in the 
egoistic case, according to Warrender. Hobbes used this 
procedure simply because he was aware that human beings will 
differ as to what they view as evil or good with the 
exception that all persons will see their own death as evil. 
Thus, fear and the desire for physical preservation become 
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the supreme motives for everyone so far as they are not 
affected by thoughts of God and salvation. The 'ought' of 
obligation, however, derives solely from God's command as 
the ground of obligation while civil sanctions provide the 
necessary conditions and security under which the individual 
is capable of having a sufficient motive for doing his/her 
duty. Given the psychological makeup of human nature, it is 
necessary that each individual be capable of seeing any 
obligatory action as in their own best interest; without 
this the individual cannot be said to be obliged. 
The formation of civil society, 
Warrender, affects obligation in three ways: 
according to 
1. The provision of security, which is deemed 
'sufficient security', renders valid some obligations to 
natural law and to covenants falling under this law, 
which were previously invalidated upon this 
account ... some suspended obligations are converted into 
obligations. 
2. The laws of nature are given a determiniate, 
public interpretation by the sovereign authority. 
3. Obligations are extended and particularized 
under a framework of obligation, validated and 
interpreted as under previous heads ... they are extended 
by the political covenant and the civil law consequent 
upon it. (Warrender, p.141) 
Thus, civil society provides the necessary conditions for 
the existence of and obedience to obligations derived from 
the law of nature but hindered by the lack of such 
conditions. The moral force to obligation is, in other 
Words, given a chance to operate upon and within each 
individual citizen only within the context of civil society. 
The sovereign's power makes civil society a 'secure 
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condition', thus satisfying this validating condition of 
obligation. As Warrender concludes: 
... the sovereign provides conditions which render 
operative obligations, which previously are but 
imperfectly effective, or as we have described ... he is 
responsible for some suspended obligations being turned 
into full obligations through his manipulation of 
circumstances. This fact often leads Hobbes to write as 
though the sovereign were himself responsible for the 
creation of obligations, where there were none before. 
(Warrender, p.144) 
4. Natural Law and Natural Rights 
Warrender notes that, for Hobbes, natural law 
logically precedes covenant and civil law as a source of 
obligation in the State of Nature. Therefore, natural law is 
what makes covenants and civil laws binding. Obligation 
would be purely a matter of self-interest and expediency 
were it not also the case that, as a member of God's 
"natural kingdom", the person were governed by a natural law 
capable of being discovered by their own rational faculty. 
Lacking this, any argument for political or Christian duty 
would fail. Natural law is the source of obligation as 
discovered and interpreted by each individual. Natural law 
also prescribes the duties of the sovereign: "His entire 
duty ... like the basic duties of the subject, is imposed by 
the law which applies to all men who acknowledge an 
omnipotent God whether they live in civil society or in the 
State of Nature" (Warrender, p.251). 
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However, there is a distinction between what appear 
to be two systems operating in Hobbes' theory. The first is 
a system of specific obligations requiring, as ground, 
obedience to natural law qua command of God; the second, a 
system of motives based on judgments by the individual as to 
what constitutes his/her self-preservation. 
The difference is represented by the contrast Hobbes 
develops, between obligation in foro interno and obligation 
in foro externo, as the distinction between a disposition of 
--
the mind toward the law and specific action in accordance 
with the law. There is always an obligation to maintain a 
favorable disposition towards obedience to the dictates of 
God's natural law, whereas the obligation to act according 
to the law is validated by the degree of security enjoyed by 
the agent concerned. This leads to a further distinction: 
1. A second-best and approximate way, where men 
try to be as peaceful as they safely can. They will 
fight where they feel it is necessary, but avoid 
gratuitous provocation and insult, and will look for 
favourable opportunities for peace. This is the style 
of obligation in foro interno or 'endeavouring 'peace. 
2. Specific performance of the law, where what 
the law prescribes is carried out precisely in action. 
This is the style of obligation in foro externo. 
(Warrender, p.68) 
The laws of nature oblige in foro interno always, without 
the proviso of sufficient security 'in the court of 
conscience'; they oblige in foro externo, in the realm of 
external action, contingent upon the security of the agent. 
Warrrender describes the resultant distinction a_nd its 
importance for Hobbes' theory as follows: 
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Obligation in foro interno are all those 
obligations for which the individual conscience is the 
guide, and for the performance of which the agent is 
responsible to God, who judges intentions as well as 
actions. Here the contrast lies with a system of civil 
law, where specific performance alone always satisfies 
the law, whatever the design of the agent; for the civil 
magistrate cannot adequately scrutinize the thoughts, 
but only the external actions (and words) of men, and it 
is typical of Hobbes that he does not grant to the civil 
sovereign the capacity to impose obligations which he 
cannot enforce. This does not mean that the citizen has 
necessarily discharged all his obligations when he has 
merely conformed to the civil law, but he has discharged 
all his obligations to the civil law qua civil law. If 
anything remains, it will be a matter for conscience and 
not the civil magistrate, and there intentions will be 
pertinent. (Warrender, p.72) 
Thus what we have is a validating condition, of 
sufficient security which provides a sufficient motive to 
act according to the letter of the law (in foro externo). 
This aspect distinguishes Warrender's theory from Taylor's. 
What is necessary first, is the agent be bound in conscience 
(see natural law as God's command) and second, that the 
agent have sufficient motive to act according to the 
dictates of the law (provided by assurance of sufficient 
security). Thus, the difference between Taylor and 
Warrender is that, although both see Hobbes as a natural law 
theorist, Warrender does not see the law as binding solely 
based on its moral character or ground but also as dependent 
upon the satisfaction of the "security principle", which 
provides the psychological motive to obey the law. Without 
providing a sufficient motive, no moral authority, even God, 
could hold a citizen obliged. 
Natural right is important here as a limiting 
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concept which shows when the law is not binding, as well as 
highlighting the use and importance of self-preservation as 
a motive. Although the citizen must accept the sovereign's 
"official version" of the natural law and Scripture and has 
no direct entitlement rights over the sovereign (that put 
duties on the sovereign), the citizen does have some 
freedoms from obligation that are never renounced, which 
stem from their natural rights. 
Warrender sees Hobbes using 'right' in a specific 
sense: 
It may be observed here that Hobbes uses the 
term 'right' with the same meaning as he employs in the 
expressions 'the right to all things' and 'rights of 
nature'. It is a usage which requires that such a 
phrase as 'a right to "x"' shall be translated as 'a 
freedom from obligation to renounce "x"', whereby rights 
do not imply corresponding duties in other people. Thus, 
by laying down a right, the individual resigns a freedom 
from obligation in some particular respect; he does not 
transfer a right in the modern sense of making over to 
others an entitlement to some object or service to which 
he himself was entitled previously. (Warrender, p.150) 
Thus, Warrender takes Hobbes to be saying that while the 
subject is obliged by the sovereign's commands, this 
obligation is not indiscriminate. There are factors 
limiting what the sovereign may command; namely the 
citizen's natural rights. There are certain things which 
cannot be limited by the law. The things which can never be 
limited by law Hobbes calls the 'true liberties' of the 
subject. The most important of these include the right of 
self-defense, the right not to be obliged to do something 
that invalidates covenants, and the right not to be obliged 
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to do that which cannot be covenanted. These are such that 
if the citizen were to give them up the result would be to 
violate Warrender's validating conditions of obligation. 
The sense of 'right' intended is not simply 'freedom from 
obligation 1 , 
obligation 1 • 
but a 'freedom from the possibility of 
The validating conditions here correspond to what 
Warrender calls in the Philosophy article, the "only two 
natural rights": a) a man cannot be obliged to obey a law he 
cannot know, b) nor can he do an act without sufficient 
motive (here is where self-preservation as a motive 
functions) (Warrender, Phil. Art., p.356). As Hobbes says: 
It is necessary to the essence of a law, that 
the subjects be acquainted with two things: first, what 
man or court hath the supreme power, that is to say, the 
right of making laws; secondly, what the law itself 
says. For he that neither knew either to whom or what 
he is tied to, cannot obey; and by consequence is in 
such a condition as if he were not tied at all. (E.W. 
II, 191) (See also E.W. III, 259, 260, 280) 
Taken together these conditions, derived from natural 
rights, limit the sovereign's choice of laws and distinguish 
law from the personal will of the sovereign. A law cannot 
impose an obligation upon a subject unless the two 
Validating conditions are met. No obligation falls upon the 
subject from any law which violates either or both of the 
subject's natural rights. 
The first of these conditions is easily met since in 
every State it is presumed that the sovereign, consequent to 
a covenant, is the authorized source of the law and that 
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each citizen knows the sovereign--ignorance of the sovereign 
is no excuse for any citizen. Further, the law itself is 
known when written, is seen to proceed from the will of the 
sovereign and is verified as such through the testimony of 
the appropriate officials and examination of the public 
record or statutes. Once these conditions obtain the 
citizen is bound/obliged by such a law unless the second 
condition is not met. 
The second condition depends upon self-preservation 
as a motive (and a right). Both in the State of Nature and 
civil society a person cannot be obliged to submit to being 
killed nor be obliged to self-destruction. Warrender calls 
this the "ultimate right of self-preservation" which cannot 
be covenanted away. As he characterizes this right, 11 ••• the 
individual can never be obliged to act in such way as to 
forfeit eternal salvation, and further that he cannot be 
obliged to kill himself ... unless the unlikely circumstance 
should arise that he has to do so, or permit others to do 
so, in order to secure eternal salvation (Warrender, p.263). 
No valid law can be such as to compel the citizen to violate 
the natural necessity of self-preservation. Should a law 
require self-destruction, the citizen would have no motive 
to obey the law, rendering the law invalid or inoperative; 
for it would ask the citizen to give up, by the terms of an 
invalid convenant, a natural right that cannot be given up 
and to perform an act without the sufficient motive to do 
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so, 
Except for the rare need to preserve eternal 
salvation, no one can validly be obliged to act against 
their own self-preservation. Thus, a valid law cannot 
command self-destruction. So long as this and the first 
condition are met the subject is obliged to obey the will of 
the sovereign. As Warrender states, this analysis holds for 
both the State of Nature and civil society: 
Granted always a right to sheer self-defence, 
the laws of nature oblige the individual in the State of 
Nature. But they oblige him subject to the satisfaction 
of validating conditions. He is always obliged to 
endeavour peace as this is always safe, but in the case 
of specific external action in accordance with the law, 
hypothetical danger may be pleaded, and the agent is not 
obliged if he honestly considers that the action 
prescribed by the law would prejudice his life or means 
of living. (Warrender, p.78} 
Warrender's conclusion follows from his belief that 
these validating conditions are a necessary part of Hobbes' 
complete theory of obligation: 
It is the thesis of the present inquiry that 
there is a single and consistent theory of obligation 
which runs through the whole of Hobbes's doctrine, and 
it is a part of that thesis that the validating 
conditions of law in the State of Nature or elsewhere, 
are the validating conditions of all law in Hobbes's 
system. Thus, in this case, if any law is to be valid 
law, or in other words to be law and oblige, it must 
operate in a context in which the validating condition 
of 'sufficient security' may be said to be fulfilled. 
It will follow also,on this view, that the features 
which distinguish obligation in foro externo in the 
State of Nature, when it is compared with obligation in 
foro interno in that state, or with obligation in civil 
society, will not be matters of principle, but of 
circumstance. (Warrender, p.58} 
For Warrender, then, a person's natural rights are 
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constituted by a knowledge of and motive to obey the law. 
They stand by themselves as "deductions from the proposition 
that 'ought implies can''' (Warrender, p.264). While God 
might alter the nature of man, the effects of things in the 
world, or the place of knowledge and self-preservation, He 
could not "use as a means of moral obligations upon men to 
perform actions for which they could have no adequate 
motive, not to observe laws which they could not know" 
(Warrender, p.264). 
It is important to stress that it is not the two 
conditions that create obligation, but rather, obligation 
stems from the natural law provided that the two conditions 
are satisfied. The reason is that, Warrender argues, for 
the covenant to be valid, there must be obligation in 
Hobbes' State of Nature. The covenant and the sovereign's 
power under it do not create moral principles but merely 
fulfill the need for an authority sufficient to enforce and 
interpret law necessary for civil society to exist and 
function. Civil law and covenants oblige because the author 
has the power to compel obedience, and because there is a 
prior obligation to abide by covenants and obey the 
sovereign's commands. As Warrender says, " ... so the general 
obligation to obey the sovereign's command is an obligation 
to a different level of law, namely the law of nature as 
interpreted by the individual conscience" (Warrender, pp.147 
&nd 149). Unless there are moral obligations in the State 
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of Nature, it is difficult to explain how the civil 
sovereign has any duties at all or how a covenant could 
oblige obedience. 
Political obedience, on Warrender's view of Hobbes, 
depends in the final analysis upon the laws of nature which 
are known to all men by the use of reason; "In their 
essential function of providing the basis for political 
obligation, moreover, these laws are in no respect dependent 
upon the Bible or any other work" (Warrender, "Reply", 
p.98). Both the covenant and civil law are extensions of 
the natural law. Thus Hobbes believes that it is natural 
law per se that crates political obligation, not the 
covenant or the sovereign's power. 
Once we see this point the question becomes, what is 
the force or power behind natural law? Warrender says there 
are three possible interpretations of Hobbes on this matter, 
though he favors one of these over the others. Warrender's 
view is not deontological but based on a "divine rewards and 
punishments clause". It is a consequentialist theory of 
natural law, which finally and fully separates his view from 
Taylor's. 
5. The Grounds of Obligation 
a. Introduction 
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The question at hand is "What is the ground of 
obligation in Hobbes' theory?" For Warrender there are three 
possible answers grouped around two principles: 
1.) Men ought to obey natural law because 
obedience is a means to salvation, which is in their 
highest interest; or contrariwise, neglect of these laws 
leads to divine punishment, which represents their 
greatest evil. 
2.) Natural law is the will of God, and ought to 
be obeyed for that reason. (Warrender, p.279) 
From these two principles follow three possible 
interpretations of the ground of obligation which Warrender 
feels fit the remainder of Hobbes' doctrine: 
1.) That 
and punishments. 
2.) That 
God alone. 
obligation is based upon divine rewards 
3. ) 
natural law 
"Phil. Art.", 
obligation is based upon the will of 
That obligation is 
having intrinsic 
p.352) 
based upon a body of 
authority. (Warrender, 
Warrender believes that Hobbes regards obeying God's 
will as axiomatic, but nonetheless goes on to develop a 
further set of arguments to justify obedience. In seeking 
the source of obligation, Hobbes turns his attention to what 
he calls the Natural Kingdom of God. Within this Natural 
Kingdom there is a system of obligations based upon 
knowledge of the law and of God, derived by the use of 
reason alone. Given Warrender's interpretation of Hobbes' 
need for a ground of obligation apart from the validating 
conditions, it is necessary for Hobbes to establish an 
obligatory force in the State of Nature which grounds the 
initial contract and "artificial" civil obligation. Without 
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natural obligation, no obligation within civil society would 
carry any obligatory force. 
"Natural" obligation stems from God, according to 
warrender: 
If it is denied that God plays an essential role 
in Hobbes's doctrine, the laws of nature in the State of 
Nature cannot be taken to be more than prudential maxims 
for those who desire their own preservation. Those 
commentators, therefore, who have seen the place of God 
in Hobbes's theory as the product of confusion or 
pretence on Hobbes's part, have taken this view .... to 
the effect that the laws of nature as they proceed fron 
nature are not commands.... If such a view were 
sustained, political obligation would turn out like 
natural law to be no more than another prudential maxim, 
as there is nothing which the civil sovereign could do 
that would retrieve this position. (Warrender, pp.99-
100) 
To be binding, laws must, for Hobbes, be the command 
of some author whom the citizen is previously obliged to 
obey. The moral character of obligation is not a result of 
anything about the law per se but is transferred to the law 
by its author. The key question, then, is why one ought to 
obey the author of the law. Hobbes' position is that unless 
the Laws of Nature, which ground the covenant and the 
sovereign's power/authority, are regarded as the commands of 
God they cannot properly be regarded as law. Now, what 
exactly, beyond the axiomatic belief that God deserves to be 
obeyed, would oblige one to obey God's will? 
Within Hobbes' Natural Kingdom (which is one of the 
three Kingdoms of God, but the only one connected to 
Political activities) God, by rational means, can be seen to 
be the ill-powerful authority who governs the world. It is 
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God's irresistable power that justifies, indeed 
necessitates, obedience to natural law (God's commands). 
Thus, for Warrender, "natural" obligation is grounded in the 
laws of nature as the commands of an irresistable God, whose 
authority derives from His Power. The obligatory character 
of natural law does not depend, ultimately, upon any act of 
man or upon any covenant, but rather on our recognition of 
God's abililty to mete out divine rewards and punishments. 
b. Divine Rewards and Punishments 
The first of the three possible interpretations 
(noted in the Introduction) is Warrender's favored, i.e. he 
judges it most consistent with Hobbes' political theory. 
Obligation is grounded upon God's power and ability to 
administer the ultimate divine rewards and punishments: 
... the power of God alone without others help is 
sufficient justification of any action he doth. That 
which men make amongst themselves here by pacts and 
covenants, and call by the name of justice, and 
according where unto men are accounted and termed 
rightly just or unjust, is not that by which God 
Almighty's actions are to be measured or called just, no 
more than his counsels are to be measured by human 
wisdom. That which he does, is made just by his doing 
it; just, I say, in him, though not always just is 
us .... 
Power irresistable justifies all actions, really 
and properly, in whomsoever it be found; less power does 
not, and because such power is in God only, he must 
needs be just in all actions, and we, that not 
comprehending his counsels, call him to the bar, commit 
injustice in it. (E.W., IV, 249-250) 
With this being the case obligation is more concretely tied 
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to the sanctions behind the laws than to the fact that God, 
specifically, has done the commanding. Warrender explains, 
"From this point of view ... duties may be regarded as a 
special class of prudent actions--those that tend to 
salvation; the laws of nature ought to be obeyed because 
they are the commands of God, but in turn, the commands of 
God ought to be obeyed because his rewards and punishments 
bring it about that obedience is in the highest interest of 
the individual" (Warrender, p.282). 
Warrender holds that, given Hobbes' psychology of 
human motivation, his own interpretation is the most 
plausible account. Three classes of action are possible if 
a person seeks his/her own apparent good: 
1.) The action the individual will do--that 
action which, given his/her existing state of knowledge 
and deliberation they take to be productive of the most 
personal good. 
2.) The most prudent act under the 
circumstances--the action, in fact, would be to the 
person's best interest given his/her particular values 
(the action they would do if they had complete knowledge 
and exercised addquate thought). 
3.) The obligatory act--a special sub-class of 
prudent acts where eternal salvation is involved (the 
act which a person who sees salvation as the greatest 
good, and had complete knowledge and adequately 
deliberated would chose). (Warrender, pp.282-283) 
Obligation is a function of those acts in which 
salvation is at issue, and which God (as the power 
rewarding--giving salvation--or punishing--denying 
salvation) has dominion over. Only acts within class #2 
above fit this description. Acts within classes #1 and #1 
do not necessarily involve salvation as a consideration. 
105 
A problem arises for Hobbes' moral theory in that 
what is in the individual's best interest is not necessarily 
in the interest of all human beings or the interest of 
society in general. Warrender believes Hobbes solves this 
problem using the concept of divine rewards and punishments. 
In fact, 
would be 
without the sanction of salvation, Hobbes' theory 
incomplete. But Hobbes views the Laws of Nature 
with their divine rewards and punishments as pertaining to 
civil society. The Laws of Nature are the general 
principles for the preservation of humanity. If Hobbes had 
not viewed them in this way there would be considerable 
problems for civil society in that, claiming personal 
interest, the individual could claim that it was in his/her 
own best interest to break civil and natural law. As 
Warrender notes, the fact is that the power of the sovereign 
is not always adequate to enforce the law--rebellion is 
somethimes successful--therefore, "Only the punishments of 
God, whose wrath cannot be escaped, are capable of providing 
an adequate sanction, and of effecting a reconciliation 
between duty and interest" (Warrender, p.276). On 
Warrender's interpretation, breaking the Laws of Nature is 
imprudent as a violation of the means to salvation and, for 
any person who sees salvation as his/her greatest good, a 
breach of moral duty. 
Warrender believes that Hobbes showed that, given 
~deguate deliberation, all persons would see salvation as 
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their greatest evil and protection/peace as the greatest 
good, From this, depending on whether or not they consider 
or ignore divine rewards and punishments (reason adequately 
or not), each person who believes in the sanctions of God 
will see eternal good (salvation) as preferable to temporal 
good and will come thus to regard salvation as the greatest 
good (Warrender, p.273). Those persons who believe in God, 
as the administrator of divine rewards and punishments, will 
not simply take these sanctions into account, but will 
necessarily obey God's laws if they deliberate adequately. 
Thus, obedience is not merely prudential (though for non-
believers it will, in fact, be prudential qua the earthly 
sovereign's power--but this is just to realistically note 
that all persons do not deliberate adequately). This is 
what Warrender calls Hobbes' doctrine of special prudence: 
"Where ordinary self-interest breaks down ... the citizen has 
a duty to obey, and, if the present interpretation of the 
ground of obligation is taken, this will mean that special 
prudence dictates obedience" (Warrender, 
p.353). 
"Phil. Art.", 
The result here is a denial of the claim that duty 
is identical with self-interest in Hobbes. Rather, duty is 
.2,,ased on self-interest such that the reason for the force of 
the 'ought' of duty is tied to the system of divine rewards 
and punishments. Given God's realm and power, the sanctions 
are inescapable and no other earthly considerations of self-
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interest can lead a person to set them aside. It is because 
of this doctrine, furthermore, that the covenant can oblige 
one person to another person. The act of covenanting 
introduces divine sanctions against the failure to abide by 
the terms of the covenant; it is the force of God's 
sanctions, not the power of the sovereign nor the covenant 
itself, that obliges and dictates the duties of citizenship 
(grounds political obligation) (Warrender, p.289). Without 
the divine sanctions civil obligation is a temporary 
illusion to be dissipated whenever an individual perceives 
it to be in his/her best interest to disobey (or whenever it 
looks like they can get away with it). 
Warrender does not believe that the fact that 
persons have a duty to obey when ordinary self-interest 
breaks down implies that Hobbes' doctrine is deontological. 
Hobbes is not advocating the performance of duty out of 
regard or reverence for the moral law in itself, thereby 
shoving self-interest entirely out of the picture. 
Warrender rejects such a view, saying, "Against this view, 
we have held that although men are obliged to act with the 
intention of fulfilling the law where judgment lies to their 
own conscience and to God, Hobbes does not require then to 
act with the motive of observing the law for its own sake, 
and self-interest is therefore still available as a motive 
for the performance of duties" {Warrender, p.290). 
Warrender concludes: 
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1.) On Hobbes' theory of motivation, the 
individual always acts to secure his apparent good, and 
a disinterested reverence for the law would not be a 
possible motive for voluntary action in Hobbes's ethical 
system, unless part of his doctrine were discarded. 
2.) ... those parts of Hobbes's text which are 
most favorable to the view that the individual is 
obliged to act for the sake of the law, are those in 
which he draws a distinction between the justice of 
actions ... and the justice of persons ... although fear of 
the penalty imposed by the civil law may not be the 
motive of the just man in obeying that law, this does 
not necessarily mean that fear of God's wrath is to be 
similarly condemned. 
3.) Although there is an obligation to do just 
actions ... there is no obligation to be a just person, 
for the justice of persons is a matter of God's grace or 
gift. That is,justice is a matter of faith and the will 
to obedience, and faith is a gift of God (E.W. II, 314). 
(Warrender, pp.290-291) 
The overall conclusion is that even if some 
interpretations of Hobbes' various passages speak of fear as 
a motive (not as an intention), and of even fear of divine 
wrath as a base motive, it does not mean that obligation 
becomes a matter of "deontological-type'' reverence for the 
law. Warrender feels the confusion is partly Hobbes' fault 
in being unclear about his distinction between counsel and 
command. To be very brief, Warrender feels that these 
interpretations confuse theological doctrine 
(advice/counsel) with moral doctrine (law/command) and fail 
to note that punishment is due only for breach of the law, 
not for lapses in faith or for failing to heed divine 
counsel. It is only God's commands, stated in the Laws of 
Nature, which oblige, but the obligatory force derives from 
the punishments God attached to breach of the law .. We may 
have reverence for both God's law and his counsel, but only 
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1aw has obligatory force. Thus, it is not reverence for 
God's word or for the law that creates obligation, but the 
rewards and punishments which define a person's moral duty 
to obey. 
Hobbes, for Warrender, is still a natural law 
moralist. However, his moral doctrine is not deontological 
but consequentialist in nature. Self-interest, taking into 
account the consequences (punishment, loss of salvation or 
gaining of it) is the motive for obeying the law (including 
civil law as the extension of the natural law through 
covenant) yet is still 
Political obligation is 
deontological in nature. 
a duty, a moral obligation. 
moral obligation; it is just not 
Although Warrender feels this is the most plausible 
interpretation of Hobbes' doctrine of obligation, he does 
note that there are some problems which make it pertinent to 
consider other possible interpretations. The major problem 
is that Hobbes' doctrine implies that somehow divine rewards 
and punishments are merited for observance or breach of the 
law; however, "it is not explained why obedience merits 
salvation, and there is implied a contingency between 
obligation and law that hardly justifies the extent to which 
Hobbes emphasizes their essential connexion (sic)" 
(Warrender, p.298). Because of these problems, Warrender 
allows that the other two alternative interpretations have 
some plausibility. However, he rejects them in favor of his 
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own interpretation. I will not outline these alternative 
views, though they are interesting, since Warrender does 
reject them and since they can be found in his book. 
6. conclusion 
The conclusions reached by Warrender may be outlined 
as follows: 
1. Hobbes belongs to the general natural law 
tradition. Obligation (on whichever of three possible 
interpretations) is grounded upon Natural Law. 
2. The obligation derived from Natural Law is moral 
obligation. 'Moral' obligation occurs when: a.) either there 
is a law, valid for a person, which prescribes an act; or 
the person has made a valid covenant to perform the act: 
which means also b.) (RE: grounds) God has commanded the act 
or it follows from what God has commanded: and further (RE: 
validating conditions) what God commands is a command 
logically and psychologically possible for the person to 
know and obey. This account holds for the State of Nature 
and applies to Hobbes' entire theory of moral obligation. 
3. 
obligation 
We may reject the following 
in Hobbes: a. ) the 
accounts of 
traditional 
materialist/egoistic, account since it fails to produce 
moral obligation and functions as part of the validating 
f conditions of true moral obligation; b.) the view, stemming 
I 
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from the above, that obligation is created by covenant and 
the command of the sovereign since both function also as 
validating conditions and neither can create obligation 
where it did not exist before; c.) Taylor's deontological 
view since, although Hobbes' theory is a theory of duty, the 
obligatory force of the Laws of Nature is a matter of 
consequences, namely, divine reward and punishment; they are 
not the deontological absolutes that Taylor describes and 
are not prescribed as duties to be done out of respect for 
the law. Also, they are derived from Hobbes' notion of 
natural rights and not, as Taylor thinks, from the notion of 
covenant and duty per se. 
4. That, although it may be possible to view Natural 
Law as self-justifying, it is most plausible to posit divine 
rewards and punishments as the ground of Natural Law and 
ultimately as the ground of obligation--thus giving God a 
key role in Hobbes' theory of moral/political obligation. 
D. HOOD'S THESIS 
1. Hood's Rejection of Mechanism and 
of the Taylor/Warrender Thesis 
Although there are elements of both Taylor's and 
Warrender's views that Hood accepts, there are a number of 
crucial differences that separate Hood's version bf the 
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natural law thesis from theirs. In a sense, Hood's basic 
position is the result of taking Taylor and Warrender one 
step beyond either a purely deontological or traditional 
natural law interpretation. That is, Hood agrees that the 
basis of obligation in Hobbes is moral in the sense of this 
term being used here, i.e. grounded on natural law; but he 
then grounds natural law directly on specifically Christian 
(or Scriptural) beliefs. Where neither Taylor nor Warrender 
emphasize the Scriptural elements in Hobbes' writings, Hood 
believes that Scripture plays a central role in Hobbes' 
theory in order to compensate for the certain linguistic and 
epistemological limitations imposed on Hobbes' argument by 
the scientific method he had adopted. In particular, Hood 
believes that Scripture takes the place of God as the force 
behind natural law, given the fact that Hobbes' scientific 
methodology prohibits any knowledge claims about God or 
God's actions. Hood believes that Hobbes circumvented this 
limitation by positing the function of obliger less laws of 
nature and then arguing that Scripture, as God's word, 
provides our only knowledge of these laws. Thus, for Hood 
the scriptural elements in Hobbes' writings are of central 
importance to Hobbes' theory of obligation. Neither Taylor 
nor Warrender use Scripture to any degree in their 
explication of Hobbes' theory; and this according to Hood is 
their error. 
Hood does agree with Taylor and Warrender that 
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Hobbes' mechanism and egoism can be disregarded as being 
essentially irrelevant to Hobbes' actual theory of 
obligation. All three interpreters agree that Hobbes began 
with a mechanistic framework and an egoistic justification 
of obligation, but that his "true" theory of obligation is 
ultimately moral rather than mechanistic/egoistic in nature. 
Hood claims that: 
Hobbes's morality is traditional and Christian. 
His Scriptural doctrine of civil obedience is a 
traditional Christian doctrine, stripped of the medieval 
safeguard of an independent spiritual authority. In 
acting as an obedient subject of his civil sovereign, a 
Christian observes and never transgresses the Moral Law. 
(Hood, p.13) 
As such, Hobbes' theory of obligation does not 
follow from a materialistic framework as implied by the 
traditional interpretation. While Hood does accept the view 
that Hobbes held a mechanistic view of the workings of the 
universe, he rejects the implied epistemological materialism 
in favor of the view that Hobbes' mechanism was an 
amplification of a religious view of the universe, within 
which mechanistic/causal explanations are indications of a 
divine plan or else the workings of divine reason, though we 
cannot know God's nature or will directly. This system is 
not contradictory, Hood claims, since "science is restricted 
to the study of secondary causes. In displaying the 
operation of such causes, science is displaying the ordinary 
Work of God, the Author of Nature. Nature itself is simply 
the aggregate of created things" (Hood, p.14). Thus, there 
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is no inherent contradiction in Hobbes' belief that 
epistemological materialism is consistent with Christianity 
since the natural laws of science are logical laws and 
logical laws are discoverable by reason. In effect, science 
is simply explicating the rationality of a universe created 
by a rational God. 
The error of the mechanists, however, is to see the 
Jaws of science as identical to the laws of morality or 
politics, according to Hood. The laws of science are in a 
separate category from those of morality or politics. Hood 
believes that Hobbes' Christian politics does not depend 
upon either his mechanism or his determinism, though taken 
together they constitute the fullest description we are 
capable of of God's action in and upon the universe. Since 
all laws discoverable by reason are mutually compatible, 
there can be no contradiction involved here. But for Hood 
mechanistic explanations and causal 
partial and subordinate role in 
analyses play only a 
determining obligation 
within Hobbes' system. For a mechanistic analysis can only 
reveal causal, material necessities, therefore excluding any 
derivation of our moral duties as such since moral duties 
are not material entities. A study of causal relations 
cannot explain nor can it justify moral obligation or moral 
duty; for moral obligations or obligations of conscience are 
obligations by the grace of God rather than by material 
necessity. Thus there can be no knowledge of moral 
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obligation in the scientific sense of having been discovered 
bY an analysis of experience; scientific knowledge is 
limited to the empirical investigation of material events 
(Hood, p.26). 
Hood's position is based on his analysis of the 
following passage from Hobbes' Behemoth: 
True politics should be such as are fit to make 
men know, that it is their duty to obey all laws 
whatsoever that shall be the authority of the King be 
enacted, till by the same authority they shall be 
repealed; such as are fit to make men understand, that 
the civil laws are God's laws, as they that make them 
are by God appointed to make them; and to make men know, 
that the people and the Church are one thing, and have 
but one head, the King; and that no man has title to 
govern under him, that has it not from him; that the 
King owes his crown to God only, and to no man, 
ecclesiastic or other; and that the religion they teach 
them, be a quiet waiting for the coming again of our 
blessed Saviour, and in the meantime a resolution to 
obey the King's laws, which also are God's laws; to 
injure no man, to be in charity with all men, to cherish 
the poor and sick, and to live soberly and free from 
scandal; without mingling our religion with points of 
natural philosophy, as freedom of will, incorporeal 
substance, everlasting nows, ubiquities, hypostases, 
which the people understand not, nor will ever care for. 
(E.W. VI, 236-237) 
There is nothing in this passage that Hood believes 
depends upon mechanistic materialism or upon Euclid's 
methods. Nowhere did Hobbes suggest that his scientific 
studies altered any of his political convictions, Hood 
argues, so that "it is reasonable to believe that his basic 
Political convictions were 
Philosophic political t~ocy" 
temporally 
(Hood, 
prior to his 
p.22). Hobbes' 
Political doctrine does not depend upon a scientific or 
egoistic foundation at all. 
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The doctrine was for him the doctrine of the 
Divine politics which are a part of the true religion of 
Christ and his Apostles, revealed in Scripture. The 
purpose of his argument from Scripture was to bring to 
light the old and true doctrine of Christian politics, 
long obscured by erroneous interpretations introduced by 
the children of darkness. He would have dismissed as 
impious any claim to establish a new morality. His 
political convictions were for him religious 
convictions. (Hood, pp.22-23) 
Accordingly, Hood believes that an interpretation of 
obligation in terms of either egoism or materialism is not 
relevant. Although Hobbes can be called a determinist so 
tar as physical actions are concerned, his theory of 
obligation is moral and rests upon religious foundations. 
Another mistake of the traditional mechanistic 
interpretation is to see self-preservation as the highest 
end within Hobbes' system. Hood writes 
Preservation is a real natural good, desired as 
such by all men. This does not mean that preservation 
in this world was for Hobbes the summum bonum; he 
adhered to the Christian view that life in this world is 
a peregrination in which no final and enduring felicity 
is attainable; no natural good, no object of natural 
appetite, can be the summum bonum. (Hood, p.64) 
In truth, the summum bonum is salvation. What is deceptive 
about Hobbes' psychology is that it appears complete, and so 
it leads the interpreters to say that civil philosophy must 
limit itself to a discussion of those deliberate actions for 
Which a natural explanation can be given. The traditional 
interpretation thus erroneously limits its discussion of 
obligation to deliberate actions for which naturalistic 
explanations can be found. What is excluded, Hood says, is 
Precisely what is central to Hobbes' actual theory of 
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obligation, namely, the will to obedience or obligations of 
conscience. It is a mistake to conclude that, since 
deliberate actions can be necessitated by fear and that 
since Hobbes' psychology deals with this topic, we have 
described Hobbes' complete theory of obligation. At best we 
have partially described his psychology of deliberation, but 
without touching his actual theory of obligation which is 
based on moral obligations of conscience; that is, on a love 
of moral goodness that cannot be contained in an argument 
from the causal principles of physical nature alone. 
A 
obligation 
explanation 
materialistic 
in Hobbes 
or 
is 
mechanistic/egoist account of 
therefore an insufficient 
of the duties of the citizen to his/her 
sovereign, according to Hood. What is needed is a moral 
analysis of obligation and the recognition that Hobbes' 
science and its materialistic analyses are irrelevant to his 
actual theory of obligation. Though Hood does not deny the 
existence of materialism and the psychology of self-interest 
in Hobbes' writings, he separates it from the theory of 
obligation just as Taylor and Warrender do. 
Hood's position does not simply accept either 
Taylor's or Warrender's views however, concerning the nature 
of Hobbes' natural law morality. Hood sees serious problems 
With both of these natural law interpretations. I will 
indicate here only the crucial factors involved in Hood's 
arguments, which depend on minute details of argumentation. 
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The details can be found in Hood's book, and are better left 
as presented there; for a short summary of so many fine 
distinctions would surely do an injustice to Hood's 
scholarship. Instead, I will explain his rejection of 
Taylor's and Warrender's positions in broad terms. 
There are some close similarities between Hood's and 
Taylor's theories in that both stress a duty-for-duty's-sake 
concept of natural law and obligation. Hood calls these 
obligations of conscience, duties to be discharged with the 
will to obedience. But Hood believes that Taylor has 
omitted the central moral element of Hobbes' theory by not 
stressing the direct role of Scripture. That is, for 
Taylor, we can reason to the content of Natural Law, though 
God is the lawgiver and ground of its authority; but for 
Hood, we need to rely upon Scripture for our knowledge of 
the content of Natural Law. Furthermore, Warrender's thesis 
is predicated on a version of consequentialism rather than 
on a deontological perspective. Obligations retain their 
force simply because we have the duty to follow natural law 
as God's command for its own sake. Taylor affirms the link 
between an appeal to duty and the appeal to God; but he 
downplays this connection, so that our obligations to obey 
natural law can alsostand on their own, apart from 
scriptural support. It is this difference taht separates 
Taylor's deontological thesis from Hood's; that is, Hood 
indentifies the role of Scripture and religion as central to 
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Hobbes' method and theory, while Taylor chooses to stress 
the role of God as the force behind natural law. Other 
differences exist, as well, and will be mentioned in Chapter 
IV, but the crucial distinction between Taylor and Hood is 
their treatment of the role of Scripture. 
Furthermore, Hood rejects Warrender's belief that 
natural right defines obligation. For Hood it is natural 
Jaw alone that defines one's obligations; and it is what is 
-
not prescribed by natural law that defines one's natural 
-
right or liberty; that is, natural right is the liberty that 
remains outside the prescriptions of natural laws. Thus 
Hood holds that Hobbes' starting point is duty rather than 
natural right. 
Right (jus) is a meaningful term only in 
relation to law. Right consists in liberty to do or 
forbear; law determines and binds (obligat) to one of 
them; 'so that law and right, differ as much as 
obligation and liberty, which is one and the same matter 
are inconsistent'. (Hood, p.9O) 
In a passage that Hood deems significant Hobbes 
speaks of the natural right of self-preservation: "I also 
say it is a privilege which God hath given them, but we 
differ in the manner how; which to me seems this, that God 
doth not account such killing sin" (E.W. V, 181). From 
this Hood concludes that law "cannot constitute right, but 
law leaves, and so allows liberty by its silence. Right is 
allowed liberty" (Hood, p.91). As such, natural right 
cannot create obligation as Warrender claims. Or, as Hood 
Puts it, natural law brings right in its train, not the 
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reverse. In effect what Hood is arguing is that Warrender 
bas the two terms in relation, which is what Hobbes 
intended, but he has the relationship reversed so as to 
contradict Hobbes' true analysis. 
point: 
Hood concludes this 
In Hobbes's moral thought it is not right, but 
obligation, which is moral. Right is negative, a mere 
absence of obligation, just as corporal liberty is a 
negative, a mere absence of physical impediment. 
Hobbes's morality is a morality of law, not of right: it 
is law, not right, which makes the difference between 
the moral and the natural goodness. (Hood, p.94) 
In addition to denying Warrender's rights-based 
explanation of obligation, Hood denies that Hobbes' theory 
is consequentialist in nature as Warrender asserts. Hood 
rejects Warrender's claims that it is the fear of God's 
wrath that provides the force behind moral obligation and 
the claim that the desire for preservation is simply a 
validating condition of obligation. For Hood obligation is 
a duty that is deonotological in nature: that is, it is a 
matter of obeying natural law, not just in fact but with the 
right spirit or will to obedience: "Action on the will to 
obedience is possible, and in the cases governed by God's 
law is obligatory. In Hobbes's thought man is obliged, as a 
subject of God, to have such a will" (Hood, pp.114-115). It 
is in virtue of being subject to God's Natural Law that a 
Person has an obligation to the sovereign, rather than out 
of fear of God's wrath as Warrender believes. law theory he 
held. 
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In summary, Hood's thesis is deonotological like 
Taylor's but goes beyond Taylor's by stressing the 
importance of Scripture as a central element in Hobbes' 
theory. Hood rejects Warrender's consequentialism and 
natural rights-based analysis of Hobbes' theory of 
obligation, interpreting Hobbes' theory as more strictly 
following from the concept of natural law itself. Thus, 
Hood sees Hobbes as a natural law theorist who relies 
heavily on Scripture and religion to define the duty of 
obedience. In the following sections I will briefly outline 
the role of Scripture and the general nature of Hood's 
interpretation of Hobbes' theory. 
2. The Role of Scripture 
Hood's interpretation of Hobbes is unique in the 
degree of importance it assigns to the use of Scripture by 
Hobbes. Where other interpreters acknowledge that Hobbes 
quoted liberally from Scripture but then ignore the 
scriptural arguments themselves, Hood accords these 
arguments a central role in Hobbes' theory. Where some 
commentators assert that the only reason Hobbes utlized 
Scripture was to avoid persecution as an atheist, Hood 
believes that Hobbes sincerely believed in the truth of 
Scripture and the existence of God (Hood, p.5). For Hood 
the scriptural component of Hobbes' work plays the role that 
122 
warrender assigned to God and that Taylor assigned to duty: 
it is the source of the force behind natural law and the 
duty to obey natural laws. That is, once we recognize that 
Hobbes has adopted a mechanistic, scientific methodology, we 
will see that he cannot refer to God directly as a causal 
agent or an explanatory entity within that framework. The 
best he can do is to refer to God as the First Cause, about 
whom we have no other knowledge. He cannot posit God as the 
force behind natural law because this requires particular 
knowledge of God's nature that falls outside the limits of 
the scientific method Hobbes chose. What we would be left 
with, as we shall see in the next section is a set of laws 
(the Laws of Nature) without an obliger (though an 
obligation is a necessary feature of any law for Hobbes). 
That is, a set of obliger-less "laws" that are either empty 
or else not laws at all. Hood argues at this point that 
Scripture, known by faith to be the word of God, acts as the 
source of the obligatory force of the Laws of Nature (Hood, 
p.4). Our duty to obey Natural Law is prescribed in 
Scripture: "the laws of nature oblige in fact, and not 
merely by definition, only as delivered in Scripture as the 
commands of God" (Hood, p.4). 
Thus, Hood's interpretation begins with the 
assumption that Hobbes was perfectly sincere in his use of 
Scripture, especially in Leviathan, where the scriptural 
arguments comprise fully one half of the text: 
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Scripture was the only source of Hobbes's moral 
convictions. He never attempted a systematic exposition 
of his Scriptural doctrine of moral duty. The scope of 
Leviathan is limited to the entire doctrine of civil 
duty; moral duty is treated only in relation to civil 
duty. And what Hobbes wrote of obligation by laws of 
nature is intelligible only in light of his Scriptural 
conception of obligation by the Moral Law of God. (Hood, 
pp.4-5) 
Unless we are willing to assert that Hobbes wrote or 
professed much that he thought was false, Hood argues, we 
must take him at his word when he claims that Scripture was 
the sole unquestionable authority over his mind (Hood, p.1). 
That Hobbes would deceive his readers as to his true beliefs 
concerning the central elements of his political theory is 
also contradicted by the high value he placed on a teacher's 
sincerity (and Hobbes saw himself as a teacher), amongst 
other virtues: "The web begins at the first element of 
power, which are wisdom, humility, sincerity, and other 
virtues of the Apostles ... " (E.W. III, 695). Hood concludes 
that "his scorn of deceit, except as a weapon of defensive 
war, has every appearance of being genuine. He himself was 
not engaged in defensive war" (Hood, p.2). To dismiss 
Hobbes' use of Scripture as incidental, as a bow to 
convention, or as a measure for his own protection alone is 
therefore unwarranted in Hood's opinion: 
My ... position is that the presumption that 
Hobbes was sincere in his Christian profession can be 
supported by arguments at least as strong as any that 
have been advanced in favor of the contrary presumption. 
(Hood, p.5) 
Once we grant Scripture and religion their proper 
places in Hobbes' 
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political theory, we can no longer 
separate his Christianity from his politics. In fact, Hood 
claims, Hobbes adheres to a Christian sanctification of 
politics rather than to some sort of pagan secularization of 
religion: 
The Old Testament contains the Law; the New 
Testament contains no new laws of God but the Gospel. 
The first table of the Decalogue, the law of 
sovereignty, can be reduced to the one commandment to 
love God. The second table, the Moral Law, can be 
reduced to the one commandment of mutual charity (E.W. 
III, 330, 513-14, 586). (Hood, p.5) 
Hood identifies Hobbes' fundamental moral conviction 
as the belief that 
It is the law from whence proceeds the 
difference between the moral and the natural 
goodness ... the actions of subjects, if they be 
conformable to the law, are morally good, and yet cease 
not to be naturally good; and the praise of them passeth 
to the Author of Nature as well as of any other good 
whatsoever ... All the real good, which we call honest and 
morally virtuous, is that which is not repugnant to the 
law, civil or natural, for the law is all the right 
reason we have and ... is the infallible rule of moral 
goodness. (E.W. V, 193-194) 
In other words, civil and moral law cannot be divorced from 
each other because civil law is grounded in Moral Law. 
Hobbes is simply offering "an affirmation of the Christian 
conviction that the moral laws of God are moral ultimates 
beyond which man cannot go" (Hood, p.6). 
Moreover, the Moral Law commands a right conscience, 
the performance of one's duties with both the will to 
fulfill them as well as the physical performance of the deed 
(K.w. II, 60-62). For Hobbes, as Hood paraphrases him: 
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The man who strives with all possible endeavour 
to fulfil the laws of God is just. The just man does 
not in fact fulfil the Law; there is none who has not 
transgressed,· but God accepts the insufficient plea of 
the just who believe in Christ. God accepts the 
insufficient plea of the just who believe in Christ. 
God accepts the will for the work as well in good as in 
evil men (E.W. III, 599). (Hood, p.6) 
Thus, there can be no exception to the duty to strive to 
fulfill the Law. But the Law is never fulfilled by actions 
alone, it must be fulfilled by the will since it is not 
"only unjust deeds, but the designs and intentions to do 
them, though hindered by accident, (that) are injustice" 
(Hood, p.6). Or, as Hobbes says, injustice consists "in the 
pravity of the will, as well as in the irregularity of the 
act" (E.W. III, 330). 
Hood believes that the origins of these aspects of 
Hobbes' position are found in his reading of Scripture and 
in the scriptural concepts of virtue, justice and the nature 
of the will to obedience in the virtuous person. Hobbes is 
simply connecting his Christianity to his politics, or as 
Hood says, offering a Christian sanctification of politics. 
Obedience to civil law is grounded on the Moral Law of God 
which commands a right conscience. Civil law follows from 
the Moral Law and is therefore concerned with the morality 
of the just person's actions in obeying God's commands 
(Hood, p.10). Politics is as concerned with the morality of 
obedience and the Scriptural notions of virtue, justice, and 
a right conscience as the Moral Law is. The principal Moral 
Law is that of covenant, Hood says, and people are commanded 
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to keep faith with whomever they contract by God through the 
Moral Law. Accordingly, civil law becomes the measure of 
moral justice in civil society, and the commonwealth may be 
seen as a divinely appointed remedy for sinfulness (the 
transgressing of God's commands) through its exercise of 
lawmaking and enforcement. Hood concludes that Hobbes held 
that the formation of the commonwealth is possible only 
because there are such things as obligations of conscience; 
and obligations of conscience allow for a real unity of the 
members of the commonwealth only because obligation is 
moral, that is, religious (Hood, p.13). 
For these reasons Hood sees Hobbes' theory of 
obligation and the formation of the commonwealth as grounded 
in traditional Christian morality as declared and elucidated 
in Scripture (Hood, p.13). Without the scriptural elements, 
Hobbes' theory would rest upon unstatable or unknowable 
moral concepts. Scripture provides the knowledge of God's 
commands that Hobbes' science cannot because of its inherent 
materialist limitations. Thus the knowledge of God's will 
lies beyond the limits of science and cannot be a topic of 
Philosophy, not because Hobbes rejected God, but because God 
is above science (Hood, p.31). Human understanding of God's 
nature and God's commands requires religious faith and the 
correct understanding of Scripture; there 1s on Hood's 
interpretation no other source for this knowledge within 
Hobbes' system. Consequently, Hobbes' use of Scripture is 
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far from incidental; it is essential to his theory of 
political obligation; for without it the Laws of Nature 
could not be laws,and humans would have no obligations. 
3. Two Kinds of Obligation 
The substance of Hobbes' moral thought could be 
expressed in the Scriptural terms of debt (debitum), 
service (officium), and accountability. But the 
metaphor of obligation passed easily from Roman Law into 
Christian thought. This old metaphor may have been 
specially congenial to Hobbes because it suggests an 
analogy between the moral and the physical. To him 
obligation implied an obliger, an obliged, and a bond, 
an instrument by or with which the binder binds the 
bound. Every law is a bond. God binds men by His moral 
laws. (Hood, p.114) 
Here we see again that the central elements of Hood's 
interpretation are those derived from Scripture. That is, 
the substance of the theory comes from Scripture, it is 
moral in nature, God is ultimately the obliger of each 
person, though there are physical or empirical elements to 
be accounted for in addition to the moral elements found in 
Christian natural law theory. While Hood denies that 
Hobbes' materialism and resultant egoistic psychology ground 
his theory of obligation, he does allow that Hobbes' theory 
includes an artificial or psychological aspect. But the 
important element of the theory is the moral element which 
Prescribes action on the will to obey. How does Hobbes 
balance these various elements in a consistent way? 
Hood's answer is that Hobbes had two types of 
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obligation in mind rather than just one, namely moral 
obligation (natural obligation) and artificial obligation 
(humanly created obligations). Moral obligation "was a 
supernatural obligation of man by God, an obligation which 
does not arise out of any voluntary act of man, but is 
incumbent upon him" (Hood, p.115). Artificial obligation 
arises out of a covenant, it is "obligation of man by 
man ... (arising) only out of man's voluntary act in 
covenanting" (Hood, p.115); as such artificial obligation is 
subject to whatever physical or psychological factors affect 
a person's senses, memory, understanding, reason, and 
opinion, all of which affect human choice and actions. 
Hood's thesis is that Hobbes' theory is moral, but is also 
an attempt to state moral principles in the language of the 
new science. As a result there is a metaphorical relation 
between the concept of physical binding and the concept of 
moral obligation: the two types of obligation are analogous 
but not identical (Hood, p.121). The traditional 
interpreters erred in focusing on only Hobbes' materialistic 
language, thus missing the actual moral nature of his 
theory; or else they identified physical and moral 
obligation in such a way as to overlook the fact that Hobbes 
say them as analogous, not identical. In fact, Hood 
asserts, "obligation is a binding which is incompatible with 
Physical binding" in Hobbes' system (Hood, p.120). It is 
l obligations of conscience, or actions done out of the will 
~ 
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to obedience, that Hobbes was actually concerned with, and 
these are moral obligations. 
Moral obligations are supernatural obligations of 
human beings by God but, having adopted a naturalistic 
methodology and linguistic framework, Hobbes "forced this 
supernatural obligation into his naturalist theory as a 
fictious natural obligation without an obliger" (Hood, 
p.115), Law, to be law for Hobbes, must be the command of 
someone with the authority to both issue the command and 
effect the binding of the person obliged to obey the 
command. The Laws of Nature are the commands of God, the 
obliger; but this is a problem for Hobbes precisely because 
his methodology had the effect of excluding God from 
philosophy. That is, the scientific method excluded the 
only moral obliger Hobbes believed in, "and yet (Hobbes) had 
to ground all civil obligations upon the natural obligation 
to perform covenants" (Hood, p.87). How could Hobbes get 
around this? Hood answers: 
He did this, by defining a law of nature as a 
precept by which a man is forbidden. Obligation without 
an obliger is a consequence of command without a 
commander. A command without a commander seems an 
absurdity; but the method of Euclid, as understood by 
Hobbes, shows that this is an uncandid assumption. 
(Hood, p.87) 
The use of principles of construction is perfectly 
acceptable in the Euclidean methodology, and some 
definitions ~ principles of construction rather than of 
demonstration. The goal in using such principles is to 
130 
initiate a demonstration or deductive proof of the major 
postulates or axioms of the system. The principles precede 
the postulates and are made before any demonstration begins 
or can begin. Hood argues that Hobbes took advantage of 
this technique: 
Euclid had to define a point before he could 
postulate that he could draw a straight line between two 
points. Hobbes's definition of a law of nature is a 
principle of construction. The laws of nature are not 
deduced from the definition of a law of nature but as 
necessary articles of peace. (Hood, p.88) 
Natural laws, as articles of peace, are laws without an 
obliger that nonetheless bind in conscience; and from the 
outset of his discussion of law, Hobbes emphasized that the 
laws of nature can be known by reason and seen to be binding 
(E.W. IV, 109). The purpose of introducing this principle 
of construction is simply to allow Hobbes to begin his 
derivation of the origin and nature of the commonwealth. 
The Laws of Nature ground the obligations of conscience, 
which in turn are the moral and natural obligations that are 
necessary to facilitate Hobbes' 
commonwealth. 
construction of the 
Hood argues that Hobbes has discarded the ordinary 
and traditional meaning of 'law of nature' by proposing a 
new meaning for it as a term of civil philosophy. As such 
it functions as a term of art. Once the meaning of the term 
is restricted in this manner, Hood says we can see Hobbes' 
intentions more clearly: -
Hobbes framed a fictitious concept which results 
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in obligation of conscience without an obliger so that 
he could construct the commonwealth without recourse to 
man's subjection to God. Though obligation is not named 
in the definition of the commonwealth, covenants are, 
and the performance of covenants is an obligation of 
conscience imposed by the third law of nature. His 
definition of a law of nature is not a definition of a 
law of God, nor of a dictate of reason, but of a 
fictitious terium quid which is more than dictate of 
reason but less than law of God. (Hood, pp.88-89) 
Hobbes applies this concept of natural obligation by 
the Laws of Nature to the explanation of the origins of the 
commonwealth through the fiction of natural man and the 
state of Nature. Without some obligatory force that exists 
in the State of Nature there is no way for human beings to 
escape the state of war by the artificial construction of 
the commonwealth since nothing would guarantee that each 
would keep their promise to obey the terms of the covenant. 
There must therefore be a law that restricts violating 
promises or breaking faith that holds prior to the formation 
of the commonwealth. moral obligations of conscience impose 
just this necessary restriction; the Laws of Nature are just 
these laws. 
Hobbes treated the Laws of Nature essentially as if 
they were laws of virtue, according to Hood, even though 
virtues are only conducive to peace, not necessary for it 
(Hood, p.100). Hobbes himself says: 
For the laws of nature, which consist in Equity, 
Justice, Gratitude, and other moral virtues on these 
depending, in the condition of mere nature ... are not 
properly laws, but qualities that dispose men to peace 
and to obedience. (E.W. III, 253) 
Because Hobbes was above all a religious moralist he was 
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interested in the moral virtues and in incorporating them 
into his theory of obligation. Were he not a religious 
moralist, Hood notes, "he could have confined his civil 
philosophy to actions necessary for peace" (Hood, p.100). 
sut since he was, in fact, a religious moralist he adhered 
to the classic view of moral philosophy as the science of 
virtue and vice. The problem for interpreters is that 
Hobbes couched his talk of moral virtue in naturalistic 
terms, calling preservation in this world the natural good 
to which morality was the means, causing various 
interpreters to misconstrue his actual intentions. 
In truth, Hood believes, Hobbes held that virtue was 
a higher good than earthly self-preservation (Hood is 
agreeing with Warrender here): 
Preservation in this world is not necessarily 
the moral end of the Moral Law. In relation to 
salvation virtue is more important than action. There 
can be no moral absolute in Hobbes's moral science. He 
never speaks of a moral absolute; but there are clear 
indications that in his thought God is the Moral 
Absolute. The commands of God are not only commands but 
right reason; and these commands are laws of virtue. 
The virtues are eternal and are morally good. Even as 
dictates of reason the laws of nature are immutable. To 
ask whether the laws of nature, as laws of virtue, could 
be changed is philosophically as inept as to ask whether 
a true geometrical theorem may be altered. (Hood, p.101) 
The problem, however, is, given that civil philosophy is 
more concerned with conduct than with virtue, Hobbes had to 
find a way of bridging the gap between civil and moral 
Philosophy. The difficulty is that his naturalistic 
language implies that virtue, so far as it is related to 
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attaining peace, is impossible apart from the commonwealth 
(Hood, p.101). 
Hood believes the concept of justice is the bridge 
Hobbes used to extricate himself from this sticky, self-
created problem. Hobbes posits justice as the cardinal 
virtue of any good citizen, derivable from the third law of 
nature, the law of contracts, "commanding the performance of 
covenants" (E.W. III, 130, 134). Injustice is, on the other 
hand, the breaking of a covenant (E.W. III, 190). Hood 
calls this "the special sense (of justice) ... (which is) a 
settled disposition of the mind to keep faith with other 
men" (Hood,p.103). The virtue of any citizen "consists 
solely in a settled disposition of mind to obey the civil 
law. Such obedience is prescribed by the law of nature, and 
is justice and equity" (Hood, p.105). 
Hobbes derived his concept of justice 
naturalistically by arguing that justice is not contrary to 
reason in that the observance of certain rules conducive to 
self-preservation in this world is required of all those who 
seek salvation or 'felicity after death'. Though Hobbes 
settled for a naturalistic formulation of his doctrine in 
the English text of Leviathan, Hood points out that in the 
Latin text, which Hood feels more correctly represents 
Hobbes• true position, he adds the reference to supernatural 
law. Hood paraphrases Hobbes' position: 
The laws of nature are, as of nature, dictates 
of reason. There can be no natural knowledge of man'e 
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estate after death; this is a matter not of knowledge, 
but of supernatural faith. Therefore, breach of covenant 
cannot be called a precept of reason, or nature. In the 
Latin text at the end of his naturalist rejoinder, 
Hobbes recognized more realistically that his opponents 
were concerned with supernatural law. But we have no 
supernatural law beyond Holy Scripture; and it 
everywhere prescribes obedience to kings and observance 
of covenants. (Hood, p.110) 
The concept of justice is therefore naturalistically 
derived yet retains its status as a moral term. The 
naturalistic aspects of the derivation allow Hobbes to use 
the term in the context of civil philosophy at the same time 
holding that political obligation is fundamentally moral 
obligation. The rightous person follows the dictates of 
natural justice, being careful to act justly (giving every 
person his/her due, honoring contracts, etc.) out of the 
will to be just and nothing more; personal benefit does not 
figure into the equation for the righteous person who obeys 
the law out of a constant will to do what is right. The 
virtues within 
translations 
Scripture. 
of 
the commonwealth are naturalistic 
the virtues found and prescribed in 
The justice of men is justice in relation to 
natural law. Justice, as a natural obligation, is an 
obligation on man as a natural person. This obligation 
is prior to civil law, and cannot be enforced by civil 
law, for it is obligation of conscience. The third law 
of nature merely states that men perform their covenants 
made. The performance of covenants is always an act, 
and this seems a reasonably specific law of action. Yet 
it also is for Hobbes essentially a law of virtue, 
obliging in conscience. The man who performs his 
covenants through fear of punishment is unjust: he 
transgresses the law of nature, because he does not act 
in conformity with reason, but from passion; ·he has 
acted not under obligation, but freely in accordance 
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with his own natural aversion, and his own reckoning of 
natural good and evil. (Hood, p.112) 
ThUS, moral obligation is antecedant to the making of any 
particular covenant since the general obligation to obey 
covenants follows from the eternal Moral Law of God as 
revealed in Scripture, all of which precedes all societies 
and commonwealths. 
The real key to Hobbes' theory then is that natural 
obligation cannot be fulfilled without the moral virtue of 
justice and the operation of God, "pf grace operating either 
naturally or supernaturally" (Hood, p.123). Hobbes could 
not, nor did he need to, provide a psychology of the 
fulfillment of natural obligation. Moral law is fulfilled 
only when it is itself the cause of the act of conforming, 
that is, when it follows from the will to obedience. "True" 
obligation is fulfilled only when one follows the scriptural 
law of God as God's word. If one acts out the fear of 
punishment or fear of Hell, the act is that of an 
unrighteous person. The obedience requires here is 
necessary for salvation and calls for more than obedient 
actions: one must act out of the correct motivations, namely 
out of respect for the Law. 
Having carefully examined the nature of natural 
obligation, Hood's analysis of civil or artificial 
obligation is easily explicated. Hood believes that civil 
obligation is a human contrivance modeled on natural 
Obligation. Artificial obligations arise out of the act of 
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covenanting, which is a voluntary act resulting in the 
establishment of the commonwealth and the system of civil 
laws within the commonwealth. The ultimate obligatory force 
behind these obligations, nonetheless, remains moral; 
artificial obligations rely upon the moral obligation to 
perform covenants that Hood refers to as moral in the 
•special sense' of being duties of natural justice, i.e., as 
prescribed by the eternal Moral Law of God that is prior to 
the making of any specific covenant (Hood, p.115). Where 
natural obligations are obligations of debt (to God, to give 
God His due), artificial obligations by covenant are 
obligations of promise (of person to person). The only real 
obligation, however, is moral; civil or artificial 
obligation is simply a copying or imitation of the real: 
"Covenants are artificial bonds. Natural obligation is real 
obligation; artificial obligation is an imitation of the 
real. All that is artificial must be grounded on what is 
natural .... Artificial obligation is obligation only in 
virtue of the natural obligation to perform covenants (E.W. 
III, 324)" (Hood, p.116). 
But why would Hobbes have need of a second type of 
obligation, especially one grounded on the first type? If 
moral obligation is real obligation, what purpose is served 
by adding an artificial imitation? Hood's answer reveals 
What he takes to be Hobbes' pragmatic awareness of human 
Psychology: 
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The man who breaks his covenant, and 
•consequently declareth that he thinks he may with 
reason to do so', can be received into, or retained in, 
a commonwealth only through the errors of others, and it 
is against reason for him to rely on such error for· his 
preservation.... No man who does not acknowledge 
obligation of conscience, including the obligation to 
perform covenants, can be a member of his commonwealth; 
but every commonwealth includes an unjust majority. 
Every breach of civil law is a breach of covenant, but 
Hobbes's commonwealth provides punishments for such 
breaches other than extrusion. (Hood, p.109) 
Thus, artificial obligations to obey the sovereign 
are necessary to establish the right of the sovereign to 
restrain and punish the 'unjust majority". This right will 
allow the sovereign the justification of the use of whatever 
force is necessary to instill fear in the unjust, 
unrighteous members of society who would be unmoved by moral 
duty or have the will to obey God's Laws (atheists being 
among the latter). Civil obligation legitimates compelling 
the obedience of the unjust majority. The passion of fear 
is the key to the erection of the commonwealth in fact, 
which requires simply getting everyone to act as if 
following their moral duty. But the justification for 
creating this fear in the unjust is the natural law grasped 
in Scripture. 
Fear may necessitate the doing of just actions 
by unjust men; within the commonwealth fear of the 
punishments appointed by civil laws may necessitate the 
obedience that is required for mutual peace and common 
defence. 
Fear is also the passion on which Hobbes reckons 
for the erection of the commonwealth. It is therefore 
essential that covenants entered into in the state of 
nature from fear should oblige .... Covenants entered 
into from fear in the state of nature are obligatory; a 
man may lawfully covenant through fear to do anything 
Its 
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which he may lawfully do without obligation. All this 
is intended to safeguard covenants made in the state of 
nature for the erection of the commonwealth. (Hood, 
p.12O) 
Civil obligation, then, is obligation by contract. 
form or structure is clearly modeled almost exactly on 
Hobbes' analysis of moral obligation. We can see this 
clearly by briefly diagramming the parallel structures of 
each type of obligation: 
Obliger: 
Obliged: 
source of obligation: 
Statement of duty: 
Motivation to obey: 
NATURAL 
OBLIATION 
God 
Just persons 
Natural Law 
Scripture 
Will to obedience 
ARTIFICIAL 
OBLIGATION 
Sovereign 
Unjust persons 
Civil law 
Covenant 
Fear 
Hood believes both forms of obligation are necessary 
simply because Hobbes recognized that not all persons are 
aoved by moral arguments, so he was willing to settle for 
conformity to natural obligation in actions performed out of 
fear (in foro externo). The commonwealth must be based on 
natural obligation, on obligations of conscience, "but a 
compelled fulfilment of artificial obligations is sufficient 
for mutual peace and common defence. Artificial obligations 
can be fulfilled by unjust men, unmindful of natural 
obligation" (Hood, p.122). 
Finally, for Hood, the duality of Hobbes' theory 
resulted from his use of naturalistic, scientific language 
•nd methods: 
Whenever obligation, natural or artificial, is 
fulfilled, fulfilment is extrinsically necessitated. 
The sovereign can necessitate sufficient fulfilment of 
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artifical obligations by compulsion; and Hobbes can 
explain such fulfilment in terms of his naturalistic 
psychology. The fulfilment of natural obligation cannot 
be explained in terms of a naturalist psychology for it 
is God who necessitates such fulfilment. There is no 
good inclination that is not of the operation of God 
(E.W. III, 421); and this operation is not always 
natural .... The fulfilment of natural obligation is not 
of nature, but of grace operating either naturally, or 
supernaturally. It was impossible for Hobbes to provide 
a psychology of the fulfilment of natural obligation on 
principles of nature only; and for the accomplishment of 
his design he had no need to provide any psychology of 
the fulfilment of natural obligation. (Hood, pp.122-123) 
The mistake of earlier interpreters was to become 
too impressed by Hobbes' scientific method and language. 
This caused them to bypass the Scriptural origins of Hobbes' 
moral theory of obligation. For Hood, the will to obedience 
follows from belief, or faith; it is a gift of God. Hobbes 
relied upon a belief in eternal life, also, to persuade his 
readers to accept their moral obligation to act virtuously: 
"The obedience necessary to salvation includes the virtues. 
The virtues give rise to virtuous actions easily and without 
struggle ... " (Hood, p.126). Hobbes' theory is thus 
deontological, a version of Christian natural law theory. 
The materialism and egoism contained in Hobbes' work is 
essentially irrelevant, though it serves practical purposes. 
In conclusion, Hood characterizes Hobbes' theory as 
basically the outcome of two statements: 
Obligation by the Moral Law is fulfilled only 
when the Law is itself the cause of the action in 
conformity with it. The Moral Law is not fulfilled by 
actions necessitated by natural passions .... These two 
statements lead to the will to obedience, but do not go 
behind that will. Moral obligation is a mystery, of 
which Hobbes wrote in Leviathan only in terms of 
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theistic belief, or of philosophic fiction. (Hood, 
p.126) 
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CHAPTER III 
THE INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS CASE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The third major thesis to be examined in this work 
is the individual rights thesis. Its major claim is that 
Hobbes begins with the concept of individual right as the 
basis for obligation and through an analysis of this concept 
locates the source of obligation in the individual person as 
the possessor of certain inalienable rights. Obligation 
follows from certain elements of human nature, not from 
mechanistic nor from purely traditional natural law sources. 
The individualist thesis clearly rejects both of the 
previously examined interpretations and focuses on the 
notion of the natural right, a component of human nature 
according to Hobbes, as the ground of his notion of 
political obligation. 
Historically, there is some reason to think that 
Hobbes, as a man of his times, would have been influenced by 
the strong current of individualism making itself felt 
during his lifetime. Richard Peters' book outlines two 
historical factors that the individualistic interpreters of 
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of Hobbes take seriously as evidence for their thesis: 
1) "The 17th C. in England was the great period 
of various forms of individualism"; from the many 
parties that abandoned the Established Church a strong 
Non-conformist movement developed. (Peters, p.225) 
2) The understanding of even a traditional 
concept such as natural law was altered at this time by 
the focus on man as an individual begun during the 
Renaissance: "The law of nature was thought to be rooted 
in man as an individual, who was in certain respects 
like all other individuals, rather than derivative from 
his civil or ecclesiastical status." (Peters, p.156) 
These historical elements point to the conclusion 
that neither mechanism nor natural law theory may fully 
explain Hobbes' theory. Rather, being a philosopher 
influenced by the individualism of his day, Hobbes saw an 
individual rights explanation of political obligation based 
on the right of nature that each person inherently possesses 
as an essential trait of humanness itself. 
That such an interpretation flies in the face of 
both the traditional materialistic/scientific and the more 
recent moral/deontological readings of Hobbes was recognized 
by its authors. The individualists (specifically Strauss, 
Oakeshott, Glover, Goldsmith, and Watkins) did not deny 
outright that the more traditional threads are presesnt in 
Hobbes, but rather that they do not account for Hobbes' 
conception of obligation. Instead, and the various 
individualists agree in principle here, their claim that 
Hobbes developed his notion of obligation in the time before 
his conversion to the scientific approach. They also hold 
that the natural law interpreters do not account 
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satisfactorily for Hobbes' theory of obligation either. 
w.H. Greenleaf explains their position: 
There is agreement with the natural law 
revisionists that the modern naturalistic appearance of 
Hobbes's thought is deceptive and that his political and 
moral theory was not dependent on his materialism or 
developed mainly by the use of scientific method. At 
the same time, however, exponents of this third sort of 
understanding do not accept the positive side of the 
natural law case, that Hobbes's political and ethical 
thought is only properly seen in the great natural law 
tradition; indeed, they regard Hobbes as having 
explicitly and firmly repudiated that tradition. 
(Greenleaf, pp.17-18). 
Apart from agreement on these fundamental points, a 
split occurs within the indivudalists' camp. On the one 
hand, Professor Leo Strauss holds that there is a link 
between Hobbes' pre-scientific developmental stage and what 
Strauss calls Hobbes' new moral attitude, a result of his 
anthropological studies of human nature, which identified 
the good with the individual's desires or needs, and takes 
as the basis of political theory the belief that natural law 
"is, or tends to be, primarily and mainly a series of 
'rights', of subjective claims, originating in the human 
will" (Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, p.viii.) 
In following this path Hobbes broke cleanly with the 
traditional natural law theory; that is the claim that 
effects the split among defenders of the individualists' 
position. Oakeshott, Goldsmith, Glover, and Watkins take 
issue with Strauss' claim that Hobbes had broken cleanly 
With traditional natural law and wish to link the 
individualist theory more closely to the traditional ways of 
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thinking honored by philosophers before 
Aristotle, Augustine, Scotus, Occam, 
Hobbes 
etc.) 
(e.g. 
and, 
particularly, to link it to classical natural law theory, 
which holds that there is a rule of binding law, independent 
of human will. But they do agree with Strauss that Hobbes' 
anthropological studies are the touchstone of his political 
theory of obligation and that these studies extend, though 
they do not totally repudiate, the classical natural law 
tradition. Thus, Strauss and the others part company on the 
point of whether or not Hobbes adheres to a classical 
natural law point of view or whether he breaks with 
tradition to form a new revised, modern, version of natural 
law theory. 
B. STRAUSS' INDIVIDUALISM 
1. Outline of Strauss' Theses and Conclusions 
In a passage near the end of the introduction to his 
book, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, Strauss writes: 
The moral attitude which underlies Hobbes's 
political philosophy is independent of the foundation of 
modern science, and at least in that sense 'pre-
scientific'. It is at the same time specifically 
modern ... Hobbes ... philosophized in the fertile moment 
when the classical and theological tradition was already 
shaken, and a tradition. of modern science not yet formed 
and established. {PPH, p.5) 
Within the body of this passage are a number of Strauss' 
most important points: First, in saying that there is a 
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fundamental distinction between Hobbes' moral attitude and 
the more traditional attitudes, Strauss implies that neither 
the Christian interpretations (such as Hood's) nor the 
traditional or classical interpretations (such as the 
natural law theories of Taylor and Warrender) are actually 
Hobbes' own theory. Second, Strauss clearly denies a purely 
scientific interpretation of Hobbes' theory, thus denying 
the materialists' interpretation. Third, what Strauss 
maintains is that Hobbes' true position is colored by the 
historical era within which Hobbes wrote so as to be a 
"modern" version of the moral view, though not yet the 
scientific view commonly attributed to Hobbes. 
This move to a modern, non-scientific, version of 
natural law, one within which the individual is the focal 
point for obligation, is comprised of five separate 
processes according to Strauss: 
1. A movement away from seeing monarchy as the 
most natural form of State to seeing it as the most 
perfect artificial State. 
2. The movement away from seeing natural law as 
the basis of legal, moral, and political obligation, to 
seeing natural claim rights as the ground of those three 
forms of obligation. 
3. A movement away from superhuman authority (of 
whatever kind) toward human authority as the basis of 
the authority of the State. 
4. A movement away from the study of the past 
histories of States toward the construction of a new 
future State. 
5. A movement away from honor as a moral 
principle, toward fear of a violent death as a moral 
principle. (PPH, p.129). 
These moves, Strauss, notes, are all away from a 
View of obligation as a natural duty toward seeing it as an 
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artificial one. Such a movement characterizes Hobbes' 
entire procedure in his political theory. To make this 
point even stronger, Strauss claims not only that this moral 
attitude is temporally prior to Hobbes' scientific methods, 
it is logically prior to them. That is, the crux of Hobbes' 
theory of obligation does not actually depend upon the 
scientific view at all--it is logically complete without 
reference to these claims. Nothing rides upon the 
scientific claims in terms of the substance of Hobbes' moral 
theory. 
Why did Hobbes make this shift from arguments 
focusing on natural processes towawrd a focus on artificial 
processes? Strauss' answer is that the change is based upon 
the emphasis Hobbes placed upon fear as an important moral 
factor in political philosophy. More specifically, the fear 
of death is what makes humans clear-sighted as 
vanity which blinds them. It is, for Hobbes, 
opposed to 
the anti-
thesis between vanity and fear that is 
important for morality. 
fundamentally 
Having recognized this antithesis between vanity and 
fear, Hobbes anaalyzed it against the background of the 
classical natural law tradition and concluded that a 
modification of the tradition was needed in order to restore 
morality to politics where passion currently reigned over 
reason. 
Strauss explains Hobbes' perception of this task as 
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that of seeking the complete basis of natural law in man's 
beginnings. Hobbes found that passion, not reason was the 
I 
most powerful force on most people of his time. As a 
result, natural law will not be effectual if its principles 
are distrusted by passion or are not agreeable to passiosn 
(Elements, Ep.Ded.) (Strauss, Natural Right and History, 
p.180). Natural law must be deduced from fear, the most 
powerful of all passions. Thus, Strauss says, Hobbes' 
method would be to attempt a rigorous deduction of natural 
and moral law from the principle of fear (especially of a 
violent death), the most powerful passion, while divorcing 
natural law from the idea of the perfection of human nature 
since natural law can only be of practical value if it is 
deduced from how people actually live (NRH, p.180). 
For Strauss the important thing to note about the 
above analysis is that Hobbes' moral attitude and the need 
to restore morality to political philosophy precedes the 
conclusion that a rigorous, scientific, deduction of natural 
law is necessary. That is, Hobbes' "science of politics" 
follows from the new moral attitude as the methodology best 
suited to proving the moral conclusions already apparent to 
Hobbes. The method does not come first as the mechanistic 
view of Hobbes' claims, nor was it a belief in traditional 
natural law theory that led Hobbes to the moral conclusions 
he reached. The conclusions were formed before the former 
and after the latter had been set aside. It is only later, 
when 
offer 
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Hobbes adopts the scientific method that he is able to 
a proof of his individualistic thesis: "self-
preservation is the sole root of all justice and morality, 
the fundamental moral fact is not a duty but a right; all 
duties are derivative from the fundamental and inalienable 
right of self-preservation" (NRH, p.181). 
At this point it is clear to Strauss that what 
Hobbes had done was to effect a fundamental change in the 
direction of natural law theory. The switch from natural 
duty to individual right as the source of obligation is the 
basis of modern natural law theory; all later political 
philosophy is based on the break with tradition that Hobbes 
achieved by replacing natural law with natural right as the 
starting point of political theory. Although Strauss' 
contention that all modern political philosophy follows from 
Hobbes' re-direction is merely a minor and unimportant 
thesis for our purposes, the claim that Hobbes switched to a 
natural rights from the earlier natural rights approach is 
the key to Strauss' interpretation of Hobbes. For Hobbes, 
Strauss contends, sees individual rights as the expression 
of what everyone actually desires and Hobbes believes that 
people, to protect or obtain what they desire already, will 
fight for their rights more easily than they will strive to 
fulfill their duties (NRH, pp.182-183). Thus the appeal to 
right makes natural law more effective, exactly what Hobbes 
Wished to achieve. But it also places the individual at the 
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focal point of any theory of political obligation, and thus 
moves beyond "perfection-oriented" theories. As Strauss 
says, "One could not assert the primacy of natural rights 
without asserting that the individual is in every respect 
prior to civil society: all rights of civil society are 
derivative from rights which originally belonged to the 
individual (De Cive, VI, 5-7, and Leviathan, chaps. xviii 
and xxviii)" (NRH, p.183). Moreover, if the preceeding 
analysis is accepted, then obligation can only arise from 
contract. For if the only unconditioned moral fact is the 
individual's right to self-preservation, then all 
obligations to others are conditional and what they are 
conditional upon is a contract between individuals, "and 
therefore inpractice from the will of the sovereign" 
(Elements, I, 17, #1; De Cive, Ep. Ded.; III, 3-6, 29, 32; 
VI, 16; XII, 1; XIV, 9-10, 17; XVII, 3; De Homine, XIII, 9; 
Leviathan, chaps. xiv, xv, xxvi) (NRH, p.188). This last 
point follows from the fact that the contract that validates 
all other contracts is the social contract, the contract of 
subjection to the sovereign. But, again, the ultimate 
starting point of all this is the switch from duty to right 
and the resultant individual rights theory. 
2. The Historical Aspect in Strauss' Defense 
of the Individual Rights Interpretation 
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The basic reason for Strauss' rejection of the 
previous interpretations is that Hobbes' theory of 
obligation could not derive from either the scientific or 
traditional natural law view simply because the conclusions 
and basics of the theory were established and accepted by 
Hobbes before his conversion to the scientific method and 
his revision of traditional natural law theory. The 
argument Strauss uses to support his major theses, then, 
grows out of an historical analysis of Hobbes' life and the 
belief that Hobbes had reached his final conclusions prior 
to his publication of the major "scientific" works most 
scholars concentrate upon for Hobbes' moral philosophy: 
Leviathan, Elements of Law, and Elementa Philosophiae, 
section II "De Homine" and section III "De Cive", all 
released after 1640. It is Strauss' contention that we can 
find all the major conclusions of Hobbes' theory in works 
prior to 1640 and that therefore they must be derived from 
other than scientific sources and/or traditional theories 
that he already rejected and revised. These later works, 
Strauss says, are a product of the third and last stage of 
Hobbes' life, and while the moral theory and its conclusions 
are most forcefully stated and argued in the later works, 
they are formulated in and depend upon principles already 
held during the first two stages of his life. Therefore, 
they are both chronologically, and also logically, prior to 
the scientific period, the implication being that· these 
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principles and beliefs cannot be supported by the principles 
available in mechanistic or the natural law interpretations. 
Study of the stages of Hobbes' life, then, is the 
keY to Strauss' historically and philosophically more 
correct interpretation of the theory of obligation. These 
stages are: the Early Aristotelian stage, the Humanistic 
stage, and the Scientific stage. 
According to Strauss the beginnings of Hobbes' 
political philosophy are found in his pre-scientific, 
informal observations of human behavior and his consequently 
•new moral attitude'. "The experience, underlying Hobbes's 
view of human life, must be traced back to a specific moral 
attitude which compels its holder to experience and see man 
in Hobbes's particular way" (NRH, p.x). Michael Oakeshott 
explains Strauss' conclusion, 
This "moral attitude" is "Hobbes's original 
view" and it is "independent both of traditional and 
modern science": it was present in his mind before he 
became acquainted with "modern science", and it is in 
conflict with the moral attitude or set of norms 
provided by traditional moral and political 
philosophy ... it is new because it is "untraditional", 
because it is a break with Aristotelian tradition, and 
it is new because it appears in Hobbes's writings as a 
successor to an original acceptance of the old or 
traditional moral attitude; that is, it is new in the 
history of moral philosophy and it is new in the history 
of Hobbes's own intellectual development. (Oakeshott, 
Hobbes on Civil Association, p.136). 
a. Early Aristotelian Stage 
Hobbes had been educated in and had accepted the 
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teachings of Aristotle and the notion of aristocratic 
virtue, as well as having studied classical poets and 
historians such as Homer, Demosthenes, and Thucydides (E.W. 
VIII, vii). Strauss notes that even at the end of his 
humanistic period Hobbes had no objections to Aristotle 
being labeled THE classical philosopher. It is only in his 
later period that Hobbes replaced Aristotle with Plato in 
his hierarchy of philosophers, which Strauss sees as further 
evidence that at the time of Hobbes' translating of 
Thucydides he held Aristotle in high regard, " ... it is only 
of importance that Hobbes, who later considered Plato to be 
the best philosopher ... of antiquity, at the end of his 
humanist period repeats without raising any objection the 
ruling opinion according to which Aristotle is the highest 
authority in philosophy" (PPH, p.33). In fact the break 
with Aristotle which marks the end of the Early Aristotelian 
stage, extends initially only to the mathematical and 
scientific studies, and even as late as his writing of the 
Elements (1640) Hobbes still relies upon and uses many of 
Aristotle's analyses and distinctions (PPH, p.33). 
What remained during the Humanistic stage from 
Hobbes' early respect for Aristotle is of extreme importance 
in grasping the true intentions of Hobbes' moral philosophy, 
according to Strauss. The important left-over was 
methodological: specifically, Hobbes followed the 
methodology of Aristotle's Rhetoric while formulating and 
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writing his own political treatises, especially in the area 
of the analysis of the passions. De Homine, Elements, and 
_y?viathan all contain passages closely paralleled in the 
,mietoric in style and substance. Strauss develops a long 
list of correlations in these four works that is the 
foundation of Strauss' claim that, if Aristotle is the basis 
of Hobbes' political theorizing, it cannot be the case that 
Hobbes' political philosophy is truly a product of his post-
Euclidean period alone (PPH, pp.36-41). 
The conclusion of this analysis is that since most 
scholars devote their attention almost exclusively to the 
later works, the recognition that Hobbes' political 
philosophy is NOT a result of either a mechanistic approach 
nor a traditionalistic approach has been overlooked. Hobbes 
has been miscast in terms of a mechanical-scientific or 
naturalistic interpretation 
Aristotle's 
solely to 
methodology is 
his lter works 
because his 
not 
and 
apparent 
forgets 
if 
reliance on 
one attends 
his earlier 
developmental periods altogether. Once we take a more 
complete overview of Hobbes' life and work we can see the 
contrasts between what follows and his earlier moral 
attitude and methodology. 
By explicating Hobbes' earlier Aristotelianism, 
Strauss can argue that the conclusions of Hobbes' mature 
moral philosophy conflict with the norms provided by the 
traditional theories. The contrast is in the different 
155 
kinds of arguments of the earlier works as against those of 
the scientific period. In particular, the emphasis on fear 
is derived through the Aristotelian influence and reliance 
upon the Rhetoric; it is this emphasis that finally defines 
Hobbes' new moral attitude and, then, separates him from 
Aristotle, for Hobbes• analysis of fear ultimately is 
different from Aristotle's. As Strauss says, 
A large part of the changes which Hobbes makes 
in his model is to be explained by his fundamental 
opinion that fear or more accurately fear of death, is 
the force which makes men clear-sighted, and vanity the 
force which makes men blind. The change in the estimate 
of fear is shown by the fact that Hobbes in his 
enumeration of good things (De Homine, ch. 6-10, 12) 
mentions life as the first good in the first place, 
whereas Aristotle mentions happiness in the first place 
and life only in the penultimate place. (PPH, p.132) 
This change is the basis of Hobbes' turning from Aristotle 
and entering the second stage of his philosophical life, the 
Humanistic period. 
To summarize, Strauss holds that it is in this early 
period (and the next) that Hobbes arrived at the content of 
his political theory of obligation. The early formulations 
of the theory pre-date Hobbes• discovery of Euclid and 
Galileo and leads him away from the traditional natural law 
theory based on Aristotle. The result is the •new moral 
attitude' and modern formulation of natural theory having 
fear as its central element. Thus, in the second 
Philosophic period in his life, Hobbes developed these early 
beliefs into his mature (and "true'') theory of obligation 
based on individual natural rights. 
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b. The Humanistic Stage 
The humanistic period of Hobbes' life is important 
because of two things: first, Hobbes rejected Aristotelian 
natural law theory and second, he undertook to study history 
in a humanistic manner. Strauss believes that these two 
things account for the structure of Hobbes' complete 
political philosophy as manifested in company with detailed 
demonstrations in the works of the third period. Strauss 
notes Hobbes' continual movement away from natural to 
artificial processes and explanations to form the basis of 
his theory of politics and obligation during this second 
period. As a result of this second period of humanism and 
historiography, Hobbes returns to philosophy, adopting the 
scientific method as his primary philosophical tool. 
However, Strauss believes that Hobbes reached his final 
conclusions during the second period. 
The second period begins with Hobbes' rejection of 
Aristotle and the traditional moral philosophy of classic 
natural law theory that was derived from the first two. In 
outline, the traditional theory of Hobbes' time was a 
development from Plato, through Aristotle, Hooker, Suarez, 
and Grotius of the notion that natural law is an objective 
rule or measure independent of and prior to any human will, 
such that moral goodness id equated with obedience to 
natural law so far as discoverable by reason (PPH, pp.xvii-
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~viii). Moral goodness, virtue, must be a product of 
wisdom. It was this that Hobbes was rejecting, according to 
strauss, because he felt that the traditional moral theory 
had failed to develop moral science beyond its theoretical 
sphere into a force having practical influence upon human 
conduct. Thus, Hobbes was forced to abandon Aristotle, 
natural law theory, and, ultimately, any moral theory that 
held virtue to be a product of wisdom. Such theories had no 
concrete connection to actual human affairs since it was 
removed from the wawy people actually lived and acted. 
Therefore Hobbes took the obvious step of beginning 
an anthropological and historical study of how people, in 
fact, behave and what influences their conduct. The reason 
for the shift is described by Strauss as deriving from, 
11 
••• the conviction of the impotence of reason, added to the 
enhanced interest in man" (PPH, 
motives Strauss indentifies as 
p.93). The source of these 
Bacon's thesis of the 
importance of history and the inductive study of historical 
examples as the way to establish norms of human conduct 
(ff!!, p.93). That Hobbes was familiar with and influenced 
by Bacon's views is certain since he had served as Bacon's 
secretary and had recorded much of Bacon's thought as 
dictated to him. Having thus questioned pure reason and 
turned to inductive empirical analysis Hobbes had shifted 
his view of moral goodness from the traditional view 
associating it with wisdom and aristocratic virtue. That he 
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did so, Strauss says, is clear from his subsequent 
identification of moral goodness with success and virtue 
with prudence, a truly Baconian move (PPH, p.94). 
Hobbes' turn to history is more coherent once we 
recognize that, in addition to Bacon's influence, the 
attitude of his times toward history was that its study 
widened one's stock of experiences and examples, thought to 
be so necessary to the development of prudence in a person. 
The lessons of history were the lessons learned from 
observing what happens when one fails to follow the dictates 
of prudence. History does not teach precepts, which the 
unvirtuous would ignore anyway, but broadens experience 
through a search for the conditions and results of the 
realization and application of the precepts. (PPH, pp.85-
86). The object of history is "to instruct and enable men, 
to bear themselves prudently in the present and providently 
toward the future" (E.W. VIII, vii). Thus Hobbes, says 
Strauss, sees history as a source for normative guidance, 
while replacing a morality of obedience with the morality of 
prudence. 
While studying history, Hobbes came to recognize the 
psychological effects of fear and pride on human action and 
came to see that all meaning is rooted in human need. By a 
study of individuals and their actions in history, Hobbes 
discovered that the organizing principle of any science of 
Philosophy of politics will be supplied by identifying human 
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good (Strauss, "On the Spirit of Hobbes's Political 
philosophy", p.9). Here the Aristotelian roots of Hobbes 
the historian are evident. But for the Hobbes of the second 
period the identification of this good is to be accomplished 
bY the study of people's actual lives in history, not by 
merely theoretical accounts of natural law. 
In the attempt to reach such an identification of 
human good Hobbes found the phenomena of actual human life 
to be central: the passions, characters, temperaments, 
intentions, and motives of individual people became a 
central interest for Hobbes. Strauss explains 
Knowledge of these phenomena is provided not by 
traditional philosophy, but by history, and among all 
historians according to Hobbes's view by none more than 
by Thucydides ... because, instead of dogmatically setting 
out precepts, he helps the reader to gain thorough and 
independent insight into the precepts as into the 
teachings which are gained from experience, and in the 
second place, because he is aware of the peculiar 
difficulties of this kind of knowledge ... he teaches the 
reader much more thoroughly than any philosopher could 
(E.W., Vol. VIII, viii and xxi f.). Thucydides is 
concerned primarily with motives. The most powerful 
motives are the passions.... Hobbes, taught by 
Thucydides about those passions which 'carry the 
greatest sway with men in their public conversation•, 
reveals his characteristic moral attitude for the first 
time in the terse statements of the introduction to his 
translation of Thucydides, which treats of those 
passions. (PPH, pp.109-110). 
Strauss believes, then, that Hobbes' recognition of 
the importance of the passions led him to history, which in 
turn brought him to Thucydides, who finally influenced his 
moral attitudes enough to complete the break with Aristotle 
and classic natural law theory. Again, Strauss ties this 
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break and formulation of the new moral attitude to the time 
of Hobbes' translation of Thucydides, prior to his 
conversion to "mechanical philosophy". It is also important 
that this new position is stated, not in terms of nature, 
but in terms of a new morality, a product of the study of 
history and informal observation of human beings and their 
manners. Ultimately it is fear and vanity that become the 
two postulates of human nature that ground the State, not 
either a "naturalistic antithesis of morally indifferent 
animal appetite ... on the one hand, and morally indifferent 
striving after self-preservation on the other, but the moral 
and humanist antithesis of fundamentally unjust vanity and 
fundamentally just fear of violent death" (PPH, p.27). 
Having reached these radically new moral values, 
Hobbes was forced by his own position, first, to reject once 
and for all Aristotle's concept of aristocratic virtue, "As 
fear is thus considered the sufficient motive for all right 
behaviour ... it is impossible to approve any virtues which do 
not arise from fear, fear of violent death, and whose 
essence consists in the conquest or denial of fear. Once 
Hobbes has fully elucidated his conception of fear he cannot 
but reject aristocratic virtue" (PPH, p.113). The 
aristocratic virtues are those of war, the State of Nature 
in Hobbes' later terminology; fear, on the other hand, is 
the virtue of peace and the State, as well as the best 
•otive for right execution and planning (De Cive, chap. I, 
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art. 2, annot. 2). 
Then, secondly, Hobbes was compelled to abandon 
reliance upon history that characterized his humanist period 
because of the very conclusions to which it led him. For 
"the need for history, which had arisen thanks to an alleged 
or real defect in traditional philosophy, is fulfilled by 
the new political philosophy. Thus from the time of the 
formation of the new political philosophy, history sinks 
back into its old philosophic insignificance--with the 
important difference, that in the new political philosophy, 
in contrast to the traditional, history is 'taken up' and 
conserved" (PPH, p.96). In short, the new conclusions 
created the necessity of abandoning historically oriented 
humanism and seeking a methodology more suited to the 
philosophic argument and the justification his new views 
required. It was at this point, Strauss notes, that Hobbes 
was drawn back to philosophy itself, though with an altered 
set of motives and values which prompted his adopting an 
untraditional philosophic method. 
c. The Scientific/Philosophical Stage 
Hobbes returned to philosophy, by his own admission, 
to overturn the long tradition of classical philosophy's 
reliance upon the Aristotelian approach to moral and 
Political theory. The tenets of that tradition Hobbes set 
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out to replace were: 1) the noble and the just are 
fundamentally distinguished from the pleasant, and are 
preferable to it; 2) that there is a rectum naturale that is 
wholly independent of any human will, compact, or 
convention; that this was false was made clear to Hobbes 
once he came to believe that it is by the right of nature 
that people save themselves when peace is not available; 3) 
that there is one "best" political order rendered best by 
nature alone; of this traditional political philosophy, 
Hobbes says it is to be identified with a particular 
position that was public spirited and too idealistic (NRH, 
p.167). Hobbes' return to philosophy in the third period is 
marked by his rejection of this idealistic strain in 
political theory, particularly the view that the essence of 
human nature is to be political. For Hobbes, says Strauss, 
we are not, by nature, political animals. Hobbes has 
stepped away from the Aristotelian tradition and into a more 
Epicurean one, says Strauss, which holds that we are 
naturally a-political and identify our good with what is 
pleasant (De Cive I, 2; Leviathan chap. vi (33)). 
It is now, Strauss contends, that Hobbes' natural 
Philosophy becomes important. His physics blends Platonic 
mathematical theory with Epicurean materialism into a 
synthesis accomplished by moving them from one arena, 
Physics, to another arena, politics. What Hobbes needed to 
do, consequently, was to show that this scientific 
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materialism was possible by refuting the claim that science 
could not be protected from the skepticism associated with 
materialism (NRH, p.172). In doing this, Hobbes reached the 
conclusion that what was needed was to mark out an "island 
of science" safe from the skeptics' attacks; the only such 
"island" that Hobbes could discern was one of our own 
conscious constructs that would be wholly unambiguous and 
certain because wholly created by ourselves as sole cause. 
As Strauss paraphrases Hobbes (De Homine X, 4-5; De Cive 
XVIII, 4 and XVII, 28; De Corpore xxv, 1; Elements, ed. 
Tonnies, p .168), 
The cause of the world of our constructs does 
not have a further cause, a cause that is not, or not 
fully, within our power; the world of our constructs has 
an absolute beginning or is a creation in the strict 
sense. The world of our constructs is therefore the 
desired island that is exempt from the flux of blind and 
aimless causation. (NRH, p.173). 
The State, then, is an artificial construct, not a natural 
entity, or else we could not understand it; that we can 
understand it once we see its ends (located in human needs), 
shows that it is an artifical entity. 
In Hobbes' system, Strauss holds, epistemology 
replaces traditional cosmology rather than a new mechanistic 
cosmology replacing the old teleological cosmology, as 
claimed by the mechanistic interpreters (NRH, pp.176-177). 
However, knowledge cannot remain the end if the whole is 
Unintelligible (De Corpore I, 6). All intelligibility is 
rooted in the fulfillment of human need, so the most 
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compelling and posited by human desire will be the highest 
principle. With this realization political philosophy, as 
Aristotle had predicted, becomes the most important sort of 
knowledge. But, Strauss notes, Hobbes does not just agree 
with the classic tradition in this respect, he also expects 
much more. What he expects is a restoration of moral 
principles and a rigorous deduction of natural and moral law 
based, not on classic metaphysics, but on a political 
science independent of every other science, one grounded 
upon the impirical observation of human beings as they 
exist. Hobbes, thus, has moved away from the naturalism of 
classic natural law by turning to natural science and 
abandoning abstract metaphysics; he is denying that there 
are any natural standards of goodness in the Platonic and 
traditional natural law senses (PPH, pp.165-166). 
The task of Hobbes' new science of politics is to 
identify exactly what the most compelling human desire is by 
careful empirical observation and analysis. The factor that 
is of primary importance for Strauss' case here is the claim 
that Hobbes had already identified, through precisely such 
empirical methods, just this need or desire during the two 
earlier phases of his life: it is the desire to avoid a 
Violent death. Strauss writes: 
The most powerful of all passions is the fear of 
death, and, more particularly, the fear of violent death 
at the hands of others: not nature but 'that terrible 
enemy of nature, death', yet death insofar as man can do 
something about it, i.e., death insofar as it can be 
avoided or avenged, supplies the ultimate guidance 
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(Elements I, 14, sec. 6; De Cive, Ep. ded., I, 7 and 
III, 31; Levviathan chaps. xiv (92) and xxvi (197)). 
Death takes the place of the telos. Or to preserve the 
ambiguity of Hobbes's thought, let us say that the fear 
of a violent death expresses most forcefully the most 
powerful and the most fundamental of all natural 
desires, the initial desire, the desire for self-
preservation. (NRH, pp.180-181) 
This belief, arrived at during the humanistic 
period, is a moral belief. It characterizes Hobbes' new 
moral attitude and thus carries over into the final period 
of his life to function as the starting point of his 
scientific deduction of the laws of morality and politics. 
Moral law then becomes all the rules that must be obeyed if 
self-preservation is to be guaranteed. Virtue has been 
reduced to the particular social virtue of peaceableness, 
vice to pride and vanity, which are the causes of the desire 
for power over others ("SH", p.18). It is the fact that all 
this depends upon the moral belief that all right action is 
guided by fear, which Hobbes held from his humanistic period 
onward, that is missed by most scholars' overemphasis on the 
later works. 
From this point on Hobbes' theory of obligation is 
developed in detail and given its scientific character. 
Indeed, Strauss maintains that the prior acceptance of fear 
as the principle of the new moral attitude combined with 
Hobbes' turn to a non-metaphisical political philosophy and 
concept of human nature, dictates his turning to Euclid and 
the new science of the day. It is not the case, Strauss 
emphasizes, that Hobbes' political science is the result of 
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,2!!.!Y his natural science; one must examine the question of 
whY Hobbes decided in favor of materialism in the first 
place. Strauss admits that only rough indications can be 
given, but his explanation, which he holds is suitable, can 
be constructed along the following lines: 
Hobbes' turn to natural science is to be 
explained by his interest not so much in nature as in 
man, in self-knoweldge of man as he really is, i.e. by 
the interest which characterized him even in his 
humanist period. The humanist or moral origin of his 
scientific question is revealed even in his answer to 
the question. The fundamental concept of his theory of 
motion, the concept of conatus, appears first in his 
analysis of appetite. Nor is ~his all. His scientific 
explanation of sense perception is characterized by the 
fact that it interprets perception of the higher senses 
by the sense of touch; and the preference for the sense 
of touch which tis presupposes is already implied in 
Hobbes's original view of the fundamental significance 
of the antithesis between vanity and fear ... If Hobbes's 
natural science in its questions and answers is thus 
dependent upon his 'humanist', that is moral, interests 
and convictions, on the other hand a particular 
conception of nature is the implicit basis of his views 
in moral and political philosophy ... He could not have 
maintained his thesis that death is the greatest and 
supreme evil but for the conviction vouched for by his 
natural science that the soul is not immortal. (PPH, 
pp.166-167) 
The problem that has prevented most scholars from 
perceiving this moral basis to Hobbes' science and political 
theory is: 
... that the moral basis of his political 
philosophy becomes more and more disguised, the farther 
the evolution of his natural science progresses ... In 
other words, with the progressive elaboration of his 
natural science, vanity, which must of necessity be 
treated from the moral standpoint, is more and more 
replaced by the striving for power, which is neutral and 
therefore mor amenable to scientific interpretation. 
(~, pp.168-169) 
What the scientific treatment is, ultimately, is the 
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use of the best method of exposition, that which can be most 
easilY rectified with a materialist bend but still be 
connected to a moral genesis: what it is not, as previously 
aaintained, is the decisive feature of Hobbes' political 
philosophy. 
3. The New Theory of Obligation 
From this moral and scientific synthesis Hobbes 
arrived at his new theory of political obligation which 
Strauss calls the modern version of natural law theory. 
What makes it modern is its switch from duty to individual 
right as the basis of theory. The result of Hobbes' 
particular methodology combined with a certain Platonic 
flavor, was a deduction not of materialistic moral law or 
obligation but the deduction of a claim: The basis of 
obligation is the right of nature. Strauss explains the 
essence of this new concept of 'right': 
This right is the minimum claim which as such is 
fundamentally just and the origin of any other just 
claim: more exactly, it is unconditionally just because 
it can be answered for in face of all men in all 
circumstances. A claim of this kind is only the claim 
to defend life and limb. Its opposite is the maximum 
claim, which is fundamentally unjust, for it cannot be 
answered for in the face of any other man. The maximum 
claim ... is the claim to triumph over all other men. 
This 'natural' claim is checked by fear of violent death 
and becomes man's rational minimum claim, and thus 
'right of nature' comes into being, or at least comes to 
light. That is to say, the 'right of nature' is the 
first juridical or moral fact which arises if one starts 
from man's nature, i.e. from man's natural appetite. 
(PPH, p.155 fn) 
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The so-called laws of nature owe any importance they 
have to being the necessary consequence of the right to 
self-preservation, the right of nature. Here is the key 
move in Strauss' development of his individualistic thesis: 
Hobbes is not a classical natural law moralist but a modern 
theorist who puts individual right at the focal point of a 
theory of political obligation, he subordinates law to right 
with consequences that alter all subsequent political 
philosophy. For Hobbes, "Since the fundamental and absolute 
moral fact is a right and not a duty, the function as well 
as the limits of civil society must be defined in terms of 
man's natural right and not in terms of his natural duty" 
("SH", p.13). 
Why did Hobbes believe this switch was necessary? 
The answer, for Strauss, is found in the earlier periods 
when Hobbes studied human nature. For Hobbes, rights are 
simply the expression of what everyone desires anyway. 
Human beings are by nature willing to fight to protect or 
gain what they desire more readily than they can be made 
willing to fulfill duties; this natural readiness to fight 
is the basis of their rights. The premises of the deduction 
of their rights are located, therefore, in passions, and 
what is needed to make these modern rights effective is 
therefore seen to be 'enlightenment or propaganda', not a 
moral appeal. 
For Hobbes, this 'enlightenment' is a matter of 
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clearly expliciting the role of fear, especially fear of a 
qiolent death at the hands of others: "yet death insofar as 
11an can do something about it, i.e., death insofar as it can 
be avoided or avenged, supplies the ultimate guidance 
(V,ements, I, 14, sec. 6; De Cive, Ep. Ded., I, 7, and III, 
31; Leviathan XIV, 92, and xxvii, 197) 11 ( 11 SH 11 , p.12). 
Natural law must be deduced from the desire for self-
preservation which, then, becomes the "sole root of all 
justice and morality, the fundamental moral fact is not a 
duty but a right" ( 11 SH 11 , p.13). As a result, Strauss says: 
... duties are binding only to the extent to 
which their performance does not endanger our self-
preservation. Only the right of self-preservation is 
unconditional or absolute. By nature, there exists only 
a perfect right and no perfect duty. The law of nature, 
which formulates man's natural duties, is not a law, 
properly speaking. ( 11 SH 11 , p.13) 
Following from this, Hobbes characterizes the 
function of the State as that of safeguarding each 
individual's natural right. The State does not produce or 
promote a virtuous life, as premodern natural law doctrines 
taught. Here, Strauss says, we may speak of Hobbes shifting 
the emphasis of political philosophy from natural duties to 
the natural rights of individuals ( 11 SH 11 , p.14). In other 
words: 
[Hobbes] ... begins his political philosophy not 
with the question as to the essence of virtue, or with 
the question ... as to the 'nature' of man in the sense of 
the idea of man, but with the question as to the 
'nature' of man in the sense of that which falls to all 
men before education .... Hobbes traces the existing 
State back to its principles in human nature--limitless 
self-love on the one hand, and fear of a violent death 
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on the other.... Hobbes characterizes the two 
principles ... as the principle of natural appetite and 
the principle of natural reason, i.e. as the principle 
of the wrong and the principle of the right .... All 
interpreters of Hobbes ... have not noticed that the 
principle of natural reason ... or, what comes to the same 
thing, the principle of the 'right of nature' which he 
seems only to presuppose, is in reality justified by 
him ... (De Cive, cap. 1, art. 7). The 'law of nature' 
owes all its dignity simply to the circumstance that it 
is the necessary consequence of the 'right of nature'. 
(PPH, pp. 153-155) 
Strauss concludes that because of Hobbes' emphasis 
on natural right, and his subsequent precise distinction 
between 'right' and 'law' that showed the State to be 
primarily founded on 'right', of which 'law' is a mere 
consequence, we may characterize Hobbes' political 
philosophy as an extreme form of individualism (PPH, p.157). 
It is this uncompromising individualism that makes Hobbes, 
in Strauss's opinion, the founder of modern political 
philosophy (PPH, p.157). 
Where classical theory assumed society to be 
superior to the individual, thus subject to a prior 
morality, Hobbes' theory reverses this: 
One could not assert the primacy of natural 
rights without asserting that the individual is in every 
respect prior to civil society: all rights of civil 
society or of the sovereign are derivative from rights 
which originally belonged to the individual (De Cive VI, 
5-7; Leviathan chaps. xviii (113) and xxviii (203-3)). 
The individual as such, the individual regardless of his 
qualities--and no merely, as Aristotle had contended, 
the man who surpasses humanity--had to be conceived of 
as essentially complete.independently of civil society. 
This conception is a state of nature which antedates 
civil society. (NRH, p.183) 
Thus, once Hobbes had altered the emphasis from duty to 
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right, individualism followed and stands as a rejection of 
the 'perfection-oriented' traditional theories. The State 
of Nature is described such that it is a state with perfect 
rights (De Cive, praef.): by nature, everyone has the right 
to preserve themselves and each individual is best suited to 
determine the means of achieving their own preservation. The 
individual, now, becomes the basis of the organizing 
principle of society. Each person's perception of the right 
means to self-preservation is the impetus behind the 
formation of civil society: any civil authority, says 
Strauss, must be an extension of the natural right of the 
individual in Hobbes' theory. 
Ultimately human beings are the makers of society 
and can control the society they make by understanding and 
controlling their passions. This makes power a key part of 
civil society, the power to control the passions and actions 
governed by them. Trading on the ambiguity between physical 
and legal power (potentia vs. potestas) (E.W., IV, p.298), 
and taking it to show the two belong together, Hobbes sees 
the State as both the greatest human force and highest human 
authority. 'Legal power is irresistible force'. There is a 
necessary conjunction of the most powerful passion (fear of 
a violent death) and the most sacred right (self-
preservation) directly ("SH", p.23-24). 
on the extreme case of the State of 
Basing his analysis 
Nature (civil war) 
Hobbes reduces, says Strauss, the various parts of the 
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social fabric to the one which remains following such 
dramatic events: fear of a violent death. This, normally, 
is the most powerful force and is supposed to supply the 
universal applicability for Hobbes' theory. Strauss' 
individualistic thesis is quite apparent in all this since 
passion is from and of the individual, as is the right to 
self-preservation an individual right, thus showing that all 
civil obligation is traceable to the individual contractors 
and their natures, including the natural right to self-
preservation. 
The content and nature of moral law is drastically 
affected by the move from duty to right, as well. "The moral 
law ... was to be greatly simplified by being deduced from the 
natural right of self-preservation. Self-preservation 
requires peace. The moral law became, therefore, the sum of 
the rules which have to be obeyed if there is to be peace 
(NRH, p.187). Obligation under this conception arises from 
a contract between individuals and justice is identical with 
obeying one's contracts. Obligation and justice, then, are 
not factors defined independently of human will; there is a 
substitution of will for duty or law, and this is the heart 
of Hobbes' individualism in Strauss' view. It is the will 
ofthe contractors that creates obligation, which, in effect, 
resolves down to, in civil society, the will of the 
sovereign since the contract making all other contracts 
Valid in civil society is the contract of subjection to the 
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sovereign ("SH", p.18). The culmination is the doctrine of 
sovereignty as a legal doctrine derived from the new natural 
1aw and leading to natural public law, the core of "modern 
natural law theory", as Strauss calls it. 
4. Conclusion 
The final paragraph of Strauss', The Political 
Philosophy of Hobbes, is a fine recapitulation of the thread 
of Strauss' argument and his individualistic conclusion: 
The foundation of Hobbes's political philosophy, 
that is the moral attitude to which it owes its 
existence and its unity, are objectively as well as 
biographically 'prior' to the mathematical scientific 
founding and presentation of that philosophy. The 
turning to Euclid as well as to naturalism is certainly 
motivated in Hobbes's original moral-political view, and 
thus these two intellectual forces were able to exert a 
positive influence, which is not to be underestimated, 
on the evolution of his political philosophy, on the 
elucidation of the whole nexus of presuppositions and 
conclusions of the original moral attitude. On the 
other hand, the mathematical method and materialistic 
metaphysics each inits own way contributed to disguise 
the original motivation-nexus and thus to undermine 
Hobbes's political philosophy. From these findings is 
drawn the methodic conclusion for the study of Hobbes's 
political philosophy that the most mature presentation 
of that philosophy, that is the Leviathan, is by no 
means an adequate source for an understanding of 
Hobbes's moral and political ideas. It is true that the 
presuppositions and conclusions of the fundamental moral 
attitude are more clearly manifest in the Leviathan than 
in the earlier presentations, but, on the other hand, in 
earlier presentations the original motives of Hobbes's 
political philosophy are generally more clearly shown. 
(PPH, p.170) 
C. OAKESHOTT'S THESIS 
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1. Thesis and Variations 
Michael Oakeshott's version of individualism denies 
strauss' claim that Hobbes had turned away from traditional 
natural law theory and founded a modern version of it. 
Rather, Oakeshott believes that Hobbes stayed within the 
boundries of traditional Aristotelean/Augustinian natural 
law theory. Numerous other commentators share Oakeshott's 
rejection of Strauss: included are Goldsmith, Glover, 
Spragens, Von Leyden, and Watkins. Goldsmith and Glover 
also share Oakeshott's belief that Hobbes stayed within the 
classical natural law tradition, while the others develop a 
number of variations on Oakeshott's thesis beyond this 
belief. A common thread joining all these commentators, in 
addition to their rejection of Strauss, is the belief that 
while Hobbes stayed within the traditional camp, still his 
scientific interests did, 
greatly color his theory 
contrary to Strauss' claims, 
of obligation and its moral 
framework, a factor that would explain Strauss' impression 
that Hobbes had abandoned the classical theory entirely. 
Finally, the strongest thread linking all of these 
commentators remains their belief that the basis of Hobbes' 
idea of obligation is individualism, based on natural right 
and its transfer; in this respect, like Strauss, they reject 
both the materialistic and the moral interpretations. 
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2 . oakeshott's Individualistic Theory 
Oakeshott 
premises. First, 
individualist 
recognized ... as 
does accept many of Strauss' initial 
he agrees that Hobbes is quite clearly an 
who holds that "human beings are 
separate and sovereign individuals, 
associated with one another, not in the pursuit of a single 
common enterprise, but in an enterprise of give and take, 
and accommodating themselves to one another as best they 
can: it is the morality of self and others (Oakeshott, 
"Moral Life", p.249 - to be cited as ML). The key concepts 
here are will and artifice: the will of human beings 
generates civil society or more correctly, the combined will 
of individual selves joined by agreement generates civil 
society for Hobbes (Oakeshott, "Introduction to Leviathan", 
pp.27-28 - to be cited as IL). 'Will' is the important term, 
Oakeshott thinks, because of Hobbes' belief that every 
individual is his/her own sovereign ruler in the State of 
Nature, where the prevailing morality is that of mutual 
accommodation, but where, also, one must decide voluntarily 
for oneself if one is to join in these accommodations and 
agreements. The influencing factors that pushed Hobbes to 
this view, according to Oakeshott, stem from the growing 
Pressure on the individual, enterprising person reaching out 
to control his/her own destiny, a pressure which emerged in 
the 17th century and is expressed in 17th century European 
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thought (ML, pp.250-51). Thus, Hobbes begins with unique 
human individuality, just as Strauss said. 
Oakeshott further agrees with Strauss that Hobbes' 
analysis of human nature identified natural passion and 
natural reason as the two most certain human traits. Both 
of these are responsive to the direct influences of pleasure 
and pain, which are internal stimuli to which human appetite 
responds in inventive, self-conscious, controlled, and 
voluntary ways (ML, p.253). Such responses of natural 
passion are not merely mechanical reactions or reflexes, but 
include also acts of will and deliberation. The natural 
passions most directly involved at this level of response 
are pride, "the greatest pleasure of a human being ... the 
consciousness of his own power ... his desire for precedence, 
his longing to be first, for glory to be recognized and 
honored by other men as pre-eminent" (E.W. IV, 257), and 
fear, "not merely being anxious lest the next pleasure 
escape him, but dread of falling behind and thus being 
denied felicity ... the ultimate fear in man is the dread of 
violent death at the hand of another man; for this is 
dishonor, the emblem of all human failure (Elements I, ix; 
!@l . 4 4 , 7 7 ) " ( ML , p . 2 5 4 ) • 
Natural reason, represented by the ability to form 
agreements and to generate both fear of the future and the 
motive to protect oneself against future disasters, is the 
second important human trait recognized by Hobbes. Reason 
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recognizes the fear of violent death and satisfies the 
desire to provide future protection against it by leading 
peoeple to form covenants, artificial agreements, designed 
to release them from these fears. The underlying desire 
here is for peace, a natural appetite generated by fear that 
is channelled through reason. The social contract is the 
man-made vehicle for satisfying this desire (ML, pp.253, 
258-59). Covenants, as a result, become a central feature 
of Hobbes' theory of obligation for Oakeshott as for 
Strauss. 
Oakeshott's analysis of covenants does not vary 
significantly from Strauss', any more than his analysis of 
the central traits of human nature varies. For Oakeshott, a 
covenant is a transfer of right through an artificial 
contract motivated by fear and reason; it is a rational, 
voluntarily agreed upon 
supremacy (ML, pp.257-57; 
modification of the race for 
IL, p.44). The right transferred 
is the natural right of self-governace, extending so far as 
the ability to perform actions that are necessary for self-
preservation after natural internal and external impediments 
that restrict one's ability to act in one's own best 
interests are factored out (Von Leyden, p.12). As Goyard-
Fabre describes it, " ... in its own nature, covenant results 
from a pragmatic and rational computation. In its own 
structure, it is a transfer of rights and a delegation of 
Powers" (Goyard-Fabre, p.24). In these important respects 
oakeshott's and 
of human nature 
individualistic 
right. 
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Strauss' interpretations of Hobbes' theory 
and covenant coincide, viewing them as 
and centered around the transfer of natural 
The split between Strauss and Oakeshott (and others 
who agree with Oakeshott) grows out of an initial 
disagreement about the moral aspects of individualism. 
Where Strauss focuses on fear as the basis of moral 
concepts, Oakeshott retains honor and justice, in the 
traditional Augustinian senses, as the key moral factors. 
Oakeshott grants that the basis of the moral nature of 
Hobbes' theory is that moral conduct is the equivalent of 
prudent conduct; good is identified with pleasure, evil with 
pain, and to act prudently is seeking the good while 
avoiding the evil. In social relations this drives people 
to recognize peace as desirable rather than to continue to 
engage in competitive struggle with one another, as in the 
State of Nature: peace is the avoidance of a painful death 
that may arise from such competitve struggles. 
But Oakeshott believes that Hobbes did not intend to 
regard the condition of peace only as a conclusion of 
natural reason based on fear. He argues that Hobbesian 
reason also suggests the means to attaining peace and 
explicates its structure. The nineteen articles of peace 
described carefully by Hobbes reduce to: "Do not to another, 
Which thou wouldst not have done to oneself" (E.W. IV, 
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101). Oakeshott contends that Hobbes believes we have a 
moral obligation to have consideration for others and avoid 
selfish partiality and not only out of fear: 
The conditions of peace, first offered to us as 
rational theorems concerning the nature of shameful-
death-avoiding conduct (that is, as a piece of 
prudential wisdom), now appear as moral obligation. 
Clearly (on Hobbes's assumptions) it would be foolish, 
in the circumstances, not to declare for peace and not 
to establish in it the only manner in which it can be 
established; but somehow, it has become a dereliction of 
duty not to do so ... Nor is this change of idiom 
inadvertent. For Hobbes leaves us in no doubt that he 
properly understood the nature of moral conduct and the 
difference between it and merely prudent or necessary 
conduct. (ML, p.261) 
On the other hand, Oakeshott goes on to argue, this 
preservation of traditional notions of honor and justice is 
not the same as the traditional, deontological moral theory 
(found in Hobbes by Taylor, Warrender, or Hood). For to 
Hobbes, 'good' merely stands for 'desirable,' and 'evil' for 
'object of aversion.' The laws of nature enjoining the 
seeking of good and avoidance of evil are thus not 
deontological moral commands. Every one of these precepts, 
Oakeshott states, clearly shows itself to be an hypothetical 
precept rather than a categoried declaration of duty (ML, 
p.262). Any force that such a rule might have will be 
conventional, the result of a human agreement to regard 
these as rules within a known jurisdiction, subscribed to by 
all who fall into that jurisdiction. This transforms these 
rules from theorems of deontology into maxims of human 
conduct (IL, p.37). To return to the contrast with Strauss, 
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nowever, at the core of the morality of Hobbes' theory is 
the concept of justice. 'Justice' is a moral, not merely a 
prudential term in Hobbes, as is 'duty', a synonym for 
•acting justly'. Von Leyden points out the various reasons 
for interpreting 'justice' in this way in Hobbes: First, we 
must note that nothing is unjust in the State of Nature 
because no covenants exist. Secondly, Hobbes defines 
•injustice' as 'the not performance of Covenant.' Third, 
Hobbes says clearly that where no covenant has been formed 
and no right has been transferred, this leaves everyone with 
a right to all things and precludes any just action (Von 
Leyden, p.7). Von Leyden continues: 
Two corollaries follow from this argument. 
First, part of Hobbes's definition of a natural right 
(jus) is that it is just ... natural right, too, is 
reasonable ... and life in accordance with it just. 
Secondly, ... 'the men perform their Covenants made' is a 
law in which 'consisteth the Fountain and Original of 
justice'. Justness, therefore, qualifies different 
sorts of action and different sets of circumstances in 
which actions are performed ... Once he covenants of his 
own free will, the carrying out of his covenant is as 
just as non-performance would be unjust. (Von Leyden, 
pp.7-8) 
For Oakeshott, too, " ... the word 'justice' has a 
moral connotation, and it was the word Hobbes most often 
used when he was writing in the moral idiom: to behave 
morally is to do just actions, and to be a virtuous man is 
to have a just disposition ... A man's duty is to have 'an 
unfeigned and constant endeavor' to behave justly" (ML, 
P-262). Or, as J. Kemp; another individualist theorist, 
puts it, 
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A man may have a motive for making a covenant 
which consists solely in the advantage he expects to get 
out of the transaction; but having made it, he has an 
obligation to keep it which cannot consist simply in the 
fact ... that it will be to his advantage to do so--
breaking a covenant is the essence of injustice, and 
this is not simply another word for self-interest. 
(Kemp, p.21) 
This interpretation of the obligation to keep one's 
contracts is the heart of Hobbes' theory for Oakeshott; and 
the issue of the obligation is the source of the debate 
between the various individualist interpreters and the other 
two major interpretive traditions as well. The issue, as 
oakeshott describes it, is "How did Hobbes bridge the gap 
between men's natural inclinations and what ought to be done 
about them?" (ML, p.263) The importance of the issue lies in 
the fact that, having described moral law, or the law of 
nature, as a set of precepts that rational, passionate, 
self-interested beings would assent to, Hobbes still 
recognized that such a law, though anchored in our deepest 
wants, must also be concretely supported with motives if it 
is to be effective. For if people did not need to abide by 
the moral law, then given Hobbes' psychological theories of 
human nature they would not. To meet these problems of 
motive and obedience, Hobbes had to "collapse the ought/want 
dualism into a single system of basic wants and proven 
hypothetical imperatives" (Watkins, pp.84-85). Oakeshott's 
thesis is that Hobbes accomplished this by implementing his 
own version of traditional Augustinian natural law theory. 
The next section will outline Oakeshott's justification of 
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this claim. 
3, Oakeshott's Justification 
According to Oakeshott, what has led to the rather 
confusing state of Hobbes scholarship, the large number of 
diverse acounts of obligation in Hobbes, is a failure to 
clearly delineate the tasks facing an interpretor. 
The situation we have on our hands ... is, then, a 
set of philosophical writings in which there appear (not 
side by side, but almost inextricably mixed) a theory of 
moral obligation at once original and consistent with 
the other philosophical novelties to be found in them, 
and another account of moral obligation the vocabulary 
and general principles of which are conventional ... Our 
question, in general, is: Why did Hobbes, in an 
enterprise designed to elucidate the ground and 
character of the obligations entailed in living in a 
civitas, run together two strikingly different accounts 
of moral obligation? (ML, p.284) 
Oakeshott specifies the problem by listing ten basic 
discrepencies that need to be rectified or explained by any 
coherent interpretation. They are all apparently 
contradictory usages of key terms, conflicting applications 
of basic distinctions, or conflicting claims about the 
mechanisms of obligation. In brief, they are: 
1. In nature we have a right to all things. But we 
also have a natural obligation to endeavor peace via the 
Natural Law imposed by God. 
2. Hobbes claims both that natural laws are 
hypothetical causal propositions, and that they are laws in 
the strict sense. 
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3. Hobbes says that reason can show us God as the 
author of fmoral law, but also that reason can only show us 
God as First Cause. 
4. Hobbes says that obligation to civil obedience is 
universal and prior to civil society, yet elsewhere he 
denies universality, specifies specific classes of people to 
whom it applies, and makes this obligation contingent on 
covenant. 
5. Hobbes asserts the independent authority of both 
Natural Law and Scripture, though he also argues that the 
authority of both derives fromthe civil sovereign's 
declaration and interpretation. 
6. Hobbes uses 'precept' as a 'general rule of 
reason' to describe the first Law of Nature, but goes on to 
deny that its prescriptive character derives from 
reasonableness at all. 
7. Hobbes uses 'Natural Law' both to mean 
hypothetical conclusions of reason and to denote obligations 
imposed by God on believers and also those imposed by God 
upon all people save atheists, lunatics, and children. 
8. Hobbes claims that the sovereign's obligation 
under Natural Law is to procure the safety of the people and 
that he is accountable to God alone for this duty; but then 
he says that this is true, at best, only of sovereigns who 
believe in a God concerned with human action. 
9. Hobbes makes strong claims, using a play on 
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words, based on the distinction between 'God's natural 
kingdom' and his 'natural subjects', but then calls all this 
metaphorical. 
10. Hobbes uses the term 'God' both to denote a 
being who establishes the civil state by covenant and as a 
term of imagination that is meaningless. (ML, pp.284-85) 
Oakeshott rejects the suggestion that any previous, 
single theory has rectified all these problems in Hobbes. 
To do so requires seeing Hobbes' theory as dualistic, having 
a two-fold purpose: to display a theory of obligation that 
is consistent with Hobbes' own concept of human nature, and 
to assimilate this to the idiom of the time he is writing, 
so as to show his contemporaries the extent and nature of 
their civil duties by clearing up confusions and 
misunderstandings prevalent at the time (ML, pp.286-87). 
For Oakeshott the foundation of Hobbes' theory of obligation 
rests upon his conviction that no duties exist except by an 
act of the agent that crates obligation (a covenant). This 
conviction excludes all natural duties in the strict sense 
since no choice exists there. It also requires that anyone 
interested in proposing a theory of civil obligation must 
take account of the fact that they must convince their 
audience not only to agree to their account, but also to act 
on it; and this requires not only making sure the readers 
have understood the theory, but providing the motivation for 
them to follow its precepts. This in turn requires, says 
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oakeshott, that the theory "cound not be successful unless 
it were framed in the idiom and vocabulary of current 
political theory and thus [the author must] present a 
doctrine whose novelties (if any) were assimilated to 
current prejudices about moral conduct" (ML, p.287). 
The way Hobbes applies himself to these tasks, 
oakeshott argues, is by developing a theory and style of 
exposition that combines artful equivocation with a theory 
of obligation consistent with his general philosophical 
beliefs. What results is a dualistic appeal for assent to 
Hobbes' doctrines: one aimed at the uninitiated ordinary 
person (one who has not adopted Hobbes' scientific approach 
nor his skepticism), couched in the vocabulary and idiom 
they are accustomed to; a second for the initiated, the 
person not deterred by skepticism nor baffled by the 
language of modern science (ML, pp.287-88). Elsewhere, 
Oakeshott notes, "His controversial purpose is large on 
every page; he wrote to convince and refute" (IL, p.14). 
Thus Hobbes' purpose was not the establishment of a science 
of politics; and the claim that it was such is a false 
reading of Hobbes' intentions, says Oakeshott. Hobbes' 
method is that of experience, of examining history and 
learning prudence, rather than a scientific mechanism. This 
is shown especially, according to Oakeshott, in the second 
half of Leviathan: 
The project, then, ... is by correcting an error 
in principle, to show more clearly the local and 
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transitory mischief in which the universal predicament 
of mankind appeared in the seventeenth century. And 
both in conception and in the execution of this project, 
Hobbes reveals, not only his sensitiveness to the 
exegencies of his time, but also the medieval ancestry 
of his way of thinking. (IL, p.48) 
Thus, though Oakeshott and Strauss are both 
individualists committed to the concept of natural right and 
its transfer as the source of obligation in Hobbes, yet 
oakeshott's characterization of a modified image of 
Hobbesian Man points him in the direction of the classic 
natural law tradition of Aristotle and Augustine that 
Strauss says Hobbes rejected. In fact, Oakeshott argues 
that there has been a failure to correctly identify the 
tradition to which Hobbes belongs, which has led to the 
further misconception that Hobbes must not belong to any 
tradition at all, so that his theory is new and without 
lineage or progeny. The critics blundered in paying too 
much attention to superficial similarities appearing to join 
Hobbes to writers with whom he has little or nothing in 
common (IL, p.56). Moreover, says Oakeshott, what Hobbes is 
doing is not dropping the traditional natural law approach, 
but rather expanding it. The line of argument taken by most 
commentators focuses on the concept of a "tame man", a 
person in whom fear and reason override the dangerous 
Passion of pride, even at the price of dimming the 
brilliance of life. But Oakeshott recognizes a neglected 
thread in Hobbes' writings, one which he admits goes against 
traditional scholarship, that pictures not a tame man 
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seeking emancipation from shameful fear and death, but a 
proud man seeking emancipation by the moralization of pride 
itself (ML, p.289). The basis of obligation is the act of 
will by which alone covenants are created and rights are 
transferred. 
Such reasoning, while unconventional, coincides with 
Hobbes' psychology and relies on a picture of "the proud 
man" easily found in Hobbes. Oakeshott gives a detailed 
description of his version of Hobbesian Man, which 
critically refocuses the emphasis in his theory of Hobbesian 
obligation: 
... a man unavoidably his own best friend and ... subject 
to the fear of finding himself shamed and dishonoured 
and even killed. But let us also suppose that the 
preponderant passion of this man remains pride rather 
than fear; that he is a man who would find greater shame 
in the meanness of settling for mere survival than in 
suffering the dishonour of being recognized a failure; a 
man whose disposition is to overcome fear not by 
reason ... but by his own courage; a man not at all 
without imperfections and not deceived about himself, 
but who is proud enough to be spared the sorrow of his 
imperfections and the illusion of his achievements; not 
exactly a hero, too negligent for that, but perhaps with 
a touch of careless heroism about him; a man, in short, 
who ... 'knows how to belong to himself' ... he is in a high 
degree self-moved. His endeavor is for peace ... there 
is nothing hostile in his conduct,nothing in it to 
provoke hostility, nothing censorious. What he achieves 
for himself and what he contributes to common life is a 
complete alternative to what others may achieve by means 
of agreement inspired by fear and dictated by reason; 
for, if the unavoidable endeavor of every man is for 
self-preservation, and if self-preservation is 
interpreted ... not as immunity from death but from the 
fear of a shameful death, then this man achieves in one 
manner (by courage) what others may achieve in another 
(by rational calculation). (ML, pp.289-90) 
Oakeshott further notes Hobbes' use of specific definitions 
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of •Nobleness or Gallantness' as 'justice of Manners' (E.W. 
III, 114) and of 'magnaminity' as preceeding from 'contempt 
of injustice' (E.W. II, 38) and Hobbes' claim that people 
maY keep their word due to pride in not breaking it rather 
than from fear of the consequences of breaking it (E.W. III, 
1oa). These texts directly support his picture of Hobbes' 
"proud man 11 • 
Goldsmith strongly agrees with Oakeshott's claim 
that we are dealing with a moral notion of the "gallant 
man", the 11 man of pride" in Hobbes. Such pride, Goldsmith 
says, is achieved in two ways within Hobbes' description of 
human behavior: 
The morality of gallantry is possible if a man 
has accepted some code of moral values in which keeping 
one's word, being generous, and acting according to the 
virtue of justice are placed higher in the scale of 
values than life ... His pleasure in living depends on his 
self-image, or upon his reputation ... eventual fame ... or 
upon some higher code of sanctions that he believes 
in ... (It) is also possible upon the ordinary principles 
of second-order power-seeking provided that this way of 
acting is believed to be the most effective way of 
acquiring power. (Goldsmith, p.81) 
Thus it would seem plain that Hobbes' concept of the "proud 
man" provides a description not of one who acts out of fear 
but of one whose intentions are just and rightous in the 
keeping of his contracts. 
But why has this view of man been overlooked or 
considered unorthodox by Hobbesian scholarship? Oakeshott's 
answer is, "the only hindrance to our recognizing this as a 
genuinely Hobbesian character is the general assertion that 
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aobbes always used 'pride' in a derogatory sense" (ML, 
p,291), For Oakeshott and Goldsmith this was simply too 
hasty a generalization, and much too broad an assertion. 
Too ready an agreement with this interpretation of pride led 
strauss away from the very tradition of natural law theory 
that Hobbes embraced and extended; by focusing upon the 
negative sense of 'pride' that Hobbes occasionally does use, 
Strauss missed the positive sense of his use of the term, 
wherein Hobbes identifies it with generousity, courage, 
nobleness, magnaminity, endeavor for glory, and avoidance of 
the vice of vain glory (illusions of true glory) (E.WU. 
III, 96, 44, 77). Once we are cognizant of this other sense 
of 'pride' in Hobbes' thought, Oakeshott believes, we must 
agree that Hobbes had not abandoned the Augustinian 
tradition of natural law, but had seen the identical dual 
meaning of 'pride' in it and was then simply extending the 
positive sense of 'pride', "the passion to be Godlike" (ML, 
p.291). This, then, is the notion of pride as a virtue, 
which Oakeshott traces back to various early Greek notions: 
Hybris; Aristotle's megalophychos; the wise man of the 
Stoics; and then the sancta superbia of medieval moral 
theology (ML, p.293). It is the Augustinian notion, that 
the passion of pride is a virtue, that Strauss missed and 
that Oakeshott says Hobbes relied on to generate in people 
the motives necessary to lead them to form civil societies. 
A proper understanding of Hobbesian Man solves the problem 
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of interpretation as well. The effect of pride is the 
state; the State is a human construction, the product of 
will and artifice in response to pride. 
The significance of Hobbes' references to 'pride' as 
an evil, on the other hand, is a further link to the 
scholastic tradition. This use of 'pride' closely parallels 
Augustine's notion of original sin. Hobbes' doctrine 
approximates Augustine's view that the human predicament 
springs from a defect in human behavior that asserts itself 
when people are in each others' company (rather than as a 
natural defect in human nature per se} (IL, p.60). As 
Oakeshott writes, 
... our conclusion must be that Hobbes' conception of 
the natural man (apart from his defects} is such that a 
predicament requiring a deliverance is created whenever 
man is in proximity to man, and that his doctrine of 
Pride and unpermissable [my emphasis] form of striving 
after power only increases the severity of the 
predicament. (IL, p.60) 
Thus, Oakeshott sees Hobbes' ancestry in the Augustinian and 
Scholastic traditions through his accounts of 'pride' as 
both virtue and vice. 
Oakeshott strengthens this claim by interpreting 
Hobbes' individualism as a direct outgrowth of the 
Scholastic tradi.tion as well. As a reasoned theory of 
society, individualism's roots lie in the "so-called 
nominalism of late medieval scholasticism, with its 
doctrines that the nature of a thing is its individuality, 
that which makes it this thing, and that both in God and man 
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will is precedent to reason" (IL, p.60). Oakeshott points 
out that Hobbes' philosophy is quite concretely tied to the 
belief in the value of the individual, the sanctity of the 
individual person, and a picture of the world as composed of 
individual substances. The outcome of these views in Hobbes 
is a denial (or avoidance) of unqualified atomism and 
universalism alike, instead it is an individualism based on 
the activity of willing, rather than on self-consciousness, 
which leads to sociality via reason and choice. 
It is the combination of individual wills agreeing 
to form an artificial entity--a government--that Oakeshott 
describes as the generation of civil society in Hobbes' 
writings: 
Civil history (as distinguished from natural 
history) is the register of events that have sprung from 
the voluntary actions of man in commonwealths (Lev., 
p.64). Civil authority is authority arising out of an 
agreement of wills, while natural authority (that of the 
father in a family) has no such generation and is 
consequently of a different character (Lev., p.153). 
And civil association is itself contrasted on this 
account with appearance if it in mere natural 
gregariousness (Lev., p.130). (IL, p.28) 
Thus, it is the combination of individual wills, voluntarily 
joined, that is the mechanism that creates the State. But 
Oakeshott stresses that this agreement preserves rather than 
comprising the individuality of those who join in the 
agreement: 
... the essence of agreement is, not a common will (for 
there can be no such thing), but a common object of 
Will. And, since these individual wills are in natural 
opposition to one another, the agreement out of which 
civitas can spring must be an agreement not to oppose 
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one another, a will not to will ... The agreement must be 
for each to transfer his right of willing in some 
specific respect, to a single artificial Representative, 
who is thenceforth authorized to will and to act in 
place of each individual. There is in this association 
no concord of wills, no common will, no common good; its 
unity lies solely int he singleness of the 
Representative, in the substitution of his one will for 
the many conflicting wills (Lev., pp.126, 127). It is a 
collection of individuals united in one Sovereign 
Representative, and in generation and structure it is 
the only sort of association that does not compromise 
the individuality of its components. (IL, pp.61-62) 
Thus, Oakeshott's view is that the State is an 
artificially created human contrivance designed to protect 
individuals through their surrender of the natural right of 
willing, without lapsing into any sort of absolutist State. 
The State is simply "the minimum condition of any settled 
association among individuals" (IL, p.62). 
In summary, Oakeshott's characterization of Hobbes 
is that of an ardent individualist writing from the 
perspective of a traditional Augustinian natural law 
theorist. Hobbes was primarily interested in supplying the 
motives for obeying civil law and concerned very little with 
human life beyond the minimal conditions under which the 
endeavor for peace could be the model of conduct for even 
the least agreeable person. Pride and self-esteem, Hobbes 
held, supply the motive for seeking peace and provide the 
author with an 'aristocratic' morality that is "neither 
inappropriate nor unexpected to find ... reflected in the 
Writings of one who ... himself understood human beings as 
creatures more properly concerned with honour than with 
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either survival or prosperity" (ML, pp.293-94). 
The final element in Oakeshott's version of 
individualism is the rejection of Strauss' implicit claim 
that it is the covenant that is the cause of the 
commonwealth and of the obligation to obey its laws. This 
would be to assent to a legalistic interpretation of 
obligation, whereas Hobbes intended a moral theory. The 
basis of civil obligation is a genuine surrender of right by 
the individual. The precise act of covenant only serves to 
give authority to the formation of civil society; it is 
unable to deliver either the moral sanction or the actual 
power required to establish the condition of peace. That 
is, it is a necessary but not sufficient cause of civil 
society (ML, p.296). It is only the choice of each 
individual subject, to surrender their natural right, that 
can create moral obligation, and create a covenant at the 
same time: 
Like all other obligations, it arises from a 
voluntary act. This act is a notional covenant between 
many in which the right of each to govern himself by his 
own reason is surrendered and a sovereign Actor ... is 
authorized to exercise it on their behalf; that is, to 
declare, to interpret and to administer rules of conduct 
which the covenanters pledge themselves in advance to 
obey ... Thus, civil obligation is a moral obligation, it 
arises from a genuine surrender of right. (IL, p.68) 
The society so generated is entirely a human work of art, 
the product of individual will and deliberation combining 
and agreeing to abide by the covenant entered into 
Voluntarily. For Oakeshott the covenant is not the actual 
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cause of civil society; though it is a necessary part of the 
process, it cannot guarantee obedience nor provide the power 
necessary to enforce obedience. 
Goldsmith holds essentially the same view and 
describes the process in such a way as to make the procedure 
clearer. To be obliged to obedience to an authority, one 
must have first convenanted to obey. That covenant must be 
a covenant to allow the will of another party to be taken as 
one's own will (whether of a majority, a minority, or a 
single person--corresponding to democracy, aristocracy, or 
monarchy. That is, they oblige themselves to submit to an 
authority that only exists as an authority as a result of 
their submission (Goldsmith, pp.155-58). 
Now let us return to the last important ingredient 
of the individualism of Oakeshott (and the other 
individualists), namely the motive for one to join in the 
covenant and to give up one's natural right. Goldsmith puts 
the problem succinctly when he says, "Magnanimous men, men 
of good will, are rare. The problem of human conduct must 
be solved for most men, and for them the passion to be 
reckoned on is fear" (Goldsmith, p.82). Now, at last, fear 
enters the picture as the spur to individuals of less than 
aristocratic virtue and magnanimous moral nature to put 
aside, voluntarily, their natural right to self-governance. 
But still this is not a theory of self-interest, of 
Psychological egoism or mechanistic egoism, Oakeshott 
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stresses. Oakeshott starts from natural right, but notes 
that while each individual's natural right is equal, their 
power is not: "Might and Right are enver the same thing" 
(IL, pp.64-65). Hence, natural right may be absolute but 
since the power to enforce it is not, they cannot be the 
same. Now to be obliged is to be bound by some impediment 
imposed, directly or indirectly, by the agent who has judged 
the likely consequences to be harmful. Here the constraint 
is actually internal, the result of rational judgment and 
fear. For Oakeshott this is Hobbes' notion of obligation, 
the internal constraint, the individual constraining 
himself. External constraint alone is not true obligation 
since the agent is not deprived of anything, merely shown to 
have always lacked power in a particular area; the basis of 
obligation is always to be found in the individual. The 
conditions that must be met to be obliged for Oakeshott's 
version of the theory, are that one must oblige oneself, and 
so must acknowledge that the obligation is a constraint on 
one's unconditional natural right and that it is also 
limited and 
surrender the 
desctruction, 
pp. 65-66). 
specific 
right 
in certain ways 
of nature totally 
(since one cannot 
without self-
leaving no person there to be obligated) (IL, 
The necessary power to motivate individuals, then, 
is supplied directly by individuals (who voluntarily 
covenant) and is made actual at the precise time they obey 
(alSO a voluntary act). 
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The authority necessary derives 
from the transfer of the natural right and is made public in 
the covenant itself. But the power behind all of this can 
onlY come directly from the individual (ML, p.299). The 
result is a strongly individualistic theory of obligation 
throughout, where individual will is prominent at every step 
in the process. This strongly individualistic focus is the 
consequence, according to Oakeshott, of Hobbes' reliance 
on the moralistic virtues of the Augustinian/Scholastic 
tradition and the reliance, in turn, of these theories on 
individual traits of reason and pride, tempered by the 
displacement of reason in favor of will and the emancipation 
of passion, all of which had been accomplished long before 
Hobbes' era. Strauss, then, is wrong to claim that Hobbes 
has created a new, modern version of natural law theory; as 
Oakeshott says: 
Political philosophy is the assimilation of 
political experience to an experience of the world in 
general, and the greatness of Hobbes is not that he 
began a new tradition in this respect but that he 
constructed a political philosophy that reflected the 
changes in the European intellectual consciousness which 
had been pioneered chiefly by the theologians of the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. (IL, p.58) 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE METHOD OF INTERPRETATION AND ANALYSIS 
A. THE CURRENT STATE OF HOBBES SCHOLARSHIP 
1. Introduction 
views 
The preceeding three chapters represent 
of Hobbes' theory of obligation and 
conflicting 
reflect the 
general state of affairs in Hobbes scholarship. At the 
present time there is no settled view of Hobbes; theory and 
competing interpretations abound. Even within the general 
interpretive categories of mechanism, natural law, and 
individualism, there are sub-groups of interpretations, as 
has been shown and there are, of course some other theories 
and categories that have not been incorporated into chapters 
I-III. I have concentrated on these three categories of 
interpretation because they are the ones most generally 
recognized, alluded to and discussed in Hobbes scholarship, 
even though they are not exhaustive. But this is precisely 
the problem, of course, that there are so many theories. 
How can we deal with so many different theories of Hobbes' 
theory of obligation? 
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Before moving on to my answer to this question, one 
1ast preliminary point needs to be emphasized: namely, how 
the proponents of these theories view each others' theories. 
If they were to accept the validity of each others' views, 
or see them as complementary or compossible, my work would 
be done. But, this is not the case at all, although it is 
the thesis I will develop and defend. To varying degrees of 
insistence, each theory is held by its adherents to be THE 
correct interpretation of Hobbes' intentions and meaning. 
Each thesis is built, to a greater or lesser extent, upon a 
rejection of the other theses, especially the natural law 
and individualist theories which grew out of the 
renunciation of the traditional mechanistic/egoistic 
framework. Each thesis, moreover, seems to be built upon a 
slightly different interpretive perspective. Even though 
there are occasional points of agreement among them about 
the elements to be found in Hobbes, the importance and 
evaluation even of these is colored by the separate 
framework of the various authors. D.D. Raphael, in his 
book, Hobbes: Morals and Politics, a summary and analysis of 
the major current interpretive works, characterizes the 
existing situation thus: 
Everyone would agree that Hobbes said some 
things that were new and derived others from tradition. 
The differences in the interpretations are differences 
of emphasis. Emphasis counts none the less. The 
thought of a philosopher may be properly classed as 
overall traditionalist or innovatory. 
The traditional interpretation of Hobbes classes 
him as an innovator, and this view seems to be supported 
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by Hobbes himself, who said (in the Epistle Dedicatory 
of De Corpore) that the study of 'civil philosophy' was 
no older than his book De Cive. But that statement does 
not necessarily contradict the interpreters who see 
Hobbes as a traditionalist. When Hobbes claimed that he 
had placed the study of politics on a new footing, he 
was probably thinking of his method; he meant that he 
was the first to treat political theory scientifically, 
after the manner of natural philosophy. No interpreter 
would deny that particular claim, though some would 
question its importance. Differences of opinion among 
interpreters are focused on four other issues. The 
first is the relation between Hobbes's political and his 
ethical theory; the second is the relation of both of 
these to his psychology; the third is the relation of 
his ethics and politics to his general philosophy; and 
the fourth is the relation of his ethics and politics to 
theology. (Raphael, p.74) 
In the first three chapters, the positive arguments 
each interpreter offers in support of his position have been 
detailed, clearly showing the obvious differences in their 
interpretive perspectives and emphases. But, it is almost 
important to at least get the flavor of, and carefully 
review in some cases, their reasons for rejecting the 
competing views in order to see clearly that for the most 
part, they all see their own views as exclusive of the 
others. This fact is the heart of the issue I am dealing 
with. In this section I shall highlight some of their 
negative arguments designed to show that other views are 
mistaken; in the second and third sections I will explain 
the methodology of my own analysis; in Chapter VI will 
argue that these negative arguments for exclusivity are 
ineffective outside their respective frameworks. The key to 
objectively understanding Hobbes, I will argue, lies in 
recognizing that this claim of exclusivity is the source of 
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a continuing and fruitless controversy and stalemate. 
The purpose of the present section is not to study 
the counter-arguments in detail since this will ultimately 
be unimportant.* Much less is this section's purpose to 
decide the conflict on the basis of the merits of the 
various counter-arguments, nor examine them for correctness 
or incorrectness. The most important point in each case is 
simply the claim that each makes to being the sole correct 
interpretation, and the fact that doing so requires that 
each reject the claims and perspectives of the other 
interpretations. This problem of mutually excluding 
interpretations is the problem that I will try to solve in 
the remainder of this dissertation. 
2. The Conflict Between Theories 
Generally, the objections that arise fall into two 
categories: (1) philosophical objections based on the claim 
that opposing theorists have (a) misread Hobbes' 
philosophical intentions or language, (b) misinterpreted 
these elements, or (c) constructed invalid chains of 
reasoning from Hobbes' own conclusions to theirs; and (2) 
*For the counter-arguments are all tied to the 
acceptance of one or other underlying framework or set of 
presuppositions; and I am going to argue for a new 
interpretive framework that allows all three of these 
frameworks to coexist and complement one another. 
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bistorical objections based on the claim that the 
sisreadings or errors of opposing theories are the result of 
sisperceiving either (a} the historical/biographical 
background of Hobbes' writings, or (b} the factors that 
sotivated or affected him as he wrote. 
Since the mechanistic/egoistic thesis is the oldest 
and is considered the traditional interpretation of Hobbes' 
theory of obligation, it receives the most critical 
scrutiny. The earliest of the modern re-interpretations, 
those of Taylor and Strauss, address the problems of the 
mechanistic view as their point of departure (as seen in 
chapters II and III}. Taylor's critique led him to his 
deontological moral interpretation, which was in turn 
criticized by Warrender, Hood and others. But they accepted 
Taylor's critique of the egoistic thesis, and differed with 
him instead on the precise nature of the moral doctrine 
Hobbes in fact espoused. I would like to begin this review 
of counter-arguments with the critical rejection of 
mechanism by Taylor and the others who dismissed it. 
Taylor's rejection of mechanistic egoism is based on 
his belief that Hobbes distinguished his egoistic psychology 
from his ethical theory rather than joining them in an 
ethical/psychological egoism. The basis of this claim is 
Philosophical (as opposed to historical} in that Taylor 
believes Hobbes• language has been misinterpreted by the 
mechanists so as to miss the crucial separation. Taylor 
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says 
It is to be observed that from the first, and 
even when he is speaking of the condition of things in 
his imaginary 'state of nature', Hobbes always describes 
the items of the natural law as dictamina, or dictates, 
never as consila, or pieces of advice, and the very use 
of this language implies their imperative character. 
(Dictates ... are something very different from counsels 
or recommendations.) So, too, Hobbes regularly says of 
his natural law that it is a 'theorem' which forbids 
certain actions, and uses imperative or quasi-imperative 
language in his formulation of them. Thus (De Cive, II, 
1) the law of nature is defined as 'the dictate of right 
reason, conversant about those things are are either to 
be done or omitted ... for the constant preservation of 
life and members, as much as in us lies.' 'A Law of 
Nature (Leviathan, XIV) is a Precept, or general Rule, 
found out by Reason, by which a man is forbidden to do, 
that, which is destructive of his life, or taketh away 
the means of preserving the same; and to omit that, by 
which he thinketh it may be best preserved.' ... The 
imperative character of the law is thus inseparable from 
it. (Taylor, "Doctrine", pp.40-41) 
The error of the mechanistic interpretation is a logical 
one: logically, we cannot derive a moral 'ought' from an 
empirical thesis--unless we wish to label Hobbes inept in 
trying to make such an attempt. But, on the interpretation 
of Hobbes' language above, Taylor chooses to reject the 
thrust of mechanism rather than to question Hobbes' ability 
or allow for the attempt itself. 
Two points led Taylor to his conclusions: 1) Hobbes 
had separated 'counsel' from 'command' and described the 
Laws of Nature as commands, which means that since 
prudential thinking can only result in counsel, and commands 
are not counsels, the basis of Natural Law must be non-
prudential; that is, it must be moral; 2) there is a certain 
parallel in Hobbes' exposition and language to deontological 
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theorists such as Kant, especially when Hobbes speaks of a 
just man as one who acts justly 'because the law commands 
it' rather than because he fears punishment, or when Hobbes 
compares injustice or promise-breaking to being self-
contradictory (Raphael, p.76). Such language is clearly not 
scientific/mechanical, and to construe it as if it were is 
to ignore the logic of the terms. 
As shown in Chapter IIA, Taylor chose to reject 
egoism and denied that Hobbes was an ethical egoist, though 
he retained the belief that Hobbes was a psychological 
egoist. In holding that Hobbes was a psychological egoist, 
he argued that Hobbes, nevertheless, did not see self-
interest as the basis of his theory of obligation. Instead 
Taylor claimed Hobbes' theory was deontological and, having 
accepted Hobbes as a psychological egoist, he put forward 
the necessary claim that the psychology and ethics were 
logically unconnected. So the mechanistic thesis, while 
partially correct, had erred in equating Hobbes' psychology 
with his moral theory; for Hobbes was trying to answer 
separate questions with the two theories: (1) why people 
ought to obey the law, and (2) what inducements would compel 
them to obey the law if respect were not a strong enought 
motive. Thus, the mechanists had failed to observe the 
logic of Hobbes' distinctions and had conjoined logically 
separate theses into a single mechanistic account, which 
must now be rejected as incorrect. 
206 
A second philosophical objection made by Taylor 
centers on the claim that, for Hobbes, the sovereign is just 
as much under a rigid moral obligation as the subjects. The 
Laws of Nature oblige everyone, ruler as well as ruled; and 
Hobbes constantly refers to the misconduct of the sovereign 
as sin or iniquity (Taylor, "Doctrine", p.45). There can be 
no explanation, consistent with the mechanistic thesis, 
Taylor argues, that explains this element of Hobbes' theory 
since it requires a binding law prior to and above that laid 
down by the sovereign who creates civil law. The account 
for this aspect of Hobbes' writings, Taylor concludes that 
Natural Law is the command of God, which defines the 
sovereign's obligations. This would explain both Hobbes' 
notion of wrong-doing as the transgression of the Laws of 
Nature and the origin of the sovereign's duties, which could 
not exist without a 'person' who has the right to command 
even the sovereign. On the materialist view no such being 
or commander exists, and the Laws of Nature are mere 'pieces 
of advice' with no force at all beyond advising self-
interest, but this leaves us with no explanation of Hobbes' 
explicit claims that the sovereign has obligations and 
strict duties. For Taylor, then, we must reject mechanistic 
accounts of obligation and accept the view that we do not 
fulfill the demands of equity unless we obey divine commands 
as divine commands, the sovereign included (Taylor, 
"Doctrine", p.49; "Apology", p.143). 
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In addition to these philosophical objections, 
Taylor offers a historical reason for the mistaken 
mechanistic view. The authors of the traditional view had 
spent too much time on Leviathan, while ignoring Hobbes' 
earlier works, especially De Cive (this was Strauss's major 
contention, too; he held that the earlier works had been 
discounted to an even greater degree than Taylor contends--
see Chapter IIIA). It is concentrating on Leviathan too 
narrowly that one gets the false impression that self-
interest is the basis of political obligation and that duty 
is equivalent to whatever is in one's best interests. Such 
a view comes from the wording of Leviathan, wherein 'Natural 
Law' is called 'precepts of prudence', as opposed to 'divine 
laws in respect of the author, thereof, God Almighty' as 
stated in De Cive and The Elements of Law (see Chapter IIB). 
The error is to ignore the earlier use of the term as if, 
historically, it did not exist, an understandable error if 
one has looked carefully only at Leviathan. But to do this 
is to commit what Collins calls the fallacy of "the great 
works syndrome", wherein an interpreter concentrates upon 
the most historically important work(s) of an author to the 
exclusion of the earlier or less important works. Taylor, 
as seen in Chapter IIA, rejects this historical error and 
What he considers a skewed, mechanistically slanted 
interpretation that it engendered. Thus, for historical as 
Well as philosophical reasons Taylor dismisses the 
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traditional mechanistic view of obligation in Hobbes' works. 
Warrender follows Taylor in rejecting the 
traditional interpretation, though he also parts company 
from Taylor's deontological moral theory in favor of his own 
consequentialist moral thesis. Warrender also focuses on 
the Laws of Nature, but on the fact that, as Hobbes says, to 
properly be laws they must be the word of God, who has the 
right to command. Warrender, then, rejects mechanism and 
Taylor's approach as well and treats Hobbes as essentially a 
traditional natural law theorist (see Chapter IIB), leaving 
room for an element of prudence in Hobbes' conception of 
morality. 
What is needed that cannot be found in the egoist 
version of Hobbes, Warrender holds, is an assertion of the 
presence of moral obligation prior to and beyond the 
instruction of the sovereign; that is, moral obligation must 
exist in the State of Nature. But the traditional theory 
allows for no obligations in the State of Nature. If this 
were true, Warrender argues, then there would be no way to 
guarantee the valid covenants necessary to bind sovereign 
and citizen. Warrender then constructs a two-tiered 
interpretation of Hobbes' theory, separating a system of 
motives from a system of obligations such that the will of 
God is the ground of obligation while self-interest is a 
Validating condition of it. But Warrender's rejection of 
the traditional interpretation rests on his claim that it 
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contains no sufficient philosophical justification for the 
binding nature of the covenant in the State of Nature and, 
thus, must be rejected. As Raphael says of Warrender's 
conclusion, "Since moral obligation depends on natural law 
and on the fact that natural law is the command of God, 
Warrender rejects the view that moral obligation arises only 
in the State" ( Raphael, p. 92) . 
only in the State is, of 
mechanistic/egoistic theory, 
That moral obligation arises 
course, a basic tenet of the 
which must now be rejected for 
lack of support, according to Warrender. 
Warrender, in addition, comments on the historical 
importance of certain of Hobbes' own statements. The 
misinterpretation by the traditionalists results simply from 
laying too much stress on Hobbes' insistence that covenants 
without the sword are empty words and that law without 
sanction is futile. By overemphasizing these remarks, the 
traditionalists have concluded that is is only the egoistic 
desire to avoid penalties attached to law-breaking in civil 
society that produces obligation. But this emphasis is 
historically unjustified. That is, it ignores all that 
Hobbes has to say concerning God and Salvation, and Hobbes' 
doctrine of 'special prudence' (the injunction to obey 
natural laws to the point of suicide), all of which show 
that duty is based on self-interest rather than being 
Adentical to it (see Chapter IIB). Once this oversight is 
corrected, we can drop the egoism of the mechanistic view 
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and accept the moral nature of Hobbes' theory. 
Warrender's dismissal of the traditional theory is 
not total, however, since prudence and self-interest play a 
substantial role in his theory as motivating factors. The 
basic point, though, is that on a purely 
mechanistic/egoistic framework we cannot build a theory of 
political obligation; and Hobbes had seen this. To think 
otherwise, once again, would commit us to seeing Hobbes as 
inconsistent or unaware of the problem and would ignore much 
textual evidence that Hobbes had, indeed, constructed a 
natural law theory of moral obligation. 
Hood's rejection of the traditional interpretation 
follows Warrender's path insofar as he accepts certain 
elements of Hobbes' mechanistic psychology, but he does not 
accept the materialism implicit in it. Of the psychology he 
says: 
The psychology which he expounds is not a 
deduction from metaphysical materialism, but a 
description derived from experience and chiefly from 
introspection ... To describe his psychology as 'egoistic' 
is, however, pointless. A man cannot do any voluntary 
act unless he himself desires to do it. What causes him 
to do it is irrelevant. {Hood, pp.60-61) 
Thus, as far as external actions are concerned, Hobbes is a 
determinist {an empirical thesis), not an egoist (a moral 
theory). But Hood holds that Hobbes' theory of obligation 
is a natural law theory, not egoistic. (See Chapter IIC). 
Self-preservation is simply not the most important end in 
Hobbes• theory; salvation is. Thus, the materialists have 
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focused too narrowly on Hobbes' psychology and have 
incorrectly interpreted the nature of it as well. Hobbes' 
psychological theory is limited only to the psychology of 
deliveration, while the basis of the State is obligation of 
conscience, obligation by God through the instrument of the 
Moral Law; such obligation cannot be understood through 
natural, empirical knowledge (Hood, pp.30-31). Hence, 
materialism is useless in describing the basis of 
obligation; according to Hood obligation is a religious 
concept for Hobbes. (see Chapter IIC). 
Thus Hood's rejection of the traditional theory is 
philosophically based. As with both Taylor and Warrender, 
however, there is also an historical reason for dismissing 
the traditional interpretation, namely that the materialists 
had simply ignored everything Hobbes wrote concerning 
religion or based on Hobbes' reading of Scripture (see 
Chapter IIC). This is, for Hood, a major error, resulting 
from misunderstanding Hobbes' reasons for including so much 
Scriptural content in his writings. The traditionalists 
either overlook it entirely or else write it off as a 
"safety valve," inserted by Hobbes for his own protection. 
But, for Hood, we must taken the Scriptural element quite 
seriously, once we see that obligation is a matter of 
religious belief. To miss its importance is to fail to heed 
Hobbes• own warning "that Leviathan must present difficulty 
to those who have no understanding of Divine justice" (Hood, 
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p.26). The interpreters chose to downplay the religious 
side to Hobbes' work because they had decided, and Hobbes' 
own contemporaries had asserted, likewise, that he was an 
atheist. But Hobbes' attack on religion had been 
misunderstood, Hood says; It is not a rejection of God but 
rather an exposing of the limits of science in dealing with 
issues beyond the scope of science. Far from being a simple 
safety valve, the Scriptural content of Hobbes' writings is 
of utmost importance for Hood: 
Nothing in this doctrine depends upon mechanist 
materialism or upon the method of Euclid. Hobbes never 
suggested that his scientific studies had brought any 
change in his political convictions; he valued Euclid 
for his method ... The purpose of his argument from 
Scripture was to bring to light the old and true 
doctrine of Christian politics, long obscured by 
erroneous interpretations introduced by the children of 
darkness. He would have dismissed as impious any claim 
to establish a new morality. His political convictions 
were moral convictions; and moral convictions were for 
him religious convictions. (Hood, pp.22-23) 
Thus, in the final analysis, it is the narrowly scientific 
materialist view which must be rejected for both 
philosophical and historical reasons. 
In addition to the theorists I have covered in 
detail, critics of the traditional thesis also include F.S. 
McNeilly and Bernard Gert, who both favor some version of 
a natural law or moral interpretation. Their views are 
interesting here in that they offer philosophical support 
for the historical claim that Hobbes either abandoned his 
egoism and derived from mechanism (McNeilly) or that he 
never was an egoist to begin with (Gert). Both theorists 
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ask whether egoism is implied by or can be deduced from 
Hobbes' mechanism; and they answer that it is not so implied 
and cannot be so deduced. In addition, both give credit to 
Hobbes for recognizing this. For McNeilly, Hobbes had tried 
to deduce egoistic conclusions but found he could not, and 
dropped his egoism following De Cive and The Elements of Law 
and replaced it with a formal system of politics based on 
human nature and what is implied by rational deliveration on 
the human condition. For Gert, Hobbes never was an egoist, 
since egoism is a theory of motives (which must be self-
interested), while mechanism is a materialist theses (an 
empirical theory) that leaves out beliefs and motives 
because they are non-physically analyzable. Thus the 
historical claim is that Hobbes recognized the problems with 
egoism and, though he was a materialist, he was not a 
thorough-going egoist, if one at all; this is based on the 
claim that, since there are obvious problems with connecting 
mechanism with egoism, and since Hobbes was a very competent 
philosopher, he would have seen these problems and moved 
beyond them in some way or another. Both accounts deserve a 
more careful look. 
McNeilly's criticism is historical in that he claims 
that the proponents of the traditional view had not seen the 
shift in Hobbes' thinking following De Cive and The Elements 
Q,f Law. Because egoism and mechanism could not give Hobbes 
the theory of obligation or politics he desired, he set 
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aside both of them in Leviathan as serious support for his 
system, though he did retain the mechanistic language of his 
earlier writings. McNeilly argues that difficulties with 
the notion of 'endeavor', when it is defined on a 
materialistic stimulus-response model, made it clear to 
Hobbes that endeavor, a key term in the mechanistic model, 
could not be used to explain complex passions such as 
ambition, curiosity, or the desires necessary to account for 
political actions (McNeilly, p.200). In Leviathan, then, 
though the mechanistic language remained, as McNeilly says: 
What Hobbes offers is a mechanical account of 
sorts, in so far as endeavor is defined as a bodily 
motion, and the thought which causes it is also said to 
be a motion inside the head. What matters, however, is 
not the mechanistic window-dressing, but the goods which 
are actually offered for sale. It is almost impossible 
to exaggerate the unimportance of mechanistic 
materialism in Hobbes's philosophy: it is the reddest of 
all the herrings that Hobbesian fisherman have caught in 
their nets. For the postulated bodily motion has no 
real part to play in the definition and use of 
'endeavor'. Nothing in the analysis of the passions, 
and nothing in the political arguments which follow, 
depends on the assumption that an endeavor is an 
internal bodily motion. (McNeilly, pp.200-201) 
McNeilly's final conclusion is that nothing of the egoistic 
doctrine remains in Leviathan, despite the language, and 
Hobbes' actual account of desire (and pleasure which 
satisfies it) is not egoistic in any way (McNeilly, p.201). 
Thus, the language of Leviathan shares mechanism's 
terminology taken from the earlier works, but the psychology 
of desire and the philosophy of politics is quite divorced 
from the mechanistic model itself which Hobbes had abandoned 
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bY the time he wrote Leviathan. 
Gert's critique goes even further in his historical 
claim, holding that Hobbes was never a psychological egoist. 
philosophical reasoning again supports the historical claim: 
Hobbes saw the impossibility of deriving egoism from 
mechanism all along, even at the time of De Cive, and had 
actually been moved by moral concerns from the start 
(reminiscent of Strauss's claim). Gert says 
To those who have regarded Hobbes as a complete 
egoist it was, of course, impossible to think of him 
appeealing to men to do what is right. But without this 
prejudice one becomes aware that Hobbes thought that the 
opinion of the rightness or wrongness of an action had a 
great effect upon the actions of people. In the preface 
to the Reader, in De Cive, he laments the lack of a true 
moral philosophy and says that mistaken doctrines of 
what is right and wrong have been responsible for a 
great amount of bloodshed. And one of the reasons he 
offers for the necessity of a coercive power is that men 
may be misled in their opinion of good and evil, right 
and wrong. He even claims that it was in order to 
correct these mistakes that he wrote De Cive before 
writing the two books which should have come first. 
(Gert, p.517) 
The philosophical argument for Gert's thesis can be 
outlined briefly (Gert, pp.504-509): 
1. Psychological egoism requires that the only 
motive for any action be self-interest. But Hobbes' 
mechanism rules out consideration of appetite, aversion, 
hope, and fear examined introspectively, thus making it 
impossible to offer a mechanical account distinguishing hope 
from fear, etc. 
2. Hobbes was aware of this and worked around it as 
is shown by the fact that he allows that 'most men would 
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rather lose their lives ... than suffer slander', which is 
clearly to act against self-interest, thus showing Hobbes 
allowed other motives. 
3. Further, motives can be tied to beliefs about how 
and what one achieves, not no mechanistic account of beliefs 
is possible. It is only tautological, given Hobbes' 
mechanistic terminology, to say that beliefs, will, and 
deliberation satisfy self-interest; in fact Hobbes never 
ruled out altruistic motives. It is only the confusingly 
complex schema and language of his psychology that drives 
one to see egoism there; careful analysis shows egoism is 
not implied at all. 
4. Hobbes' analysis of pity, grief, compassion, 
fellow-feeling, etc., are all non-egoistic (in the later 
writings especially). Thus, Hobbes was aware of the need to 
go beyond mechanism, and did so. 
5. Since mechanism cannot analyze conscious motives 
and beliefs or causes of actions, and Hobbes seems aware of 
this all along, Gert concludes that egoism is positively 
incompatible with Hobbes' political theory. Even though 
Hobbes did make an appeal to self-interest in it, his real 
appeal is to a different account of morality (Gert, p.516). 
The emphasis on mechanism is misplaced; it results from 
Hobbes• own confused and complex language, which confused 
Hobbes• commentators as well as sometimes Hobbes himself 
(Gert, pp.507-508). 
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Thus, both McNeilly and Gert reject the traditional 
thesis for historical and philosophical reasons. The tone 
and pattern of their critiques is illuminating insofar as 
both biographical and logical/linguistic elements that work 
together in them. As I will argue in the remainder of this 
dissertation, it is the combination of these sorts of 
analyses that can ultimately release us from the conflict 
between interpretations. 
The individualist interpreters also reject the 
traditional egoistic view of Hobbes. Strauss's rejection of 
the traditional version of Hobbes' theory is almost entirely 
historical, as shown in Chapter IIIA. To summarize briefly, 
Hobbes could not have been a scientific materialist because 
his conclusions concerning politics and obligation had been 
formed earlier than his introduction to the scientific 
methodology and conceptual framework. How could Hobbes have 
used the scientific methodology before he knew of it? Since 
the major thesis of Hobbes' theory, as stated in his 
'scientific' works (those released after 1640, including 
Leviathan, and The Elements, 
Cive and De Homine) are found 
as well as key sections of De 
in his earlier works and 
appear to be unchanged in the later works, the influence of 
science and mechanism must be simply discounted. All Hobbes 
had done, says Strauss, was to adopt a more "modern" 
terminology to express his earlier moral conclusions. Both 
the conclusions and the principles that support them are 
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both chronologically and logically prior to the use of the 
scientific method and language. This being the case, 
Strauss concludes, Hobbes was not a mechanistic egoist. 
For Oakeshott and similar theorists, egoism is not 
consistent with the analysis of aristocratic virtue and 
natural right found in Hobbes, and the looser two-tiered 
system Hobbes adopted as a result. Self-interest and fear 
are simply spurs to those of less than virtuous disposition, 
encouraging them to act justly; these motives are not to be 
construed as the basis of obligation at all. Hobbes simply 
saw self-interest as one factor of human nature that had to 
be taken into account when bridging natural inclination and 
moral virtue in his appeal to ordinary people to submit to 
the sovereign's will. The mechanist interpretation, in 
other words, is based more on the expectations of the 
interpreters than on what is found in Hobbes' writings for 
no single, unified, top-to-bottom structure, mechanistic or 
otherwise exists in Hobbes' works (Oakeshott, IL, p.16). 
There are other objections and refutations of the 
traditional thesis which reflect similar historical or 
philosophical points. All I have tried to convey is the 
flavor of the objections to the traditional thesis and some 
of the details of the arguments of the major interpreters. 
At this point you might think that the mechanistic 
interpretation is dead, thoroughly refuted. But that is not 
the case. For we have still to consider the objections to 
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the remaining two categories of interpretations, many of 
which come from defenders of the traditional view. 
The natural law view has likewise received 
considerable critical scrutiny and the objections to it are 
numerous. Once again, the objections are either 
philosophical or historical. Thomas Spragens offers what 
may be seen as the first and most general objection to the 
moral view: namely, that it is too radical a shift in our 
perspective of Hobbes. As Spragens says 
Although the Taylor-Warrender thesis has 
illuminated some significant aspects of Hobbes's 
political theory, it has a clear tendency to change the 
overall image which Hobbes seemed to have of his own 
work. In the first place, it makes absolutely central 
what Hobbes deemed to be relatively peripheral--e.g. 
that status of laws of nature as divine commands--and 
makes peripheral what Hobbes deemed important--e.g. the 
relationship of self-interest and duty. Moreover, the 
whole thesis involves a laborious separation of what 
Hobbes equally laboriously strove to reconcile, namely, 
his psychological postulates and his account of the 
origin of political obligation. This transformation may 
be justified on the grounds that it is necessary to save 
Hobbes from the 'logical blemish' of deriving an 'ought' 
from an 'is'. This justification, however, raises the 
question of how far one is entitled to interpret a 
person's thought after rejecting his premises. 
(Spragens, p.31) 
This objection concentrates on the necessity of 
having to rearrange too many important elements in Hobbes' 
Writings to support the moral thesis. The justification 
seems to require stretching Hobbes too far, so the natural 
law framework must be considered a distortion of Hobbes' 
actual intentions. The objection is both philosophical and 
historical. If we abstract Hobbes' work from its true 
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historical context Spragens objects we commit major 
philosophical errors of interpretation. We ought not try to 
fit Hobbes into something other than his own conceptual 
framework, namely, the traditional mechanistic one. 
3ohn Bowle also objects to the restructuring of the 
historical context of Hobbes' theory. To place Hobbes in 
either a natural law or religious context is wrong, since 
Hobbes' outlook was typical of his age, both in his 
empirical rationalism, and in his confidence in systematic 
method, though he was a much more thoroughgoing materialist 
than his contemporaries. He is a prophet of a cynical, 
deterministic, and utilitarian political theory, which 
discards the old sanctions of natural reason reflecting 
Divine order, and which replaces it by the imposition of 
arbitrary power as the price of security. He repudiates the 
alternative--the standard by which government, as distinct 
from society, is to be judged. He attempts to destroy the 
concepts of both a constitutional frame of society superior 
to executive government and of a cosmic order superior to 
manmade institutions. (Bowle, p.55) 
Bowle's claim is that the methodology Hobbes chose 
was clearly the scientific approach of his time, which 
allowed him to drop those "old sanctions" left over from 
unenlightened times. In his work, Hobbes and His Critics, 
Bowle makes use of much historical evidence to show that 
almost all of Hobbes' contemporaries (both critics and 
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supporters) took the mechanistic/egoistic nature of his 
theory for granted, as well as the fact that Hobbes was an 
atheist. Hence, the various versions of the moral thesis, 
by extension, must be false. 
A more specific and philosophical objection to the 
moral view turns on the language Hobbes used when speaking 
of •natural law'. Miriam Reik cautions against seeing 
natural laws as moral laws in the strict sense of the term 
'law': 
Law, said Hobbes, is the command of the 
sovereign. It locates and bespeaks his authority. As 
for the 'fundamental law', it is the natural law which 
bids us keep the peace and our word by obeying the 
sovereign's civil laws. That is essentially the meaning 
of his famous dictim that the civil law and the natural 
law are of equal extent and contain one another ... The 
theoretical significance of Hobbes' contention, however, 
is to point out that any theory resting the foundations 
of the state on natural law must inevitably run aground 
on the shoals of subjectivity if the interpretation of 
natural law is ultimately allowed to become a multitude 
of private judgments, for no civil code coincides 
entirely with everyone's notion of the content of 
natural law. (Reik, p.107) 
Such anarchy is what Hobbes was trying to avoid, after all, 
argues Reik; so it would be a mistake to interpret Hobbes as 
basing political obligation on natural law as the moralistis 
do. 
Continuing the same theme, Samuel Mintz, another 
traditionalist, reasserts the primacy of seeing natural laws 
as pieces of advice or counsel rather than laws in the moral 
or individualist (Oakeshott' Augustinian natural law view 
especially) sense. Mintz argues 
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What then becomes of the doctrine of natural 
law, of an eternal and immutable morality antecedent to 
political institutions and implanted by God in the 
hearts of men? Hobbes retained the name of this 
doctrine and little else ... for Hobbes the laws of nature 
are not really laws at all; rather they are theorems of 
conduct for the ordering of men's lives in a 
commonwealth so as to ensure civil peace ... And so they 
are not really the traditional 'laws of nature', not 
really, that is to say, moral laws which exist prior to 
positive law and oblige even in the absence of positive 
laws, and which draw their authority from the will of 
God. What Hobbes has done is to secularize the 
traditional concept of natural law; he has removed it 
from the sphere of absolute morality; he has deduced it, 
not from the idea of man's perfection, not from what man 
ought to be, but from what man is, or at any rate from 
what Hobbes though man is. (Mintz, pp.26-27) 
Thus, according to these objections, the moralists 
have simply misread the meaning of the term 'natural law' as 
Hobbes used it. Having done so, they erect a false chain of 
reasoning deducing the mistaken conclusion that 'obligation' 
1s a moral term, too. This overlooks Hobbes' claim that 
morality exists only following the establishment of civil 
society and that Hobbes would be inconsistent to say that 
natural laws "enjoin certain kinds of action insofar as they 
are morally correct." (Ackerman, p.416). Again, the 
underlying supposition is that Hobbes was competent enough 
to have recognized and avoided such inconsistencies; we must 
reject the moral thesis or settle for a mistaken view of an 
inept Hobbes that runs contrary to historical evidence. 
Apart from these general objections there are, of 
course, numerous specific objections to Taylor, Warrender, 
and Hood's theses. While I will look at some of them, we 
should note that they are the tip of the iceberg, but it is 
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unnecessary to consider each and every specific objection, 
given my purposes here, as noted earlier. 
Stuart Brown, in his article, "The Taylor Thesis: 
some Objections", points to a number of problems with 
Taylor's (and Warrender's) moral thesis, again both 
historical and philosophical in nature. In fact, Brown 
argues that by ignoring Hobbes' own statements (a historical 
factor) Taylor has erred philosophically (in attributing a 
moral theory to Hobbes). Brown notes that, if we pay 
attention to Hobbes' statements, "He explicitly denies, and 
on his own view of political theory cannot even in principle 
admit, that his ethical theory is independent of his 
psychology" (Brown, p.58). Thus, the Taylor thesis is 
false. By ignoring such evidence Taylor has made a grave 
error, ignoring the standards of 'theoretical adequacy and 
logical rigor' that Hobbes 
subjectively removing Hobbes' 
himself 
theory 
imposed, thus 
from its true 
philosophical context and 'emasculating' him by imposing 
doctrines logically independent of his own onto him. The 
moral thesis is not Hobbes' own, but is forced onto a set of 
arguments in his work that do not and cannot support it, 
given Hobbes' own standards of logical proof (Brown, p.58). 
As Brown argues: 
Those who accept the Taylor thesis must present 
on Hobbes's behalf a theory in which the concept of 
obligation is moral, as distinct from prudential or 
legal, and in which this moral concept is explicated 
without recourse to psychological considerations. But 
this task is impossible of fulfilment. For in Hobbes 
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the notion of covenant is employed as an indispensable 
logical link between political obligation on the one 
hand and psychological considerations on the other ... The 
duties of citizenship, that is, presuppose an obligation 
made out in terms of covenant, and covenanting 
presupposes interests at stake. On the Taylor thesis 
this chain of presuppositions must be broken at a point 
where the moral considerations will lie together 
completely isolated from considerations of interest 
explicated in psychological terms. But the moral 
notions in Hobbes are so connected, logically, with 
psychological ones that they cannot be isolated and 
still make sense. Thus the concept of obligation 
actually isolated by Taylor and the others turns out to 
be legal rather than moral. But Taylor, Oakeshott, and 
Warrender wish to expound for Hobbes a distinctively 
moral theory of obligation. They therefore introduce 
moral considerations to which neither they nor Hobbes, 
on this view of him, are entitled; and the moral 
doctrine attributed to Hobbes is inconsistent. (Brown, 
pp.60-61) 
In fact Warrender, Brown argues, ends up with 'a theory of 
obligation on which no one would be obliged at all.' For his 
account begins with the view that private interests are 
morally irrelevent, that covenants can be made with no 
obligations following from them, and that the status of the 
sovereign imposes no duties at all (Brown, p.63); and the 
argument for moral obligation that is proffered fails in its 
task. For these reasons and because of the absurdity of 
their conclusions, we are obliged to consider the 
Taylor/Warrender thesis false (and Oakeshott with them). 
Warrender's thesis has received its share of 
criticism over and above from the link with Taylor's 
Problems. In particular, the idea that obligations exist in 
the State of Nature is questioned by many Hobbes scholars. 
Ramon Lemos argues, "The existence of a society with a power 
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sufficient to compel obedience to the laws of nature is 
therefore a necessary precondition of the possibility of 
morality. For Hobbes it is the existence of society that 
makes morality possible, nor morality that makes the 
existence of society possible" (Lemos, p.31). To have 
obligations, especially moral obligations, in the State of 
Nature seems impossible on this assessment. This would 
destroy Warrender's thesis since he "rests the whole weight 
of Hobbes's argument on the prior obligation to obey God' 
law; and in particular his third law which commands the 
keeping of covenants" (Plamenatz, p.79). In addition, 
Oakeshott argues, following the laws of nature is not 
morally obligatory in the sense necessary to support 
Warrender's thesis; the reason is that no law can be binding 
if the subject cannot know the author of the law and the 
author's intentions in handing down the law, and the 
evidence suggests that Hobbes believed we cannot know God's 
intentions as the author of natural law (Oakeshott, ML, pp. 
277-279). Taken together, as Plamenatz notes, these 
objections make Warrender' ingenious and elaborate system 
unjustifiable or self-contradictory (Plamenatz, p.80). 
In addition to these philosophical objections are 
several based on more historical grounds. They arise from 
the belief that Warrender (and Taylor) interprets Hobbes' 
work completely out of context and so alters his intentions 
by representing him as a natural law moralist. Spragens 
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writes: 
Becaus.e of this narrowing of what constitutes a 
genuine theory of obligation, Warrender's depiction of 
Hobbes is disturbingly eccentric in the literal sense of 
that word. In the first place, the vast energies which 
Hobbes devoted to demonstrating the appropriate 
political implications of an intelligent self-interest 
become virtually irrelevant. The essential Hobbes, in 
relation to natural law and political obligation becomes 
a fideist, who believed rational theological 
propositions impossible but nevertheless grounded a 
political theory on divine will; all the psychological 
propositions become logically unnecessary enterprises. 
If these propositions had any relevance to Hobbes's 
political theory, by Warrender's standards it was purely 
to sustain the possibility of compliance with natural 
law, possibility being a necessary validating condition 
of any obligation. It quickly becomes apparent, 
however, that almost everything of interest in Hobbes's 
theory comes under the heading of validating 
condition ... What is left as the grounds of obligation 
are peculiarly empty and almost purely formal ... the 
parallel of natural and political obligation in Hobbes 
becomes 'coincidental'; Warrender's logical categories 
require that the two remain chastely separate, and hence 
cannot be connected with each other. (Spragens, pp.119-
120) 
Here Warrender's errors, though philosophical, are the 
consequences of 
intentions and the 
an incorrect 
application 
interpretive framework as a result. 
assessment of Hobbes' 
of a badly suited 
Finally, there are objections to Taylor, Warrender, 
and Hood voiced by those who retain the traditional 
interpretation and find the moralist arguments against it 
unconvincing. Examples are the objections developed by 
Thomas Nagel. In his refutation of Warrender Nagel holds 
that both Taylor and Warrender have sabotaged themselves by 
admitting the role of self-interest and then proceeding to a 
moralistic interpretation of obligation instead. They were 
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correct to begin with self-interest as the key moral 
motivation; but it is an egoistic moral motivation and one 
that is incompatible with any sort of non-egoistic moral 
feelings of the type Taylor and Warrender want to espouse 
(Nagel, pp.74-75). In effect, Nagel argues the natural law 
thesis is self-contradictory. In addition, Warrender's the 
use of validating conditions and the separation of the 
egoistic theory of will and the theory of obligation is 
merely an elaborate attempt by Warrender, Nagel claims, to 
avoid having to say that self-interest is in fact the ground 
of obligation (Nagel, pp.72-73). Even the seemingly 
altruistic discussion of social welfare found in Hobbes and 
the strict system of laws derived from it is derived from a 
careful consideration of self-interest (Nagel, p.72). 
Similarly Nagel interprets the laws of nature as God's 
commands as reducible to a prudential basis. God is not the 
ground of moral law as Warrender and Taylor claim; instead, 
Nagel argues: 
Nowhere does Hobbes say that only the commands 
of an authority can obligatory. All he says is that 
only the commands of an authority can be laws. This is 
all that is maintained in any of the passages cited by 
Warrender to support his view, nor have I been able to 
find any more in Hobbes's writings. There is a 
difference between denying that they derive their status 
as laws because they proceed from God and denying that 
they derive their obligatory status because they proceed 
from God ... I think it is quite consistent with Hobbes's 
system to say that the laws of nature can be considered 
the commands and laws of God, but I do not think that 
saying they have this sort of obligation is in 
contradiction to the notion that Hobbes's primary ground 
of obligation is prudential. I believe that he 
considers even our obligation to obey God a prudentially 
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grounded one. (Nagel, p.76) 
Nagel's conclusion, then, is that Hobbes was in fact 
an egoist, and the natural law interpretation is false. As 
Lemos says, "Hobbes's entire political philosophy is as 
consistent and elaborate a presentation and development of a 
thoroughly egoistic approach as any that has ever been 
devised. He is both a psychological and an ethical 
egoist ... He explicitly defines the expressions 'natural 
right' and 'natural law' in egoistic terms" (Lemos, p.12). 
These objections hold for Hood's thesis as well since if we 
accept the mechanistic view there is no room for a non-
egoistic, religious interpretation either. 
I should also mention that Hood's criticisms of the 
Taylor/Warrender version of the natural law view were noted 
in Chapter IIC. The tensions in interpretation are not just 
between the advocates of opposing categories of 
interpretation, but also between advocates within the same 
general category. 
As a last remark on the natural law view, I think 
the most important historical question is whether Hobbes 
was, in fact, an atheist. The moralists as a group hold 
that he was not, and they use God as a central element in 
their accounts of obligation. But this is a hotly debated 
question. Quite obviously the materialists tend to hold 
that Hobbes 
that he did 
had dismissed God at least from philosophy and 
this, in all probability, because of his 
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atheism. Paul Johson, in "Hobbes's Anglican Doctrine", 
makes a purely historical point that , if true, effectively 
dismisses the natural law view, especially Hood's version: 
If Hobbes was not an atheist then, one might 
very well wonder why his contemporaries so uniformly 
took him to be one. While this problem constitutes 
another study which cannot bew undertaken here, the 
question demands at least a partial answer. those 
who would theologize Hobbes's politics are committed to 
a kind of historical absurdity, namely, that all 
Hobbes's contemporary commentators' entirely missed the 
point Hobbes was concerned to make, although it was a 
point they were highly attuned to see; all of them saw 
instead the opposite point, although none was attuned to 
do so, and although Hobbes was not in fact making such a 
point at all.' (Johnson, p.123) 
or as J.W.N. Watkins summarizes, "Hobbes's sovereign was 
man-made ... Hobbes recognized no supernatural or theological 
standard by which men's desires might be judged" (Watkins, 
article, p.250). If these historical, biographical, and 
philosophical claims are true, then the natural law view is 
built upon a foundation of illusion or misrepresentation. 
But are these claims true? In defense of the role 
of God and religion, the moralists argue in detail 
philosophically; and there is also the fact of Hobbes' 
writings to consider. After all, Hobbes gave a large 
portion of each of his major works to developing scriptural 
arguments and connections to his own theory of obligation 
(as Hood, especially, vigorously argues). So the other side 
of the 'atheism' question is also defined historically as 
Well as philosophically. Typical of replies to the 
atheistic objection is this claim by Eldon Eisenach that 
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non-theists have misread the historical context of Hobbes' 
writings: 
Contemporary scholarship has ignored the 
connection between Hobbes's three-chapter general theory 
of politics in history and the entire second and 
'religious' half of Leviathan. The result has been a 
variety of alternative approaches, each containing prima 
facie weaknesses. The simplest and most widely used 
alternative is to write off the entire second half of 
Leviathan as 'nonphilosophy' and unworthy of serious 
attention. The result is to write off as well (or 
radically misread) the philosophical account of 
supernatural and natural religion under the general 
rubric of 'theism', thereby reducing the second half of 
Leviathan to an application (Christianity) of a more 
general principle (natural religion, the god of nature). 
This alternative not only confuses two notions of 
religion which Hobbes consistently distinguishes but 
ignores the fact that Hobbes denies all efficacy in the 
world to a religion based on what unaided reason can 
tell us. As Hobbes makes plain ... no civil or moral 
philosophy in the past has made its way in the world 
without the aid of supernatural gods, real or imagined; 
in all of man's past, prophets and no philosophers have 
given intellectual birth to the opinions creating power 
among men. (Eisenach, p.14) 
It is clear, then, that the natural law view is as 
subject to philosophical and historical debate as the 
mechanistic interpretation. 
Finally, there is the individualist thesis to 
consider. It is obviously open to refutation on the grounds 
that if either the mechanist or natural law view is correct, 
then it is false. But beyond that the individualist 
interpretation has received remarkably little 
counterargument. The major objections to Strauss's thesis 
have come from those within the same interpretive framework 
(Oakeshott, Goldsmith, et al, see Chapter IIIB). While 
there is some critical attention given to the concept and 
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role of natural right by others outside the individualist 
camp, there is not nearly as much controversy here as there 
is surrounding the first two interpretations. There is 
also little specific criticism of individual authors' views. 
The historical facts of Strauss's view have been 
criticized as inaccurate by Oakeshott and Goldsmith (Chapter 
IIIB), and by Raymond Polin, C.B. Macpherson, and Watkins, 
as well. Their criticisms follow upon each other and raise 
serious historical questions for Strauss. Polin's argument 
is that Hobbes cannot be correctly called an aristocrat or a 
bourgeois, nor a formulator of a bourgeois theory of virtue, 
as Strauss says he is. The Straussian response might be 
that all this is historically true, but from our historical 
vantage point we can now see Hobbes' views as the precursors 
of the modern bourgeois attitude (Raphael, p.82). C.B. 
Macpherson picked up this idea and argued that Hobbes' 
society was already bourgeois and that Hobbes indeed argued 
his picture of human nature from precisely that perspective; 
his values simply reflected those of his capitalistic 
mercantile era. In addition, where Strauss kept the theory 
of obligation separate from the mechanism, Macpherson's 
theory closely links Hobbes' ethics to his general 
Philosophy, arguing that his bourgeois individualism is 
necessarily connected to mechanistic materialism (Raphael, 
P,83). This, of course, is quite a radical method of 
joining Hobbes' ethics to his general philosophy, Watkins' 
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final modification of this "bourgeois" thesis, on the other 
band, claims that the character of Hobbes' political theory 
is determined above all by his conception of the scientific 
method; it cannot be deduced from his materialism. The 
result is Hobbes' use of the new method to resolve the State 
into its constitutive parts--namely, individuals--without 
the bonds of civil law or justice, followed by a 
reconstruction of the State from those parts through the 
analysis of the State of Nature and resultant social 
contract. Watkins regards all this as a criticism of 
Strauss, although it is not clear that Strauss would have 
seen it as such (Raphael, p.83). 
These objections are primarily historical, questions 
about how the historical context of Hobbes' work affected 
his philosophy. There are also some philosophical 
objections to the individualist thesis that center on the 
precise role of natural right, the primary concept of 
individualism. Lemos, again defending the traditional 
interpretation, argues that the concepts of natural law and 
natural right are egoistic and cannot support any notion of 
natural injustice not even prima facie obligation to respect 
the natural rights of others unless self-interest dictates 
it (Lemos, p. 12) • The result is that to speak of 
obligations as grounded in the transfer of natural right is 
itself an error. Natural right does not create obligation, 
only direct promises do; justice is not a moral vaiue in 
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itself, as Oakeshott maintains, but only a function of 
promise-keeping, which must be egoistically interpreted 
(Lemos, p.12). Obviously then, Hobbes' doctrine of natural 
right cannot be interpreted on the individualistic model. 
The question here is how Hobbes defined the terms 'natural 
right' and 'natural law', which Lemos maintaining that the 
definitions are egoistic and so are inconsistent with any 
other. 
Hood, too, is critical of the connection between 
natural right and political obligation proposed by the 
individualist. His objection is that the individualists 
have identified the wrong starting point for Hobbes' 
derivation of obbligation. Consistent with his own moral 
view, Hood denies that rights are the starting point for 
Hobbes, since "the rights of man find no place in his 
summary of true Christian politics. Civil philosophy is 
above all a theory of civil duty" (Hood, p. 24) • 
Furthermore, Hood argues, obligation cannot be grounded, as 
Strauss and Oakeshott suggest, on the moral force of natural 
rights: 
In Hobbes's moral thought it is not right, but 
obligation, which is moral. Right is negative, a mere 
absence of obligation, just as corporal liberty is 
negative, a mere absence of physical impediment. 
Hobbes's morality is a morality of law, not of right; it 
is law, not right, which makes the difference between 
the moral and the natural goodness. (Hood, p.94) 
If Hood is correct, then the individualist 
characterization of obligation as moral, but derived from 
234 
the ethical force of the concept of natural right, is false. 
Miriam Reik, however, disputes Hood's analysis and 
defends an individualistic view concerning the term 'natural 
right I : 
Hobbes's prescriptive language in describing the 
first law (men ought to endeavor peace) and in a number 
of other passages has led some commentators to argue 
that natural laws impose moral obligations on us, and 
the search for peace is then construed as a duty. But, 
as others have pointed out, natural law also dictates 
self-defense, and the preservation of our nature is a 
natural right, and thus cannot be a duty. Besides, if 
natural laws were obligatory, failure to fulfill them 
would mark a man as unjust or bad, but in the state of 
nature, goodness is determined by each man's appetite 
and justice does not exist ... (Reik, p.92) 
Without the transfer of right as the source of covenant's 
obligatory nature, the individualist argues, there could be 
no obligation for Hobbes. Fear would motivate us, natural 
law (which Reik takes as no more than general maxims) would 
guide us; but neither could oblige us to abide by the social 
contract. Thus, Hood's arguments fail to account for 
obligation since they relie upon natural law to create 
obligation, when in fact it is the contract itself as the 
vehicle of our exercise of natural right that binds us to 
the State. 
• 
3. An Evaluation of the Conflict 
It is obvious that no one of the three general 
interpretations is accepted as definitive by .Hobbes 
scholars. The traditional interpretation enjoyed the 
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10ngest uncritical acceptance but this changed abruptly 
following Strauss's and Taylor's new proposals (in 1936 and 
193a, respectively). Since then the range of alternative 
interpretations has expanded dramatically. With each new 
view of Hobbesian obligation, new controversies have arisen, 
new objections and counter-objections have been proposed, 
and replies to each have followed. 
In Chapters I-III I outlined in detail the major 
arguments and conclusions of the most prominent interpreters 
under the three general headings of those chapters. In the 
preceeding section I sketched some of the reasons each has 
for rejecting the various counter-theses, as well as 
objections offered from several other sources. The purpose 
of this last task was to highlight the current state of 
scholarship, a seeming stalemate, in the field of Hobbes 
research, particularly concerning his theory of obligation. 
No attempt has been made to try to settle the dispute in 
favor of one alternative or the other; for the goal has been 
simply to describe the debate. 
What is clear from this survey of the current 
conflict is the fact that two sorts of objections and 
counter-objections are most common. First are objections 
based on philosophical factors. Included here are 
objections based on linguistic disagreements: for example 
the claims of Reik that the individualists have 
misunderstood the meanings of 'natural right' and 'natural 
, 
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iaw', or the traditionalists' definition of 'natural laws' 
as 'maxims of prudence' and the moralists' redefinition of 
the term as deontological or as God's commands. There are 
also philosophical objections that claim that particular 
interpretations are invalid readings of Hobbes' own 
arguments: for example, the objections to Warrender's use of 
various of Hobbes' concepts as validating conditions but not 
grounds of obligation or the claims that the separation of 
Hobbes' psychology from his general. These claims and 
others relie upon logical, metaphysical, or scientific 
arguments, all of which constitute types of philosophical 
objections. 
The second type of objection is historical, based on 
the grounds that the interpretations in question erred in 
assessing the factual or biographical context of Hobbes' 
theory or statements, or lese simply ignored relevant 
historical data in reaching its 
this kind of objection are 
conclusions. Examples 
Strauss's claims that 
of 
the 
traditional view overlooks the facts of Hobbes' life, Hood's 
claim that almost everyone has mistakenly ruled out the 
scriptural content of Hobbes' theory on the erroneous belief 
that he was an atheist, and the counterclaims that he could 
not have been anything but an atheist. These objections 
stress historical factors and perspectives rather than 
technical philosophical arguments. 
The one claim which every one of the theorists 
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aakeS, however, is that only one view can be correct. In 
chapter VI will argue that, to a great extent, the precise 
points made in the counter-arguments can be ignored because 
a general conceptual framework can be constructed which 
circumvents the intricate and thorny question of "who is 
right?" by providing a coherent context from which to view 
Hobbes' theory, one which has a place for all three kinds of 
interpretation. 
What is lacking currently is just this sort of 
coherence. The interpretations each argue for the most part 
mutually exclusive positions that allow for no overlapping 
of points, or else reinterpret key terms and claims in an 
attempt to blend the various points of view; what happens in 
the latter case is that the major aspects of one theory get 
demoted to minor features of the unified theory (for 
example, the lip service paid to mechanistic language in the 
natural law interpretation). What is needed is a way out of 
this impasse. W.H. Greenleaf notes that the usual appeal to 
the "facts" by the various interpreters overlooks the nature 
of the factual evidence itself: 
The coherence sought must be a coherence which 
we are obliged to believe by the nature of the evidence. 
Yet this evidence is not something given, autonomous, 
objective. There is no such thing as an historical 
'fact' in and of itself independent of 'interpretation', 
and used to judge an interpretation. A fact presupposes 
a world of ideas, an existing interpretation, something 
achieved in such a context and not something merely 
given. Any historian begins not with brute, objective 
facts about the past but with a body of present material 
seen in a certain light but which, thus seen, seems to 
lack coherence. And what he tries to do is to give his 
material a greater 
looking at it in a 
necessarily involve 
called facts have 
historical facts 
p. 27) . 
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relative degree of coherence by 
different way, a process which will 
altering the manner in which the so-
hitherto been regarded. The only 
are the interpretations (Greenleaf, 
By focusing on the interpretations rather than on 
Hobbes alone, I hope to achieve the coherence called for. 
But this requires taking into account the diverse contexts 
of the interpretations and finding a way of allowing for the 
diversity in Hobbes himself. It is interesting, Greenleaf 
says, that Hobbes did seem to be aware of this precise point 
and tied it to an awareness of the role of language in the 
expression of opinions: 
"He (Hobbes) ... says that, though words are the 
signs we have of other people's opinions and intentions, 
it is, nevertheless, often difficult to interpret them 
correctly because of what he calls 'diversity of 
contexture, and of the company wherewith they go' 
(Elements of Law, ed. Tonnies, pp.52-53) (Greenleaf, 
p. 29) • 
This task will be both philosophical and historical; since 
the major points of contention are both, as was shown above, 
both have to be a part of any coherent overview of the issue 
of obligation in Hobbes. But as I shall argue, the 
historical factors offer a way of rectifying many of the 
philosophical controversies. As Greenleaf says: 
The appropriate understanding of the rule of 
biographical factors may often be a way in which system 
can be introduced into varied expressions of thought. 
It may be that in a man's work a series of 
inconsistencies or even contradictions exist which 
appear unresolvable at the intellectual level, but it is 
sometimes possible to reach a lower degree of coherence 
by taking account of the author's personality or 
situation. (Greenleaf, p.30) 
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That such a reinterpretation is necessary seems 
apparent. However, I will briefly examine the need in the 
next section prior to developing the elements of the 
conceptual framework and methodology necessary to reach the 
desired rectification of diverse theories. The important 
thing to remember here is, as Raphael observes, 
I am not suggesting that incompatible accounts 
can all be equally true, or that we can legitimately let 
our imaginations run riot in reading into works of the 
past whatever our own background suggests to us. 
Hypotheses of significance can and should be restrained 
by canons of historical truth. They must be readings 
that the original author would probably have been 
willing to accept if they had been put to him .... Some 
of the differing interpretations of Hobbes can be 
definitely rejected as false. This does not mean that 
only one can be true. (Raphael, pp.99-1OO) 
B. THE METHOD OF HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION 
1. The Need for a New Perspective 
What are we to make of the current state of the 
debate concerning Hobbes' theory of obligation? We have 
three conflicting sets of interpreations, each claiming to 
be the most, or the only, correct account of Hobbes' 
intentions and theory, each with a significant body of 
textual and critical support in its favor, and each with 
carefully reasoned arguments based on the respective textual 
evidence. Almost immediately the intuitive response is to 
fall into line with the interpreters themselves and say, 
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11 well, two of these views have to be wrong, either that or 
is to raise a they're all wrong!" But what 
difficult question about Hobbes. 
this does 
Is it possible that Hobbes 
was persistently self-contradictory? Could he have been 
such a careless reasoner as to miss the fact that he was 
being inconsistent or contradictory? Have the interpreters 
created a picture of a bungling, loose, rather careless 
philosopher who can't be given credit for knowing what he 
was up to or how to do it even if he did know? Or 
alternatively, have the interpreters misread Hobbes so badly 
as to read into his work what is actually not there? Or 
have these interpreters imposed an unjustifiably narrow 
reading on Hobbes, causing them to exclude other views or 
miss other threads that are to be found in his work? 
Now, an affirmative answer to all but the last of 
these questions would imply a serious lack of ability on the 
part of either Hobbes or the interpreters that is belied by 
the general philosophical excellence of the people and the 
works involved. Hobbes simply does not strike us as someone 
who could persistently contradict himself or consistently 
fail to do what he intended to do when constructing his 
theory of political obligation. Nor, on the other hand, do 
the analyses and arguments offered by the various 
interpreters seem radically unjustified, or loosely 
constructed, or merely subjective renderings of Hobbes' 
Writings. Thus, the problem. But if we conclude that each 
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interpreter 
contest this? 
has read Hobbes too narrowly, 
That is not yet clear. 
The preceding section pointed out 
trying to fit the theories together 
coherent unit by indicating in what ways 
the 
into 
the 
how are we to 
problems of 
a logically 
interpreters 
see them as mutually exclusive or inconsistent with each 
other. To try to overcome this incompatibility directly 
would require the kind of philosophical slight of hand, the 
stretching of points, and subtle alterations of the meanings 
of terms (or of Hobbes' intentions) that, when done, would 
produce a theory needlessly convoluted or overly complex, 
and not persuasive. This is the fate of the theory of Von 
Leyden, which tries to subsume moral and individualistic 
terms and points under the linguistic and conceptual 
framework of mechanism. Such an attempt faces the problem 
of demonstrating the consistency of rather obvious 
inconsistent views. Contortions of interpretation are 
needed to apply a single consistent meaning to terms that 
seem clearly to be used in more than one sense, and to 
respond to the claim that the textual evidence offered by 
those who argue for the exclusiveness of the three 
interpretations. This brings us back, once again, to the 
earlier problem of having to assume some lack of ability in 
Hobbes or some subjective misreading of Hobbes by all the 
interpreters, save one. It seems to me wrong to say this of 
Hobbes, and intuitively risky to hold that every interpreter 
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is mistaken, though I might certainly be able to say some 
were. 
What this leaves finally is the possibility that all 
three interpretations are to be found in Hobbes, but that 
they were not meant to fit together into one logically 
consistent theory. Here we have an option that has a number 
of virtues: first, we need not imply any lack of logical 
acumen on the part of either Hobbes or the various 
interpreters; for the views were not meant to be logically 
joined. Second, we need not undertake the difficult task of 
showing that all the interpretations and the textual 
evidence for each of them are flawed; they may all be 
correct and valid. Third, we do not need to try to fit 
disparate theories, complete with their own terms, contexts, 
and conceptual frameworks, into a larger, logically unified, 
but unpersuasive framework; three separate frameworks exist 
and were, in fact, intended by Hobbes. Thus we would avoid 
many of the problems previously stated. However, we do face 
the strangeness of arguing that Hobbes created and intended 
three separate mutually exclusive theories of obligation. 
Obviously, we face the problem of finding a coherent 
theoretical model from within which to make and justify such 
an assertion without maintaining that Hobbes was 
inconsistent, contradictory, or simply inept. I believe 
that this can be done and the remainder of this dissertation 
Will develop and argue for my claim. 
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Exactly what is needed here is a methodology or 
theoretical model. that does two things: 1) argues 
historically that Hobbes saw and intended to present three 
distinct theories of obligation, a method of historical 
interpretation; 2) argues philosophically that it is 
plausible to interpret Hobbes' three seemingly incompatible 
theories in accord with this historical interpretation, a 
new philosophical perspective on Hobbes' theory of 
obligation. My task in the remainder of this dissertationis 
to show the validity of the historical approach and to 
provide a philosophical framework which preserves both the 
historical claim and the various claims of the interpreters 
so as to show the triple nature of Hobbes' writings without 
reducing Hobbes to the level of a philosophical mediocrity. 
In this way we can preserve the three interpretations 
generally, while avoiding the pitfalls associated with the 
other options outlined previously. 
2. The Historical Aspect 
It is clear that a new perspective is necessary 
since the alternative perspective presupposes that when more 
than one interpretation of a set of writings exists, either 
only one is correct or they can all be subsumed under a more 
general, logically unified, theory, has left us with the 
conflicts about Hobbes' theory of obligation that we have 
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seen, What is needed is a fresh conceptual framework. The 
work of James Collins, Interpreting Modern Philosophy, 
offers us the beginnings of such framework. It is Collins' 
recognition of the importance of history, both in the sense 
of the intellectual history of a philosophical problem, and 
in the sense of historical context per se (biography, dates, 
events, the tenor of the times, etc.), that enabled me to 
see the problem of obligation in Hobbes in a new light and 
to go beyond the basic premises of the traditional 
interpretations and conflicts. Further, Collins advocates 
re-interpretation of persistent historical problems in light 
of contemporary methodologies that could not previously have 
been used in examining the issues; modern historical 
interpretation involves new perspectives derived from 
current frameworks. Here, given the triple nature of 
Hobbes' theory and the belief that all three might somehow 
be compossible, I believe a combination of Collins' approach 
and a Wittgensteinian approach, provides a unique framework 
for re-evaluating the current standoff. 
The first important common aspect of Collins' theory 
and the Wittgensteinian methodology I will employ is the 
recognition that conflict, as in the case of the Hobbes 
interpreters, is a natural and perhaps essential part of 
philosophical analysis. Collins stresses the point that 
conflicting interpretations are not disasterous but normal, 
necessary conditions for progress in discovering meaning and 
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truth. Further, he says, "diversity and methodic strife 
among philosophers is fruitful because it is an important 
mode of the diversity and strife required everywhere for 
mankind's development and wisdom" (Collins, p.414). 
Wittgenstein also points out that conflicting perspectives 
are to be expected and accepted given the diversity of 
language and its uses. (The Wittgensteinian aspect of my 
methodology will be explicated in detail in the next section 
of this chapter.) In fact, it has been the failure to 
understand and allow for such conflict and diversity that 
has stifled philosophy, according to Wittgenstein. Once we 
accept conflict we may be able to work toward a more 
sympathetic and accurate reading of a given historical 
figure's intentions. In the case of Hobbes, this would 
allow us to avoid the assumption that where there is a 
conflict between three interpreations, there must be at 
least two incorrect views. Rather, it may be possible that 
the conflict is acceptable or natural to Hobbes' way of 
thinking. When we allow conflict and tolerate it, we may be 
able to keep ourselves from making false assumptions about 
Hobbes' intentions, about the meaning or use of terms within 
his work, and about the validity of the interpreters' 
readings of them. 
Part of the problem, too, is that the intolerace for 
conflict and the ensuing rejeection of opposing theories may 
result from psychological factors rather than from the 
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textual material. As Collins recognizes, 
... historians find that certain psychological attitudes 
(whether deliberately or unthinkingly entertained) do 
raise obstacles against a more effective examination of 
the source philosophers. Some re-orientation of mind is 
required, not precisely to constitute the act of 
historical understanding but to modify the working 
suppositions of readers sufficiently to permit such a 
developing acquaintance to occur. (Collins, p.38) 
It is my contention that this has been part of the problem 
in finding a way of utilizing all three perspectives to 
arrive at a version that would remain true to Hobbes' own 
intentions without impuning his ability or having to dismiss 
other views with significant textual evidence behind them. 
The goal is to rectify the competing theories and do justice 
to Hobbes in a way that, although it will not end the job of 
interpretation once and for all, will allow for a more 
sympathetic reading of Hobbes and of the interpreters 
themselves. We need to accept conflict as normal, however, 
before we can rest easy with an interpretation of Hobbes 
that allows him seemingly contradictory threads of reasoning 
and accepts the validity of conflicting interpretations 
concurrently. The psychological block to be overcome is the 
precommitment to a monistic view of interpretation in 
philosophy which will allow only one correct view and seeks 
to end conflict by dismissing competitors. We might call 
this "the definitive interpretation block". Both Collins 
and Wittgenstein counsel against such preformed molds into 
Which to pour historical or philosophical interpretations. 
The way around such blocks is to utilize 
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contemporary philosophies and newly developed theories as 
tools for re-evaluating historical figures and 
controversies. Collins stresses the need to see that 
classical texts are not monolithic and do not present 
themselves to us in any immutable way. Rather, they must 
always be rendered intelligible anew in the idioms of our 
present philosophical theories and concerns. It is the job 
of modern interpretors to blend the current methods with the 
historical background in an attempt to render classical 
texts, such as Hobbes', deciferable: 
... the kinds of interpretive questioning do not 
constitute a separate standard apparatus, for they stand 
in fundamental need of being reminted and newly equipped 
with the specific means for bringing the sources to bear 
upon the problems we are facing. The confluent 
principles of source and interpretation cannot join 
together automatically, immediately, and under their own 
impetus alone. There is always need for fresh acts of 
judging just how best to relate the modes of textual 
insistency with ever more pertinent and servicable modes 
of interrogation. (Collins, p.189) 
Further, Collins views this re-interpretation as vital to 
the philosophic task: 
What keeps history of philosophy a living discipline is 
precisely its assimilation of new ways of reading, 
interpreting, and redeploying the basic writings. The 
initial narrowing effect of a correlation between these 
writings and a contemporary methodology is to be 
expected. It provides the inciting spur toward 
improving a new path in historical interpretation, one 
which quite properly unsettles the traditional view and 
generates novel relationships among all the components 
of historical meaning ... One function of the interpreting 
present is to discipline the historian's judgment of 
these long-range expectations concerning contemporary 
innovation. Therefore, it is a good working rule that 
the historical spirit be encouraged to take many 
surprising forms, all of which are to be provisionally 
welcomed and tested by their actual interpretive 
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fruits. {Collins, p.210) 
My proposed interpretation of Hobbes, using a 
Wittgensteinian method of analysis to supplement Collins' 
historical approach, is precisely an attempt to realize 
Collins' goals. In addition, there is textual and 
historical evidence that makes it plausible to claim that 
Hobbes had something of a Wittgensteinian approach in mind 
when he addressed his various audiences through his 
writings. If it is plausible to maintain that Hobbes 
directed different arguments toward different segments of 
the English public in order to convince them that they would 
be well-advised to grant the sovereign with almost absolute 
obedience, then there is good reason for allowing all three 
theories to stand together as related, but separate, 
frameworks of justification. 
Historical analysis eventually 
says, a plateau where further sources, 
reaches, Collins 
undiscovered or 
untranslated texts, and profitable strategic overemphasis of 
early, late, or seminal {"great works") texts ceases, and 
the philosopher's job becomes one of giving a balanced 
assessment of the primary sources from all phases of the 
author's work and all the various interpretations 
accumulated up to the present time. The job "is to 
correlate all the phases in his development, determining as 
definitely as possible how they work together to achieve the 
continuity of a living philosophy" (Collins, p.145). In the 
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case of Hobbes, I would add that the same must be done for 
the interpretations. What is needed is a renewed reading of 
Hobbes, but one that proceeds from a new point of view that 
allows both historical context and current trends in 
philosophical methodology a place. Interpretive questions, 
Collins notes, "are both addressed to a personal center of 
creativity and centered upon those leads which will help us 
make better theoretical sense out of the philosopher's 
writings, taken as a whole" (Collins, p.124). 
Therefore, I do not believe that we should rest 
content upon the presupposition that only one of the three 
views of Hobbes' theory of obligation is correct, nor upon 
the further assumption that they are mutually exclusive. To 
do so would be conceding that we are as far as we can go in 
understanding Hobbes and that all that is left to do is take 
our pick of one of the existent theories. Collins makes the 
same point in more eloquent terms: 
When we agree to study a philosophy in the historical 
spirit and not as a collage of abstract theses, we find 
it to be already deeply involved in the process of being 
mediated, qualified, and reoriented in one respect or 
another. For this is the living process which furnishes 
the historical grounds for taking the from-to approach 
to that philosophy. Its capacity to educate us in an 
understanding of its problems and ours does not suddenly 
manifest itself to the present generation of students. 
The judgment about a source's latent capacity of 
meanings and its accessibility for subsequent minds 
rests upon that source's gradual achievement of 
continuing historical presence, that is, upon its 
involvement already for some time in the kind of 
interpretive relationships which underlie the from-to 
interrogation of a historian. (Collins, p.355) 
Involving Wittgenstein's insights in Hobbes 
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scholarship expands the boundaries beyond the traditional 
perspectives and offers what seems to me to be a fresh way 
around the controversy that is consistent with aspects of 
Hobbes' personality, writings, and the traditional 
perspectives themselves. Even if the attempt would 
ultimately fail, the process remains valuable as a tool that 
opens the past to the modern mind in terms more compatible 
with current philosophical attitudes. The attempt keeps 
Hobbes scholarship alive and may open the way to still more 
creative interpretations by causing us to see in new ways 
and apply the new ways of seeing to the old problems. All 
of this is desirable once we accept Collins' 
characterization of the nature of the discipline of the 
history of philosophy. But, beyond this, I shall argue, 
this approach makes the best sense of Hobbes' theory of 
obligation of any interpretation to date. 
3. The Purpose of Historical/Contemporary Re-analysis 
Quite obviously, the point of any historical 
analysis is to understand the author's central textual 
purposes and intentions, shorn of any interpretive bias or 
preconceptions. The initial focus must be on the texts 
themselves, as Collins emphasizes: 
The 
concerned is 
themselves. 
itself, with 
intention with which the historian is 
that conveyed in the philosophical texts 
This is the intention actually achieving 
varying degrees of adequate expression, in 
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the sources available for study. When the actuating 
intention is rendered determinate in function of the 
source writings, it constitutes an accessible foundation 
for historical inquiries from many directions and a 
decisive testing ground for statements about the mind of 
the philosopher or his fundamental intention. What the 
historian strives to render always more comprehensive 
and precise is an understanding of the philosopher's 
central textual intent. (Collins, p.47) 
However, in cases like that of Hobbes' theory of 
obligation, the waters may be muddied by a plethora of 
existing and perhaps conflicting interpretations which 
render the tasks of ramaining faithful to the author's true 
and original intentions difficult. Here the philosophical 
historian must take the various interpretations into account 
in a non-partisan attempt to correlate and judge them so as 
to resolve the controversy. This may, as it seems to in the 
present case, involve using a new perspective that allows 
the historian to do justice to both the original and 
secondary texts. Collins sees the task as one of declining 
to sit as a supreme judge above the principals in a court 
proceeding, wherein the purpose of the process is to declare 
one side victorious and dismiss the others. Rather, the 
intent is to do justice to all the parties by using "all the 
interpretive judgments bearing upon the designated subject 
of inquiry", in this case Hobbes' theory of obligation, 
Using both the source material and any "modes of 
interrogation and correlation" operative in current 
Philosophizing. All of these various components must be 
included since, as Collins explains, they all "contain" an 
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aspect of requiredness, a demand that he use and relate them 
as precisely, discernedly, and artfully as he can" (Collins, 
p.382). My use of Wittgenstein serves to incorporate 
current modes of interrogation and correlation, and, as I 
hope to show, connects all the relevant sources fairly and 
objectively while preserving Hobbes' original intentions. 
A second feature of Collins' theory that is of 
particular importance to my methodology and to the 
Wittgensteinian perspective itself is his denial, 
essentially, of the presupposition that only one of a number 
of competing interpretations can match an author's true 
intentions. Collins and Wittgenstein both stress the 
complexity of intentions, the plurality of influences on an 
individual, on his/her work, and the language of his/her 
writings, as well as on any interpreter of the original 
sources. Collins states this point when he writes: 
... this theory explicitly includes the condition of 
there being plural forms of actional influence of signs 
upon the interpreter. Even a highly general semiotic 
must study the varieties of sign-actions and hence the 
various modes of interpretant determinations. This 
rings true to the more concrete situation presented by 
historical studies of modern philosophy. There is no 
singularly privileged, one-channel path of 
interpretation linking a source philosophy with a 
historical inquirer. At every turn in our analysis, we 
have found the modes of signification to be various and 
deliberately variated, whether they come from the source 
thinker's fertile use of arguments and modes of 
expression or from the historian's ways of questioning 
and interrelating. (Collins, p.363) 
The current state of affairs in Hobbes scholarship is almost 
a perfect example of the need for this type of reminder, 
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especially since the textual evidence suggests a plural 
intent by Hobbes. Following Collins' suggestions I will try 
to establish a "teleologically well instructed historical 
judgment" relating the sources of contemporary philosophies 
so that the "integrity of each is respected, at the same 
time as their mutual bearing is established" (Collins, 
p.353). 
We need not discard any of the three conflicting 
interpretive frameworks entirely (though particular aspects 
of each, or specific sub-interpretations may be rejected) if 
we join Collins' attitude with Wittgensteinian methods of 
analysis. That these two approaches are compatible beyond 
the allowance of plurality is shown by a third feature that 
Collins explicates: 
It is quite possible to make accurate summaries 
of the individual arguments in a philosopher's writings, 
and nevertheless fail to do historical justice to their 
content and function within that philosopher's own 
development and comprehensive vision of life. These 
latter considerations serve to modify and unify all his 
statements, so that their proper presentation belongs 
among the chief aims of the responsive interpreter. 
Historical re-envisioning of a philosophy requires that 
the purposive unity of meanings be respected, along with 
their separate argumentative structure. (Collins, 
pp.398-399) 
Just as Wittgenstein stressed context so, too, does Collins 
hold both the individual and social context to be important 
in understanding a philosopher's language, meanings, and 
Vision. The attempt to comprehend the complexity of Hobbes' 
thinking as to the nature of obligation is furthered, rather 
than hindered, by the diversity of interpretations under 
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consideration. That is, part of our interpretive task is 
already complete: able interpreters have already uncovered 
various important aspects in Hobbes' thoughts about 
obligation and provided strong textual support for their 
various claims. What is lacking, however, is a way of 
rectifying, without rejecting, these well supported 
insights. The application of the Wittgensteinian approach 
provides a way of doing this that is both compatible with 
Collins' methodology and plausible given specific textual 
evidence concerning Hobbes' personality and perception of 
his own times and task. 
Finally, Collins offers, by way of a quotation from 
a letter by William James, a caution not to go too far from 
an author's central core when interpreting the author's 
work: 
You take utterances of mine written at different 
dates for different audiences belonging to different 
universes of discourse,and string them together as the 
abstract elements of a total philosophy which you then 
show to be inwardly incoherent. This is splendid 
philology, but is it live criticism of anyone's 
Weltanschaung? Your use of the method only strengthens 
the impression I have got from reading criticisms of my 
'pragmatic' account of 'truth,' that the whole Ph.D. 
industry of building up an author's meaning out of 
separate texts leads nowhere, unless you have first 
grasped his center of vision, by an act of imagination. 
That, it seems tome, you lack in my case ... Not by 
proving their inward incoherence does one refute 
philosophies--every human being is incoherent--but only 
by superseding them by other philosophies more 
satisfactory .... (Collins, p.401) 
This warning is especially relevant to the task of sorting 
out the various interpretations of Hobbes' theory of 
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obligation. Two questions need to be considered: 1) Do the 
various existent interpretations suffer from having done 
just what James warns against? and 2) Does my present 
attempt to rectify the existent interpretations suffer for 
violating James' warning? With respect to the second, the 
final answer will have to wait until I have concluded my 
efforts, but I do not believe I have constructed a "new" 
Hobbes out of thin air, nor taken his writings out of 
context. 
As to the first question, I do not believe the 
various interpretations are the results of unjustified 
lifting of quotes from Hobbes out of their context and re-
aligning them to produce an artificial view of obligation 
(though, again, I am referring to the overall thrust of each 
interpretation and not to each and every individual sub-
interpretation). Instead, I maintain that the general 
thrust of each interpretation is justified by the texts, but 
that each presupposes a context or framework of its own 
within which the justification holds. The error is to fail 
to recognize the contextual shift and to apply one standard 
of interpretation exclusively, thereby excluding the other 
Views. Essentially, in Wittgensteinian terms, the error is 
to apply standards from one linguistic framework to another 
linguistic framework. It is my contention that Hobbes 
himself did construct what amounts to three separate 
language-games, based on his awareness of a difference in 
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the audiences that might read his work. I hope to 
substantiate this claim and then show how the three 
interpretations co-exist in Hobbes' writings, without being 
contradictory, as separate language-games; it is this, I 
believe, that previous interpretations have missed. 
The purpose, then, of what I propose is to take a 
step back from the traditional assumptions and explore a new 
interpretive option. Such a step seems particularly 
necessary where Hobbes' theory of obligation is concerned, 
but necessary for the history of philosophy generally as 
well. As Collins says: 
First, the growth of a logical interpretant begins in 
the mode of suggestion and conjecture. This is a formal 
statement of a trait already observed in the practice of 
historians. The art of historical questioning is 
fructified by a constant influx of new interpretive 
hypotheses, new suggestions about how to explore the 
fundament and trace the interdependencies among 
philosophers. Without this mine of conjectural logical 
interpretants, there could be no fresh orientations of 
research and revision. 
Second, the logical interpretant incorporates 
the values of the emotional and energetic factors, since 
general meanings emerge only from exploring imaginative 
situations and steadily modifying all the accepted 
historical judgments. (Collins, p.370) 
4. Methodological Particulars 
One attractive feature of Collins' method that seems 
tailor-made to an investigation of the conflicting 
interpretations of Hobbes is the resolve to respect the 
development of the author's thought, while adapting modern 
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perspectives to past interpretations of that thought. When 
faced with multiple theories, Collins urges us not to abide 
bY a precommitment to any one logical model, primary or 
central intuition, or a monistic schema that reduced every 
aspect of the theory to a single developmental image. 
(Collins, p.140). In the case of Hobbes, this allows us to 
avoid a precommitment to any one of the traditional 
interpretations and further admits new interpretive 
mechanisms as necessary additions to the task of doing 
justice to Hobbes' thoughts about obligation. More 
specifically, given the kind of linguistic conflicts found 
within the context of the competing interpretations, the re-
appraisal of Hobbes from a Wittgensteinian slant seems 
natural given Wittgenstein's stress on understanding 
language through understanding contexts, intentions, and 
conventions. Particularly appropriate is Wittgenstein's 
emphasis on describing how a framework of rules develops and 
functions, rather than in imposing our own preconceptions 
upon the framework and its users' intentions. To resolve 
the stalemate in Hobbes scholarship we do not want or need a 
"new" theory of obligation, but rather a more plausible 
description of Hobbes' intentions in light of the extant 
primary texts and interpretive models already proposed. 
In constructing this description, biographical 
features are important since, as Collins says, 
One index of a student's maturing readiness to 
move beyond predigested outlines of modern periods and 
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isms lies in his willingness to learn what he can about 
the life and setting of the individual philosopher. To 
recognize the worth of a biographical study and its 
contribution to philosophical understanding is to grasp 
the role of fundament-oriented questioning. (Collins, 
p.110) 
This is of the utmost importance to Wittgenstein as 
well, as is evidenced by his stress on conventions, 
contexts, and so forth. One cannot understand an author's 
meaning without describing the context in which he wrote, 
nor without describing as accurately as possible the 
author's intentions. In the case of Hobbes this is what 
seems to be lacking. Even though many interpreters have 
described the biographical/historical background in detail, 
their interpretations seem limited by the imposition of the 
monistic framework onto Hobbes' intentions. By adopting 
Wittgenstein's pluralistic framework, I believe considerable 
light can be shed on Hobbes' intentions in a way that will 
not discount the valid work of previous scholars nor distort 
Hobbes' own goals. 
Collins holds that two sorts of historical 
contingencies are important, though often ignored: the 
extrinsic contrast between an author's ideas and the 
author's often mismatched 
considerations which qualify 
life, 
the 
and the intrinsic 
author's methods, 
arguments, and vision, and which demand an evaluation of the 
author's perceptions of his own age and how the historical 
age itself may have colored his vision (Collilns, p.115). 
Hobbes, fortunately for his interpreters, led a life 
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consistent with his theories, to the point of boasting that 
fear was continually the primary motivating factor of all he 
did, although he also had deep respect for science and a 
belief in Christianity filtered through his own particular 
perspective. Thus my attention will be focused on the 
second contingency, Hobbes' perceptions of his age and the 
effects of his perceptions on the goals and style of his 
work. W.H. Greenleaf observes: 
a contradiction of some sort in a man's writings ... then 
the reader is properly to assume that the opinion 
signified most clearly and directly by the author is the 
one intended and that any apparently contradictory view 
arises either from an error of interpretation on the 
reader's part or from the writer's not seeing any reason 
to suppose a contradiction at all. (E.W.,IV,75). 
(Greenleaf, p.29) 
It is this warning that various interpreters have 
ignored when they have dismissed Hobbes' theory of 
obligation as the incoherent product of an inept, 
contradictory mind. As I've said before, there is no 
evidence that Hobbes had such a mind. Two alternatives 
remain, either the readers have constructed contradictory, 
artificial "Hobbeses", or there exists no contradiction once 
we adopt Hobbes' own perspective. I do not believe, again, 
that the three "Hobbeses'' are figments of the interpreters' 
minds; the textual support for all three views is strong. 
However, the contradictions or inconsistencies seem to 
remain. The way out of the morass that I propose relies on 
accepting the last portion of Hobbes' warning as an 
indication of how he would like us to see his work: Hobbes 
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did not see any reason to suppose his various pronouncements 
on obligation were really contradictory at all. 
Collins suggests that "the most illuminating focus 
will be to observe the themes of genesis and system in their 
mutual transaction rather than in separation" (Collins, 
p.127). Here is where all the interpreters have been short-
sighted: each approaches the controversy exclusively from an 
"inside-out" perspective, that is, by trying to fathom 
Hobbes' intentions in isolation rather than in conjunction 
with the external element of any author's work--the audience 
being addressed. There is a mutual transaction in Hobbes 
between the character of the separate audiences he aims at 
reaching and his intentions at any particular time. Hobbes, 
as I will show in Chapter V, was accutely aware of his 
audience and, as he constantly reiterated, a writer who 
hopes to influence behavior must correctly assess the nature 
of his audience and use whatever language or method of 
argument that will best succeed in bringing that specific 
audience over to his side. This is the basic theme of the 
whole of Hobbes' Rhetoric and one that he reminds us of 
throughout his writings. The omission of any regard for 
Hobbes' perceptions of his readers lies at the heart of the 
claims of contradiction and mutual exclusion. 
My thesis is that Hobbes perceived that different 
arguments and methods of arguing were appropriate for the 
various segments of the intellectual community he was 
261 
addressing. His specific choice of language, meaning, and 
methods of arguing take the full context for form of life of 
the readers into account. Rather than taking an "inside-
out'' perspective, we need to take an "outside-in" point of 
view to see Hobbes' intentions correctly: each separate 
theory describes a separate framework of justification 
adopted by Hobbes in response to his perception of what had 
to be done to convince different segments of his audience of 
his main conclusion that each citizen has an almost absolute 
obligation to obey the sovereign. Hobbes' arguments are not 
contradictory any more than different uses of language are 
contradictory for Wittgenstein; they are separate arguments 
utilizing common terms in different contexts which preclude 
logical contradiction. 
The methodology Collins recommends consists of a re-
evaluation of an issue designed to change our way of seeing 
the issue itself (a process Wittgenstein repeatedly said he 
was engaged in--getting philosophers to see similarities and 
differences in new ways, and to see philosophical problems 
in new ways). The outline of the process is given by 
Collins as follows: 
An initial move is to arouse critical 
dissatisfaction with the preconceived schemas under 
which the sources are already organized. 
A second step in our historical self-education 
consists in becoming critical of the monistic usage we 
customarily employ in discussing the work of the 
individual philosopher. Thus we speak confidently about 
'the' philosophy of Leibniz and 'his' position on this 
or that issue in later seventeenth-century philosophy. 
Such references are at best ambiguous, and at worst are 
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a hinderance to engaging in historical study of a 
philosopher so mentioned. 
The illusory supposition is that the 
philosophical sources are inert objects, laid out there 
for our immediate intuition and wiating to be totally 
dominated by the aggressive reader. We can disabuse 
ourselves of this notion only by making the actual 
effort to work historically into the texts .... 
We must learn to comport ourselves toward the 
source men and their works as we would toward a company 
of critical inquirers, with whom we are in personal 
relationship. This rule of historical comportment can 
be followed without reducing historical study of texts 
to a psychologizing operation, a claim of special 
empathy, or an esoteric type of cognition. (Collins, 
pp.38-43) 
A successful re-interpretation will be one that survives the 
test of being read always within its context, being 
consistent with parallel passages within the author's works, 
and being true to the author's general statements about 
method and systematic connection, a test the traditional 
interpretations avoid or overlook in one way or another 
(Collins, p.45). 
My finished product, as noted, is not meant to be a 
"final solution" in the usual sense, but a proposal of a new 
way of seeing the old problems of Hobbes' theory of 
obligation. Collins recognizes such a limitation, too, to 
the nature of "final solutions" of historical problems, and 
his method presses us to see things differently while trying 
to do justice to an author's point of view: 
The creative historian tries out several 
imaginative approaches, varies the proportions of 
analysis and synthesis, and thus always presses toward 
those slightly altering and slightly more illuminating 
conceptions which keep his interpretation of the textual 
source futurally alive and incremental for historical 
understanding. (Collins, p.371) 
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And again: 
To follow a problem through its treatment by 
many thinkers--who may belong to quite different 
philosophical traditions and schools, national climates 
and time periods--is a way to see relationships and 
threads of meaning which would otherwise escape our 
notice. It also gives a functional basis, in the 
practice of historians of philosophy, for coming to 
recognize that modern philosophy is neither solipsistic 
nor loosely episodic in its foundations, but rather that 
it enjoys a real persistence and community of 
meanings .... Even where there is no strict 
interdependence based on genetic descent, there are 
determinate likenesses and differences available for 
comparison. (Collins, p.177) 
The very tone of the above passages is 
Wittgensteinian, but Collins, too, is sympthetic to the use 
of current, but perhaps unorthodox approaches to traditional 
problems that have led to an interpretive impasse, thus 
adding justification to my use of the Wittgensteinian 
context for my "re-visioning" of Hobbes. The unorthodox 
attempts are important as a way of breaking such impasses, 
as Collins notes: 
It is not entirely idle or impertinent, then, to 
ask whether a current methodology is able to make sense 
out of the classic modern texts. In this reversal of 
perspective, the interpreting mind tests a contemporary 
philosophy by the measure of its relevance for 
illuminating the abiding themes developed in the modern 
tradition. The direction of challenge is thus shifted 
from the questionable study of past theories to the 
questionable sufficiency of present ones, instancing 
once more the process of their becoming simultaneously 
problematic for the historically educated mind. 
(Collins, p.211) 
The next section will explicate the precise nature 
of the Wittgenstein perspective, while Chapter V is the 
application of the new perspective to the problem of the 
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"real" Hobbes and the conflicting interpretations of his 
theory of obligation. 
C. WITTGENSTEIN 
1. Introduction 
In the previous section the first element of a new 
interpretive framework from which to view Hobbes was 
outlined. In addition to stressing historical factors, 
Collins' methodology emphasizes new perspectives, new ways 
of seeing old philosophical problems, and the use of 
contemporary philosophical tools in the re-analysis of these 
problems. Where Collins' theory provides the historical 
elements, some aspects of the later Wittgenstein's work 
provide the necessary philosophical element for my own 
interpretive model. This combination is not arbitrary. The 
nature of the problem of obligation is such that the 
contemporary Hobbes scholar is faced with numerous competing 
theories and frameworks, each coming from a slightly 
different perspective, but employing various common terms in 
ways that lead to the interpretive stalemate described 
earlier. Part of the problem is historical and lends itself 
to an application of Collins' methods; part of the problem 
is linguistic/philosophical, arising from the conflict of 
Perspectives and the various different uses of common terms. 
265 
This is precisely the sort of problem Wittgenstein labels as 
peculiar to philosophy. Moreover, a Wittgensteinian model 
closely parallels Collins' in many ways. Finally, as I will 
show in Chapter V, Hobbes himself was keenly aware of 
history and of language in ways that are very similar to 
those of Collins and Wittgenstein, thus making the use of 
this combined approach here natural rather than arbitrary. 
The present section will concentrate on two tasks: 
to clarify 
methodology, 
one version of the later Wittgensteinian 
and to establish the compatibility of it with 
Collins' historical model. In respect to the second of 
these tasks, a number of common elements, beliefs, and 
attitudes have been noted in section B. Both Collins and 
the later Wittgenstein accept the fact that there is no one 
set way to look at philosophical problems. Both are 
critical of the monistic view that presupposes that only one 
view or method is correct for any given philosophical 
problem. Both accept, on the other hand, that conflict 
between views is normal and necessary to the doing of 
philosophy: and both acknowledge that the plurality of 
influences on any philosopher must be recognized and used in 
our attempts to understand him/her. 
There are a number of shared methodological factors 
as well. Both alter the old notion that there are final 
solutions in philosophy by stressing the continuing need for 
new ways of seeing the old problems, ways of shifting our 
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perspective to focus on the various elements of any given 
problem so as to fully describe the nature of the problem; 
and both regard the context or historical background out of 
which a philosopher wrote or a philosophical conflict arose 
as basic to correctly understanding the issues. The present 
section will outline other common elements in addition to 
these from the previous section, thereby strengthening the 
tie between Collins and Wittgenstein and justifying the 
combination of these methodologies in the proposed 
interpretation of Hobbes. 
The other goal of this section is to outline and 
clarify the specifics of the Wittgensteinian side of my 
methodology. I will clarify Wittgenstein's conception of 
philosophy and the nature of philosophical problems. There 
will be separate treatments of the concept of meaning and 
the importance of grammatical analysis. 
2. The Nature of Philosophical Problems 
and Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy 
For Wittgenstein most philosophical problems are not 
factual problems. 
problems of some 
Rather, they are linguistic, 
sort or the other, but 
conceptual 
most often 
misinterpretations of the forms or uses of language. 
they are not superficial because they are linguistic; 
" ... have the character of depth. They are 
But 
they 
deep 
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disquietudes; their roots are as deep as the forms of our 
1anguage and their significance is as great as the 
importance of our language" (PI, 111). Wittgenstein 
stresses, too, that it is the grammar of the language we use 
that accounts for many of philosophy's problems: 
A main source of our failure to understand is 
that we do not command a clear view of the use of our 
words.--Our grammar is lacking in this sort of 
perspecuity. A perspicuous representation produces just 
that understanding which consists in 'seeing connexions' 
(sic). Hence the importance of finding and inventing 
intermediate cases. 
The concept of a perspicuous representation is 
of fundamental significance for us. It earmarks the 
form of account we give, the way we look at things. (PI, 
122) 
Without clarity of view and perspicuity in our 
grammar, we lose sight of the nature of philosophical 
problems such that factual data and observations are 
useless--the problem will remain unsolved simply because 
what the problem's cause is remains hidden, obscured by our 
misuse of the language. The problem demands that the 
philosopher find the correct context or framework for the 
facts he already has, so they do not appear to conflict with 
one another and can be fit together into some kind of 
coherent whole. It is a matter of removing the cloud caused 
by limits in our grammar or our ways of using language; it 
is a matter of seeing through the cloud to the heart of the 
problem, not a matter of gathering new facts. It strikes me 
that this is exactly the problem in Hobbes scholarship. 
There are no new facts to be gathered. Hobbes is producing 
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no new texts. What is needed is some new way of re-
evaluating the texts that we have in light of the research 
and interpretation already existent. But it is in relation 
to these interpretations that we reached the stalemate. 
But for Wittgenstein this is also part 
of the nature of philosophical problems. The facts 
conflict; there are multitudes of interpretations that do 
not fit together coherently. What are we to do with all the 
data? What interpretation is the correct one? As 
Wittgenstein put it, the problem has the form: "I don't know 
my way about" (PI, 123). It is, as it were, a 'mental 
cramp' or a 'knot in our thinking' to be untied (Z, ,52). 
The problem of obligation in Hobbes has this 
character also, as a result of the various presuppositions 
made by interpreters about the nature of philosophical 
interpretation, the belief in monistic frameworks, and the 
inability to see the problem in a different light. It takes 
the form of deciding between competing interpretations, 
discarding the incorrect ones and retaining the correct one. 
But, as I said earlier, these preconceptions need to be 
circumvented; Wittgenstein might say we need to "battle 
against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of 
language" (PI, 109). We need to "show the fly the way out 
of the bottle" (PI, 309). I believe the form of the 
question, "Which is the correct interpretation of obligation 
in Hobbes?" or "What is Hobbes' true position?", has cramped 
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our view of the problem. The form of the question imposes a 
traditional, monistic framework onto any attempt to answer 
it, But, as Collins and Wittgenstein agree, there is no 
reason to suppose there is only one correct answer to a 
philosophical question of interpretation. 
Philosophical problems, then, are often puzzles, 
vexations, that defy easy solutions not because factual data 
is needed, but because the philosopher's vision is obscured. 
He recognizes that something is profoundly wrong, something 
is deeply unsatisfactory, and that something lies at the 
heart of the way one thinks about the problems. 
Wittgenstein's suggestion is that we must see the problem 
itself as somehow misconceived, as resting upon mistaken 
foundations, upon incorrect assumptions. The difficulty is 
that such errors are so deep, so basic, that we do not 
understand how to get at them--especially if we do not get 
outside the conceptual framework from within which the 
problem comes. We need new ways of looking, of seeing, of 
thinking about the problems. This is one of the major 
points of Collins' approach as well. 
Wittgenstein often calls these deep problems 
"grammatical problems", which arise because the depth of our 
grammar does not reach far enough to comprehend the depth of 
the problem itself. We are, grammatically, in over our 
heads. (The nature of the grammatical element is the topic 
of section v.) Because of the limitations of grammar, 
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philosophical problems must be treated with care: "In a 
certain sense one cannot take too much care in handling 
philosophical mistakes, they contain 
460). To handle such problems requires 
Binkley says, " ... one must pay more 
so much truth" (Z, 
that, as Timothy 
attention to the 
surfaces of things within their natural environs in order to 
observe what goes on. To be sure, one must see the depth of 
the landscape, but this depth is the simple reality of the 
many dimensions of the countryside, and not any hidden 
structure which constitutes the foundation of it all." 
(Binkley, p.158) 
three 
basic 
In dealing with Hobbes' theory of obligation, the 
groups of interpreters have 
terms: 'laws of nature', 
focused upon the same 
'God', 'science', 
'psychology', 'contract', 'obligation', and 'materialism'. 
These, and others, are common to all three views; but their 
definitions and emphasis are different. We are puzzled as 
to how Hobbes could have meant so many and seemingly 
contradictory things when he used these common terms 
himself. The puzzlement arises, again, out of a certain 
lack of grammatical refinement, out of a certain lack of 
attention to the contexts behind the surface of the terms 
being used. 
The 
primarily 
nature of such 
linguistic since 
problems turns out to be 
we are trying to interpret the 
meaning of Hobbes' terminology in order to explicate his 
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theory of obligation, and "It is only in a language that I 
can mean something by something ... For philosophical problems 
arise when language goes on holiday" (PI, 38). It is the 
confusion of surface and depth grammar that accounts for 
much philosophical perplexity, the trying to express by our 
use of words what should be embodied in a grammar. 
Wittgenstein describes what often happens in much the same 
way as I would describe how the current stalemate in 
interpretations arose as a result of the presuppositions of 
traditional history of philosophy: 
The fundamental fact here is that we lay down 
rules, a technique, for a game, and that then when we 
follow the rules, things do not turn out as we had 
assumed. That we are therefore as it were entangled in 
our own rules. 
This entanglement in our rules is what we want 
to understand (i.e. get a clear view of). (PI, 125) 
Often, too, another error occurs. This sort of 
error involves taking the rules we have prescribed for one 
specific framework and either misapplying them to another, 
or generalizing in such a way as to come to believe that our 
specific rules cover all issues, frameworks, or uses of 
language. To take an example from Hobbes' interpretation: 
why should we necessarily conclude that 'law of nature' 
means the same thing in a scientific context as it does in a 
religious one? Because Wittgenstein is so attuned to these 
sorts of errors and his solutions are geared to avoiding 
them, his methodology seems a valuable way of shedding light 
on the conflict. The point is that often we apply 
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grammatical rules out of their proper context due to the 
fact that the surface grammar appears similar in several 
contexts. Thus Hobbes used 'law of nature' in both 
contexts, i.e. scientific and religious; and the term 
appears the same on the surface. Because the deep 
structures of the grammar are dissimilar, we become ensnared 
in the trap of language and try to free ourselves by 
resorting to standard methods, i.e., 
conflict, at least one is wrong. 
if two theories 
Many philosophical 
problems have the same etiology as that of interpreting 
Hobbes' theory of obligation; it is not a unique error. 
Contributing to the tendency to err in this way is 
the current atmosphere and context of historical study. The 
philosopher today is bound by the rules of the past. He is 
doing historical research, and since there are traditional 
ways of doing this, with certain common presuppositions, he 
works inside their limits. The difficulty here, as 
elsehwere in philosophy, is dispossessing ourselves of these 
preconceptions. Binkley explains Wittgenstein's conception 
of the problem in these terms: 
Context is one of the key words for the 
Investigations, and it is the clue to many confusions. 
In some instances, we take a word or expression out of 
context and farme it as a picture of reality; then, 
after staring at this one picture for a long time we 
become possessed with a vertigo in which nothing can be 
seen clearly. Such an abstraction may go unnoticed but 
it is nevertheless stifling. (Binkley, p.123) 
The key to escaping this situation is to correctly 
perceive the context, the background, and style that we are 
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working within (that of the author, and of ourselves). But 
this is a difficult task for one so bound up in these 
practices. We need a depth of investigation that brings out 
the practices and traditions and shows us how to see and 
assimilate them since they are rarely reducible to simple 
formulae. It is this, too, that Collins urges us to do do 
when looking at historical figures. That is, we must 
perceive our own biases and perspectives, try to step 
outside them, and assimilate the contexts of the historical 
figure we are examining. The approach of Strauss and 
Oakeshott, especially, tries to do this with Hobbes, though 
not with complete success: their problem is that, to some 
extent, they are prescribing how we must look at Hobbes 
rather than describing what Hobbes himself said within its 
context. They both seem to see their analysis as a final 
solution to the question of obligation, and this is part of 
the error. 
For Collins and Wittgenstein this runs contrary to 
the nature of philosophy as descriptive. The nature of 
philosophical problems being as it is, Wittgenstein 
conceives of philosophy as descriptive: we describe the 
problem and its context/grammar to illuminate it, not 
'solve' it in any traditional sense. 
Here we come up against a remarkable and 
characteristic phenomenon in philosophical 
investigation: the difficulty--I might say--is not that 
of finding the solution but rather that of recognizing 
as the solution something that looks as if it were only 
a preliminary to it. 'We have already said everything.--
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Not anything that follows from this, no this itself is 
the solution!' 
This is connected, I believe, with our wrongly 
expecting an explanation, whereas the solution of the 
difficulty is a description, if we give it the right 
place in our considerations. If we dwell upon it, and 
do not try to get beyond it. 
The difficulty here is: to stop. (Z, 314) 
Elsewhere Wittgenstein puts it differently 
We are not interested in any empirical facts 
about language, considered as empirical facts. We are 
only concerned with the description of what happens and 
it is not the truth but the form of the description that 
interests us. What happens considered as a game. 
I am only describing language, not explaining 
it. 
For my purposes I could replace the sensation 
the word is said to express by the intonation and 
gestures with which the word is used. (PG, 30) 
The job of philosophy is descriptive: we must fully 
describe the contexts and uses of language and all the 
surrounding phenomena. Further, we must do this by altering 
the ways, the angles from which we view the confusion, not 
by imposing final solutions or prescribing 
interpretations. 
Once we fully grasp the nature of the 
definitive 
issue we are finished with the philosophical task, in so far 
as it is ever finished. This is why a Wittgensteinian 
solution may seem like only a preliminary to a solution--the 
second use of 'solution' is frought with the old traditional 
preconceptions that philosophy dictates the truth or finds 
the correct interpretation--while a Wittgensteinian solution 
is simply a redescription or way of getting the philosopher 
to see the problem anew, not a revelation or new truth--
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simply the "old truth" seen in a new way. Philosophy 
•1eaves everything as it was'; it does not declare this or 
that theory true, the others false, "Philosophy may in no 
way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the 
end only describe it. For it cannot give in any foundations 
either. It leaves eerything as it is" (PI, 124). 
Binkley describes Wittgenstein's view of traditional 
theories: 
Philosophers are like people with primitive 
prejudices or superstitions (PI, 110); and the 
appropriate response to them seems to be an enlightened 
return to innocence, or rather a return to an innocence 
now enlightened. Like savages, philosophers become 
caught up in their own superstitions and stilted ways of 
viewing things (which are nevertheless deeply revelatory 
of customs and natural history), and everything is 
interpreted in terms of their theories and schemes which 
are supposed to apply to reality a priori and thus make 
astute observation superfluous--at least with respect to 
certain issues. The superstitions are eliminated only 
at their origins, so the philosophers (who are also 
members of the civilized community) are taken back to 
the primative sources of their own customs and protocol 
as well as back to those of the civilized community at 
large. (Binkley, p.101) 
The job of philosophy is to "untie knots in our 
thinking; hence its result must be simple, but 
philosophizing has to be as complicated as the knots it 
unties" (Z, 
coincides 
452). Wittgenstein's philosophic method 
with his conception of philosophy--we must 
describe the origins of the problems, the preconceptions and 
confusions by means of describing the various frameworks, 
contexts, and conventions. We are not producing 'a real 
understanding for the first time', but clarifying the· 'use 
276 
of our language, the existing language' (PG, 72). The roots 
of philosophical problems lie in language, the way around 
them is to describe the language and the misuse that created 
I 
the problem. 
It is important not to misunderstand Wittgenstein 
here. The descriptive method is not a single way of doing 
philosophy. Description is not a set procedure done in the 
same way but applied to different tasks. Wittgenstein views 
the method as analogous to therapy in psychology. The word 
'therapy' covers a wide range of activities and addresses a 
wide range of illnesses to which it must be adapted 
according to the nature of the illness. Philosophy is like 
therapy in this and other ways: "There is not ~ 
philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like 
different therapies" (PI, 133). The choice of therapy is 
relative to the illness and the person suffering from it, 
but like therapy, the first step for the philosopher is to 
look for the source of the puzzlement (BB, p.59). "The 
philosopher's treatment of a question is like the treatment 
of an illness" (PI, 255). 
Thus, how we see philosophical problems will vary 
from case to case, though, overall, we seek to describe the 
source of the confusion so as to set it out clearly in view, 
which is quite unlike using~ definite method to prescribe a 
definite solution. As Wittgenstein carefully explains: 
But some 
philosophy could 
of the greatest achievements in 
only be compared with taking up some 
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books which seemed to belong together, and putting them 
on different shelves; nothing more being final about 
their positions than that they no longer lie side by 
side. The onlooker who doesn't know the difficulty of 
the task might well think insuch a case that nothing at 
all had been achieved.--The difficulty in philosophy is 
to say no more than we know. E.g., to see that when we 
have put two books together in their right order we have 
not thereby put them into their final places. (BB, pp. 
44-45) 
Wittgenstein's method for achieving such reordering 
of our thinking is not the tight linguistic analysis of his 
earlier period, but an analysis based on uncovering the 
underlying rules that govern linguistic usages. "We are 
interested in a language as procedure according to explicit 
rules, because philosophical problems are misunderstandings 
which must be removed by clarification of the rules 
according to which we are inclined to use words" (PG, 32). 
We are seeking an understanding of exactly what has gone 
wrong with our use of the language and our application of 
the rules of a particular context or linguistic framework. 
"(The) solution of the problem lies in discovering how and 
why the logic of the language has been misunderstood" 
(Hartnack, p.66). We must find the solution in a deeper 
understanding of the real function of the words and 
sentences involved in the dispute or problem by a close 
analysis of the context in which they actually occur. 
Since the ways we use words are so numerous and 
various, there is no one set method for uncovering the 
hidden rules and functions of every sentence or term in a 
Particular context. Wittgenstein's own style of writing 
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illustrates a number of different approaches to the analysis 
of language. "There is", 
in the Investigations 
as K.T. 
which we 
Fann explains, "nothing 
should ordinarily call 
reasoning, argument, or proof. It is a book of reminders. 
Wittgenstein draws our attentionto some very obvious facts 
which we forget while philosophizing" (Fann, p.107). Like 
different therapies, Wittgenstein employs imagining or 
inventing LGs as objects of comparison, finding and making 
up intermediate cases, reminding us that certain questions 
giving rules of thumb, and 
nature of a (particular linguistic 
its context, and its place in 
cannot arise, 
investigating 
framework) by 
joking, 
the full 
exposing 
aim of language. The his diverse 
enlightenment as to the problem or usages 
investigation does not try to find the real, 
techniques 
involved: 
is 
"Our 
of words; though we do often give words exact 
exact meaning 
meanings in 
the course of our investigation" (Z, 467). 
It is this sort of re-visioning that is needed to 
clarify the conflict between interpretations of Hobbes' 
theory. It may seem obvious on first glance that only one 
theory can be correct, but by adopting a Wittgensteinian 
perspective I hope to show that this is not the case and 
that Hobbes may have had something in mind which allows 
multiple interpretations to exist. 
3. Joining Wittgenstein and Collins 
Before 
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clarifying the major elements of 
Wittgenstein's analysis of language, as they are relevant to 
the present project, it seems appropriate to justify the 
combination of Wittgenstein's method with Collins'. The 
combination is by no means arbitrary and is justified by 
noting the similarities between Wittgenstein's conception of 
philosophy and Collins' characterization of the method for 
interpreting modern philosophy historically. The common 
elements include the emphasis both authors place on context-
-being aware of the setting of the original work and the 
works of the interpreters as part of an ongoing or differing 
cultural milieu, the awareness that history and biography 
play a role in all philosophical statements, and the stress 
on the importance of seeing old problems in new ways. All 
of this adds up to the fact that what Collins calls 
historical interpretation essentially fits what Wittgenstein 
includes in grammatical investigation. 
Wittgenstein approached of philosophy and 
philosophizing as a natural phenomenon, "made intelligible 
by showing how they arise from human behaviour anchored in 
its material, biological, and cultural setting" (Bloor, 
p.2). As such, it is a living, changing, variable process 
rather than a fixed, totally determinate "thing". 
Philosophical theories are not chiseled in stone, waiting to 
be uncovered in their original and final form; theories are 
living and changing because they are human products. There 
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is no way to grab hold, in a particular interpretation, of 
~ correct representation of a philosopher's beliefs; 
beliefs are fluid, too. This is Collins' view as well. 
Historical figures 
finally 
and 
known 
their works cannot be labeled as 
fully and 
definitive interpretation 
philosophy aimed at. The 
or explicated; they 
that traditional 
new historian must 
defy 
history 
avoid 
the 
of 
the 
temptation to freeze a theory and declare the search for the 
author's meaning done. 
How a thing divides up, what its components are, how 
we are to understand it, and what we are to do with it are 
not determined uniquely by one account; so one account is 
never the only correct one. Each separate account fills a 
different purpose, a different role in the life of the 
author, his times, and his purposes; each is better for some 
purpose andprobably less so for another. We should not 
stereotype a single perspective as the only way to look at a 
theory, nor stereotype a theory by restricting our view of 
it to one interpretive framework. Yet this is the tendency 
of philosophy say Wittgenstein and Collins. The philosopher 
for Wittgenstein, and the historian of philosophy for 
Collins, have to avoid falling into some standarized way of 
seeing the problems, be they historical or not. 
The solution is to "try out" different perspectives, 
to invent new ways of seeing the old theories, to "fiddle" 
With what the modern interpreters such as Taylor, Strauss, 
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warrender, etc., have done with the traditional approaches 
to Hobbes'theory of obligation. Wittgenstein stresses this 
flexibility continuously when speaking of language and 
philosophy: 
The scrutiny of the grammar of a word weakens 
the position of certain fixed standards of our 
expression which had prevented us from seeing facts with 
unbiassed eyes. Our investigation tried to remove this 
bias, which forces us to think that the facts must 
conform to certain pictures enbedded in our language 
(BB, p.43). 
And again, 
Language is a labyrinth of paths. You approach 
from one side and know your way about; you approach the 
same place from another side and no longer know your way 
about (PI, 203). 
But what men consider reasonable or unreasonable 
alters. At certain periods men find reasonable what at 
other periods they found unreasonable. And vice verse 
(OC, 336). 
Very much like Wittgenstein, Collins stresses the 
use of multiple interpretations and the breaking of the hold 
of the stereotypical or standard views of a historical 
figure's works. In particular, this seems absolutely 
necessary when confronted with the maze of interpretations 
of Hobbes and the standard approach which says only one can 
be correct, the one Hobbes intended. Once we buy into the 
monistic thesis we are forced to view the problem of 
obligation in the stereotyped way. To avoid this sort of 
error Collins and Wittgenstein recommend rearranging and re-
evaluating the perspective we have and the various elements 
of the problem itself (I mean here the existent versions or 
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interpretations). Wittgenstein's point, Binkley says, is 
that: 
The two key concepts here are 'arrangement' and 
•connection'. Philosophical descriptions, like 
aesthetic descriptions, show us different arrangements 
of what is before us in order to point out connections 
which we may have missed because of certain stereotyped 
ways of looking. We can thereby 'find ourselves' in the 
landscape by getting in touch with the surroundings 
through more perspicuous ways of seeing, i.e. through 
recognition of revelatory connections between concepts 
and between instances of a single concept. (Binkley, 
p.54) 
Collins' re-visioning of problems is almost exactly the same 
procedure; and I believe Collins would adhere to 
Wittgenstein's recommendation that: "We shall also try to 
construct new notations, in order to break the spell of 
those which we are accustomed to" (BB, p.23). Rather than 
notations, of course, in the present use we must construct 
new interpretive frameworks from which to view Hobbes' 
theory and the accepted interpretations of it. 
The imagintive construction of new points of view or 
interpretations is not, for either Collins or Wittgenstein, 
to be done haphazardly, of course; it must keep the end in 
mind--which is an enlightening of the old problems. But the 
necessity for such altered points of view remains so long as 
the problem remains from the existing point of view. We 
must remain open to the use of this technique so as to avoid 
stereotyping and avoid becoming locked into a stalemate, as 
is presently the case with Hobbes. We must, do the re-
visioning and the imagining before we write it off or call 
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it unintelligible; we must take the new perspective to see 
what can be gained. Wittgenstein says: 
I am not saying: if such-and-such facts of 
nature were different people would have different 
concepts (in the sense of a hypothesis). But: if anyone 
believes that certain concepts are absolutely the 
correct ones, and that having different ones would mean 
not realizing something that we realize--then let him 
imagine certain very general facts of nature to be 
different from what we are used to, and the formation of 
concepts different from the usual ones will become 
intelligible to him (PI, p.230). 
We have to limit ourselves, however, to the facts 
before us, or to the author's works and intentions. That 
is, we should not create "new facts" or new readings out of 
whole cloth, since this is simply to fit the case to our 
prejudices, and this is precisely what Collins and 
Wittgenstein are trying to avoid here. We have to look at 
what is going on, describe it, not prescribe how to see it. 
That is, we are going to test the hypothesis that, given the 
belief that each interprtation is textually well supported, 
the three views might all be correct. The question is 
whether Hobbes' writings can abide such a revision. 
These are the similarities that justify the use of 
Collins and Wittgenstein together. To use a Wittgensteinian 
analysis with Collins' historical methods seems natural, and 
given the particular nature of the issue itself, necessary. 
Finally, it should be noted that such a re-analysis 
will not constitute a final solution for either Collins or 
Wittgenstein. Historians, Collins advises, should resist 
the temptation to see what they do as aiming at such an 
284 
absolute end. This, too, fits well with what we have seen 
of Wittgenstein's analysis: we provide reminders, devices, 
aids to the philosopher rather than a system of rules that 
can be followed mechanically to the final, definitive 
conclusion. 
4, Wittgenstein on Meaning in Context 
For Wittgenstein, words, propositions, and concepts 
have meaning only within a language-game or linguistic 
framework; a starting point leads to a general rule for 
doing philosophy: "to understand a concept, a word, put the 
word in its linguistic context and whole utterance in its 
social context and then describe, without preconceptions, 
what you find; remembering that each word, each utterance, 
may figure in many contexts" (Strawson, p.62). 
Understanding a word or concept involves observing the role 
of the word or concept in the various language games or 
frameworks in which it functions, the behavior surrounding 
its use, and the reactions speakers and hearers have to its 
use. We must take the whole of the context into account; we 
must see the role the word or concept plays in the actual 
usage of the language; and we must be careful to avoid 
focusing on just a specific context or phrase rather than 
the whole language-game or framework since this tends to 
obscure our understanding of the word (BB, p.108). 
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Seeing how a term functions in its linguistic 
context includes a comparison of the word's functions in 
different contexts, different frameworks, different 
language-games, so as to observe the similarities and 
dissimilarities, its various rules and functions in this or 
that framework i.e., its various meanings: 
It is easy, on the other hand, to point our 
experiences characteristic of remembering, expecting, 
etc., accompanying the images and further differences in 
the immediate or more remote surrounding of them. Thus 
we certainly say different things in the different 
cases, e.g., 'I remember his coming into my room', 'I 
expect his coming intomy room', 'I imagine his coming 
into my room' .--"But surely this can't be all the 
difference there is!" It isn't all: There are three 
different games played with these three words 
surrounding these statements (BB, p.183). 
Understanding is facilitated by this process of 
observing the various contexts, social backgrounds, etc. 
"'Understanding' is not the name of a single process 
accompanying reading or hearing, but of more or less 
interrelated processes against a background, or in a 
contest, of facts of a particular kind, viz. the actual use 
of a learnt language or languages" (PG, 35). 
This point is consistent with Collins' historical 
method as well. Where Collins stresses interpreting modern 
philosophy within the whole context of the time it is 
written, 
emphasizes 
general. 
both social and philosophical, Wittgenstein 
the identical factors for language use in 
Both Collins and Wittgenstein, also rely on 
actually looking and seeing how terms function, what the 
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author/speaker intends, and the avoiding of preconceived 
explanatory frameworks. Taken together the two methods tell 
us to be aware not only of the author's framework but our 
own, as interpreters; the reader's way of seeing is tied to 
his/her time, social background, and philosophical 
perspective. Wittgenstein, especially, uses this as an 
important factor to keep in mind when examining a 
philosophical concept (like 'obligation'): 
Concepts with fixed limits would 
uniformity of behaviour. But where I 
someone else is uncertain. And that is 
nature. (Z, 374) 
demand a 
am certain, 
a fact of 
These are the fixed rails along which all our 
thinking runs, and so our judgment and action goes 
according to them too. (Z, 375) 
In Chapter VI will argue that Hobbes held a similar 
belief in that he cautions anyone addressing an audience to 
take the perspective and contextual background of the 
audience into account. In his Rhetoric Hobbes states very 
clearly that to convince someone of your position requires 
tailoring your arguments to the temper and perspective of 
that person. This warning appears at various places 
throughout Hobbes' other works as well. For this reason, 
the methodology of Collins and Wittgenstein seems ideal for 
investigating the controversy surrounding Hobbes'intended 
theory of obligation. As Wittgenstein recommends, we have 
to see how Hobbes uses the key terms of his theory of 
obligation against the full background, which I believe 
includes his perceptions of his audience: 
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The sign (the sentence) gets its significance 
from the system of signs, from the language to which it 
belongs. Roughly: understanding a sentence means 
understanding a language. 
As part of the system of language, one may say, 
the sentence has life. (BB, p.5) 
We must carefully observe how someone actually uses 
terms against the full background and pay close attention to 
very small differences if we wish to correctly grasp the 
meaning of the terms: 
A meaning of a word is a kind of employment of 
it. For it is what we can learn when the word is 
incorporated into our language. (OC, 61) 
If we imagine facts otherwise than as they are, 
certain language-games lose some of their importance, 
while others become important. And in this way there is 
an alteration--a gradual one--in the use of the 
vocabulary of a language. (OC, 63) 
Meaning is not just a matter of linguistics and 
contexts per se, it is an expression of shared experiences, 
of adopting conventions or rules, and a matter of training. 
Language has meaning not in isolation or privately, but as 
part of a complicated network oif behavior, of practices 
(BB, p.69). For a word or phrase to belong to a common 
language, it is necessary "that the occasions on which it is 
right to apply it should provide shared experiences of a 
certain kind, the existence of which is connected with the 
rightness of applying the word" (Strawson, p.63). The 
shared experiences evolve into regular practices, uses, 
customs, or institutions which presuppose in turn a society 
or form of life (PI, 199). Further, the practices are 
transmitted by means of rules that govern word usage and 
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criteria for correctly following the rules. Removing the 
background of the practice or custom removes the rules as 
well. Since language-games are rule governed, to understand 
any language-game requires understanding its rules and how 
they are imbedded in their social context. 
What we are doing is simply observing human 
behavior, human agreement to observe certain practices (Z, 
428, 430). The agreement on rules is transmitted through 
training; it is not enough to know the rules, one must be 
trained in the conventions that constitute correctly and 
incorrectly following the rules. We learn through repeated 
trial and error within the family of users of a language or 
language-game; it is not something we do alone, or once, and 
then say we have mastered it (PI, 199, 202; BB, p.96). The 
process, again, is not arbitrary; the conventions taught 
cannot be just any set of conventions if language is to 
communicate: they must be grounded on 'the uniformities of 
nature' (PI, 240). 
5. Wittgenstein on Grammar and Context 
Meaning (of words, phrases, etc.) within a context 
or linguistic framework is tied to the rules governing the 
game, the grammatical rules in Wittgenstein's sense of the 
term. For example, Wittgenstein, speaking of the various 
uses of the term 'now', says: "And in this case the word 
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•now' means: 'in this calculus' or 'if the words are used 
according to these grammatical rules"' (PG, 71). The rules 
govern the uses of the terms in a particular context, and 
the different uses point to different meanings or the terms. 
aow a term is used depends upon the context. 
Therefore the expression 'The picture hasn't 
changed' is used in a different way when we talk of a 
material picture on the other hand, and of a mental one 
on the other. Just as the statement 'These ticks follow 
at equal intervals' has got one grammar if the ticks are 
ticks of a pendulum and the criterion for their 
regularity is the result of measurements which we have 
made on our apparatus, and another grammar if the ticks 
are ticks which we imagine. (BB, p.171) 
It is because of this that we must pay careful 
attention to the distinction between surface and depth 
grammars: 
In the use of words one might distinguish 
'surface grammar' from 'depth grammar'. What 
immediately impresses itself upon us about the use of a 
word is the way it is used in the construction of the 
sentence, the part of its use--one might say--that can 
be taken in by the ear.--And now compare the depth 
grammar, say of the word 'to mean', with what its 
surface grammar would lead us to suspect. No wonder we 
find it difficult to know our way about. (PI, 664) 
Imagine someone pointing to his cheek with an 
expression of pain and saying 'abracadabra!'--We ask 
"What do you mean?' And he answers, "I meant 
toothache'.--You at once think to yourself: How can one 
'mean toothache' by that word? Or what did it~ to 
~ pain by that word? And yet, in a different 
context, you would have asserted that the mental 
activity of meaning such-and-such was just what was most 
important inusing language. 
But--can't I say 'By abracadabra' I mean 
toothache'? Of course I can; but this is a definition; 
not a description of what goes on in me when I utter the 
word. (PI, 665) 
We must not be misled by the surface grammar of a 
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term's use--it may show up as a noun or subject in two very 
different sentences and we may be tempted, since it plays 
the same role in the structure of the sentences, to conclude 
that it means the same thing (after all, it fills the same 
role in each sentence). But this would be an error if the 
close analysis of the term's use disclosed a very different 
depth grammar at work, as is the case with Wittgenstein's 
example in the previous citation (PI, 665). Part of the 
depth grammar is the context: in the first use of 
'abracadabra' the 
context is 
background 
that of 
we are 
term fails 
normal, 
puzzled 
to express pain because the 
everyday use. Against this 
'toothache' or 'mean pain'. 
as to how it can express 
In the second case alluded to, 
to mean 'toothache' all we need is a redefinition specifying 
the new meaning; the non-normal context is drawn around the 
term by the definition, while it is obvious that depth 
grammar is that of an entirely different context. In both 
cases, however, notice that the term's surface grammar would 
be the same: it appears in the same places in the sentences, 
appears to be a noun, etc. Yet it fails to be meaningful 
before the redefinition and adjustment of the depth grammar 
as a result of the new context are explained. 
It is a certain lack of attention to the differences 
between the surface and depth grammars of the key terms and 
Phrases in Hobbes that I believe causes a large part of the 
Problem of interpretation. Terms such as 'natural law', 
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•natural right', and 'contract' appear to occupy the same 
roles in the sentences across very different contexts within 
Hobbes' body of works. The various interpreters have taken 
the terms, thus, to mean the same thing in each context: if 
•natural law' means 'piece of advice' in a certain context, 
and appears to fulfill the same syntactical role and to be 
used for the same purposes, the natural conclusion would 
seem to be that it must mean 'piece of advice' in the second 
instance as well. But if the context has radically altered, 
say from the scientific materialistic context to a moral 
context, the error would be that of mistaking the surface 
grammar of the sentences for the depth grammar of the entire 
framework. 
For Wittgenstein, then, there is a relativity or 
"arbitrariness" to grammar that does not affect other bodies 
of rules in the same ways: 
Why don't I call cookery rules arbitrary, and 
why am I tempted to call the rules of grammar arbitrary? 
Because 'cookery' is defined by its end, whereas 
'speaking' is not. That is why the use of language is 
in a certain sense autonomous, as cooking and washing 
are not. You cook badly if you are guided in your 
cooking by rules other than the right ones; but if you 
follow other rules than those of chess you are playing 
another aame [Note: Wittgenstein often likened the 
playing of LGs to the playing of chess] if you follow 
grammatical rules other than such-and-such ones, that 
does not mean you say something wrong, no, you are 
speaking of something else. {Z, 320) 
It is not as if we set up a grammatical system first 
Which determined the uses and purposes of language; to set 
up the rules in this way necessarily presupposes a language 
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we can use to reach the agreement, and this language will 
have to have its grammatical system antecedently. Seeing 
this, we see that we have merely pushed the investigation 
back a step, and we may fall into an infinite regress. At 
some point, we just have a language whose grammar we can 
describe and then, by comparison, go on to construct new 
frameworks or language-games and accompanying grammars in 
contrast to it. It is against the background of ordinary 
language that grammar is recognized and new frameworks 
constructed to fit different purposes which require 
different grammatical systems (depth grammars). 
I want to say: It is primarily the apparatus of 
our ordinary language, of our word-language, that we 
call language; and then other things by analogy or 
comparabililty by this. (PI, 494) 
Grammar does not tell us how language must be 
constructed in order to fulfill its purpose, in order to 
have such-and-such an effect on human beings. It only 
describes and in no way explains the use of signs. (PI, 
496) 
The rules of grammar may be called 'arbitrary', 
if that is to mean that the aim of the grammar is 
nothing but that of the language. 
If someone says 'If our language had not this 
grammar, it could not express these facts'--it should be 
asked what 'could' means here. (PI, 497) 
Grammatical factors (and investigations) are a 
matter, then, of pragmatic interests for Wittgenstein. A 
grammatical analysis is a pragmatic investigation of 
linguistic functions. As Fann describes this sort of 
analysis, it is a drawing of a boundary of sense around the 
criteria of 'use', 'purpose', 'employment' and the like 
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(Fann, 
theory 
p . 91 ) . What is 
of obligation is 
needed when considering Hobbes' 
to set just such boundaries. 
Hobbes' use of the various key terms, such as 'natural law', 
•natural right', or 'obligation', vary from framework to 
framework. Our task is to carefully draw the boundaries 
around the different frameworks based on the awareness of 
Hobbes' intentions to address different audiences and how 
his use of such key terms differs accordingly. 
What seems to me to be needed to make sense of the 
Hobbes stalemate is a better 
frameworks of Hobbes' account of 
argument that they were all 
These are the topics of Chapter V. 
understanding of the three 
obligation, including an 
intended by Hobbes. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE PROPOSED SOLUTION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The thesis that I will defend is reconciliatory: it 
is that all three of the major interpretations of Hobbes' 
theory of obligation are contained in his writings, and that 
they co-exist without contradiction, inconsistency, or 
conflict as separate frameworks of justification. Further, 
I will argue that this thesis is consistent with Hobbes' 
intentions and the general aim of his political philosophy. 
More specifically, I wish to argue that the three 
interpretations represent different approaches by Hobbes to 
the same final goal--to convince his fellow citizens that 
they should seek peace and that the most effective guarantee 
of a permanent peace is a strong sovereign to whom the 
people own almost absolute obedience. The three frameworks 
are Hobbes' attempts to reach different segments of his 
general audience by means of arguments or demonstrations 
framed in the language best able to generate their assent to 
his basic conclusions. 
What I do not wish to argue is important to note, 
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too. First, I do not wish to argue that Hobbes' arguments 
are successful, either in the sense of having actually 
convinced his audience or in the sense of being 
philosophically sound. History shows us that there was no 
general rush to embrace Hobbes' conclusions nor to put them 
into practice, and philosophically, there exist numerous 
serious problems with the arguments themselves. All I am 
trying to establish is that separate theories of obligation 
do co-exist in Hobbes' writings and that this was 
intentional on his part. Whether the arguments of the 
theories are successful or not is outside the scope of this 
dissertation. Second, in light of the previous disclaimer, 
it should be obvious that I do not wish to argue the 
comparative merits of each interpretation or sub-
interpretation; nor do I wish to draw any conclusions about 
whether one or the other of the interpretations is superior, 
should have been seen to be by Hobbes, and so should have 
been developed in full detail while the others were dropped. 
It may be the case that one or another of the three theories 
is superior to the rest in its philosophical power or its 
power to convince, and that Hobbes erred in not recognizing 
this. But this is a separate question entirely. All I am 
trying to show is that Hobbes advanced three separate 
theories, each designed to reach different audiences, and 
that they are able to co-exist without contradiction once we 
see them from an appropriate perspective. I am not claiming 
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that this is the only thing Hobbes was doing, but that it 
was this aspect of what he was doing that led him to the 
formulation of the three frameworks in question. Finally, 
and most obviously, I do not wish to argue that there is any 
~ correct way to interpret Hobbes' theory of obligation. 
I do not even wish to maintain that my thesis is a final 
solution to the interpretive problem. I only hope to 
stimulate a re-analysis of the various theories of 
obligation, and the theoretical stalemate itself as it 
exists in Hobbes scholarship, by positing a novel approach 
that offers a new way of seeing both Hobbes himself and the 
interpretations. This aim is consistent with the 
Collins/Wittgensteinian method that I have adopted. 
My argument, then, is (1) that strong textual and 
historical evidence exists for each of the three major 
interpretations and (2) that this makes it plausible to 
suggest that we adopt the perspective held by Collins and 
Wittgenstein that allows multiple interpretations and (3) 
that the historical and textual evidence supports our new 
point of view. From this perspective we will recognize 
three frameworks of justification falling into two basic 
categories in Hobbes' works. Broadly speaking, we have a 
mechanistic framework and two varieties of moral frameworks: 
the traditional interpretation being mechanistic, while one 
moral perspective focuses on deontological or natural law 
theory (Taylor, Warrender, and Hood), and the other focuses 
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on individual rights (Strauss and Oakeshott), that is, 
roughly a duty-oriented approach to morality as contrasted 
with a rights-oriented approach. 
That three divergent theories can co-exist in the 
same author's works without being contradictory is explained 
once we see them as manifesting different contexts or 
frameworks of justification and recall the Wittgensteinian 
description of such frameworks. The compatible co-existence 
of the three theories is allowed by the belief that, as 
separate frameworks, they are governed by separate sets of 
logical/grammatical rules. They would be contradictory only 
if governed by the same set of rules; since Wittgenstein 
cautions us against judging one framework by the rules of 
another, or one LG's by those of another, it is 
inappropriate to say that our separate frameworks contradict 
each other or are inconsistent. They are neither 
contradictory nor non-contradictory, consistent nor 
inconsistent. Contradictoriness is a function of statements 
within the same context or framework for Wittgenstein; it is 
governed by the logical-grammatical rules of that context. 
Or, to put it differently, contradictions only occur within 
a single context, not across numerous contexts. For 
example, it would be 
statements contradict 
context and logic of 
an error to claim that theological 
scientific statements since the 
theology is different from that of 
science; the issue of contradictoriness never arises if we 
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see this from the Wittgensteinian perspective. To argue 
that the three frameworks in Hobbes are contradictory (or 
inconsistent) would require seeing them as a part of one, 
unitary, larger context--in effect, to adopt the monistic 
framework that has created the stalemate to begin with and 
that is precisely what I am arguing against. 
The evidence that I will offer for my thesis is both 
historical and textual. The textual evidence falls into two 
categories: that which establishes and describes the 
structures of the three frameworks, and that which shows 
that Hobbes' intentions were to use three separate lines or 
argument geared to three different audiences in order to 
convince them to accept his conclusions. The historical 
aspects of my arguments overlap with these since part of the 
evidence will come from the primary texts and part will come 
from more general sources and relate to the surrounding 
circumstances and conditions which could reasonably be said 
to have influenced Hobbes. Both bodies of historical 
evidence, however, serve to establish Hobbes' intentions and 
make plausible the claim that he had a particular aim in 
mind requiring 
(constituting 
different, audience-relative, approaches 
three frameworks of justification). Taken 
together, the evidence strongly suggests that Hobbes' goal 
is to convince his audience.of the value of peace and the 
need for rather stringest obligations to the State to ensure 
peace, and that his arguments are suasive in nature (as well 
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as being philosophical) and would be guided by his 
perception of rhetorical or 
persuasion, which dictate 
pragmatically to best reach each 
"hortatory" methods of 
tailoring one's arguments 
particular audience. The 
conclusion would then be that we must recognize that Hobbes' 
overall framework is largely governed by rhetorical concerns 
and his philosophical arguments are constructed relative to 
his need to address different audiences using different LGs 
of justification. Hobbes' conclusion is the same regardless 
of the justification, however; it is the meaning of his 
terminology and particular linguistic framework that varies. 
We must reformulate our understanding of Hobbes' theory of 
obligation in light of this re-visioning of Hobbes' 
intentions and methods. 
The steps in my argument will follow from the 
requirements of the Collins/Wittgensteinian methodology 
previously outlined. I will begin by describing various 
important aspects of the general historical setting of 
Hobbes' time to establish the larger context of his work. 
Roughly, we will see how the historical contingencies 
explain Hobbes' motives behind both his general aims and his 
use of separate frameworks, while the overall analysis will 
show us the source of, nature of, and solution to the 
interpretive dispute. 
I will then demonstrate that my view of Hobbes 
remains true to what is known of Hobbes' character, 
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intentions, and methods. This requires seeing his aim to be 
to convince the general English public of his conclusions, 
as well as to establish them philosophically. To this end I 
will examine the rhetorical elements of his style to show 
that each framework of justification was a response to the 
conventions and perspective of a particular audience. Here 
I will concentrate on the Rhetoric and other comments Hobbes 
makes as to the language and styles of arguments, including 
a brief demonstration that even the scientific method 
contains strongly rhetorical eleme~ts. 
argue that the mechanistic framework is 
Essentially, 
directed at 
I will 
those 
learned in the language and methods of the new science, that 
the natural law/moral framework is aimed at the 
scholastically minded and at the Christian community, and 
that the individual rights framework is aimed at those who 
embrace the new individualism of the time, or those who 
might be called 'legalistically' minded. 
Finally, I will conclude by summarizing how my 
proposal preserves the various interpretations while 
avoiding the pitfalls of contradiction, inconsistency, and 
of questioning Hobbes' abilities or those of the authors of 
each interpretation. I will refer here to the ten questions 
Oakeshott says must be answered by any interpretation of 
Hobbes' theory of obligation (see Chapter III, B). 
B. HISTORICAL ATMOSHPERE 
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1. The Historical Period of Hobbes' Life 
Basil Willey, in his book, The Seventeenth Century 
Background, joins a writer's work to the climate of the time 
the writer lives: 
What we have to look out for, in reading the 
philosophers of Western Europe, is the emotional or 
social determinant which makes their work what it is, 
and this is usually implicit rather than explicit. As I 
have attempted to suggest above, what will seem 'true' 
or 'explanatory' to anyage or individual is what 
satisfies current demands and interests. What has this 
writer most urgently demanded from life? is the question 
we must constantly ask ourselves. The original impulse, 
towards, say 'materialism', or 'idealism', is usually 
something sublogical; not, that is, a 'conviction' 
resulting from an intellectual process, but a quite 
simple set of the whole being towards a particular way 
of life. (Willey, pp.93-94) 
That this is true of Hobbes will be made obvious, since 
beyond others of his day Hobbes absorbed and was affected by 
the cultural and political atmosphere and made full use of 
the most modern methods to analyze it and to justify his 
opinions about it. In fact, Hobbes was more often than not 
explicit about the significant impact current events had on 
him and on his theories. To fully comprehend the motives 
behind Hobbes' theory of obligation and his method of 
presenting its conclusions, we need to understand something 
of the major historical events that affected his perceptions 
of philosophy and politics. 
A complete historical sketch of Hobbes' time is 
unfeasible here, but certain significant events and ideas of 
overriding importance must be outlined if we are to place 
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Hobbes' character and theory into proper perspective. 
Immediately we must be struck by the pervasive chaos and 
hostility that characterize the period immediately 
preceeding and including Hobbes' life. The period spanning 
the years 1520-1660 has been called the age of the Wars of 
Religion, though dynastic wars were no less frequent or 
brutal. In conjunction with the continual warfare there 
were many experiments in governmental restructuring. In 
England alone at least four different forms of government 
came and went in one forty-year period during Hobbes' life; 
and the general intellectual and cultural climate underwent 
equally numerous changes, though of a more positive and 
progressive character. Of this Ross, Schneider, and Waldman 
say 
During Hobbes' life the theories of divine 
right,of feudal birthrights, and of hereditary 
sovereignty were becoming antiquated. With the rapid 
rise of commercial capital and power, the ideas of the 
landed aristocracy appeared artificial to the 
bourgeoisie. Status was giving way to contract; one's 
fixed positionin society was being replaced by agreement 
and exchange of goods and services. The quarrels of 
rival lords were being subordinated to international 
rivalry. Within the churches there was an increasing 
emphasis among congregations and parishes on 
'covenants', both 'under God' and in the communion of 
saints. (Ross, Schneider, and Waldman, p.4) 
The spirit of the age, too, was moving away from the 
comforting spiritual institutions of the past. There was a 
general abandoning of strict adherence to all the beliefs of 
the medieval church and its other-worldly asceticism in 
favor of the more materialistic concerns of mechanical 
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science, business, and the accumulation of wealth (Ferguson, 
p.374). The concerns of this world were taking precedence 
over the concerns of the spiritual realm in the minds of the 
intellectuals and general population. This transition was 
made almost a necessity by the turmoil of the day and the 
destruction that impinged on the lives of almost every 
member of European society: to ignore the material world was 
becoming increasingly difficult. The effect on the average 
person is apparent in the description given by Rubin 
Gotesky: 
Hobbes's description of himself as a child of 
fear applies just as aptly to his contemporaries. They, 
too, were children of fear, for they lived in the shadow 
of crumbling walls, in the midst of burning fields set 
ablaze by advancing armies or bands of brigands. They 
knew hunger, thirst, and famine. They saw the 
demolition of great cities, the devastation of entire 
countrysides, and the massacre of hundreds of thousands 
of burghers, artisans, peasants, women, and children. 
Their fathers had seen the destruction of a prosperous 
Germany, the crippling of France, the impoverishment of 
Italy, the partial ruination of England. They 
themselves bore upon their backs the frightful 
consequences of the Thirty Years' War in Germany and the 
two civil wars in England. During the period from 1525 
to 1676 ... during a period ... which encompasses 
practically the entire life of Hobbes and the sixty-
three years before his birth--more than eighty major 
wars were fought, not counting the countless minor 
rebellions and battles between feudal lords, cities, and 
towns. The striking fact about these wars is this: most 
of them are civil wars. (Gotesky, p.405) 
We should not, however, conclude that every aspect 
of life in Hobbes' day was a matter of nothing but staying 
alive in the midst of the rubble. The humanist movement 
burgeoned during the period prior to Hobbes' birth, with its 
emphasis on the human being and the study of and literal re-
306 
interpretation of the Bible (Ferguson, p.376). This also 
lessened the interest in the dogma and the ritualistic 
aspects of medeival society. This is not to say there was a 
total abandonment of the concern with salvation or morality. 
In fact, these topics were receiving the attention of large 
numbers of the followers (and opponents) of John Calvin. 
Calvinism, given its doctrine of predestination, seemed to 
render morality moot, logically unnecessary, since one could 
do nothing to alter one's place in the afterlife. But 
nevertheless there remained a psychological need for strict 
morality: no serious, rational, virtuous person could see 
God's awesome power without being concerned with his/her 
personal salvation. Coupled to the idea that God's chosen 
were those most likely to live a thoroughly moral life, this 
made it prudent, if not necessary, to follow the dictates of 
the moral law (Ferguson, p.384). (Note that this doctrine is 
quite similar in tone and psychology to Hobbes' treatment of 
determinism and free will. Though we are determined, Hobbes 
said, we also psychologically need to feel as if we were 
free to chose a form of government.) Thus, concern with 
salvation remained a very real aspect of life despite the 
general ascension of materialism. One could, even should, 
be aware of both elements without contradiction. 
In general, though, the tension between the chaos of 
the real world and the spiritual world brought about 
fundamental shifts in the world views of thinking people: 
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But if civil war was a daily calamity, an 
omnipresent and pandemic evil, then social cohesion, the 
life of peace, could not be looked upon, as it was 
throughout the Middle Ages, as a simple, self-evident 
fact requiring no explanation. It was no longer 
possible to assume naively that God had made man in his 
own image rather than that of Satan or Mephisto. The 
sins of Adam could no longer, as hithertofore, be 
uncritically affirmed as the cause of strife. It was 
social peace, not war, which needed to be explained: and 
it was a principle of social peace, of 'civil life', 
which needed to be discovered. (Gotesky, p.407) 
Nowhere was this more the case than in England. 
Following the last of the Tudors, Elizabeth I, the first of 
the Stuarts, James I, came to the throne in 1603. James 
brought with him from Scotland the legacy of a tradition of 
absolute rule and the ingenuity to cloak his absolutism in a 
constitutional legality. What followed might be termed 
legal absolutism: the English Parliament was weak, and James 
was able to exert the sort of authority he sought (Ferguson, 
p.432). There was a spirit in England, too, that seemed to 
need an absolutist government: after all, Henry VIII and 
Elizabeth had taken care of England in a truly paternalistic 
fashion, and amid the chaotic climate the people felt a 
genuine need for being taken care of. But this need was 
greatly lessened following the defeat of Spain in 1588, 
since there was no longer a common enemy against which 
monarch and people could unite. It was around this time 
that the English political atmosphere became more unstable 
and unpredictable. Civil wars and religious reforms were to 
become common during the period from 1605 to 1660. 
By 1605, the third year of his reign, James I had 
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alienated both the Puritans and Catholics alike through a 
series of religious reforms; and the Gunpowder Plot of 1605, 
an assissination attempt linked to Catholic planners, 
expressed the Catholics' antipathy and resurrected strong 
anti-Catholic sentiments amongst the Protestants. 
feelings had deep roots, as Sir Leslie Stephen explains: 
Such 
cause or the pretext of the warfare which culminated in 
the Spanish Armada. The patriotic Englishman regarded 
the pope as the instigator or accomplice of the 
assailants of our national independence ... Throughout the 
seventeenth century the protestant Englishman suffered 
from 'papacy' on the brain, ... [during this time]. James 
I himself and his most learned divines, such as Andrewes 
and Donne, were arguing against the great Catholic 
divines, Suarez and Bellarmine. The controversy turned 
especially upon the imposition of the oath renouncing 
the doctrine of the right of the pope to depose kings. 
To that right was opposed the 'divine right of kings': 
thereby being meant, not that kings had a 'right divine 
to govern wrong', but that the king's right was as 
directly derived from Heaven as the rights of the 
Church. (Stephen, pp.178-179) 
Hobbes concerned himself with these questions, too, Stephen 
points out, even after the power of the Catholic Church to 
enforce its claims had all but dissolved. "Men are often 
most interested," Stephens notes, "in discussing the means 
of escaping the dangers of the day before yesterday" 
(p.179). Throughout Hobbes' life, in any case, these 
conditions certainly created political issues that seemed to 
turn on the interrelations of secular and spiritual 
authority; purely political questions became intricately 
intermingled with ecclesiastical questions, as is clear in 
James' own formula, 'no bishop, no king' (Stephen, p.179). 
As a consequence there were disputes between 
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religious factions siding for and against royal authority, 
with the Church of England closely allied to the king: 
passive obedience became an "almost essential doctrine" for 
even liberal Anglican divines (Stephen, p.179). When 
Charles I came to power (in 1625) he continued to propound 
the doctrine of divine right, as well as the opposition to 
the Puritans: and he possessed little or no real 
understanding of the English people and their customs or 
traditions. It has been suggested that he may not have even 
realized they had any (Ferguson, p.436). During his reign 
there were wars with Spain and France, and the infamous 
dismissal of Parliament when it voiced opposition to his 
policies. In the political scramble surrounding Charles and 
Parliament, religious and political doctrines continued to 
be propounded, curiously intermixed, by almost every person 
and faction involved in the disputes. 
There were those who proclaimed the British 
Constitution to be the highest example of perfect wisdom and 
urged the preservation of the ancient parliamentary 
traditions. There were those who dedicated to the decay of 
that tradition, hoping to replace it with a new State 
organization along European lines. There were those, like 
Hobbes, who condemned the parliamentarians and their 
principles because they saw the claims of the parliamentary 
party as an obstacle to the achievement of a vigorous 
national government (Stephen, p.180). Their hope was for a 
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monarch with full authority in matter of national policy and 
independent of the advice or consent of Parliament. For to 
allow Parliament any superintendent power would allow it to 
throw the whole system of authority for law and order out of 
gear. Though the parliamentarians eventually established 
the supremancy of Parliament, in the late 1500's and early 
1600's this was almost unimaginable; for it to become 
reality would require its overcoming deep class antagonisms 
as well as religious and political differences. 
The conflficts of the time produced a general 
paralysis of the State's central authority; as Stephen says: 
The State, on one side, was struggling with the 
Church--whether the Church of Rome or the Church of 
Scotland--and, on the other hand, the supreme power was 
claimed for king alone, parliament alone, and for some 
combination of the two. (Stephen, pp. 179-180) 
There simply was no way to exercise effective power under 
such conditions. 
The theoretical problem of the political 
philosophers, as a result, was to determine the nature of 
sovereignty and to determine who should be the sovereign. 
These were Hobbes' issues, of course. They grew naturally 
out of the conflicts raging around him. 
In 1640 the Long Parliament met, following a series 
of religious, political, and monetary crises; and Cromwell's 
seizure of power followed and continued for twenty years. 
This twenty-year period was again to be characterized by 
general chaos, warfare, and turmoil, including the wrenching 
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civil war of 1642-1646 that fixed Cromwell's place as ruler 
of England. Then, after Charles I was executed in 1649, 
Cromwell and England experimented with a variety of forms of 
government from 1649 to 1660, almost all but the last of the 
experiments being designed to allow Cromwell to retain his 
power. There was the Commonwealth, a council-governed 
republic; the Protectorate, with Cromwell as Lord Protector 
complete with a subservient Parliament; and finally a series 
of constitutional and political changes that ultimately 
reduced Cromwell to a ruler in name only (Ferguson, p.440). 
There was the continual series of wars running concurrently 
with these events, of course: rebellions in Ireland and 
Scotland and wars with the Netherlands and Spain. The 
period of Cromwell's supremacy ended with his death in 1658 
and the Stuart Restoration of 1660. 
The first of the "new restoration" monarchs, and the 
last of importance during Hobbes' life, was Charles II. 
Like his two predecessors, he believed in the divine right 
of kings; but he was also more discrete and conciliatory to 
Parliament. Having been proclaimed king "by God's grace," 
Charles nevertheless agreed to limit hos power and to summon 
Parliament regularly. His limited powers of taxation and 
religious reform required parliamentary approval before 
being implemented. Underneath all this, too, was his own 
Catholicism and his desire to restore England to the true 
faith; but this remained a secret, unspoken wish that 
Charles held on to 
Indeed, during the 
deal with a loyal, 
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but took no overt steps to enact. 
first ten years of his reign he had to 
but headstrong "Cavalier" Parliament 
dominated by country gentlemen and the supporters of 
Anglicanism. To undertake a Catholic revival at the time 
was simply out of the question, In fact, Parliament asserted 
its power and restored the Church of England to its full 
privileges, including its power to punish dissent. 
of legislative acts during 1661-1664 put the 
A series 
Anglicans 
firmly in control of the state machinery of repression, used 
now for new persecution of dissenters and Catholics. 
Charles was firmly opposed to the persecutions, 
eventually issuing pardons to dissenters and Catholics alike 
in 1670. This did nothing,however, to lessen the anti-
Catholic paranoia, manifested by continual fear of "popish" 
plots, that ebbed and flowed but never subsided during the 
whole of Charles' reign until his death in 1685, six years 
after Hobbes' death. The time was filled with anti-
Catholicism and various acts, legislative and othrwise, that 
fanned the flames of the negative sentiment even after 1685. 
In sum, Hobbes lived through politically and religiously 
turbulent times, times that saw little of peace and much of 
war and death. 
In the intellectual/cultural world, where the same 
issues burned on a more theoretical level, the changes that 
took place proved to be more constructive, even though those 
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who were responsible for them were sometimes forced to 
acknowledge serious limits in the pace pf 
of the political and religious views 
progress because 
of the time (e.g. 
Galileo). From our present perspective, however, we can 
surely say that the arts, sciences, and philosophy of the 
period made steady and sometimes rapid progress. 
Though there was a general decline of Humanism 
immediately prior to Hobbes' birth, the study of the 
classics that the humanist movement initiated remained 
profoundly influential throughout Hobbes' lifetime (as is 
evident in Hobbes' own training (recall Strauss' outlined of 
it). The intellectual curriculum was based on the classic 
texts, as was the Scientific Revolution itself, which traced 
its roots back to Greek mathematics and science. 
Scholasticism, which had prospered under the influence and 
study of the Greek masters in the 1200's, began to decline 
in the fourteenth century. (Ferguson, p.474). It was 
replaced by the restoration of classical humanism that was, 
in turn, in decline by the end of the 1500's. But the 
humanists had, sometimes even inadvertently, fostered the 
cause of science because of their interest in the documents 
of antiquity, which included all the works of the ancient 
sciences that could be found. The science of Hobbes' time, 
then, rested on a firm classical heritage though it had also 
gone beyond it in many ways. 
The sciences of Hobbes' age had been affected by the 
314 
work of the Renaissance artists, engineers,and architects 
who conducted large numbers of practical experiments in the 
course of solving their professional problems. Optics, map-
making, linear perspective, mathematics, and other fields 
were advanced or begun under the influence of this eclectic 
band of intellectuals and practitioners. The growth and 
spread of knowledge had accelerated exponentially due to the 
invention and use of the printing press; texts of all sorts-
-art, science, philosophy, and the classics--could be 
printed cheaply, uniformly, and most important, quickly. 
Educational opportunities, 
of whom previously could 
thus, spread to the laymen, most 
not afford an education. 
Information and the exchange of ideas grew never before, and 
bookmakers and pamphleteers prospered. Naturally the debate 
raging in the political arena carried over into the 
intellectual sphere and engaged the minds of the 
philosophers and theologicans, Hobbes included. 
With the increasing availability of texts and the 
attendant questioning of the ideas contained in them, 
Aristotle's authority at its height during the Scholastic 
period was questioned and there ensued a general revolt 
against the tenets of "The Philosopher''. The thinkers of 
the new day had come to consider matter as purely material, 
devoid of abstract essences and potentialities; and the 
rejection of medeival theology and its Aristotlean 
underpinnings was widespread (Ferguson, pp.474-475). At the 
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same time there was rapid growth in mathematics and its 
impact on other sciences. Mathematics itself progressed 
through arithmetic and geometry, to algebra, trigonometry, 
decimels, logarithms, the calculus of probabilities, and 
analytic geometry. The effects of these deveoplments in 
mathematics reached into astronomy and physics almost 
immediately. The Copernican system challenged the older 
Ptolemaic notions in theory, while Galileo's telescope 
revealed concrete evidence for the Copernican account. 
This, as we know, eventually led to Galileo's "persecution" 
and the suppression of his works. Nonetheless, Galileo 
remained a seminal figure in physics, having devised a 
methodology that joined experimentation with mental analysis 
to make valid generalizations from both experimental and 
theoretical beginnings. This, of course, was the resoluto-
compositive method that so influenced Hobbes (see Chapter I) 
and about which I will have more to say in the upcoming 
sections. Galileo's views renewed the secular/spiritual 
debate, which was to be mirrored in the political debate 
once again. 
Thus, in both the political and intellectual worlds 
a major topic of debate was between secular and various 
distinct ecclesiastical doctrines. Gotesky describes the 
original ecclesiastical doctrine: "The ecclesiastical 
doctrine, a profound adaptation of the Greek and Roman 
conception of natural law to the requirements of feudal 
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society, was clearly thought out; and it still had tradition 
and authority behind it" (Gotesky, p.408). In the political 
realm it held that God had crated human beings as social, 
revealed the rules of life through the teachings of Jesus 
and the Ten Commandments--the divine laws--and provided 
reason to be used to discover and understand the rules for a 
peaceful life (Gotesky, p.408). But an alternative doctrine 
began as alternative, anti-ecclesiastical conclusions were 
drawn from the same starting point in divine law. This 
doctrine was essentially that the church was responsible 
for the corrupt social condition of humankind because it was 
supposedly the guardian of that spirit of divine law on 
earth, but had failed, and attempts to reform the church 
deom within had resulted in savage resistance, civil war, 
devastation, and massacres like that of St. Bartholomew's 
Day (Gotesky, p.410). 
On the other side, a growing secular doctrine filled 
a void created for many by a loss of faith in the spiritual 
dogmas. It also offered a solution to the political unrest 
that made social life chaotic. As a practical matter the 
secular doctrine was a methodology, rather than, as yet, an 
answer to any particular 
was the belief that 
questions. 
historical 
Its 
fact 
basic 
should 
foundation 
form the 
framework of philosophy and science (Gotesky, 
resulted when this method was applied was 
naturalism in political theory and the turn to 
p.411). What 
the rise of 
a study of 
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the actual social conditions. This is not to say that there 
were no limitations to the naturalistic historical 
methodology, as Hobbes himself was to find out; but· its 
development did mark a radical change in the intellectual 
world-views of the day. 
But of course it would not do to imply that the 
secular doctrine's supremacy was recognized as fact or that 
the original ecclesiastical doctrine or its critique had no 
influence whatsoever. This was by no means the case. 
Religion and religious doctrine was enormously influential 
and remained so long after this period, as Willey clearly 
notes: 
It was one of the characteristics of the 
seventeenth century that no English writer of the time, 
whatever his philosophical views might be, could 
explicitly abandon the assumption that the universe 
rested upon a basis of divine meaning. Further, all 
thinkers of that century, with but one or two 
exceptions, assumed the truth in some sense of the 
specifically Christian doctrines, and the supernatural 
status of the Bible (Willey, p.111). 
In conclusion, then, we may say that both 
social/political life and intellectual development during 
the historical period encompassing Hobbes' life were in the 
throes of conflict, turmoil, and continual change. That 
Hobbes' thoughts and opinions were formulated in reaction to 
this tumultuous atmosphere is hardly surprising. How his 
work was influenced by these factors will be explicated in 
subsequent sections of this chapter. But first we need to 
take a look at Hobbes' own personality and character. For 
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not only will the historical context of his theorizing be 
important to fixing the nature of his frameworks of 
justification but so will his own personal intentions, which 
we can understand best against the background of his 
personal history. That is, we must get a feel for the man 
in order to understand the iterpretive thesis proposed here 
about his work. That thesis rests, at least partially, on 
important beliefs about Hobbes' personal 
when he was constructing his theory 
obligation. 
2. Hobbes' Personal History 
motives and aims 
(or theories) or 
In many ways Hobbes went through the same turmoil 
and conflicts as his society. He was a man caught up in the 
issues and passions of the social, political, philosophical, 
and religious debates flaming around him and, indeed, took 
an active role in many of them. He was outspoken on 
political issues especially, though hardly less so on the 
topic of religion, particularly on what we would today call 
'organized religion'. While a staunch royalist and believer 
in absolute monarchy, he aroused the ire of the royalists of 
his day by offering a defense of monarchy not based on 
Divine right. Meanwhile, the antiroyalists were already 
alienated by his commitment to absolutism; and it mattered 
not at all that he rejected Divine right theories. On 
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purely philosophical topics he was no less controversial, as 
the free will-determinism debate with Bramhall shows. 
Hobbes' arguments for determinism led Bramhall to brand him 
an atheist and thereby an enemy of the state. At the same 
time, he was extremely progressive in his views about 
science and scientific methodology. Whether arguing a 
progressive or reactionary cause, however, he was known for 
his zeal and aggressiveness. The controversy in which he 
was embroiled, the personal vilification, and the necessity 
of a sort of self-exile for Hobbes seemed to mirror the 
turmoil of the larger world in which he lived. 
What might we expect the character traits of such a 
man to be? Whatever our answer, we are likely to find that 
Hobbes possessed some traits we expected and others that we 
did not. He was indeed an ambitious, proud, self-
congratulatory, and assertive person, especially when his 
opinions were involved or questioned. That he had a high 
opinion of his ability and influence is not surprising for 
someone so willing to engage in heated debates with figures 
as renouned as Descartes' or with those of superior training 
in specific fields. For example, his debates with various 
geometricians and mathematicians show him unable to perceive 
the faults of his own proofs and the superiority of theirs. 
On the other hand we might be surprised to learn that Hobbes 
was as pleasant and sanguinary a person, and as timid, 
fearful, and concerned for his own personal safety in the 
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midst of turmoil as any ordinary person would be. This does 
not square so well with the side of his character that put 
him out in the forefront of raging, dangerous controversies; 
yet it is nonetheless the case (Rogow, p.12). In fact, 
Hobbes surely took from his own introspective analysis his 
view that everyone experiences similar timidity, fear, and 
at the same time ambition. For him these were the basic 
components of human nature, along with greed, envy, and 
pride, whose evils could only be avoided in an all-powerful 
state (Rogow, p.12). 
Stephen characterizes Hobbes as logical but also 
one-sided: 
Of course, like most men in whom the logical 
faculty is predominant,he was splendidly one-sided. When 
things seemed clear to him, he could not understand that 
any difficulty existed for any one ... That difficulties 
did in fact exist is plain enough to his readers, if 
only from the curious devices by which he is sometimes 
driven to meet them. But though to others he may appear 
to be evading the point, or adopting inconsistent 
solutions, to himself he always seems to be following 
the straightforward path of inexorable logic. (Stephen, 
p.71) 
In intellectual matters Hobbes was the sort of thinker who 
did not work except at the highest level of concentration. 
Fitting his perceptions to his theories required the 
marshalling of his whole personality before he considered 
himself able to think clearly. He engaged all of himself in 
the process of writing philosophy, which he saw not as an 
affair of quick wits, but the use and focusing of one's 
entire mind (.James, p. 10) • Rogow claims that, by 
temperament and habits 
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of mind, Hobbes preferred 
intellectual thought-experiments and deductive reasoning to 
empirical observation or trial and error experimentation; 
and he was not adept at detailed mathematical calculation 
either (p.101). 
This is not out of line with the fact that, though 
Hobbes generally agreed with Bacon, he never became a 
disciple of Bacon's experimental method, choosing instead 
the resoluto-compositive approach of Galileo. Hobbes also 
seems to have benefitted, however late in life, from the 
acquired orderliness of thought required by his love affair 
with geometry, though he never really became a first-rate 
geometrician despite the fact that he fancied himself as 
one. (His repeated claims to have squared the circle were 
repeatedly demonstrated to be false. But where he should 
have been embarassed by the failures, Hobbes concluded that 
his critics had erred and his calculations were so far 
superior to theirs that they could not see the plain truth 
in front of them.) 
Rogow hypothesizes "that one root of Hobbes's 
interest in mathematics was a need, traceable to the 
insecurities and uncertainties of his childhood, to 
establish a scientific politics of authority and stabililty11 
(Rogow, p.102). His interests in order, security, 
authority, and stabililty would further account for his 
determination to prove his political principles with 
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certainty and preserve them from the destructive ravings of 
the various opposing factions of the time. 
That Hobbes was trained in Aristotle's methods and 
philosophy and in the classic at Oxford was noted, though 
perhaps overemphasized, by Strauss and is simply a matter of 
record. Rogow describes the climate and course of study at 
Oxford during Hobbes' stay: 
At Oxford there were a few courses in 
mathematics, astronomy, geography,and 'Physics'--
geometry, including Euclid, was taught at Brasenose 
College, and French and Italian may also have been 
taught--but they were elementary in nature, and most 
students in the arts curriculum, including Hobbes, 
graduated knowing little or nothing about these 
subjects. In logic, philosophy, and other courses, the 
supreme source of wisdom was Aristotle and his 
interpreters; indeed, as late as 1636, 'the Laudian 
statues of Oxford required that determining bachelors of 
arts argue their propositions in logic, rhetoric, 
politics,and moral philosophy according to the teachings 
of Aristotle, whose authority is paramount.' Where 
Aristotle had been silent, the students turned to Plato, 
Ptolemy, Cicero, Strabo, and other luminaries of the 
Greek and Roman world. (Rogow, p.49) 
Hobbes, thus, had been exposed to the traditions and methods 
of the classics and the schoolmen, although he was not 
favorably disposed toward them, nor fully able to grasp the 
deficiencies of the scholastic doctrines, so that, as 
Robertson says, we should not conclude he had turned away 
from the traditional doctrine with a conscious purpose in 
mind--it seems more an emotional recoiling from everything 
traditionally associated with Rome and the Papacy of the 
Middle Ages (Robertson, pp.4, 8-9). Rather, Hobbes came to 
see the attack by his contemporaries on every philosophical 
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doctrine he had learned at the university as fully 
justified, including the accompanying revival of interest in 
nature and the development of new sciences or natural 
philosophies (Robertson, pp.14-15). 
Hobbes' association with Bacon strengthened his 
anti-scholasticism and fueled his desires for scientific 
knowledge and a new secular synthesis (Gooch, pp.4-5). What 
Bacon and Hobbes shared should not be overemphasized, nor 
disregarded given Hobbes' own preference for the 
deductive method rather than Bacon's experimental induction. 
Peters stresses two significant effects of Hobbes' 
acquaintance with Bacon's Novum Organum of 1620: 
The book, too, would enable him to improve his 
newly found paradise by using Nature's secrets for his 
own ends ... knowledge meant power--power to use Nature 
for human purposes. This conviction, shared by so many 
of the new men of the seventeenth century and evidence 
by the rapid developments of experimentation and 
technology, is one of the keys tounderstanding Hobbes' 
thought. Like Bacon, he was to coin some of his most 
pungent epigrams for the discomfiture of the 
Aristotlians; like Bacon, he replaced reverence for 
tradition by belief inmethod, albeit a different method; 
and, like Bacon,he believed that knowledge was power. 
His hope was to devise a civil philosophy which would 
provide a rational ground-plan for the reconstruction of 
civil society by those who could penetrate the secrets 
of human nature. 
There is, too, another significant 
similarity ... Both men used language to say things 
clearly,pungently, and in order to convert .... Hobbes 
thought that society could almost be saved by 
definitions and tracked down the various types of 
ambiguity and vacuousness in scholastic terminology 
which he regarded as potential sources of danger to the 
peace. (Peters, pp.16-17) 
Other similarities include a dislike of theolc;,gical 
arguments, the role of religion in government, a claimed 
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avoidance of the books of others, the belief that nature was 
more or less mechanical,and their dismissal of final causes 
(Rogow, pp.65-66). But despite this all of Hobbes' 
biographers stress that Hobbes cannot be regarded as Bacon's 
disciple, nor can we say he had any enthusiasm for Bacon's 
general aims or methods (see Rogow, pp.66-67; Stephen, p.13; 
Gooch, p.5; Robertson, pp.19-20; Peters, p.16). Surely, 
though, Hobbes' own beliefs were strengthened by the 
agreements with Bacon, and though their methods varied each 
was profoundly impressed by the new science. 
His belief that he was a first-rate thinker carried 
over into his assertions about the superiority of his 
analysis of sound government. After asserting that 
Aristotle's knowledge of government was unsurpassed, Hobbes 
observed that contemporary political theorists seemed to 
believe that they had superior knowledge though, in fact, 
they had little study or recourse beyond natural wit. 
Hobbes labelled these errant theorists 'dogmatic!' and 
contrasted them to the 'mathematic!' who knew figures, 
numbers, and proportions and from whose studies came all the 
advances in the arts and sciences, astronomy, geometry, 
geography, and politics, which were the result of their 
scrupulous reasoning, starting from the most evident and 
"lowly" principles. "Included in this group, of course, was 
Hobbes himself" (Rogow, p.128). In fact Hobbes' 
overinflated sense of his own importance prompted his flight 
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from England prior to the first deposition of the Stuarts. 
Hobbes fled believing that the 'rebels' would come after him 
due to his opinions (from The Elements of Law), even though 
it seems they had little knowledge of his books or opinions 
at the time. But, as Peters says, "Hobbes' fear was that of 
a self-made man whose feeling of insecurity and desire for 
esteem expressed itself in the flattering delusion that men 
were taking note of him and planning his decease; it was not 
an unreasoning panic" (Peters, p.26). 
Hobbes' father was a failed clergyman, violent and 
often embroiled in religious controversies, both of which 
Hobbes repeatedly warns against and abhorred. His complex 
views on religion seem hardly surprising against this 
background--that he sees religion more in terms of a problem 
than a solution is more understandable once we consider his 
father's failures, controversies, and example. His warnings 
against religious conflict, the rule of clerics, his 
ambivalence toward organized religion,and perhaps his 
reputation for atheism might be traced back to his youth 
(Rogow, p.44). In addition, Hobbes' hometown of Malmesbury 
was a place where limited or constitutional monarchy was 
openly discussed; we might be tempted to see much of Hobbes' 
later religious and political theories as a psychological 
repudiation of Malmesbury and the disagreeable associations 
it may have had for him (Rogow, p.44). 
Hobbes also had the tendency to carry grudges 
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against those who had "wronged" him. Rogow points out that 
Hobbes,when interpreting Scripture in ways contrary to his 
adversaries, could not just stop there--he had "scores to 
settle dating back to Malmesbury and Oxford." Consequently 
Leviathan, part IV, contains references to the pope as the 
"King of the Fairies" or the "Ghost of the Roman Empire", 
the ecclesiastics being the "Fairies", and their followers 
are called "Elves" who are sent out to pinch the sovereign 
by preaching sedition (Rogow, p.164). How well does this 
fit the shy, fearful, and timid side of Hobbes? 
Imperfectly, at best, unless as Peters says, this is a 
manifestation of insecurity, expressing itself in an angry, 
aggressive style of stating a life-long fear and hatred of 
religious organizations that had usurped governmental 
authority and caused civil wars (Peters, pp.28-29). 
Hobbes also saw himself as an important teacher, and 
looked on his writings as lessons for princes and for the 
common people to study as well. He had "always for his last 
and highest aim to become a political teacher, he could not 
shut his eyes to the need, growing every day more pressing, 
that a teacher should appear" (Robertson, pp.49-50). This 
desire is a very important aspect of Hobbes' self-perception 
and an important contextual element for my interpretation of 
his theory (or theories) of obligation. For Hobbes was 
doing more than just developing theories; his aim was to 
instruct, to affect actions, to alter behavior. 
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Finally we can see Hobbes as a pragmatic an in his 
attitudes toward actual monarchs and changes in political 
power. He sees religious practices or beliefs, i.e. of 
organized religion, as being subordinate to the government, 
to the extent of hiding that, if a Catholic were king, then 
the subjects should embrace "Romish idolatry", if a Jew were 
general of an army in which Hobbes served, he would have had 
himself circumcised if so ordered, and if a Turk were ruler, 
he would have embraced Mecca, and so on (Rogow, p.238). 
That the sovereign should have this power 
concedes, and that the subject should 
Hobbes readily 
obey is simply a 
matter of practicality. The pragmatism has a theoretical 
side as well, in so far as once a sovereign no longer has 
the power to enforce particular practices or protect the 
subject, then the subject may regard the ruler as no ruler 
at all. That is, sovereignty is grounded not just by 
custom, law, or tradition, but by fact as well (Rogow, 
pp.171-172). Hobbes' critic, Clarendon, even suggested that 
Hobbes had added the sections on sovereignty by conquest to 
his work in order to give favor to Cromwell, a purely 
pragmatic addition if Clarendon is correct (although Hobbes 
denied having done this since he had published Leviathan 
prior to Cromwell's becoming sovereign in 1653). In any 
case it seems clear that Hobbes was pragmatic enough not to 
be particular about whose support he obtained, so long as he 
was supported or aided in realizing his long-cherished goal 
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of teaching the prince and the people and was sheltered by 
those in power, no matter how reckless or disgraceful they 
might be (Robertson, pp.190-191). 
We see, then, that Hobbes' was not a simple 
character. But through all of the complexity of the man, 
there is still a ''certain logical consistency" that Hobbes 
claimed for himself. I believe that a good deal of the 
seeming inconsistency and contradictoriness of the man and 
his work is a function of the historical period in which 
Hobbes lived. For we have seen that political changes, 
social changes, and religious changes were coming fast and 
furious. We have seen that scholasticism was still the 
order of the day in the schools, that classicism was still 
revered, but that the new sciences and methodologies were 
also being established, developed, and used to question 
every other tradition as well. Given Hobbes' pragmatic bent 
(almost necessary as a defense against the time itself), it 
is not unlikely that he would weigh each disparate influence 
on him to see what value each viewpoint might have in 
relation to his own purposes. It does not seem unnatural, 
given the times and the man, that Hobbes would argue in more 
than one way for the same conclusions, especially if it he 
judged the conclusions to be of the highest importance, and 
if he saw himself as a teacher trying to educate many 
different kinds of students about the true and correct form 
of government in the hope of getting them to then act 
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according to his reasoning. The use of multiple approaches 
in the classroom is a common enough practice. One does not 
need to embrace scholasticism to be aware that there are 
those who do embrace it and who are going to be best 
convinced by arguments in the scholastic manner or based in 
the scholastic tradition. The same would be true of someone 
teaching students convinced of the methods of the new 
science or students taking other points of view. I shall 
argue shortly that Hobbes did in fact see this and did 
indeed tailor his arguments accordingly. The point here is 
simply to show that, given the multiple influences on 
Hobbes' thoughts throughout his youth and early training and 
given the character of the world he lived in, it is 
plausible that the complexity of his work and the diversity 
of positions and arguments attributed to him could be traced 
back to precisely these factors. 
The effect of all these factors was to generate in 
Hobbes the idea of teaching his countrymen the rudiments of 
a sound society, using the new principles of demonstration, 
the aim being to accomplish a great political gesture or 
action in the world (Wolin, p.8). He hoped to have his 
doctrine taught and disseminated by the universities, and 
have it spread until all ranks of the populace would 
understand their duty, 
'commodious living' 
establishing peace, 
(Watkins, p.17). 
security, 
The aim 
and 
of 
establishing an absolutist monarchy and of demonstrating the 
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evils of democratic principles, including an exhibition of 
his intolerance of even moderate challenges to authority and 
his pessimistic view of human nature, appears already in 
Hobbes' treatment of Thucydides, well before 1629. At this 
time, however, his aim had not been joined to a specific 
method of demonstration (Rogow, p.83, 91). In 1634, while 
in Paris, Hobbes became persuaded that all behavior was 
caused by types or varieties of motion, and that the key to 
understanding actions correctly would be connected to the 
analysis of motion (Rogow, p.103; Robertson, p.33). (Note 
how this seems to contradict Strauss's claims that Hobbes 
had no inkling of the mechanical thesis or method prior to 
1639.) 
Hobbes' aim in all this is derived from his 
preoccupation with peace and how best to establish it. With 
the discovery of the methods of the new science of motion, 
Hobbes was finally able to attempt a demonstration of his 
belief that the best way to secure peace was to establish an 
anti-democratic, absolute monarchy. It is this overriding 
aim that seems to govern all of Hobbes' political writings, 
regardless of which of the interpretive perspectives we 
adopt. As Peters says 
In brief, Hobbes believed that the only hope for 
the permanent preservation of peace was an absolute 
sovereign, whose commands were laws enforced by judges, 
bishops, and the military ... Obedience to such a 
sovereign was always obligatory unless he should prove 
an ineffective autocrat. This was the geometer's 
panacea for peace, the clear-cut, rational construction 
of a ruthless theoretician who thought the definitions 
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and demonstrations could reveal solutions to problems 
which had blunted the wits and swords of practical 
men ... 
It seems probable that Hobbes wrote Leviathan 
much more in order to instruct his countrymen how best 
to reconstruct English civil society so that it was a 
fit place for sensible people like himself ... (Peters, 
pp.33-35) 
Peace and political order, then, is Hobbes' major 
interest; monarchy is the instrumental good securing this 
intrinsic good. More specifically, Watkins describes 
Hobbes' aims as being: "(1) ... [to] show the need for a 
political sovereign, undivided and unrestricted, obedience 
to whom is the citizen's overriding duty. (2) ... [in order 
to] clinch this he should show that it is impossible to have 
a duty to disobey one's sovereign. (3) ... [and then to] 
demonstrate all this" (Watkins, p.16). His method Watkins 
likens to that of a chess instructor who does not try to 
instil in the students' minds alien material since they 
already possess the necessary raw materials, but rather, 
appeals to what they already know if only their attention 
can be drawn to it (Watkins, p.79). Thus, once more we see 
Hobbes presented as a teacher with a guiding aim, willing to 
instruct his pupils in a manner suited to their present 
knowledge and convictions in whatever way will work best. 
Although it was the deductive method that Hobbes was 
initially enamoured with, once he had settled on a method, 
still we should not conclude either that the goals of the 
task or the sole method are deductive or scientific. The 
goals of Hobbes' work are traceable to his background, while 
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his role as teacher would require the pragmatic adjustment 
of the teaching style from pupil to pupil, audience to 
audience. Peters, who rightly sees Hobbes' relation to 
history as a factor in Hobbes' approach to the task of 
instructing mankind, says of Hobbes' concept of the 
historian's job: "The historian, while remaining truthful, 
should select and record events which seem most significant 
for instructing mankind" (Peters, p.19). Thus, there was a 
fixed aim and a preferred.method, although the method is 
ultimately viewed pragmatically and is adjusted to the 
audience in whatever way is best to accomplish the aim, 
including a selectivity in exactly what subjects or facts to 
present and how to present them. 
The most important biographical fact for 
interpreting Hobbes' theory (or theories) of obligation here 
is that this single aim is consistently Hobbes' central aim 
throughout all his political work: 
... his paramount interest was in establishing absolute 
sovereignty, preferably through the institution of 
absolute monarchy, as the only alternative to chronic 
civil disorder, and in defending sovereign power against 
any and all challenges based on appeals to religion, 
natural law or natural rights, the social contract, or 
any other body of principles that was inimical to, or 
that could be interpreted by 'dogmatic!' and 'orators' 
as inimical to, sovereign power. (Rogow, p.132) 
The fidelity Hobbes showed toward this goal seemed 
to remain regardless of how it affected the particular 
governments that came to power. That is, Hobbes did not 
seem to try to fit his aims or beliefs to what would be·most 
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politically advantageous to himself, though he did show 
concern to keep on the right side of the reigning powers. 
His views, though, were such that the parliamentarians or 
anti-monarchists would see him as a dangerous reactionary, 
while his anti-divine right stance would offend royal 
fundamentalists. His concern for peace was overriding, and 
"his essential message, that any government was better than 
no government, was at once too conservative for social-
contract theorists and too radical for those who insisted 
the monarch held his appointment from God" (Rogow, p.139). 
But Hobbes thought the collapse of government would be the 
greatest calamity that could befall humankind and that peace 
is the most important goal. Given this belief, he simply 
did what he judged necessary to establish and secure its 
realization. It is for this reason that he was willing to 
tailor his arguments to his audience and to risk offending 
parties in or out of power by stating the precise nature of 
the means best able to guarantee the goal, absolute, 
contractual monarchy. 
To summarize, we can say that Hobbes was both timid 
(in his life) and bold (in his theories and beliefs), a 
complex man whose background and personal experience led him 
to believe in the overriding importance of peace. In 
addition, he wanted to be seen as a great philosopher and 
teacher who would guide his nation out of the political 
turmoil it was in by teaching the people the correct path to 
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peace. In this task he was enamored of the resoluto-
deductive methods of Galileo, but also pragmatic enough, I 
believe, to see that it had limits as a tool for instruction 
and so the teaching needed to be adapted to the knowledge 
and character of the audience addressed. Such a man, living 
in a chaotic historical period and subject to multiple 
intellectual currents, old and new, might very likely employ 
different approaches, or frameworks of justification, to 
demonstrate the necessity of a view of absolute monarchy 
that he hoped would effect a real change in the political 
conditions around him. Each of these approaches involves a 
distinctive account of obligation, namely the three kinds of 
accounts of obligation that have already been examined in 
detail. The next sections of this chapter will focus on the 
primary texts of Hobbes and will explicate the nature of 
each of these approaches, showing that each of the three was 
in fact something Hobbes himself had in mind to say, to a 
particular audience in each case. 
C. THE THREE INTERPRETATIONS AS COEXISTENT 
1. Hobbes' Aims and Intentions as Rhetorical 
It would be difficult to deny that Hobbes was 
affected by his awareness of the multitude of influences on 
his audience. He was certainly concerned with rebutting the 
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intolerable effects of organized religion of the 
transitional Scholastcism, while at the same time being 
cognizant of the fact that each had set standards of 
thought, evidence, and justification to which large numbers 
of people still adhered. To reach this segment of his 
audience would require both tact and arguments that 
differerd significantly from those he could offer to that 
portion of his audience versed, like himself, in the 
language and methods of Galilean science. Another set of 
arguments might be required to convince those who believed 
in individualism, that individual rights were the central 
elements of any de4fensible political theory. The question 
for Hobbes was how to approach such a diverse audience, how 
to lead them to accept his conclusions. Hobbes' answer was 
to use a rhetorical method which was consistent with 
different frameworks of justification. But his answer, when 
misunderstood or left unnoticed, creates the interpretive 
problems we have already outlined. 
To complicate matters, Hobbes did not stress his use 
of a rhetorical method as clearly as nor with a fervor equal 
to that with which he stressed his geometric or scientific 
methodology (although, as we will see, such an emphasis is 
perfectly consistent with his rhetorical method). This led 
to a particular monistic view of Hobbes' work as 
egoistic/mechanistic and the subsequent knot in our thinking 
about Hobbes' theory of obligation. Kahn, a careful student 
336 
of Hobbes' rhetorical method, expresses the problem well: 
The majority of Hobbes's critics, at least in 
the twentieth century, have persisted in reading the 
Leviathan primarily as a logical argument. Two points 
need to be made about this approach. The first is that 
this reading seems to correspond, at least in part, to 
Hobbes's stated intention in the Leviathan, for ... while 
rhetoric and logic were not as strictly separate in 
Hobbes's time as in our own, it is also clear that 
Hobbes wants to subordinate a rhetoric of probability 
and passion to a logic of certainty and reason. On the 
other hand, such a view of the Leviathan cannot come to 
terms with--and thus inevitably ignores--Hobbes's 
remarks about rhetoric and sovereignty; and his use of 
irony, paradox, contradiction, argument in ultramgue 
partem. What these critics fail to see is that rhetoric 
can be used for the purposes of ideological closure as 
well as disclosure: that is, to support the claims of 
logic and theoretical reason as well as to undermine 
these claims. Moreover, it can create the fiction of 
these claims, and this is what Hobbes does in the 
Leviathan. Indeed, so effective is he in constructing 
his logical model of the argument that most readers have 
accepted it at face value. In an important sense, these 
rhetorically naive raders are the ideal subjects of the 
Hobbesian commonwealth: having been fully persuaded by 
Hobbes's logical model of state, they are incapable of 
seeing the contribution of rhetoric to his argument. 
They are the ones, in short, on whom Hobbes's rhetorical 
strategies have had the greatest effect. (Kahn, pp.157-
158) 
My proposal here is that this problem is not restricted to a 
view of Leviathan, but extends to the entire body of Hobbes' 
political writings; for the intention and structure of all 
of them are quite similar. 
Once we recognize that Hobbes' method is rhetorical 
(the meaning of rhetorical will be discussed shortly) and 
not purely logical or scientific in the sense of Galilean 
deduction, we are on our way to untying the knot in our 
understanding of Hobbes' theory of obligation. We must not 
be misled by the apparent connections between Hobbes' 
337 
various frameworks into believing that there must be a 
single framework or argument operative. Here we must 
observe Wittgenstein's caution against being fooled by the 
surface grammar or superficial appearance of the various 
uses of language. Though the terms of the different 
approaches are similar, they function in different contexts. 
In this way, for example, we should not assume that a term 
like 'natural law' means the same thing throughout Hobbes' 
work. If we fall prey to this "monistic illusion," Hobbes 
will appear contradictory or inconsistent in his theories. 
But if we learn the nature of his rhetorical approach, we 
can reconcile the apparent inconsistencies. As Wittgenstein 
says, "Our mental cramp is loosened when we are shown the 
notations which fulfil these needs" (BB, p.59). Hobbes' 
needs or intentions are not just dictated by logic but are 
also rhetorical: i.e. they are dictated by his desire to 
persuade or convince different audiences to accept his 
conclusion that everyone should obey the sovereign in order 
to secure lasting peace and their own safety. 
"Describing an intention means describing what went 
on from a particular point of view, with a particular 
purpose", Wittgenstein explains (Z, 23). In the case of 
Hobbes, as we have seen, his overall purpose is that of 
establishing the necessity of obedience, of the duty of 
obligation to the sovereign. In addition, we have seen 
three different interpretations of how he went about doing 
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this. But we cannot conclude that in pursuit of his single 
goal Hobbes would necessarily have used only a single one of 
these three methods. Given the mutiple influences in his 
life and the chaotic political events he witnessed, it is 
not unreasonable to imagine Hobbes acquiring a sense of 
urgency that would push him to use whatever means would best 
convince his readers to adopt the ways of peace. As Willis 
Glover observes, 
Hobbes wrote his political philosophy with 
practical intent. He tells us himself that the threat 
of civil war in England caused him to publish De Cive 
before the two sections of his projected comprehensive 
philosophy that logically proceded it" (Glover, p.149). 
Here we should heed Hobbes' own warning: 
... it is not the bare words, but the scope of the 
writer, that giveth the true light, by which any writing 
is to be interpreted; and they that insist upon single 
texts, without considering the main design, can derive 
nothing from them clearly. (E.W. III, 436) 
I will argue that Hobbes' goal is to convince and 
his design, or method, is rhetorical. The scope of Hobbes' 
training included large doses of rhetoric and there is no 
indication that he ever rejected the usefulness of even 
Aristotle's rhetorical methods. Indeed, his own Rhetoric is 
largely a condensed and amended translation, or brief, of 
Aristotle's Rhetoric. Rather, there is solid evidence that 
he held rhetoric in high esteem all his life. Further, the 
rhetorical method, as practiced during Hobbes' time, is 
perfectly suited to the job of convincing divergent 
audiences of a single conclusion, as well as being 
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consistent with the use of a logical methodology as a part 
of it. Before examining this method it is important to show 
that Hobbes perceived himself to be addressing different 
audiences with the intent to persuade them rather than 
simply establishing his conclusions by a monistic logical or 
philosophical method. We have already seen that his single 
overriding conclusion is that people own obedience to the 
sovereign. 
Hobbes say his task as describing "the duties of 
men: first, as men; then as subjects; lastly as Christians" 
(E.W. II, ix). That he also saw himself as a teacher has 
been shown and as such he believed he could "train, educate, 
and discipline people into good citizens" (Gert, p.519). 
But the task was complicated by the fact that different 
people are moved to action by different causes and the fact 
that different people perceive the same things in different 
ways. There will be, then, no end to disagreements until 
Hobbes can teach them that it is each person's duty to 
submit to a sovereign power who will settle such disputes 
and have the power to enforce those settlements: 
For in the differences of private men to declare 
what is equity, what is justice, and what is moral 
virtue, and to make them binding, there is need of the 
ordiances of sovereign power, and punishments to be 
ordained for such as shall break them. (Lev., 212) 
He would have to produce a book that could be read 
by all segments of his audience and show to each of them the 
"true and only way of lasting civil peace, by constituting 
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the secular power absolute 
departments of the active life of 
This book was the Leviathan, 
over every other in all 
men" (Robertson, p.61). 
but as Robertson and others 
note, it is a direct outcome of the influences of Hobbes' 
earlier works and is in no major way different from them in 
either its methods or conclusions, so that we can view all 
of Hobbes' works as sharing the method and intent of 
Leviathan. Though interpreters such as Strauss perceive 
significant differences between De Cive and Leviathan, this 
generally seems to be a result of their own point of view 
rather than of an objective reading of Hobbes. That is, 
especially for Strauss, this claim seems to rest on 
interpretive errors such as 'the early works syndrome' or 
'great works syndrome', or more generally, as a result of 
adopting a monistic framework which requires seeing 
Leviathan as THE statement of Hobbes' political theory. We 
have argued against these approaches and shown that Hobbes' 
overriding thesis remained the same throughout his life and 
works, though the presentation may vary. It is important, 
in order to avoid mistaken interpretations here, not to 
confuse the theory with the presentation. 
Hobbes' goal is thus to show his audience the 
necessity of obedience to the sovereign but to do this in 
such a way as to achieve a practical effect, which politcal 
philosophy had been unable to do in Hobbes' time (Wolin, 
p.13). The joining of the philosophic goal, i.e. to 
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demonstrate the necessity of obedience to the sovereign, to 
the practical intention of actually doing something yields 
Hobbes' belief that he must address his readers in a way 
that will do both at once. That is, he must convince them 
to act upon his conclusions and to do so effectively; this, 
he saw, requires a rhetorical approach: 
Like Aristotle's political orator, Hobbes 
realizes that 'counsel can only be given on matters 
about which people deliberate: matters, namely, that 
ultimately depend on ourselves, and which we have it in 
our power to set going'. So, 'in this time, that men 
call not only for Peace, but also for Truth,' Hobbes 
'offers such Doctrines as (he) ... think(s) True, and that 
manifestly tend to Peace and Loyalty, to the 
consideration of those that are yet in deliberation' 
(E.W., III, 726). He does not offer the truth, but what 
he thinks true. Yet, as with the humanist proponents of 
the vita activa who preceded him, Hobbes hopes not 
simply to prove a point, but to persuade his readers to 
prudent action {E.W. III, 408). He differs from the 
humanists only in hoping to do so more effectively in 
the person of a political scientist. (Kahn, p.177). 
Hobbes considered himself to be a counselor to his 
readers rather than as the possessor of absolute truth who 
is handing it down to them in absolute form. This is, at 
least, the position he adopts throughout his writings even 
if he were personally inclined to believe his conclusion to 
be absolutely true. As a counselor Hobbes presents his 
beliefs in a manner consistent with his conception of a 
counselor's job, that is, in the persuasive form called 
'exhortation': 
EXHORTATION and DEHORTATION is counsel 
accompanied with signs in him that gives it of vehement 
desire to have it followed: or to say it more briefly, 
counsel vehemently pressed. For he that exhorts does 
not deduce the consequences of what he advises to be 
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done and tie himself therein to the rigor of true 
reasoning, but encourages him he counsels to action; as 
he tht dehorts, deters him from it. And, therefore, 
they have in their speeches a regard to the common 
passions and opinions of men deducing their reasons, and 
make use of similitudes, metaphors, examples, and other 
tools of oratory to persuade their hearers of the 
utility, honor, or justice of following their advice. 
From whence may be inferred, first, that 
exhortation and dehortation is directed to the good of 
him that gives the counsel, not of him that asks it, 
which is contrary to the duty of a counselor, who, by 
the definition of counsel, ought to regard not his own 
benefit but his whom he advises ... 
Secondly, that the use of exhortation and 
dehortation lies only where a man is to speak to a 
multitude; because when the speech is addressed to one, 
he may interrupt him and examine his reasons more 
rigorously than can be done in a multitude, which are 
too many to enter into dispute and dialogue with him 
that speaks indifferently to them all at once. (E.W. 
III, 242-243) 
The good that Hobbes hopes to exhort his readers to 
accept is an abandoning or war for peace through the 
instituion of the sovereign and the taking on of the 
obligation necessary to ensure the peace thereby achieved. 
He will have to educate them, too, in the causes of war and 
peace since without this knowledge few people can learn 
"those duties which unite and keep men in peace, that is to 
say ... the rules of civil life ... " (E.W. I, 8). Hobbes' 
belief was that because of the diversities of his audience 
he had to show his readers that it is necessary to the 
attaining of peace to institute an artificial absolute, i.e. 
the will of the sovereign. Here he is trying to persuade 
his readers to give up their private reason, give up their 
private interpretations of experience or truth, and submit 
to the judgment of the sovereign {E.W. III, 189). To do so 
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is to accept what Kahn calls the "rhetorical sovereign" (to 
be explained shortly) and to help "constitute the common 
sense of the sovereign and thereby preserve himself against 
the threat of contradiction, which is ultimately the threat 
of extinction" (Kahn, p.160). The most efficient form of 
sovereignty, in Hobbes' eyes, is an absolute monarchy since 
"where the public and private interest are most closely 
united, there is the public most advanced. Now in monarchy 
the private interest is the same with the public" (E.W. III, 
173-174). Thus, Hobbes seeks to convince his audience, by 
rhetorical means, to accept an absolute monarch for their 
own good. Hobbes hoped, also, that his doctrines would be 
taught in universities, thereby reaching more people who 
were void of prejudice and who would be easier to instruct 
in his principles (Rogow, pp.132-133). Hobbes' overall 
purpose, then, is to reach as large an audience as possible 
and as a good counselor and, teacher, to benefit the largest 
part of mankind (E.W. VII, 335). 
Within this rhetorical framework, all three 
interpretations of Hobbes' theory of obligation have a 
place. As a skilled 'counselor' trained in the practice of 
rhetoric Hobbes was not only aware of the need to convince 
his audience, but was also aware of the fact that different 
segments of that audience, like different individuals, would 
respond best to different sorts of persuasive arguments. He 
would have to take the limits of each part of his audience 
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into account, i.e. their personal experience and training 
when presenting his counsel. 
This approach is also consistent with Hobbes 
analysis of causation. That is, he repeatedly stresses that 
to explain or achieve any given effect requires 
understanding or initiating the entire cause necessary to 
produce the effect (i.e. the sum total of all the causal 
influences taken together) (E.W. I, 67, 121-122; III, 92; 
IV, 246; VII, 78). If we accept Hobbes' goal as subject to 
the same causal analysis of any other effect, then we see 
that what Hobbes has to do is initiate a cause sufficient to 
produce the intended effect. Since the goal is to convince 
everyone to accept their obligations to an absolute 
sovereign, he will have to convince each segment of his 
audience using whatever arguments or exhortations necessary 
to motivate them to act in their own best interest. In 
short, he will have to produce a set of justifications 
tailored to the nature of each audience he addresses. What, 
in essence, Hobbes did was to construct a mechanistic 
framework of justification, a natural law framework of 
justification, and an individual rights framework of 
justification (analogous to body, man, and citizen, perhaps) 
within his overall rhetorical framework such that the 
"concourse of all causes make one simple chain ... (of) an 
innumerable number of chains joined together" (E.W. V, 
105). Or, as P.J. Johnson says 
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Hobbes, I think, felt that he needed vivid 
images to jar the minds of his readers awake .... he was 
struggling to affect his contemporaries in an immediate, 
practical way~ Hobbes's works are no mere academic 
exercises in political theorizing, but attempts to 
motivate willful men caught up in the broil and trouble 
of parties and factions to see the inestimable value of 
peace. (Johnson, p.37) 
The persuasive, or rhetorical, side to Hobbes' 
method requires that he know his audience, know that 
different forms of persuasion will be necessary, and that to 
reach the largest portion of the audience will require 
speaking to them in the language they will best understand. 
In conveying his political truth, then, Hobbes saw that 
there could be no ambiguity in his language and that what 
might seem ambiguous or unintelligible for one person need 
not be so for another, therefore different ways of speaking 
were necessary (i.e. different linguistic or conceptual 
frameworks in Wittgenstein's terminology). Speech will 
produce understanding and to that end Hobbes says: 
Forasmuch as whosoever speaketh to another, 
intendeth thereby to make him understand what he saith, 
if he speak unto him either in a language which he that 
hearet hunderstandeth not, or use any word in other 
sense than he believeth is the sense of him that 
heareth, he intendeth also not to make him understand 
what he saith: which is a contradiction of himself. It 
is therefore always to be supposed, that he which 
intendeth not to deceive, alloweth the private 
interpretation of his speech to him to whom it is 
addressed. (E.W. III, 76) 
Hobbes also speaks of the art of engendering belief 
as a matter of not only proofs, but of manners, which 
involves understanding the design and ends of whatever we 
hope to cause our hearers to believe in, as well as, by 
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implciation, what will please the audience so as to create 
the agreement (E.W. IV, 436). The end of Hobbes' theory is 
preservation through obedience, the way to reach his readers 
is to convince each that they ought to submit voluntarily to 
the rule of the sovereign as the best means to that end. 
The act will only be achieved, however, if the audience is 
convinced. 
That Hobbes set out to do what was necessary is 
clear, according to Wolin, who says, 
In formulating the program of 'public teaching,' 
Hobbes set out his notion of political education. One 
part of it was aimed at a popular audience and hence the 
teaching was adjusted accordingly. He proposed a 
program of 'public instruction both of doctrine and 
example, 1 designed to indoctrinate the populace with 
beliefs conducive to strict obedience (Wolin, p.47). 
This is precisely the point of the rhetorical method Hobbes 
had assimilated at school and advance in his own Rhetoric. 
But it is Hobbes' rhetorical education, the specific sources 
and the use Hobbes makes of rhetoric that has seldom been 
taken into account by Hobbes' commentators, especially in 
connection to his theory of obligation. M.L. Short, in an 
unpublished dissertation, contends that rhetoric is the key 
element operative in Hobbes' work, especially Leviathan. If 
this is true, Short argues, then 
... it is not absurd to suggest 
sharply distinguish between the 
necessary to science ... and to 
distinguish between the appropriate 
logic, from the appropriate method 
(Short, p.141). 
that Hobbes would 
human faculties 
history, and also 
method of science, 
of history, rhetoric 
My contention takes Short's analysis a step further 
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to include a recognition that, if Hobbes so distinguished 
methods, then he must have distinguished the appropriate 
audiences for each approach. Finally, I believe that we may 
be too strict in saying that the method of science, i.e. the 
method of the MP framework, is purely logical. If we 
correctly understand Galileo's method, as the next section 
will demonstrate, we can see a strongly rhetorical element 
operative in it, which allows the plausible claim that 
Hobbes' overall method, based as it was in Galileo's method, 
is rhetorical in every part, iricluding the mechanistic. 
From this perspective each of the three interpretations we 
have examined are to be viewed as attempts to convince 
different audiences of Hobbes' beliefs. 
All of this shows an awareness on Hobbes' part of 
certain points about the nature of the language of 
justification. Hobbes would, I believe, agree with 
Wittgenstein that "the sentences that we utter have a 
particular purpose, they are to produce certain effects. 
They are parts of a mechanism, perhaps a psychological 
mechanism, and the words of the sentences are also parts of 
the mechanism ... " (PG, 33). This is not unlike Hobbes' 
observation that speech expresses and excites the passions 
(E.W. III, 49) and that we use speech to 'beget in others 
the same conceptions that we have ourselves' so as to 
express appetite, intention, and finally, will (E.W. IV, 
71, 74). For will, as we saw in Chapter I, is the efficient 
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cause of any voluntary action. 
Wittgenstein, too, stresses that what people accept 
as justification be relative to how they think and live (PI, 
325). It is this same understanding on Hobbes' part that 
causes him to develop the three frameworks of justification 
that interpreters have noticed but mistaken for a single 
theory of obligation that must be exclusive of other 
possible interpretations. We might call the three 
interpreations language-games, here, and then show how they 
fulful Hobbes' rhetorical aims only in unison. 
This task will require, first, an understanding of 
the rhetorical method and of the rhetorical aspects of each 
of the three frameworks. We will need to pay attention to 
the historical setting of Hobbes' use of the method and the 
language of the method as well, as Collins maintains. Thus, 
we will have to show that historical factors help explain 
Hobbes' methods and help delineate his frameworks, paying 
particular attention to the needs, purposes, and nature of 
Hobbes' three audiences. 
2. Hobbes' Rhetorical Method 
Hobbes' conception and use of rhetorical proof is 
not original with him. The art and analysis of rhetoric, 
Hobbes himself notes, dates back to Aristotle whose 
rhetorical theories Hobbes believed had never been surpassed 
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(E.W. VI, 422). Indeed, Hobbes studied and restudied 
Aristotle's methods throughout his life, and carefully 
excluded them from the negative criticisms he leveled at 
Aristotle and Aristotelean doctrine as used and explicated 
by the schoolmen. His longer treatise on rhetoric is a much 
shortned and amended translation of key 
Aristotle's own Rhetoric. 
elements of 
Beyond the Aristotelean roots of Hobbes' knowledge 
of rhetoric, we can trace three major influences on him: 
Ramus, Bacon, and, of course, Galileo. Peter Ramus divides 
rhetoric into (1) the method of teaching, which is clearly a 
precursor of Galileo's and Hobbes' notion of the resoluto-
compositive method, and (2) the method of prudence as 
explained in Ramus' Dialectigue (1555). 
describes these divisions as follows 
Short briefly 
The method of teaching is the dialectic of plain 
language and this method proceeds via definition, 
division, and repeated definition. Consequently, the 
'method of teaching' involves invention and first 
judgment (i.e. syllogism), and the various syllogisms 
are ordered in descending manner from the more to less 
universal. The method of teaching is the appropriate to 
scientia or science. 
Ramus asserts that 'the method of prudence' 
arranges the syllogisms constructed according the first 
judgment from the results of invention 'according to the 
condition of persons, things, times, and places'. 
(Short, p.9) 
Both were methods of instruction for Ramus and his 
followers, and were mutually useful in that if one method 
failed to affect a particular audience then one would simply 
switch to the other. Which method one should use at what 
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time was entirely dependent on the nature of the audience, 
the circumstances, and the nature of the content of the 
instruction (Short, p.301). This aspect of the rhetorical 
method is obvious in Hobbes' writings and helps explain the 
rhetorical character of his theory of obligation. Ramus' 
method of teaching is very similar to Hobbes' idea of the 
resoluto-compositive method, while the method of prudence is 
mirrored in Hobbes' distinct appeals to morality, Scripture, 
and individual rights, all of which are audience-relative 
appeals. 
Hobbes' relationship with Bacon and his familiarity 
with Bacon's work, much of which he wrote to Bacon's 
dictation as the latter's secretary, exerted a strong 
influence on Hobbes application of rhetoric. We have seen 
that Bacon's influence on Hobbes was not always as great as 
might be expected, but in the matter of rhetoric there seems 
no doubt that the two men shared a common ground. A few 
details of Bacon's conception of rhetoric will make this 
clear. 
For Bacon, as D.G. Douglas says, "the end of 
rhetorical endeavor is persuasion, that is, the influencing 
of conduct ... " (Douglas, p.26). Douglas cites Bacon's work, 
Advancement (1605) and De Argumentis (1623); from the first, 
"The duty and office of Rhetoric is to apply Reason in 
Imagination for the moving of the will," and from the 
second, " ... the duty and office of Rhetoric ... is no other 
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than to apply and recommend the dictates of reason to 
imagination, in order to excite the appetite and will" 
(Douglas, p.26). These principles are echoed in Hobbes' own 
Rhetoric and in numerous places in other works, (E.W. III, 
11; IV, 14). For different audiences Bacon recommends 
different approaches: deliberative or political speech is 
aimed at establishing the good or evil of a course of 
action, which Hobbes takes up in exactly the same form (E.W. 
VI, 430). Forensic speech aimed at finding justice, which 
Hobbes calls judicial speech (E.W. VI, 425). Occasional 
speech determines praise or blame; Hobbes calls this 
demonstrative speech (E.W. VI, 425). In these categories 
both men are simply retaining old Aristotelean forms 
(Douglas, p.27), All these types of speech or discourse are 
aimed at exciting the will or moving the hearer to act as 
the speaker or writer wishes. Hobbes has simply accepted 
traditional doctrine here. 
Bacon's idea of "Method" constitutes, Douglas notes, 
a principal part not only of communication but also of 
transmitting images of actions to an audience. For Bacon 
(and Hobbes) the method requires "a way or technique of 
organizing and expressing subject matter according to the 
end sought and audience addressed" (Douglas, p.31). 
Included here, Bacon believed, is the abililty to adapt 
logical proof to the audience by stimulating the 
imagination; this depends upon a knowledge of human nature 
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and the ability to express ideas so as to appeal to the 
hearer's or reader's imagination (Douglas, p.35). Hobbes, 
again, extolls these same methods and abilities, and given 
his concept of human nature and the role of the imagination 
and speech in moving us to act (E.W. IV, 25), it is less 
than surprising that his theory of obligation and the 
arguments for it would lend themselves to a rhetorical 
method that appeals to various audiences in differing ways. 
Finally, given Hobbes' belief that it is necessary for the 
good of the people to accept his theory of obligation, we 
may plausibly claim that he was following Bacon in adopting 
a rhetorical method. For Bacon, "rhetoric ... carries the 
social obligation of helping reason to 
passions, of establishing, on the level 
knowledge, the just and good cause" (Douglas, 
prevail over 
of popular 
p.46); and 
Hobbes' Rhetoric also stresses this same principle (E.W. VI, 
428, 430-431, and passim). 
The most interesting source of Hobbes' reliance upon 
rhetorical methods is Galileo and his writings. The 
advocates of MP make no mention of Galileo's use of rhetoric 
or his belief that rhetoric was an aid to science rather 
than being at odds with it. Maurice Finocchiaro, however, 
in his study of Galileo's method, emphasizes this other 
aspect of Galileo's conception of the scientific method. 
Finocchiaro focuses on the Dialogue, the purpose of which he 
sees as primarily methodological in that Galileo tries to 
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extract the proper lessons about science and scientific 
inquiry in it (Finocchiaro, p.95). In this work Galileo 
points to various acceptable ways of proceeding in a 
scientific inquiry, ways that are persuasive or rhetorical. 
So we can see Hobbes' use of rhetorical reasoning as 
consistent with the Galilean concept of science that he 
adopted. As Hobbes was familiar with Galileo's work, had 
met him and talked to him, and had been trained extensively 
in rhetoric at Oxford, it seems plausible to say that he 
would have noted and used the rhetorical aspects of 
Galileo's resoluto-compositive method. If we believe that 
Hobbes had to be restricted to a mechanistic notion of 
science because he accepted Galileo's methods, then we are 
misrepresenting the Galilean concept of science as being the 
same as our own. 
The rhetorical content of the Dialogue is an 
integral part of Galileo's apprach rather than being merely 
''cosmetic verbal expressions of desire and intentions" 
(Finocchiaro, p.46). Finocchiaro describes this element of 
the Dialogue as follows: 
The substance actually present in the book from 
this rhetorical point of view is a type of intellectual 
content, but one that plays upon feelings and emotions, 
either directly or explicitly by verbal expressions that 
have the desired effect, or else indirectly and 
implicitly by emphatic identification with what is 
explicitly said or done. (Finocchiaro, p.46) 
In fact, Finocchiaro argues, the force of Galileo's 
arguments is "found in its combined emotional appeal and 
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literary-aesthetic value ... its rhetorical force" 
(Finocchiaro, p.65). Such rhetorical appeals are separate 
from, but in no way contradictory to, the logical structure 
of Galileo's arguments. The rhetorical elements add 
emotional appeal and persuasive effectiveness to the 
scientific evidence and conclusions, and were used precisely 
for this reason (Finocchiaro, p.65). 
Finally, because of his mixed method, Galileo's 
arguments may appear to conflict and contradict each other, 
just as Hobbes' have appeared to do to many commentators. 
Speaking of the structure of the Dialogue, Finocchiaro says 
The second general feature of its explicit 
methodological content is ... judgment. That is, we find 
Galileo emphasizing on various occasions different and 
in some cases opposite things; for example, sometimes 
the need, and sometimes the superfluousness of 
experiments; sometimes quantitative considerations, 
sometimes qualitative considerations; sometimes 
antiverbalistic mathematical analysis, sometimes verbal-
oriented logical analysis; sometimes causal explanation, 
other times phenomenological description. There is no 
inconsistency here, except when the methodological claim 
is improperly generalized ... (Finocchiaro, p.150). 
The use of such devices serve to convince the readers who 
are not apt to grasp or be persuaded by purely logical 
proofs, something Galileo, like Hobbes recognized and 
something which was perhaps inherent in the nature of the 
causal explanation as they saw it. 
Taken together these influences strongly support the 
use of rhetoric in conjunction with scientific proof. 
Hobbes, as one being trained in rhetoric, enamored of 
Galileo's methods, directly familiar with Bacon's work, and 
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accutely interested in speech and its effects on action 
would surely have accepted rhetoric as not only useful in 
practice, but even as methodologically, a But precisely how 
did Hobbes' use his rhetorical method? We need to know how 
it functioned in order to correctly re-interpret the three 
views of his theory of obligation. 
Hobbes defines 'rhetoric' simply as "that faculty, 
by which we understand what will serve our turn concerning 
any subject to win belief in the hearer" (E.W. VI, 424). 
The problem Hobbes saw was that rhetoric had been at work in 
the cause of civil war and chaos; that is, it had been ill 
used, used to bring about evil rather than good. Civil war, 
Hobbes explains in De Cive, is caused by "private men being 
called to councils of state, (where they hope) ... to 
prostitute justice ... to their own judgments and 
apprehensions" (E.W. II, xiii). These men use rhetoric to 
present a skewed view of what is good, (presumably, in 
Hobbes' eyes, the retaining of the King is what is good), so 
as to make it appear evil, and vice-verse so, that people 
can discontent and have their peace disrupted (E.W. III, 
226). Hobbes' hope is to substitute for this use of 
rhetoric, based on merely gaining practical advantages, an 
objective, mathematical language or rhetoric 
... commensurate with his new scientific notion of 
politics, a logic of invention that would do what the 
humanists' prudential rhetoric had failed to do: bridge 
the gap between intention and action, between cause and 
effect of persuasion. (Kahn, pp.153-154) 
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This goal is consistent with what we have seen of 
Bacon's and Galileo's conceptions of science. A 
"mathematici, if he seeks to demonstrate and teach the truth 
must proceed deductively from 'perfect and manifest 
knowledge', but if he sought to win belief of those truths 
he would have to proceed 'another way'" (Short, p.162). So 
Hobbes is leaving open the possibility, as Galileo and Bacon 
had, that the rhetorical mode could be as valuable to the 
mathematici as the logical mode and a firm basis in fact. 
If one is seeking truth, they would use the latter, if 
seeking to win belief, they would use the former. As we 
have seen, it is clear Hobbes was seeking both; thus it 
would be natural to find that rhetoric formed a major part 
of his framework of justification. "The belief that proceed 
from our invention, comes partly from the behaviour of the 
speaker, partly from the passions of the hearer; but 
especially from the proofs of what we allege" (E.W. VI, 424-
425). So Logic and rhetoric are intertwined for Hobbes: 
A sentence is an universal proposition 
concerning those things which are to be desired or 
avoided in the actions or passions of the common 
life ... And is to be an enthymeme (a rhetorical 
syllogism) in rhetoric, as any proposition is to a 
syllogism in logic. And therefore a sentence, if the 
reason be rendered, becomes conclusive; and both 
together make an enthymeme. (E.W. VI, 475) 
Thus, there is a logic quite similar to syllogistic logic 
operating in Hobbes' rhetorical framework. The point is 
that Hobbes' framework is an attempt to present a logic of 
rhetoric for the good,as opposed to the ill use of purely 
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practical rhetoric that caused the political chaos of the 
time. 
Though Hobbes stressed the importance of logic in 
his description of his method, he needed the persuasive 
force of rhetoric to accomplish his purpose since he knew he 
could not acount on his readers' abilities to see and 
understand the logical necessities of the technical 
methodology. For those readers who suffer "defects" in 
reasoning, Hobbes recommends something other than a plain 
and evident style alone (logic alone), but to supplement it 
with a manner of speaking more "full of grace" since this is 
more apt to instruct the reader or hearer (E.W., VI, 519). 
This style is characterized by the use of antitheses, 
metaphor,and animation, all of which is easily seen 
throughout Hobbes' writings. As Short characterizes Hobbes' 
beliefs: 
Hobbes draws a distinction between the 
philosopher, the one who uses the 'open conveyance of 
precepts' to instruct, and the 'political 
historiographer', the one who 'secretly' instructs by 
'clearly' setting before his reader the results of 'good 
and evil counsels'. Such secret instruction is part of 
what Hobbes means by a 'perspicuous' method. Hobbes is 
confident that the perspicuous method is better than the 
'open conveyance of precept' because it is more apt to 
instruct. (Short, pp.144-145) 
Hobbes is essentially recommending an appeal to the 
readers based first on sound logical proof, then, if 
necessary, on methods tailored to the limits of the readers' 
abilities which require elocution and, finally, dispo~ition 
(E.W. VI, 487). Hobbes will draw on whatever he believes 
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the readers have already acquired by way of knowledge and 
experience, he does not wish to impart new factual 
knowledge, only reorder what is already there, and reorder 
it correctly to compensate for the damage already done by 
faulty use of rhetoric and reasoning. The best rhetorician, 
Hobbes asserts, would be a logician who was able to discern 
and exploit the differences between a logical syllogism and 
rhetorical enthymemes (E.W. VI, 423-424). Neither, however, 
allows for the misuse of persuasion and logic, as Hobbes 
claims had been done in his time. Correct reasoning 
requires an awareness of the common opinions of the 
audience, for these function in rhetoric, just as infallible 
truths do in logic, to delineate the scope of the proof 
(E.W. VI, 426). Hobbes writes: 
The principles, colours, or common opinions upon 
which a man's belief is grounded concerning the manners 
of him that speaks, are to be had, partly out of that 
which hath before been said of virtue (Book I, chap. 9); 
partly out of those things which shall be said by-and-by 
concerning the passions. For a man is believed, either 
for his prudence or for his probity, which are virtues; 
or for good will, of which among the passions. 
The principles concerning belief, arising from 
the passion of the hearer, are to be gathered from that 
which shall now be said of the several passions in 
order. 
In every one of which, three things are 
considered. 
1. 
2 • 
3. 
First, how men are affected. 
Secondly, towards whom. 
Thirdly, for what. (E.W. VI, 451) 
to be 
All of this, Hobbes believes, is necessary to prevent evil 
men possessed of natural ability "to carry an evil cause 
against a good" by appealing to the "ordinary" people who 
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"are neither patient, nor capable of long scientific proofs 
drawn from the principles through many syllogisms". Hobbes' 
arguments, then, will be rhetorical, and shorter, so as to 
correctly educate this audience in the ways of truth (E.W. 
VI, 424). 
Rhetori is also used to discredit the rivals of the 
king for the subjects' obedience. Here Hobbes means 
organized religion and individuals seeking to supplant the 
sovereign as the final judge or arbiter in matters of state. 
Hobbes' method, Kahn argues, is a rhetoric of logical 
invention that first, 
that ... is in itself 
"presents us with a logical argument 
persuasive, and thus aims to be a 
substitute for and to foreclose all further rhetorical 
debate", and then reintroduces the rhetorical techniques to 
the realm of logic Hobbes believes he has mapped out in 
order to "purge the commonwealth of its most dangerous 
rivals for the subject's obedience" (Kahn, p.158). We can 
cite Hobbes' use of Scripture as an illustration of using 
"the enemy's weapons against the enemy". His use of 
Scripture in Leviathan is aimed at the undermining of 
Scripture's authority to raise and support the civil power 
of the Church (see E.W. III, 592, 635). Scripture is used 
to prove that the subject owes obedience to the civil 
sovereign and that there are no ethical conflicts between 
the civil and spiritual authorities (Kahn, p.158, 171). 
Thus Scripture is, in a sense, used against itself in the 
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cause of Hobbes' civil sovereign. The same can be said of 
Hobbes' use of individual rights as the basis of the 
obligation to the sovereign. Although persons possess the 
unlimited right of nature to self-preservation and all the 
means necessary to secure it, ultimately the right of nature 
cannot be effectively exercised for this end without a 
contractual limiting of it and the transfer of its liberties 
to the civil sovereign. Both of these examples illustrate 
the rhetorical argument in utramgue partem, the turning of 
one's opponent's arguments against the opponent (Kahn, 
p.158). 
Hobbes' theories of language, speech, and truth all 
support his belief that he had developed a logic of rhetoric 
that puts the persuasive argument on a firm rational 
footing. Truth, for Hobbes, is a matter of speech, of how 
we name objects, of how use and understanding the names, and 
how the names relate to each other (E.W. I, 36; III, 23). 
Truth and true propositions or sentences are equivalent to 
each other (E.W. I, 35; II, 303; IV, 24). Truth and 
falsity are matters of speech, not matters of fact or 
properties of things (E.W. III, 23); it is propositions and 
sentences that are true (E.W. I, 35, 38). Truth, then, is 
a function of language and of naming within language, both 
of which are artificial human constructs: "the first truths 
were arbitrarily made by those that 
things" (E.W. I, 36) . Hobbes sees 
imposed names upon 
truth as that which 
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"consists in the right ordering of names in affirmatives" 
and says, "he that seeketh precise truth, had need to 
remember what every name he uses stands for, and to place it 
accordingly, or else he will find himself entangled in 
words, as a bird in lime twigs, the more he struggles the 
more belimed" (E.W. III, 22-23). Hobbes' attention to 
definition and the logic of rhetoric are thus attempts to 
control the misuse of language and the art of false 
definition and persuasion, which affects politics in a 
negative way. 
The logic of persuasion rests upon the right 
ordering of names and definitions according to rules and the 
customs of the hearers and speakers of the language. In 
politics this is especially important for, as Mintz says, 
"as language is by 'arbitrary institution', and the meanings 
of words conventional and fixed by agreement, it follows 
that the names given to ethical judgments such as 'good', 
'evil', 'just', 'wicked', are also conventional, their 
meanings fixed by arbitrary institution" (Mintz, p.25). As 
Hobbes writes 
The names of such things as affect us--that is, 
which please and displease us--because all men be not 
alike affected with the same thing nor the same man at 
all times, are in common discourses of men inconstant 
signification. For seeing all names are imposed to 
signify our conceptions, and all our affections are but 
conceptions, when we conceive the same things 
differently we can hardly avoid different naming of 
them. For though the nature of what we conceive be the 
same, yet the diversity of our reception of it, in 
respect of different constitutions of body and 
prejudices of opinion, gives everything a tincture of 
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our different passions. And therefore in reasoning a 
man must take heed of words which, besides the 
signification of what we imagine of their nature, have a 
signification also of the nature, disposition, and 
interest of the speaker: such as are the names of 
virtues and vices ... (E.W. III, 28-29) 
Even though arbitrary all these elements are of the utmost 
importance for Hobbes' science of politics since they all 
translate speech into action and it is action that Hobbes 
hopes to effect. It is as much truth as peace that Hobbes 
believes "men now call for" (E.W. III, 711), especially as 
truth is "that which opposeth no man's profit or pleasure" 
and "is to all men welcome" (E.W. III, 714). Truth, then is 
in an important way a matter of convention and agreement, 
and is subject to rhetorical methods as much as those of 
ratiocination (science). So Hobbes can say it is as much a 
matter of prudential conjecture as it is of absolute 
certainty (E.W. III, 97). 
But, nonetheless, language allows us to transcend 
private reason to formulate the general or universal 
propositions characteristic of reason (E.W. III, 103-104): 
"there being nothing in the world Universall but Names" 
(E.W. III, 102) . As Kahn says, "Language ... seems in short 
to provide us with a common sense and thus with the 
possibility of a consensus and a commonwealth" (Kahn, 
p.162). We must be careful to define our terms and avoid 
all abuses; but, as all language needs interpretation and as 
all interpretation is debatable, "one can never be sure 
whether one's reasoning is correct" (Kahn, p.164). Here 
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Hobbes can, however, move from rhetorical concerns that 
involve an appeal to the passions, to logic which involves 
reasoning about the passions. Because we recognize that 
absolute agreement is not possible, we must decide upon an 
"arbitrary representative of reason", since "right reason is 
illegible in nature, so a fictional but persuasive standard 
of right reason must be decided upon, that is, there must be 
a sovereign" (Kahn, p.164). In Hobbes' own words 
And therefore, as when there is a controvers in 
an account, the parties must by their own accord, set up 
for right Reason, the Reason of some Arbitrator, or 
Judge, to whose sentence they will both stand, or their 
controversies must either come to blowes, or be 
undecided, for want of a right Reason constituted by 
Nature; so it is also in all debates of what kind 
soever 11 (E.W. I I I, 111) . 
Thus the three frameworks of justification, the 
three interpretations of Hobbes'theory of obligation, that 
have been examined, may all be seen as providing persuasive, 
logical (in both the logical and rhetorical senses) reasons 
for the various segments of his audience to accept this 
conclusion and abide by it. His aim is for them to accept 
what Kahn calls the "rhetorical sovereign," who will 
preserve peace and life through the exercise of the 
artificial power to settle all controversies, differences of 
opinion, and matters of truth. 
Getting the populace to accept and act upon this 
conclusion requires Hobbes to use both logic and rhetoric 
and an appeal to the passions of pleasure and pain (E.W. IV, 
441), especially the passion of fear. The orator must use 
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fear, Hobbes says, letting the reader or hearer see it as 
obnoxious (E.W. VI, 457). In this way the reader will be 
motivated to act to alter the circumstances that caus~ the 
fear. Since what each person fears varies it is up to the 
speaker to appeal to different aspects of fear or in 
different ways suitable to the audience addressed. Indeed, 
we have seen in chapters I-III that Hobbes can be shown to 
offer appeals to the fear of one's own death, fear of 
disobeying God's will or divine punishment, and, in a 
slightly different guise, fear of violent death and loss of 
honor. Thus each interpretation carries persuasive force 
and seeks to convince different audiences to contract with 
each other to create and take on the obligation to obey a 
sovereign. 
For in the act of our submission consists both 
our obligation and our liberty, which must therefore be 
inferred by arguments taken from thence, there being no 
obligation or any man which arises not from some act of 
his own, for all men equally are by nature free. And 
because such arguments must either be drawn from the 
express words, I authorize all his actions, or from the 
intention of him that submits himself to his power, 
which intention is to be understood by the end for which 
he so submits, the obligation and liberty of the 
subjects is to be derived either from those words or 
others equivalent, or else from the end of the 
institution of sovereignty--namely, the peace of the 
subjects within themselves and their defense against a 
common enemy. (E.W. III, 203) 
Hobbes' use of the rhetorical method is thus consistent with 
his own doctrine of causality, moving people to act by 
prompting the requisite internal motions. 
Thus rhetoric is an integral element in Hobbes' 
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attempt to end the causes of political quarrels and the 
chaos of his time. His end was to show everyone that there 
was reason for them to accept an absolute sovereign to 
protect their own peace and survival (E.W. VI, 236), and he 
simply uses the best means available to do so according to 
his perception of his audience's abilities and passions. In 
the case of MP, Hobbes aimed his mechanistic arguments at 
those versed in and moved by the reasons of the science and 
methods of Galileo. In the case of the moral 
interpretation, Hobbes aimed his arguments at the Christians 
who were moved to action 
divine punishment. An in 
Hobbes appeals to those 
concerns of individualism 
by fear of God's will or God's 
the individualistic framework, 
of his day who were moved by the 
and individual rights as key 
factors in the science of politics. 
The important point is that, given Hobbes' 
background, training, and conception of science and logic, 
this is perfectly consistent and in no way contradictory. 
The obligation of the subjects is established in all cases, 
and it is the same obligation. Though the motives different 
audiences will have for accepting and abiding by this 
obligation differs, all the justifications are, within their 
own framework, perfectly logical and consistent with the 
dictates of reason, and therefore consistent with each other 
since the dictates of true reason cannot conflict. The 
reader must simply exercise his own judgment in interpreting 
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the texts; but Hobbes has offered convincing rhetorical, 
persuasive arguments that lead each reader to the true 
conclusions. We may find that Hobbes' various appeals are 
problematic and inconsistent with our own notion of science 
or logic, but as Miriam Reik says: 
The most noteworthy feture of this problem of 
Hobbes' transition from humanist to scientist or 
philosopher is that Hobbes himself nowhere indicates he 
found it in the least bit problematic, making one 
suspect that the difficulty is imposed on his biography 
by the modern mind. (Reik, p.21) 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
We have seen that Hobbes refers to three elements as 
important to determining the correct rhetorical arguments or 
justifications to use to persuade a particular person or 
audience according to their interests and passions: 1) How 
the audience is affected, 2) Towards whom they direct their 
passions; and 3) For what the passion is shown (E.W. VI, 
451). If we keep these questions in mind it is a simple, 
and by now anti-climactic, matter to characterize the three 
theories of obligation as separate but consistent frameworks 
of justification or persuasion that run through Hobbes' 
work. 
The MP interpretation outlines a framework quite 
clearly materialistic and deductive, but also rhetorical in 
nature. That is, it is a logical and rhetorical framework 
that aims at the scientifically sophisticated audience that 
includes the mathematici. This group is composed of 
intelligent, educated, and trained intellectuals who hold 
certain common presuppositions, among them being the belief 
in a universe that is material, that is governed by 
mechanistic, causal laws, and which can be known by the 
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correct application of the resoluto-compositive method. For 
this group, transcendent, spiritual reasons are not 
persuasive. What is needed is causal, mechanistic 
justification. To Hobbes, then, it was necessary to reduce 
all explanation, justification, and persuasion to an appeal 
to the analysis of matter and motion. His first philosophy, 
psychology, ethics, and politics reflect this perspective, 
especially in the earlier works. The methodology, 
principles, and persuasive appeals are all couched in the 
materialistic language appropriate for addressing this 
audience. The conclusion, that the citizen must accept the 
obligation to obey an absolute monarch or sovereign, is 
proven by an egoistic and mechanistically framed argument in 
true resoluto-compositive fashion. The central features of 
the proof include the laws of nature, which must be seen as 
maxims of prudence; the motivation of the subjects, which 
must be egoistic given this approach's psychology; and the 
force behind the obligation, which must be based on physical 
power and fear. All of this is dictated by the limits of 
the framework. 
But this argument, relying as it does on the 
knowledge of science and its methods, and on certain 
materialistic presuppositions cannot possibly be convincing 
to an audience not versed in these matters or unwilling to 
grant these presuppositions. Hobbes, with his knowledge of 
history, psychology, and rhetoric, and his observations of 
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social conditions could hardly have missed this fact. More 
especially, Hobbes was aware of the large Christian audience 
and intimately familiar with their conceptions of morality, 
natural law, and Scriptural proof. For this group it simply 
would not do to accept the laws of nature as merely maxims 
of prudence, to argue egoistic duties rather than moral 
duties, or to claim that the power of man and fear were the 
forces of obligation. In the context of Christian/moral 
justification, natural law embodied universal moral concepts 
that all people could apprehend as the commands of God. 
Duty was a matter of obedience to God and God's will, and 
the force of obligation was God's power or God's will alone. 
The moral interpretation outlines the context of Hobbes' 
appeal to this segment of his audience. Although 
Warrender's version stresses a consequentialist 
interpretation based on divine rewards and punishments, 
while Taylor and Hood stress deontological views, we must 
remember that both were common elements of Christian 
doctrine in Hobbes' time, and it would not be inconsistent 
with what we have seen of Hobbes to imagine him including 
appeals to those who believe one or the other or a 
combination of both views. For example, one could recognize 
a duty to God as God, yet be aware of the fact that breaking 
God's laws would entail divine punishment. In any case 
Hobbes' might simply appeal to Christians of all persuasions 
without violating any logical or theological rules. Here, 
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as Reik says, the result is that 
The obligations ... (imposed) are moral only for 
Christians both in and out of the state of nature since 
breaches are punishable by God. Had Hobbes not 
considered natural laws binding on Christians, he would 
have had little use for them in his system. He could 
have been content, then, to discard the concept 
altogether as a superfluity and conceive of the state as 
founded on expedience and prudence alone. 
Thus, the government and society are to be 
derived from both an enlightened self-interest and, on 
the other hand, from a Christian obedience to the 
commands of God ... (Reik, p.97) 
Finally, there was a wave individualism traceable 
back to the Renaissance and manifested in the interest in 
"man the individual" that is apparent in many of Hobbes' 
contemporaries. Its presence fostered the need to shape an 
appeal to that segment of his audience concerned with the 
topic of individualism and individual rights. As Peters 
says, Hobbes' age was one of individualism, competition, and 
social mobility (Peters, p.142), and Hobbes certainly had 
similar interests. Hobbes saw human nature as 
individualistic and his psychology and ethics reflect this; 
so it is natural that he would be aware of individualistic 
concerns and take them into account. His age was also one 
that was struggling with the idea that the rights of the 
individual outweigh (or are, at least, as important as) 
those of the state; and civil wars had been fought partly to 
establish these rights. Furthermore, as Strauss noted, 
Hobbes had developed his own brand of morality and his own 
concept of human rights early in life. Against this 
background Hobbes' analysis and use of the concept of the 
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individual's right of nature can be seen as a third 
framework of justification designed to persuade even ardent 
individualists to accept the obligation to the sovereign and 
transferring their natural right through the vehicle of the 
contract. Mechanistic arguments and moral arguments based 
on universal duties might persuade some, or perhaps most, 
individualists but it is plausible to suggest that Hobbes 
tailored the third approach to reach this group more 
directly. 
Thus, Hobbes' theory of obligation is really a 
three-part theory that is centrally rhetorical in nature. 
Its goal is to gain assent from all segments of a larger 
audience to Hobbes' conclusion that an absolute sovereign is 
necessary to preserve everyone's best interest and life, and 
to hasten the end of the divisive series of civil wars and 
conflicts raging throughout Hobbes' lifetime. Hobbes is 
offering three persuasive arguments dependent on three 
different conceptual frameworks or contexts, all designed to 
move his various audiences to act as he deems fit and best 
for themselves. In reference to Hobbes' own understanding 
of the rhetorical appeal to an audience we can say that: 1) 
How persons are affected varies, some by scientific 
reasoning, some by moral reasoning, and some by appeal to 
individual rights; 2) Towards whom they are moved is Hobbes 
and his conclusions and ultimately towards the acceptance of 
the sovereign; 3) For what ends they are moved is their own 
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best interests whether they see that as temporal, material, 
or spiritual, moral. 
The coherence and fruitfulness of adopting the view 
that Hobbes had three different frameworks within which he 
presented persuasive arguments for his theory of obligation 
can perhaps be best illustrated by answering the ten 
questions Oakeshott 
interpreter of Hobbes' 
(Chapter 
theory. 
III 
These 
B) 
are 
posed 
the 
for any 
ten basic 
discrepencies that are troublesome for any monistic theory, 
but given our rhetorical, pluralistic model they are more 
easily handled. I have not developed the details of each 
answer, but simply illustrated the path I believe can be 
taken to answer them. In each case the response stresses 
that Oakeshott's questions are troublesome only if we are 
working from within a monistic framework. In this sense the 
responses are reminiscent of Kant's solution to two of the 
antinomies where he points out that both alternatives are 
true but true within different contexts, one for noumena, 
one for phenomena. Oakeshott's ten discrepencies are: 
1) Hobbes claims a right of nature to all things, 
but also admits a natural obligation to endeavor peace as 
part of God's Natural Law. Here the discrepency exists only 
for a monistic interpretation: if we adopt the individual 
rights view alone, the role of God's Natural Law is an empty 
one, or at least problematic, but if we adopt only the moral 
framework the role of the right of nature is problematic. 
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But on my view both the claims operate separately as part of 
different frameworks while, at the same time, playing 
complementary roles within the overall rhetorical 
methodology Hobbes uses. Thus, they are consistent with 
each other in the sense that each is asserted only within 
its proper framework and outside these frameworks should not 
be compared to each other at all. To attempt this is to 
misapply the rules or context of one framework to the 
terminology of another. If we keep the contexts straight, 
there is no damaging discrepency here. 
2) Hobbes claims that natural laws are both 
hypothetical causal propositions and laws in the strict 
sense of being commands. Again, if we recognize the 
framework from within which Hobbes makes each assertion the 
discrepency vanishes. In the framework of the MP Hobbes 
cannot call the laws of nature anything but hypothetical 
causal propositions; the language and context of the 
framework allows no other possibilities. However, the laws 
of nature can be called laws in the strict sense of commands 
within the language and framework of the natural law view or 
the individual rights view. The frameworks here allow for 
an explanation of the laws of nature that includes a law 
giver of one sort or the other. The different contexts must 
be kept apart. Once we separate the contents the conflict 
disappears. Given a pluralistic view the two uses are not 
contradictory. 
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3) Hobbes says reason can show us God as the author 
of moral law, but also that reason can only show us God as 
First Cause. Again, it is the limits of the framework .that 
determine Hobbes' language. Within the mechanistic 
framework, reason is limited to a God that can only be 
described as the First Cause; for to go beyond this requires 
transcendent or spiritual language and knowledge. However, 
in the context of the moral view reason can determine that 
God is the author of the laws of nature, and additional 
knowledge can be gained through Scripture whose authority is 
valid in this framework, but invalid in the mechanistic 
approach. 
4) Hobbes says obligation exists prior to society 
but also that it is contingent upon covenant. Here again 
within the moral framework we can argue that prior, 
universal obligation exists since the laws of nature are 
God's laws and are eternal, and thus are binding on all 
people (though only Christians or believers might actually 
accept this obligation). Within both the MP or individual 
rights views, we must form a covenant of some sort to create 
or support obligations but this is not to say that 
obligations of all sorts fail to exist prior to a contract: 
for on the MP we are physically or psychologically obligated 
by our egoistic natures, that is, causally determined to 
form the covenant, which is where political obligation 
begins. On an individual rights view we simply create 
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political obligation via the contract but can be said to be 
obliged by fear or reason prior to this, and since fear and 
reason are not particular traits of specific individuals but 
are universal traits of human nature, consequently we can 
see obligation as existing at least immediately prior to the 
existence of the state. So for both views it can exist 
prior to civil society, but also be dependent on covenant. 
5) Hobbes asserts the independent authority of 
Natural Law and Scripture, but also argues that the 
authority of both derives from the sovereign. Here we must 
remember Kahn's concept of the "rhetorical sovereign". The 
sovereign settles disputes about correct interpretation of 
Natural Law and Scripture because otherwise reason and 
passion will drive people to disagree. Though Scripture and 
Natural Law are independent authorities within the moral 
framework, even here there will be disputes about correct 
interpreation among Christians which can only be resolved 
bythe sovereign. Thus Hobbes is simply asserting the limits 
of reason and certain facts of human nature that run through 
all three frameworks. If we correctly interpret Scripture 
and Natural Law there is no problem within the moral 
context, but outside this context there are those who will 
not accept either as independent authorities. Hobbes has 
other appeals for this audience within which the sovereign's 
force and authority create the force behind both Scripture 
and Natural Law. Hobbes is merely covering all his- bases 
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here with regard to Scripture and Natural Law for an 
audience that includes believers and atheists. 
6) Hobbes uses 'precept' as a 'general rule of 
reason' to describe the first law of nature, but goes on to 
deny that is prescriptive force derives from reasonableness 
at all. Here the use of 'general rule of reason' is most 
appropriate to the MP context. Within that framework this 
is all Hobbes can call any natural law; in this context all 
prescriptive force is denied in the sense of a moral 
prescription other than in an egoistic sense. In the moral 
context reason discloses the laws of nature as God's 
commands, which are reasonable in themselves because God 
could not issue irrational commands. Again, if we keep the 
contexts in mind the problem disappears, or at least is 
mitigated. 
7) Hobbes uses 'natural law' both to mean 
hypothetical conclusions of reason and to denote obligations 
imposed by God on believers. This is handled quite simply 
on our pluralistic view. Within the MP, 'natural law' can 
only be a set of hypothetical conclusions of reason, since 
reason does disclose them and since all scientific laws are 
hypothetical, as shown in Chapter I. In the context of the 
natural law framework, however, there is no such restriction 
and Hobbes is free to call natural laws God's commands and 
assert that their obligatory force derives from this fact. 
Again, Oakeshott's question presupposes a monistic framework 
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when, in fact, more than one framework is relevant. 
8) Hobbes claims that the sovereign's obligation 
under Natural Law is to procure the safety of the people and 
that the sovereign is accountable to God alone for this 
duty; but then he says that, at best, this is true only of 
sovereigns who believe in a God concerned with human action. 
The answer here is also clear. For any sovereign who doubts 
a God exists or denies natural law as God's dictates there 
can be no obligation on these grounds. Hobbes merely 
recognizes the fact that belief is relative and personal, 
even for sovereigns. We could also say that a sovereign who 
believes in God and God's Law is operating within a context 
separate from that of a non-believer who may see duty in a 
way consistent with the MP or a non-religious IR framework 
such as Strauss' interpretation stresses. The sovereign's 
duty or obligation is describable in different terms 
dependent upon the framework one adopts, just as are the 
duties of the subjects. 
9) Hobbes makes strong claims based on word play 
with a distinction between 'God's natural kingdom' and his 
'natural subjects', but calls this all metaphorical. I 
simply concede that this is a rhetorical device, an argument 
by analogy or metaphor. Hobbes stresses such methods in his 
rhetoric as ways of reaching an audience unable to respond 
to direct logical argument. Within our concept of Hobbes' 
rhetorical methodology this is not at all a surpri~ing or 
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debatable claim. Hobbes is simply acting as an orator here. 
10) Hobbes uses the term 'God' both to denote a 
being who established the civil state by covenant and as a 
term of imagination that is meaningless. Again this is 
easily explained using our model. The meaningless use of 
the term 'God' is relative to the limitations of the MP 
framework and its strict denial of meaning to any term taken 
to denote non-physical objects; that is, the term is 
meaningless as a term of science. For believers, or those 
willing to admit such talk of transcendent beings, the use 
of the term is meaningful and perfectly acceptable in its 
traditional sense. 
Thus, on our view of Hobbes' methods and intentions, 
the problems Oakeshott sees are easily handled. Most of the 
discrepencies are simply matters of misapplying the criteria 
of one framework to terms as they are used in another 
framework. Once the limits of the frameworks are seen the 
discrepencies disappear. This supports the plausibility and 
fruitfulness of adopting a pluralistic view of Hobbes as I 
have argued. The value of such an approach lies in its 
ability to break the stalemate in Hobbes scholarship, as 
well as to clarify the methodology behind Hobbes' theory of 
obligation. 
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